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THE  ETHICS  OF 
WILLIAM  WOLLASTON 


BY 

CLIFFORD  GRIFFETH  THOMPSON 

M.A.,  B.D.,  D.D.,  Ph.r>: 

PROFESSOR  IK  EMORY  TTKIVERSITY 

A dissertation  'presented  to  the  Faculty  of  the  Gradmite  School 
of  Yale  University,  in  Ccmdidacy  for  the 
Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BOSTON 

RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM  PRESS 


CopYBiGHT,  1922,  BY  Richard  G.  Badger 


All  Rights  Reserved 


Made  in  the  United  States  of  America 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


INTRODUCTION 


It  has  happened  more  than  once  in  the  history  of  thought 
that  a really  great  and  creative  thinker  has  become  the  vic- 
tim of  a traditional  interpretation,  which  soon  became  so 
thoroughly  established  that  no  further  thought  was  given 
to  his  system.  Instead  of  giving  his  thought  the  critical 
examination  which  it  really  deserved,  each  generation  of 
thinkers  and  writers  would  simply  pigeonhole  it  according 
to  the  traditional  interpretation.  I am  very  sure  that  this 
is  just  what  has  happened  in  the  case  of  Wollaston.  Even 
British  writers  on  the  history  of  ethical  philosophy  have, 
for  the  most  part,  said  the  traditional  things  about  him, 
and  that  without  verification  as  to  the  truth  of  the  state- 
ments made.  This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  his 
book  soon  became  rather  rare.  Very  few  British  writers 
give  any  evidence  of  having  read  Wollaston  at  all  carefully 
and  those  who  did  read  his  book  seem  to  have  stopped  with 
the  first  two  sections.  We  can  be  quite  sure  from  internal 
evidence  that  many  of  his  critics  knew  him  only  through  sec- 
ondary sources.  Some  attribute  illustrations  and  even  quo- 
tations to  him  that  cannot  be  found  in  his  work.  Perhaps 
the  most  common  of  these  fictitious  illustrations  is  the  one 
regarding  a man  breaking  his  wife’s  head,  which  is  mentioned 
as  authentic  by  even  as  great  an  authority  on  the  Eighteenth 
Century  as  Leslie  Stephen.  “Thirty  years’  profound  medi- 
tation had  convinced  Wollaston  that  the  reason  why  a man 
should  abstain  from  breaking  his  wife’s  head  was,  that  it 
was  a way  of  denying  that  she  was  his  wife.”  ^ The  same 
can  be  said  of  the  French  as  of  the  British  writers  in  this 
respect.  Instead  of  criticising  him  on  the  basis  of  actual 
’ L.  Stephen,  English  Thought  in  the  18th  Century,  p.  130. 

3 


607750 


4 


Introduction 


quotations  and  on  the  basis  of  Wollaston’^s  own  illustrations, 
they  discuss  him  in  a most  general  way,  using  illustrations 
that  are  not  his.  On  the  whole  the  German  historians  of 
philosophy  understand  him  better  and  treat  him  more  ex- 
tensively and  more  fairly.  This,  though,  does  not  mean 
that  they  had  read  him  more  carefully,  in  fact  one  finds 
more  of  this  fictitious  material  in  the  German  works  than  in 
the  British  and  French.  It  means  that  they  had  more  sym- 
pathy with  his  rationalistic  and  idealistic  philosophy  and  so 
they  invented  materials  that  more  truly  represented  Wollas- 
ton. The  Germans  gave  considerable  attention  to  Wollaston 
because  they  regarded  him  as  a precursor  of  Kant.  So  re- 
garding him,  however,  and  making  interpretations  of  his 
philosophy,  without  careful  objective  investigation,  they 
naturally  miss  his  meaning  in  many  cases.  They  try  to 
give  Wollaston’s  ethics  an  intuitionistic  interpretation  for 
which  there  is  no  justification.  Garve  and  Drechsler  are 
responsible  for  this  interpretation.  The  latter  wrote  a 
book  dealing  with  Wollaston’s  philosophy  exclusively;  but 
perhaps  the  former  was  even  more  responsible  for  this 
interpretation  becoming  traditional,  because  he  claims  that 
his  interpretation  of  Wollaston  is  an  actual  quotation  and 
actually  incloses  his  remarks  in  quotation  marks.  Later 
German  writers  have  based  their  interpretation  on  this  pas- 
sage. For  example.  Von  Hartmann  quotes  the  entire  pas- 
sage and  says  that  it  is  Christian  Garve’s  translation  of 
Wollaston.^ 

Conybeare  tells  us  what  a great  impression  Wollaston’s 
intellectual  criterion  of  morals  made  upon  the  contempor- 
aries of  Wollaston  who  were  interested  in  finding  a firmer 
foundation  for  morals  than  that  offered  by  hedonism.  Cony- 
beare himself  speaks  of  the  theory  as  though  it  were  a 
discovery  in  morals,  “fit  to  be  placed  beside  the  discoveries 
of  Newton  in  astronomy.”  ^ That  his  system  enjoyed  con- 
siderable popularity  when  it  was  first  promulgated  is  proven 
by  the  fact  that  his  work,  itself,  went  through  seven  editions 

^Drechsler,  uber  Will.  Wollaston’s  Moralpliilosophie,  Erlangen,  1801. 
Garve,  tJbersicht  der  vornehmsten  Principien  der  Sittenlehre,  p.  172. 

* Conybeare,  Defence  of  Revealed  Religion,  p.  239. 


Introduction 


s 

in  ten  years,  and  also  by  the  number  of  books  and  pamphlets 
which  it  evoked.  His  popularity,  however,  must  have  been 
exceedingly  ephemeral  for  his  work  soon  became  very  rare. 
Because  of  the  fantastic  interpretations  given  to  his  system 
of  ethics  it  was  soon  relegated  to  the  curiosity  section  of  the 
philosophical  museum. 


607750 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction . • j . 3 

Wollaston’s  Dedication 11 

The  Relation  o£  Wollaston  to  the  Thought  of  His  Age  • . 13 

The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston * . . 18 

“The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated’’ 32 

Exposition  of  the  Section  on  the  Nature  of  Goodness  . 32 

Wollaston’s  Critical  Interpretation  of  Other  Systems  . . 68 

Wollaston  Deals  with  Possible  Objections  to  His  Principle  72 

General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 78 

I.  Morality  Treated  as  Analogous  to  Truth  ...  78 

II.  The  Seareh  for  and  Objective  Standard  of  Moral- 
ity   85 

Wollaston  and  His  Critics 95 

I.  That  He  Confuses  Logical  and  Moral  Relations  . 95 

II.  That  Immorality  as  Well  as  Morality  Conforms 

to  Nature 114 

III.  That  Wollaston  Obscures  the  Real  Nature  of 

Morality 125 

IV.  That  the  Nature  of  Virtue  is  Not  Defined  but  As- 

sumed   137 

V.  That  Wollaston’s  System  is  Over-Intellectualistic  150 
Critical  Exposition  of  the  Section  on  Happiness  . . . 162 

I.  Exposition  of  Section  II  “Of  Happiness’’  . . 162 

7 


8 


Contents 


PAGE 

II.  An  Examination  of  the  Hedonistic  Interpretation 

of  Wollaston I7l 

III.  An  Examination  of  the  Utilitarian  Interpretation 

'yit  l|ollaston 176 

IV.  An  Examination  of  the  Dualistic  Interpretation  of 

Wollaston 184 

V.  "Elie  Etllics  of  Wollaston  Reconciles  Rationalism 

and  Hedonism 192 

Practical  Religion  and  Practical  Morality 198 

Sectioii  VI.  “Truths  Respecting  Mankind  in 

General” 198 

Section  VII.  “Truths  Respecting  Particular  So- 
cieties of  Men  and  of  Governments”  . . . 201 

Section  VIII.  “Truths  Concerning  Families  and 

Relations” 201 

Section  IX.  “Truths  Respecting  a Private  Man”  201 

The  Metaphysical  Teachings  of  Wollaston 204 

The  Epistemology  of  Wollaston 208 

Section  III.  “Of  Reasoning,  and  the  Ways  of 

Discovering  Truth” 208 

The  Problem  of  Freedom 219 

Section  IV.  “Of  the  Obligations  of  Imperfect  Be- 
ings with  Respect  to  Their  Power  of  Acting”  219 

The  Problems  of  Evil  and  Immortality 230 

Section  V.  “Truths  Relating  to  the  Deity”  . . 230 

Index 233 


THE  ETHICS  OF 
WILLIAM  WOLLASTON 


THE  ETHICS  OF 
WILLIAM  WOLLASTON 


WOLLASTON’S  DEDICATION 

Wollaston  dedicates  his  book,  “The  Religion  of  Nature 
Delineated,”  to  his  friend,  one  A.  F.,  Esq.,  because  it  seems 
that  this  gentleman  had  asked  him  to  state  his  thoughts 
upon  three  questions,  namely; 

I.  Is  there  any  such  thing  as  natural  religion  properly 
so  called 

II.  If  there  is,  what  is  it.? 

III.  How  may  a man  qualify  himself,  so  as  to  be  able 
to  judge  for  himself,  of  the  other  religions  protest  in  the 
world;  to  settle  his  own  opinions  in  disputable  matters;  and 
then  to  enjoy  tranquillity  of  mind,  neither  disturbing  others, 
nor  being  disturbed  at  what  passes  among  men? 

Wollaston’s  work,  “The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,” 
is  an  answer  to  the  first  two  questions.  We  know  that  he 
gave  considerable  thought  to  the  third,  but  none  of  his 
thoughts  on  that  question  were  ever  published.  It  would 
not  be  difficult  to  tell  how  he  would  answer  it  from  the  many 
suggestions  in  his  answers  to  the  other  two  questions.  Natu- 
ral Religion,  I am  sure  he  would  say,  contains  the  great  uni- 
versals  and  essentials  of  all  religion  and  all  else  in  the 
religions  of  the  world  is  false. 

Wollaston  says  that  if  he  had  anticipated  that  he  was 
to  be  called  upon  to  write  a book  that  he  would  have  made 
notes  on  his  readings  and  would  have  recorded  his  thoughts 

11 


1£  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

through  the  years.  Because  he  failed  to  do  this  he  cannot, 
he  says,  write  a learned  book;  “but  can  only  give  some  of” 
his  “thoughts  upon  the  articles  and  duties  of  natural  reli- 
gion.” He  makes  almost  no  reference  to  modern  moralists. 
His  illustrations  are  taken  largely  from  the  classics.  He 
claims  originality  for  his  ethical  ideas. ^ 

“Wollaston,  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,  London,  1725. 


THE  RELATION  OF  WOLLASTON  TO  THE 
THOUGHT  OF  HIS  AGE 


In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Wollaston  claims  to  be  a phil- 
osopher after  the  order  of  Melchisedeck : “That  which  is 
advanced  in  the  following  papers,  concerning  the  nature  of 
moral  good  and  evil,  and  is  the  prevailing  thought  that  runs 
through  them  all,  I never  met  with  anywhere,”  I think  that 
it  can  be  shown  that  his  philosophy  belongs  indubitably  to 
the  period  in  which  he  lived  and  that  it  is  very  definitely 
related  to  the  stream  of  world  thought.  Wollaston  died  in 
1724,  the  year  Kant  was  born,  so  his  thought  belongs  to 
the  first  quarter  of  the  18th  century.  This  period  is  gen- 
erally known  as  the  early  Enlightenment.  It  has  been  char- 
acterized as  an  age  of  reason.  The  breaking  down  of  reli- 
gious authority  necessitated  the  rationalization  of  mox'ality. 
The  practical  diflSculty  which  the  moralists  of  the  time 
faced  was  how  to  maintain  order  in  society  without  the  sanc- 
tions of  traditional  religion.  Since  theology  refused  to 
rationalize  religion,  the  moralists  had  to  seek  other  grounds 
on  which  to  base  morality.  The  old  religion  had  taught  that 
the  revealed  will  of  God  determined  the  good,  and  as  long 
as  this  religion  of  authority  was  generally  accepted  there 
was  no  room  for  ethical  discussions.  But  with  the  rise  of 
the  rationalistic  attitude  toward  religion,  ethical  specula- 
tion became  necessary  to  the  very  salvation  of  morality.^ 
Wollaston  calls  his  book  “The  Religion  of  Nature  Deline- 
ated.” He  set  out,  as  did  the  contemporary  Deists,  to  prove 
the  essentials  of  religion  to  be  true  apart  from  revelation. 
He  would  also,  like  them,  limit  the  essential  doctrines  of 
religion  to  those  which  can  be  shown  to  be  rational.  The 
very  questions  he  set  out  to  answer  definitely  relate  liim 
to  Deism.  Reason  for  him,  as  for  the  deists,  is  the  final 
^ Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  p.  XXXI. 

13 


14 


The^  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


test  of  truth  in  religion  as  elsewhere,  Wollaston  was  in 
holy  orders  and  perhaps  belonged  more  to  the  Rationalistic 
School  of  Theology  than  to  Deism,  but  there  was  much  in 
common  in  the  two  movements.  The  rationalistic  theology 
accepted  the  deistic  position  that  faith  must  be  tested  by 
reason,  that  reason  is  the  ultimate  court  of  appeal.  Essen- 
tial Christianity,  it  said,  is  reasonable  and  its  truths  are 
capable  of  rational  proof.  Deism  made  morality  the  essence 
of  Natural  Religion.  The  deists  taught  that  he  who  believes 
God  to  exist  must,  in  order  to  be  true  to  reason,  acknowledge 
the  obligations  of  morality  and  natural  religion.  The  the- 
ologians of  the  Rationalistic  School,  like  the  deists,  laid 
more  stress  on  right  living  than  on  subscriptions  to  theologi- 
cal creeds.  Their  religion  was  not  only  ethical,  but  like  the 
deists  they  considered  ethics  to  be  the  chief  part  of  religion. 
Wollaston  was  in  entire  agreement  with  this  view  of  religion. 
The  first  article  of  faith  in  Wollaston’s  religion  is  the  belief 
that  the  human  reason  is  competent  to  discover  and  to  de- 
fine religious  truth  without  supernatural  aid  or  divine  reve- 
lation, All  religious  truth  is  discernible  by  the  unaided 
powers  of  reason  and  that  which  cannot  be  so  explained  is 
to  be  rejected.^ 

There  were  two  schools  of  moralists  in  England  in  the 
18th  century, — the  Intellectual  School  and  the  Sensational 
School.  These  schools  had  a great  deal  in  common.  They 
had  the  same  attitude  towards  traditional  theology,  espe- 
cially towards  traditional  theological  ethics.  Both  schools 
were  rationalistic  in  the  theological  sense  and  both  made 
great  use  of  the  term  “natural”  as  opposed  to  “inspira- 
tional” religion  and  ethics.  The  schools  were  entirely  agreed 
that  it  is  not  the  mere  will  of  God  which  constitutes  the 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  and  that  morality  is 
independent  of  revelation.  Both  schools  used  “conformity 
to  nature”  as  the  formula  of  morality,  but  the  only  thing 
in  common  in  the  use  of  it  as  the  criterion  of  morality  was 
the  attempt  to  work  out  an  ethics  that  would  be  independent 

^L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  chs.  2 and  3.  Selby- 
Bigge,  British  Moralists,  pp.  XX-XXIV.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.,  pp. 
7,  42  and  203.  Hurst,  His.  of  Rationalism. 


Relation  of  Wollaston  to  the  Thought  of  His  Age  15 

of  traditional  theological  ethics.  Both  schools  taught  that 
virtue  is  natural.®  Selby-Bigge  says  that  “according  to  na- 
ture” is  an  article  of  faith  with  both  schools.  This  is  true, 
but  it  is  very  evident  that  the  two  schools  use  “natural” 
and  “according  to  nature”  in  very  different  senses.  When 
the  intellectualists  say  that  virtue  is  natural  they  mean  that 
it  conforms  to  the  eternal  nature  of  things,  and  also  that 
it  considers  the  true  nature  of  man  and  seeks  to  realize  it. 
For  the  other  school  “natural”  means  in  conformity  to 
man’s  sentiments  and  affections.  In  the  one  school  moral 
distinctions  are  matters  of  reason;  in  the  other,  a matter 
of  feeling.  Selby-Bigge  says  that  the  two  schools  are 
“primarily  distinguished  by  their  adoption  of  reason  and 
feeling  respectively  as  the  faculty  which  perceives  moral 
distinctions,  a faculty  declared  in  each  case  to  be  peculiar 
and  not  identifiable  with  ordinary  reason  or  ordinary 
feeling.”  ^ 

I do  not  agree  at  all  that  Selby-Bigge’s  statement  that  I 
have  just  quoted  is  applicable  to  Wollaston.  Some  of  the 
intellectualists  did  believe  that  the  faculty  which  perceives 
moral  distinctions  is  a “pecuhar’’  one  “and  not  at  all  iden- 
tifiable with  ordinary  reason.”  These  I would  denominate 
intuitionists.  Wollaston  did  not  believe  that  man  possesses 
a special  moral  faculty  capable  both  of  apprehending  the 
reason  why  actions  ought  to  be  performed,  i.  e.,  the  prin- 
ciple from  which  the  rightness  follows,  and  of  causing  the 
performance  of  such  actions.  I think  that  I can  prove  that 
Wollaston  was  not  an  intuitionist  in  ethics,  nor  an  intu- 
itionalist  in  epistemology,  but  that  his  philosophy  is  a re- 
conciliation of  the  empirical  and  rational  elements  both  in 
knowledge  and  in  morals.  We  have  considered  pre-Kantian 
rationalism  identical  with  intuitionalism,  and  in  general  this 
is  true,  for  it  is  a philosophy  which  makes  knowledge  and 
morals  dependent  upon  a body  of  immediately  given  self- 
evident  and  necessary  first  truths.  Kant’s  epistemology 
reconciled  the  a priori  and  the  a posteriori  factors  in  knowl- 
edge. Thanks  to  the  natural  empiricism  of  the  English 

® L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  ch.  9. 

‘Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  Intro. 


16 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


mind  and  to  the  influence  of  Locke,  Wollaston  did  not  re- 
quire a Hume  to  arouse  him  from  dogmatic  slumber.  Wol- 
laston went  much  further  than  Kant,  for  the  latter  remained 
an  intuitionist  in  morals,  a position  inconsistent  with  his 
anti-intuitionalistic  epistemological  position,  while  the  for- 
mer tried  to  reconcile  the  a priori  and  the  a posteriori  fac- 
tors in  morals. 

The  term  rationalism  is  used  in  three  very  different 
senses.  When  theologians  use  the  term  they  generally  have 
in  mind  the  religious  and  ethical  systems  which  base  truth 
on  the  reason  rather  than  on  revelation.  Wollaston  was  a 
rationalist  in  this  sense  of  the  word.  A second  use  of  the 
term  would  identify  rationalism  with  intuitionism  and  intu- 
itionalism. The  term,  when  given  this  connotation,  cannot 
apply  to  Wollaston,  but  moralists  of  the  Sensational  School 
quite  generally  confuse  rationalism  and  intuitionalism  and 
consequently  criticize  Wollaston  for  believing  in  innate  ideas 
of  morality.  The  third  view  thinks  of  reason  as  a factor  in 
knowledge  but  that  it  is  dependent  upon  experience  for  its 
data.  Wollaston  was  a rationalist  in  this  sense,  for  he  be- 
lieves that  knowledge  is  dependent  upon  the  senses  for  data 
and  upon  the  reason  for  organization.  Dewey  classifies  the 
uses  of  the  term  in  these  ways  and  then  says;  “The  three 
senses  are  historically  connected.  The  18th  century  ra- 
tionalism in  theology  and  in  morals  is  derived  from  the  in- 
sistence of  Descartes  upon  method,  and  clearness  and  dis- 
tinctness as  criteria  of  truth.  It  is  combined,  however,  with 
an  empiricism  which  descends  from  Locke.”  ® It  is  cer- 
tainly true  that  Wollaston  combined  the  truth  of  rational- 
ism with  that  of  empiricism.  His  higher  rationalism,  un- 
like intuitionalism,  is  not  opposed  to  experience,  but  instead 
is  based  on  experience.  It  was  a construction  of  experience 
itself  as  a system  of  reason.®  I have  no  particular  objection 
to  classing  Wollaston  with  the  “Philosophical  Intuitionists” 
as  Sidgwick  does,  because  his  definition  “Philosophical  In- 
tuitionism” is  a clear  statement  of  the  a priori  factor  in  the 
determination  of  duty.  Sidgwick  says : “it  is  a view  that 

° Dewey,  Art.,  Rationalism  in  Balwin  Diet. 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  D.,  pp.  42-6. 


Relation  of  Wollaston  to  the  Thought  of  His  Age  17 

seeks  a complete  synthesis  of  practical  rules,  and  the  prac- 
tical is  held  to  be  able  to  lay  down  one  universal  rule  capable 
of  distinguishing  good  from  evil.”  This  “one  universal 
rule,”  in  Wollaston’s  ethics,  is  that  everything  should  be 
treated  as  that  which  it  is.  This  is  a universal  and  necessary 
truth,  but  Wollaston  does  not  think  of  it  as  an  innate  idea 
or  an  intuition,  but  as  a product  of  reflection. 

I think  that  it  can  be  said  with  truth  that  Wollaston 
gave  to  the  formula  “according  to  nature”  a more  meta- 
physical connotation  than  was  generally  given  to  it,  and 
that  when  he  spoke  of  the  “law  of  nature”  he  meant  some- 
thing quite  different  from  the  ordinary  meaning.  Locke 
used  “natural”  in  a somewhat  similar  way  when  he  said  that 
morality  is  capable  of  being  demonstrated  as  “natural.” 
This  meaning  is  that  morality  is  as  natural  and  as  necessary 
as  a natural  law.  In  no  other  sense  could  the  law  of  nature 
be  the  law  of  morality.  The  naturalness  and  necessity  of 
natural  law  is  not  what  is  meant  by  the  naturalness  and 
necessity  of  morality.  In  a sense,  though,  it  is  the  natural 
law  in  the  moral  world  and  is  based  on  the  belief  that  the 
world  is  all  of  a piece.  The  utilitarian  interest  was  great  in 
Wollaston,  due  to  the  fact  that  he  consciously  tried  to  recon- 
cile the  opposing  views  of  “naturalness,”  by  showing  that 
ultimately  the  two  belong  to  the  same  all-comprehending 
world  of  meaning.  He  may  be  fairly  accused  of  confusing 
the  two  meanings  of  “law  of  nature,”  but  he  was  seeking  to 
make  it  clear  that  morality  is  based  on  the  real  nature  and 
relations  of  things,  and  that  happiness  has  the  same  foun- 
dation. The  free  conformity  of  life  to  the  nature  of  things 
is  goodness,  and  happiness  is  the  natural  and  necessary 
consequence  of  such  a life.® 

’Sidgwick,  Method  of  Ethics,  ch.  Intuitionism,  I,  6,  8 and  13. 

* Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  p.  28.  Wollaston,  Reli. 
of  Nat.  D.,  pp.  37-8  and  41-2. 


THE  PREDECESSORS  OF  WOLLASTON 


Professor  Sidgwick  is  right  when  he  says  that : “The 
main  stream  of  English  ethics,  so  far  as  it  flows  independ- 
ently of  Revelational  Theology,  begins  with  Hobbes  and 
the  replies  that  Hobbes  provoked.”  He  says  that  the  start- 
ing point  of  Hobbes’  ethical  speculation  is  to  be  sought 
mainly  in  the  current  view  of  the  law  of  nature  which  was 
defined  to  mean  the  rules  that  men  ought  to  observe,  so  far 
as  they  can  be  known  by  the  light  of  nature  apart  from 
revelation.  ^ Grotius  had  taken  the  position  that  this 
natural  law  is  a part  of  divine  law  which  follows  necessarily 
from  the  essential  nature  of  man,  and  is  as  unalterable  as 
the  truths  of  mathematics.  This  law  of  nature,  Grotius 
says,  is  cognizable  a priori  by  an  abstract  consideration  of 
human  nature.^  Hobbes  took  the  position  that  Grotius 
had  left  unanswered  the  all-important  question:  “What 

is  man’s  ultimate  reason  for  obeying  these  laws  of  nature.^” 
He  undertook  to  answer  it  by  saying  that  each  man’s  appe- 
tites and  desires  are  naturally  directed  either  “to  the  pres- 
ervation of  his  life  or  to  the  heightening  of  it  in  the  way 
of  pleasure.  Since  all  tlie  voluntary  actions  of  men  tend  to 
their  own  preservation  or  pleasure,  it  cannot  be  reasonable  to 
aim  at  anything  else;  in  fact,  nature  rather  than  reason 
fixes  the  end  of  human  action,  to  which  it  is  reason’s  func- 
tion to  show  the  means.  Hence  if  we  ask  why  it  is  reasonable 
for  any  individual  to  observe  the  rules  of  social  behavior 
that  are  commonly  called  moral,  the  answer  is  obvious  that 
this  is  only  indirectly  reasonable,  as  a means  to  his  own 
preservation  or  pleasure.”  ® Naturally  there  was  a very 

^ Sidgwick,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  159. 

“ Ibid.,  161. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  165. 


18 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston 


19 


strong  reaction  from  this  extreme  hedonistic  position  and 
Wollaston  belongs  to  this  reaction  movement.  This  school 
of  thinkers  were  insistent  upon  the  point  that  morality  must 
of  necessity  be  based  on  the  real  nature  of  things,  and  must, 
consequently,  be  as  natural  and  as  necessary  as  the  natures 
and  relations  of  things.  So  Wollaston  was  influenced  nega- 
tively by  Hobbes.  He  reacted,  not  only  from  the  ethical 
position  of  Hobbes,  but,  perhaps,  eA^en  more  from  the 
materialistic  determinism  of  his  philosophy.^ 

I think  that  it  can  be  said  that  Wollaston  was  influ- 
enced on  the  positive  side  by  several  very  different  schools 
of  thought.  Rogers  is  right  when  he  says  that  Wollaston 
was  greatly  influenced  in  his  thinking  by  Locke’s  episte- 
mology. He,  like  Locke,  denied  innate  ideas,  in  general, 
and  innate  ideas  of  morality  in  particular.®  Wollaston, 
like  the  entire  rationalistic  school  of  British  moralists,  was 
also  greatly  influenced  by  the  Newtonian  conception  of  the 
universe;  but,  perhaps,  even  more  by  the  mathematical 
method  of  the  neAV  science.  The  rationalistic  philosophy 
of  Descartes  was  also  influential  in  the  same  way.  In  fact, 
what  Leslie  Stephen  says  of  the  intellectualists,  in  general, 
is  true  of  Wollaston  in  particular.  Lie  says:  “It  is  very 
difficult  to  tell  whether  the  intellectualists  in  morals  were 
more  influenced  by  the  Newtonian  conception  of  the  universe, 
which  gave  the  world  loftier  ideas  of  God,  and  great  aid  and 
support  to  morality  and  religion ; or  by  Descartes’  philoso- 
phy, which  inspired  the  rationalistic  method  of  ethics.”  ® By 
the  use  of  the  mathematical  method,  inspired  by  both  New- 
ton and  Descartes,  the  intellectuahsts  claimed  that  they 
were  able  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  and  the  obligations 
of  Natural  Religion.  Wollaston  certainly  cannot  be  classi- 
fied as  a rationalist  in  the  Cartesian  sense  of  the  term,  nor 
would  any  one  think  of  classifying  him  as  an  empiricist.  To 
my  mind  he  is  far  more  of  an  empiricist  than  a rationalist, 
if  rationalism  is  given  the  intuitional  connotation.  Rogers 
is  perhaps  right  when  he  says  that  Wollaston’s  position  was 

’‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  62  and  104-5. 

® Rogers,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  150. 

°L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  p.  XXXII. 


20 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


a combination  of  the  two.'^  It  has  been  customary  to  call 
Wollaston  an  Intuitionist,  meaning  thereby  that  he  taught 
that  men  have  innate  ideas  of  virtue  and  vice.  I do  not 
understand  him  to  teach  any  such  doctrine.  Rather,  I 
understand  him  to  say  that  all  of  our  knowledge  comes 
through  the  senses.  Wollaston  thinks,  also,  as  I shall  try 
to  show  later,  that  we  have  rational  synthetic  minds  that 
are  capable  of  organizing  experience  and  of  determining 
what  our  duty  is  in  any  given  situation  of  life.  He  believed 
that  there  are  two  elements,  both  in  knowledge  and  in 
morality,  the  empirical  and  the  rational.  While  Wollaston 
was  influenced,  on  the  rationalistic  side,  by  both  Descartes 
and  Newton,  he  was  not  by  any  means  a disciple  of  either, 
and  the  influence  of  each  upon  his  thinking  was  very  general. 
He  did  get  his  rationalistic  attitude  and  method  partly  from 
them.  I say  this  advisedly,  because  this  rationalistic  attitude 
was  characteristic  of  the  age.  The  rationalistic  method, 
however,  was  taken  bodily  from  them  and  used  by  Wollaston, 
as  offering  an  analogy  of  morality,  to  determine  the  general 
formula  of  morality.® 

The  influence  of  Cudworth  upon  Wollaston  was  more 
specific.  I think  that  it  was  his  insistence  upon  the  objec- 
tive reality  of  moral  distinctions,  and  his  insistence  that 
the  criterion  of  morality  must  be  rational  in  nature,  that 
most  impressed  Wollaston.  Cudworth  wrote  his  Treatise 
concerning  eternal  and  immutable  morality  in  answer  to 
Hobbes.  In  this  work  he  took  the  position  that  just  as 
knowledge  contains  a permanent  intelligible  element  over  and 
above  the  flux  of  sense  impression,  so  there  exist  eternal  and 
immutable  ideas  of  morality.  According  to  Cudworth  the 
distinctions  of  good  and  evil  have  an  objective  reality,  “cog- 
nizable by  reason,  no  less  than  the  relations  of  space  and 
number;  the  knowledge  of  them  no  doubt  comes  to  the  hu- 
man mind  from  the  divine;  but  it  is  from  the  divine  reason, 
in  whose  light  man  imperfectly  participates,  not  merely  from 
the  divine  will  as  such.”  Things  are  what  they  are,  not  by 

’ Rogers,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  141.  Wollaston,  Rell.  of  Nat.  D.,  pp.  24, 
48-50. 

• Ibid.,  Sec.  III. 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston 


21 


will  but  by  nature.  . . . For  though  the  will  and  power 
of  God  have  an  absolute,  infinite  and  unlimited  command 
upon  the  existence  of  all  created  things  to  make  them  to  be, 
or  not  to  be  at  pleasure;  yet  when  things  exist,  they  are 
what  they  are.  . . . Nothing  is  morally  good  or  evil  by  mere 
will  without  nature,  because  everything  is  what  it  is  by  na- 
ture, and  not  by  will.  ...  No  positive  commands  what- 
soever do  make  anything  morally  good  or  evil,  which  nature 
had  not  made  such  before.®  Wollaston  agrees  with  Cud- 
worth  that  the  real  nature  of  things  constitutes  the  basis 
of  morality.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  their 
ethics  is  objective.  This  objective  nature  is  discerned  by 
the  reason,  and  the  appropriate  moral  behavior  is  deter- 
mined by  the  reason  also. 

But  Wollaston  was  as  greatly  influenced  by  the  empiri- 
cists. Cudworth  and  Wollaston  have  very  different  ideas 
as  to  the  relation  of  sense  and  reason  in  knowledge,  thanks 
to  the  influence  of  Locke  upon  Wollaston;  but  both  base 
the  criterion  of  morality  on  the  reason.  Cudworth  says 
that  the  mind  has  conceptions  which,  while  occasioned  by 
sense,  could  not  be  formed  but  by  a faculty  superior  to 
sense.  He  does  not,  like  Locke,  believe  that  all  knowledge 
comes  through  the  senses,  but  rather  holds  to  the  doctrine 
of  innate  ideas.  This  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  was  attacked 
by  Locke,  and  Clarke  and  Wollaston  admit  the  force  of 
Locke’s  arguments.  They  were,  nevertheless,  greatly  in- 
fluenced by  Cudworth.^®  They  were  especially  influenced 
by  his  statement  that  moral  relations  are  as  evident  and  as 
necessary  as  the  laws  of  thought  and  the  axioms  of  mathe- 
matics. Speaking  of  eternal  truths,  Cudworth  says,  “Neither 
are  there  such  eternal  truths  as  these  only  in  mathematics 
and  concerning  quantity,  but  also  in  ethics  concerning 
morality.”  Cudworth  says  that  ethical  ideas  do  not 
come  from  experience,  but  are  necessary  ideas  in  the  divine 
and  in  the  human  reason.  The  individual  mind,  being  derived 

“Cudworth,  Treatise  Concerning  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality, 
bk.  I,  ch.  2. 

“ Clarke,  Natural  Religion,  p.  45.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  45. 

” Cudworth,  Intel.  System,  p.  734. 


22 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


from  tlie  eternal  mind,  inherits  these  eternal  moral  truths, 
is  conscious  of  them,  and  realizes  their  obligations^  This 
extreme  Intuitionalism  is,  of  course,  unnecessary,  and  the 
universality  and  necessity  of  morality  is  entirely  reconcil- 
able with  an  ethical  epistemology  which  gives  due  place  to 
the  empirical  factor  in  knowledge.  Ethical  ideas,  Cudworth 
says,  cannot  come  from  experience,  for  experience  is  always 
particular,  and  morality  must  be  universal  and  necessary. 
He  is  right,  of  course,  in  saying  that  experience  cannot  give 
universality  and  necessity;  but,  as  Clarke  and  Wollaston 
realized,  his  inference  from  this  to  the  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas  of  morality  is  not  necessary.  And  yet  they  realized 
that  he  was  right  in  insisting  that  the  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong  is  a rational  distinction  and  is  universal 
and  necessary.  Clarke  and  Wollaston  agree  that  it  would 
be  contradictory  to  say  that  any  power,  human  or  divine, 
could  change  their  nature. The  good  could  not  be  bad 
nor  the  bad  good.^^  This  internal  perception  of  moral 
truth,  which  Cudworth  calls  conscience,  teaches  men  that 
the  good  of  the  whole  is  better  than  individual  good  alone. 
Thus  he  set  for  Wollaston  a eudsmonistic  example.^® 

Cumberland’s  importance,  for  our  purpose,  rests  on  his 
attempt  to  supply  the  connecting  link  between  moral  per- 
ception and  moral  action  by  identifying  the  good  of  all  with 
the  good  of  each,  and  on  his  endeavor  to  make  the  utilitarian 
principle  of  the  good  of  all  the  ethical  end  and  the  standard 
of  moral  action.  The  good  of  all  is  the  moral  standard,  and 
the  reason  is  the  moral  faculty.  He  believes  in  the  mathe- 
matical certainty  of  moral  truth,  and  his  faith  in  the  ulti- 
mate rationality  of  the  world  is  so  great  that  he  believes 
that  this  will  result  in  the  good  of  humanity.  He  did  not, 
like  Wollaston,  say  that  one  should  consider  the  probable 
consequences  of  actions  and  that  these  should  enter  into 
the  motivation.  Cumberland  took  the  position  that  the 
Baconian  method  is  as  applicable  to  ethics  as  to  natural 
science.  By  observing  external  nature  we  discover  its  truths 

“ Cudworth,  Intel.  System,  p.  730. 

“ Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  45.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

“ Cudworth,  Intel.  System.,  p.  895. 

Ibid.,  p.  898. 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston 


23 


and  laws,  and  by  studying  the  nature  of  man  we  discover 
the  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  the  natural  universe  of 
which  he  forms  a part.  The  foundation  of  morality  lies 
in  the  nature  of  things,  antecedent  to  all  positive  law,  else 
no  reason  could  be  given  for  the  enactment  of  any  law.  He 
defines  the  laws  of  nature  as  “immutably  true  propositions 
regulative  of  voluntary  actions  as  to  choice  of  good  and 
avoidance  of  evil,  and  which  carry  with  them  an  obligation 
to  outward  acts  of  obedience.”  The  laws  of  nature  are 
the  laws  of  God,  so  are  the  universal  laws  of  right  reason. 
There  are,  he  says,  no  innate  ideas,  but  by  means  of  reason 
man  perceives  the  mathematical  and  moral  truths  contained 
in  nature,  and  both  are  of  equal  certainty. Practical 
reason  points  out  the  ends  to  be  pursued  and  the  means  to 
those  ends,  and  since  reason  is  common  to  man,  all  unpreju- 
diced men  agree  with  regard  to  the  fundamental  principles 
of  morality.  The  mind  of  man  naturally  assents  to  the  uni- 
versal law  of  nature.  He  states  this  law  as  the  universal 
law  of  benevolence:  “The  greatest  possible  benevolence  of 
every  rational  agent  towards  all  the  rest,  constitutes  the 
happiest  state  of  each  and  all,  so  far  as  depends  on  their 
own  power,  and  is  necessarily  required  for  their  happiness, 
therefore  the  common  good  is  the  supreme  law.”  The  hap- 
piness of  all  is  at  the  same  time  the  end  of  every  rational 
man’s  actions  and  the  standard  of  right  and  wrong. Cum- 
berland’s dynamic  is  prudential  hedonism.  The  law  of 
benevolence  is  the  law  both  of  rationality  and  of  reality,  he 
says ; but  then  he  proceeds  to  say  that  it  derives  its  obliga- 
tion from  the  fact  that  only  by  striving  to  promote  the  hap- 
piness of  all  can  one  be  bappy.  Sidgwick  says  that  Cum- 
berland is  tbe  first  one  to  lay  down  the  principle  that  “the 
common  good  of  all  is  the  supreme  end  and  the  standard  of 
morality.”  So  far,  says  Sidgwick,  he  may  be  fairly  called 
the  precursor  of  the  later  utilitarianism.  Sidgwick  says  that 
Cumberland  meant  by  “the  common  good  of  all”  not  only 
“the  greatest  happiness  of  all  but  perfection.”  He  regards 

“ Cumberland,  De  legibus  naurae  Cap.  V.  5. 

” Ibid.,  Cap.  V,  8. 

“Cumberland,  Proleg.  IX.;  Cap.  I,  15  and  Cap.  Ill,  3. 

“ Ibid.,  Cap.  I,  4 and  22. 


24i  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

Cumberland  as  a precursor  of  Wollaston,  since,  in  his  esti- 
mation, Wollaston’s  position  was  that  of  late  utilitar- 
ianism.^® 

The  connection  of  Locke  with  the  moral  systems  of  Clarke 
and  Wollaston  is  well  expressed  by  Erdmann:  “In  the  first 
book  of  his  Essay,  Locke  bad  placed  speculative  and  practi- 
cal principles  on  the  same  plane.  In  regard  to  the  former, 
however,  he  had  supplemented  the  negative  result  that  they 
are  not  innate,  by  the  positive  statement  that  they  are  pre- 
sented to  us  by  the  external  world.  Exactly  the  same  pro- 
cess must  be  looked  for  in  the  case  of  the  latter:  the  mind 
cannot  draw  the  principles  of  action  from  within  itself ; they 
must  come  to  it  from  without,  and  not,  as  mediaeval  philoso- 
phy had  taught,  through  revelation,  but  from  the  external 
world.  This  positive  addition  to  Locke’s  negative  asser- 
tion was  made  by  some  thinkers  who  are  connected  with  him, 
not  merely  by  nationality,  but  also  by  the  fact  that  they 
owe  to  him  their  first  impulse  towards  philosophy.”  Erd- 
mann, then,  expressly  mentions  Clarke  and  WoUaston.^^ 

Wundt  also  connects  Locke  directly  with  the  objective 
intellectualists.  Locke,  he  says,  even  draws  a comparison 
between  the  application  of  moral  rules  to  particular  cases 
and  the  application  of  mathematical  axioms.  Such  state- 
ments clearly  bear  the  closest  relation  to  his  opinion  that 
“all  judgments  on  moral  values  are  the  results  of  rational 
insight  and  intellectual  deliberation.”  This  opinion  con- 
nects Locke  with  the  Cambridge  Intellectualists,  says 
Wundt,  but  they  are,  he  says,  distinguished  from  Locke  by 
the  fact  that  his  morality  was  subjective  whereas  their  cri- 
terion was  objective.  “Their  attempt  is  rather  to  show  the 
objective  reality  of  the  moral  law,  from  which  its  obligatory 
force  necessarily  follows.”  Whereas  the  subjective  intel- 
lectualists, as  Wundt  terms  them,  make  the  natural  law  to 
be  a thing  of  empirical  origin  in  our  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  the  objective  intellectualists,  Clarke  and  Wollas- 
ton, have  moral  norms  that  are  claimed  to  possess  an  ob- 

“ Sidgwick,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  174. 

“Erdmann,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  116. 

“Wundt,  Ethics,  p.  323. 


25 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston 

jectlve  reality  equal  to  that  of  mathematical  or  physical 
laws.  A transgression  of  law  in  the  moral  realm  is  like  a 
change  which  disobeys  the  laws  of  physical  nature. 

For  Locke,  as  for  the  objective  moralists,  Clarke  and 
Wollaston,  morality  is  essentially  a matter  of  conformity 
to  relations.  For  Locke  there  are  three  fundamental  cer- 
tainties ; the  existence  of  the  self,  of  God  and  of  the  world, 
and  there  are  three  corresponding  fundamental  ethical  con- 
ceptions ; man,  God  and  nature.  The  foundation  of  morality 
does  not  lie  in  the  nature  of  man  alone,  but  in  the  nature  and 
character  of  God,  the  creator  of  the  universe.  God  cannot 
act  contrary  to  his  own  nature,  and  so  the  laws  of  the  uni- 
verse are  as  unchangeable  as  God  himself ; for  the  laws  of 
nature  are  the  laws  of  the  divine  nature,  the  will  and  the 
command  of  God.  Thus  the  law  of  nature  is  eternal  and 
unchangeable,  the  rule  of  God  to  himself  and  to  all  his 
creatures.  Into  this  divine  order  man  is  bom,  a sociable 
being  endowed  with  reason.  By  means  of  reason,  which  is 
the  only  ethical  faculty,  man  perceives  and  recognizes  the 
law  of  nature,  which  is  at  the  same  time  the  law  of  God. 
There  are  moral  relations,  which  are  capable  of  being  ration- 
ally perceived  antecedent  to  all  positive  revelation.  In  the 
law  of  nature  reason  discovers  the  foundation  of  duties  and 
rights.  The  various  kinds  of  duties  are  founded  on  various 
relations  ; — the  duty  of  piety,  on  the  relation  of  man  to  God ; 
the  duties  of  benevolence,  equity  and  love  arise  from  the 
various  relations  men  stand  to  one  another.^^ 

Clarke,  of  course,  stands  a great  deal  closer  to  Wollaston, 
both  in  time  and  in  thought,  than  did  any  of  his  other  pre- 
decessors. Wollaston  was,  in  fact,  an  older  contemporary 
of  Clarke,  but  his  book  was  not  published  until  two  years 
before  his  death,  1722,  while  Clarke’s  work  on  the  same  sub- 
ject was  published  in  1706.  Clarke’s  philosophy  represents 
a reaction  both  from  the  materialistic  determinism  of  Hobbes 
and  from  the  spiritualistic  determinism  of  Calvin.  He  sought 
to  define  right  and  wrong  so  clearly  and  to  place  the  dis- 
tinction between  them  on  such  a solid  foundation  that  moral 
relations  would  be  as  indubitable  as  are  mathematical  rela- 
“ Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  IV,  ch.  2. 


26 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


tions.  This  he  did  by  making  reason  and  morality  conform. 
He  insisted,  however,  upon  making  an  important  distinction, 
a distinction  equally  important  in  Wollaston’s  system:  “The 
only  difference  is,  that  assent  to  a plain  speculative  truth 
is  not  in  a man’s  power  to  withhold,  but  to  act  according  to 
the  plain  right  and  reason  of  things,  this  he  may,  by  the 
natural  liberty  of  his  will,  forbear.”  Wollaston’s  ethics, 
also,  attempts  to  ground  morality  on  the  very  nature  of 
things,  and  to  show  moral  relations  to  be  necessary  and  in- 
dubitable. He,  also,  says  that  assent  to  truth  is  necessary, 
but  acts  conformable  to  truth  are  contingent  upon  free 
choice.  This  objectivity  of  the  moral  standard,  and  this 
insistence  upon  freedom  make  both  Clarke  and  Wollaston 
stand  out  distinctly.^®  Erdmann  says  that : “These  two 
had  placed  the  determining  factor  in  the  object,  but  had 
left  it  to  the  choice  of  the  subject  whether  or  not  to  fol- 
low it.” 

Clarke  undertakes  to  state  a complete  moral  principle  in 
terms  of  “fitness”  of  actions  to  the  objective  nature  of 
things.  He  says  that  things  stand  one  to  another  in  cer- 
tain relations  which  are  necessary  and  eternal;  and  that  we 
can  conceive  nothing  without,  at  the  same  time,  conceiving 
its  relations  to  other  things.  There  are  such  relations  be- 
tween man  and  God  and  between  man  and  man,  and  from 
such  relations  there  arises  a “fitness”  or  “unfitness”  of  ac- 
tions. The  whole  of  these  relations  constitutes  truth. 
“These  eternal  different  relations  of  things  constitute  or 
at  least  involve  eternal  fitness  or  unfitness  in  the  application 
of  things  one  to  another;  with  regard  to  which  the  will  of 
God  always  . . . chooses  . . .,  and  which  ought  likewise 
to  determine  the  wills  of  all  subordinate  rational  beings. 
These  eternal  and  necessary  differences  of  things  make  it  fit 
and  reasonable  for  these  creatures  so  to  act ; they  cause  it 
to  be  their  duty  and  lay  an  obligation  on  them  to  act  in  ac- 

“ Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  vol.  II,  p.  14. 

“ “Hatten  diesen  heiden  zwar  den  determinirenden  Grund  in  die  Ob- 
jecte  gesetz,  dagegen  es  dem  Belieben  des  Subjectes  anheimgestellt,  ob 
es  ihmfolgen  wolle.” 

“ Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  107. 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston  27 

cordance  with  the  eternal  fitness  of  things.”  To  deny  that 
I should  do  for  another  man  what  he  in  like  case  should  do 
for  me,  “and  to  deny  it,  either  in  word  or  action  is  as  if  a 
man  should  contend  that,  though  two  and  three  are  equal 
to  five,  yet  five  is  not  equal  to  two  and  three.”  “Wicked- 
ness,” according  to  Clarke,  “is  the  same  absurdity  and  in- 
solence in  morals,  as  it  would  be  in  natural  things  to  pretend 
to  alter  the  relations  of  numbers,  or  to  change  the  prop- 
erties of  geometrical  figures.” 

Lowman,  one  of  Clarke’s  followers,  says,  that  Clarke  con- 
ceived of  morality  as  “the  practice  of  reason.”  Morality 
for  Clarke,  says  Falckenberg,  is  the  subjective  conformity 
to  the  objective  “fitness  of  things.”  The  good  is  the  fitting. 
Certain  things,  relations,  and  modes  of  action  are  suited 
to  one  another  and  others  not.  “He  who  is  induced  by 
passion  to  act  contrary  to  the  eternal  relations  or  harmony 
of  things,  contradicts  his  own  reason  in  thus  undertaking 
to  disturb  the  order  of  the  universe;  he  commits  the  ab- 
surdity of  willing  that  things  should  be  that  which  they 
are  not.  Injustice  is  in  practice  that  which  falsity  and  con- 
tradiction ai’e  in  theoretical  affairs.” 

The  positions  of  Clarke  and  Wollaston  are  so  very  similar 
on  most  questions  that  it  has  been  common  to  practically 
identify  them.  I do  not  deny  the  justification  of  that  pro- 
cedure. I do  wish,  however,  to  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that  Wollaston  does  not  acknowledge  indebtedness  to  Clarke. 
Rather,  he  insists  that  his  treatment  is  original:  “That, 
which  is  advanced  in  the  following  papers,  concerning  the 
nature  of  moral  good  and  evil,  and  is  the  prevailing  thought 
that  runs  through  them  all,  I never  met  with  anywhere.” 
Only  once  in  his  entire  book  does  he  use  the  tenninology  of 
Clarke,  and  even  in  that  instance  the  use  may  well  be  acci- 
dental. The  word  used  by  Wollaston  is,  however,  Clarke’s 

Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  vol.  II,  pp.  3-7. 

Ibid.,  619. 

Clarke,  Evidences,  p.  42. 

Lowman,  Unity  and  Perfection  of  God,  p.  29. 

^ Falckenberg,  His.  of  Phil.,  pp.  196-7. 

“‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  6. 


28 


The  Ethics  of  William  W ollaston 


favorite  term,  namely,  “fit.”  We  can  say  that  there  is  no 
verbal  dependence,  for  even  in  the  case  just  mentioned 
Clarke  never  uses  “fit”  but  “fitness”  or  “fiting.”  The 
thoughts  of  the  two  men,  though,  with  reference  to  the  cri- 
terion of  morality  are  so  very  similar  that  it  is  quite  im- 
possible for  me  to  doubt  the  dependence  of  the  one  on  the 
other.  On  two  rather  important  questions  of  the  time  the 
men  differed  considerable,  namely,  the  question  of  the  rela- 
tion of  happiness  to  virtue  and  the  question  of  the  relation 
of  truth  and  revelation. 

Perhaps  there  is  more  difference  between  Clarke  and 
Wollaston  on  the  question  of  happiness  than  on  any  other, 
and  this  difference  is,  I suppose,  responsible  for  tbe  fact 
that  Wollaston  has  often  been  classed  with  the  hedonists, 
while  Clarke  has  never  been  so  classed.  Clarke  says  that  < 
happiness  is  a necessary  consequent  of  acting  according  to 
the  fitness  of  things.  “God,”  he  says,  “will  certainly  cause 
truth  and  right  to  terminate  in  happinss.”  He  says 
that  virtue  “tends  to  the  good  of  the  world”  as  certainly  as 
physical  effects  or  mathematical  truth  follow  from  its  prin- 
ciples.^^ It  may  be  said,  in  general,  that  Clarke  considers 
happiness  more  as  the  necessary  consequent  of  true  living, 
and  that  the  desire  to  be  happy  and  make  others  happy 
does  not  enter  into  the  motivation  of  moral  actions  to  the 
same  extent  with  him  as  with  Wollaston.  It  is  true  that 
Wollaston  does  insist  that  happiness  is  the  natural  and 
necessary  consequence  of  right  living;  but  he  also  empha- 
sizes the  fact  that  one  should  deliberately  consider  the 
happiness  or  unhappiness  that  can  be  expected  to  result 
from  a given  action,  and  that  without  so  doing  one  cannot 
be  said  to  be  acting  truly.  It  is,  Wollaston  thinks,  wrong 
not  to  treat  happiness  as  what  it  is,  a true  mental  state 
and  a desirable  human  good.®® 

Vorlander  says  that  while  Clarke  takes  the  objective 
ethical  principle  of  the  fitness  of  actions  orJy  from  the  uni- 
versal metaphysical  side,  Wollaston  tries  to  define  it  more 

^ Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  512. 

^'Ibid.,  524. 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  38. 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston  29 

definitely,  partly  by  means  of  reference  to  the  particular 
purposes  of  tilings,  partly  “through  more  definite  reference 
to  the  principle  of  happiness.”  Wollaston  does  make  a 
significant  advance  from  the  position  taken  by  Clarke  in  that 
he  gave  far  more  consideration  to  consequences,  in  so  far 
as  they  can  be  anticipated,  and  human  happiness  is  the  most 
important  of  all  the  consequences  that  must  be  considered. 
I would  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  such  a consideration  must 
constitute  an  all  important  part  of  every  moral  action,  and 
that  due  place  must  be  given  to  the  consideration  of  conse- 
quences by  any  system  of  ethics  that  makes  any  pretence 
of  being  based  on  an  objective  foundation.  The  principle, 
otherwise,  is  that  of  Intuitionism.  Clarke  does  say  that  God 
created  the  world  only  that  he  might  communicate  to  his 
creatures  goodness  and  happiness,  and  that  he  expects  and 
requires  that  all  his  creatures  should  endeavor  to  promote 
happiness  among  men.'^®  There  is  another  passage  which 
better  represents  Clarke’s  position  and  shows  him  to  be  more 
eudsemonistic  than  do  these  passages.  I refer  to  the  pas- 
sage with  which  he  begins  his  great  work  on  Natural  Religion, 
a passage  which  states  the  thesis  of  his  work  and  gives,  in 
one  sentence,  his  metaphysics,  philosophy  of  religion,  and 
philosophy  of  morals : “The  same  necessary  and  eternal 
different  relations,  that  different  things  bear  one  to  another, 
and  the  same  consequent  fitness  or  unfitness  of  the  applica- 
tion of  different  relations  one  to  another,  with  regard  to 
which  the  will  of  God  always  and  necessarily  does  determine 
itself,  to  choose  to  act  only  what  is  agreeable  to  justice, 
equity,  goodness  and  truth,  in  order  to  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  universe,  ought  likewise  constantly  to  determine  the 
wills  of  all  subordinate  rational  beings,  to  govern  all  their 
actions  by  the  same  rule,  for  the  good  of  the  public.” 
For  Clarke,  then,  consequences,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be 
anticipated,  must  necessarily  enter  into  evei’y  motivation; 
and  are  involved  in  acting  “according  to  the  fitness  of 

“durch  die  bestimmtere  Beziehung  auf  das  Princip  der  Gliickselig- 
keit.”  Vorlander,  Gesch.  der  Philosophischen  Moral,  etc.,  p.  386. 

"Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  524. 

" Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  I,  Intro. 


30 


The  Et\ics  of  William  Wollaston 


things.”  It  Is  true,  however,  that  Clarke  does  think  of 
happiness  more  as  the  necessary  consequence  of  acting  ac- 
cording to  moral  principles  and  less  as  an  element  in  the 
motivation.  He  leaves  happiness  to  providence  and  has  the 
faith  to  believe  that  it  will  result  from  treating  everything 
according  to  nature. 

The  article  in  Chambers’  Encyclopedia  says  that  Wollas- 
ton’s system  is  a development  of  Clarke’s  system.  This  is 
undoubtedly  true  in  the  sense  that  Wollaston  went  further 
away  from  ecclesiastical  ethics.  As  the  article  well  says 
“his  methods  were  exclusively  rational,”  whereas  Clarke  de- 
pended more  on  religious  authority  and  religious  sanctions.^^ 
Both  Clarke  and  Wollaston  take  as  their  starting  point 
“the  clearness,  immutability  and  universality  of  the  law  of 
nature.”  They  agree  that  morality  is  founded  upon  “the 
eternal  and  necessary  differences  of  things,”  and  that  the 
essentials  of  morality  rest  upon  as  sure  a foundation  as  the 
laws  of  thought  in  logic  or  the  axioms  in  mathematics.^* 
An  interesting  question  arose  as  to  the  relation  of  revela- 
tion to  such  a view  of  ethics.  It  was  seen  very  clearly  that 
an  inspired  system  of  ethics  is  no  more  necessary  than  an 
inspired  system  of  mathematics.  Clarke,  however,  did  not 
regard  revelation  as  supeidluous  as  did  Wollaston.  He  took 
the  position  that  while  revelation  is  riot  necessary  to  reveal 
a code  of  morality  it  is  necessary  to  reveal  the  sanctions  of 
that  code.  He  thinks  with  Wollaston  that  the  reason  is  a 
sufficient  guide  to  morals,  that  revelation  is  not  necessary 
to  tell  men  how  they  ought  to  live.  He  thinks  that  revela- 
tion is  necessary,  however,  to  tell  men  that  a true  life  leads 
to  everlasting  happiness  and  that  a wicked  life  leads  to 
everlasting  misery.  Clarke  thinks  that  most  men  will  be 
too  weak  to  live  right  without  a belief  in  the  hereafter.  So 
while  Clarke  is  as  sincerely  anxious  to  prove  that  moral 
principles  are  binding,  independent  of  Divine  appointment, 
as  is  Wollaston,  he  is  no  less  concerned  that  morality  re- 
quires tlie  support  of  revealed  religion.  So  while  he  be- 

“ Art.  Wollaston,  Chambers  Ency.,  vol.  10,  p.  709. 

“ L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  I,  p.  123. 

^ Clarke,  Works,  pp.  609-13.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  D.,  p.  24. 


The  Predecessors  of  Wollaston 


31 


lieves  that  “virtue  is  worthy  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake” 
and  also  that  the  virtuous  life  necessarily  leads  to  happi- 
ness, he  still  thinks  revelation  to  be  necessary  “for  the 
reformation  of  mankind.”  He  says  that  revelation  is  needed 
as  a bulwark  of  truth,  particularly  concerning  the  here- 
after, “for  without  revelation  many  men  could  not  forbear 
doubting  a future  state  of  retribution  or  reward,  in  spite 
of  the  strongest  arguments  of  reasons.”  Wollaston  makes 
only  one  reference  to  revelation  and  that  is  in  connection 
with  his  treatment  of  the  problem  of  evil.  He  had  said  that 
“there  must  be  a future  life  where  proper  amends  may  be 
made,”  where  the  wrongs  of  this  world  may  be  made  right. 
If  this  life  be  aU,  he  argued,  “the  general  and  usual  state 
of  mankind  is  scarce  consistent  with  the  idea  of  a reason- 
able cause.”  But  how  can  we  be  sure  that  God  will  reward 
virtue  in  the  next  world  more  liberally  than  in  tliis.^  In 
trying  to  answer  this  question,  he  says,  he  “begins  to  be 
very  sensible  how  much  he  wants  a guide.”  He  does  not, 
however,  grant  that  we  have  a guide  other  than  reason,  for, 
in  his  view,  the  Scriptures  constitute  only  that  kind  of 
guide.^*  The  only  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil,  tliinks 
Wollaston,  and  revelation  can  offer  no  other,  is  belief  in 
the  ultimate  rationality  of  the  universe.^®  So  we  can  say 
with  the  Grande  Dictionnaire  Universel  that  “Wollaston 
made  morality  to  rest  upon  a foundation  entirely  indepen- 
dent of  revelation.” 

" Clarke,  Works,  pp.  643,  646,  652  and  667. 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  205. 

« Ibid.,  p.  211. 

“ Ibid.,  Sec.  IX,  Prop.  xii. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  72  and  113-14. 

“Grande  Diet,  Universel,  Art.  Wollaston. 


THE  RELIGION  OF  NATURE  DELINEATED 


Section  I 

“or  MOKAL  GOOD  AND  EVIl” 

This  thesis  is  an  endeavor  to  give  a systematic  and  criti- 
cal exposition  of  the  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston,  but  since 
he  was  the  author  of  only  one  work  on  that  subject,  “The 
Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,”  this  treatment  naturally 
takes  the  form  of  a critical  commentary  on  that  book.  I 
have  tried  to  harmonize  his  order  of  treatment  with  a strictly 
logical  and  systematic  procedure.  Since  my  purpose  is  to 
delineate  his  Ethics,  and  to  treat  other  aspects  of  liis  gen- 
eral discussion  from  that  point  of  view,  I have  in  several  in- 
stances departed  from  his  order  of  treatment. 

Introduction 

THE  RELATION  OF  MORALITY  AND  NATURAL  RELIGION 

“The  foundation  of  religion,”  says  Wollaston,  “lies  in 
that  difference  between  the  acts  of  men,  which  distinguishes 
them  into  good,  evil,  indifferent.  For  if  there  is  such  a 
difference,  there  must  be  religion;  and  contra.”  Erdmann 
understands  him  to  mean  by  this  that  all  religion  is  based 
on  the  difference  which  men  must  make  between  good  and 
bad,  and  where  such  difference  is  made  you  have  religion. 
He  understands  that:  “Nothing  else  is  here  meant  by  reli- 
gion but  the  obligation  to  do  what  may  not  be  omitted  and 
to  refrain  from  doing  what  may  not  be  done  (So  wird  hier 
unter  Religion  nicht  Andres  verstanden,  als  die  Verpflichtung, 
zu  thun  was  nicht  unterlossen).  . . . To  obey  the  law  which 
God  has  given  is  religion  in  general,  and  to  obey  that  law 
in  particular  which  he  reveals  unto  us  when  we  rightly  em- 

32 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  83 

ploy  our  natural  abilities  is  the  religion  of  nature  or  natural 
religion.”  ^ So  Wollaston  begins  his  work  by  seeking  to  find 
the  ultimate  ground  of  natural  religion.  He  grounds  Nat- 
ural Religion  in  the  distincton  that  men  naturally  must  make 
between  good  and  evil.  It  is  the  necessity  of  thinking  that 
constitutes  the  necessity  and  the  universality  of  this  dis- 
tinction. 

Just  as  Natural  Religion  is  based  on  natural  morality, 
so  is  morality  grounded  in  the  nature  of  things.  Moralists, 
Wollaston  says,  have  long  sought  for  some  idea  or  principle 
that  would  decide  the  morality  of  acts,  but  have  not  come 
to  any  agreement.  He  proposes  a principle  that  he  considers 
self-evident,  and  implies  that  this  is  the  principle  which  has 
really  determined  men’s  evaluations  of  conduct.  Wollaston 
proposes  the  plain  and  obvious  principle  of  evaluation,  used 
by  the  plain  man,  as  the  moral  criterion.  He  says  just  let 
things  “speak  for  themselves,”  and  they  will  “proclaim  their 
own  rectitude  or  obliquity.”  “ He  means  by  this  that  the 
nature  and  relations  of  things  determine  their  moral  char- 
acter. Selby-Bigge  says  that  the  British  moralists  of  all 
schools  base  morality  on  the  nature  of  things,  and  all  make 
their  appeal  to  the  ordinary  man’s  ideas  of  virtue  rather 
than  to  those  of  saints  and  pliilosophers.® 

I 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  discusses  the  necessary  im- 
plications of  morality,  intelligence  and  freedom.  “That 
act,  which  may  be  denominated  morally  good  or  evil,  must 
be  the  act  of  a being  capable  of  distinguishing,  choosing  and 
acting  for  himself ; or  more  briefly,  of  an  intelligent  and 
free  agent.”  Blakey  suggests  that  Wollaston  was  influ- 
enced by  William  King’s  book,  “Treatise  on  the  Origin  of 
Evil,”  as  well  as  by  Clarke,  in  arriving  at  his  conception 
of  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  of  its  importance  for  moral- 
ity.^ But  Erdmann  is  right  in  saying  that  the  starting 

^Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  113. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

® Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  p.  XVII. 

^ Blakey,  His.  of  Morals,  p.  208. 


34> 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


point  in  Wollaston’s  thinking  is  with  the  ideas  of  good  and 
evil  as  necessary  ideas  because  of  the  very  nature  of  things. 
Then  he  arrives  at  the  notion  of  freedom  as  the  necessary 
implication  of  good  and  evil.  In  this  division  Wollaston  lays 
down  the  preconditions  of  morality, — intelligence  and  free- 
dom.^ Properly  speaking,  he  says,  “no  act  at  all  can  be 
ascribed  to  that  being  which  is  not  indued  with  these  ca- 
pacities,” and  certainly  no  moral  character  can  be  applied 
to  acts  other  than  those  of  a “being  capable  of  distinguish- 
ing, choosing  and  acting  for  himself.”  ® All  other  kinds 
of  acts  are  but  the  acts  of  an  instrument,  acts  “under  a 
necessity  incumbent  ab  extra”  and  consequently  not  moral 
acts  at  all.^ 

Wollaston’s  only  proof  of  freedom,  in  this  section  of  his 
work,  is  that  it  is  the  necessary  precondition  of  morality.  If 
he  had  been  asked,  but  why  must  there  be  morality.?  I sup- 
pose that  he  would  have  answered  very  much  as  did  Kant, 
later  “I  know  that  I ought.”  But  while  Kant  attributed 
the  feeling  of  ought  to  an  intuition,  to  an  indubitable  and 
immediate  impingement  of  the  moral  conscience  speaking 
within;  Wollaston  could  say,  only,  that  intelligence  demands 
that  we  treat  things  according  to  their  natures,  that  we  act 
conformably  with  reason.  The  one  constitutes  a moral  im- 
perative as  much  as  does  the  other.  So  while  Kant’s  ought 
is  subjective,  resting  as  it  does  on  intuition,  and  Wollaston’s 
ought  is  objective,  being  based  on  experience  and  ratio- 
cination; still  “If  we  ought  we  can”  holds  as  much  for  Wol- 
laston as  for  Kant.  Wollaston  does  not  say  that  we  have 
an  immediate  consciousness  of  freedom  nor  an  immediate 
consciousness  of  ought,  but  both  are  for  him  the  product 
of  thinking  about  the  natures  of  things  and  of  our  rela- 
tions there-to.  As  intelligent  beings  we  cannot  do  otherwise 
than  perceive  the  natures  of  things  and  our  relations  to  the 
rest  of  reality.  In  view  of  these  natures  and  relations  we  see 
that  there  are  duties  we  ought  to  perform  or  else  be  false 
to  ourselves  and  to  the  universe.  So  if  we  ought  we  can, 

' Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  114. 

" Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

’ Ibid.,  p.  8. 


35 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

and  since  we  know  that  we  ought  we  know  that  we  can,  for 
freedom  is  the  necessary  precondition  of  there  being  an 
ought. 


II 

This  paragraph  is  concerned  with  defining  the  nature  of 
truth.  “Those  propositions  are  true,  which  express  things 
as  they  are;  or,  truth  is  the  conformity  of  those  words  or 
signs,  by  which  things  are  exprest,  to  the  things  them- 
selves.” * Here  Wollaston  is  asserting  what  he  understands 
by  truth.  It  is,  he  says,  the  conformity  of  thought  and 
language  to  reality. 


Ill 

The  topic  of  this  paragraph  is  the  nature  of  goodness. 
“A  true  proposition  may  he  denied,  or  things  may  be  denied 
to  be  what  they  are,  by  deeds,  as  well  as  by  express  words  or 
another  proposition.”  ® It  has  frequently  been  thought  that 
in  this  proposition  Wollaston  is  just  simply  saying  that 
there  is  another  way  of  asserting  or  denying  truth.  He 
seems  to  have  anticipated  the  danger  of  being  misunder- 
stood here  and  tried  to  safeguard  against  it.  It  is  true 
that  he  says  that  “things  may  be  denied  to  be  what  they  are 
by  deeds,”  but  that  he  is  doing  something  other  than  merely 
describing  a form  of  existential  judgment  is  quite  evident 
from  his  own  statement.  After  saying  that  “there  is  mean- 
ing in  many  acts  and  gestures”  and  that  “everybody  under- 
stands weeping,  laughing,  shrugs,  frowns,  these  are  a sort 
of  universal  language” ; he  then  goes  on  to  say : “But  these 
instances  do  not  come  up  to  my  meaning.”  Why  do  not 
these  instances  of  actions  which  either  affinn  or  deny  things 
to  be  what  they  are  come  up  to  his  meaning?  I think  it  is 
because  he  is  not  referring  to  the  different  methods  that 
may  be  employed  to  convey  meaning,  to  affirm  or  to  deny 
the  conformity  of  thoughts  with  things.  He  is  not  dealing 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

'Ibid.,  p.  8. 


36  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

with  theoretical  matters  at  all,  but  with  moral  considera- 
tions. “There  are  many  acts,”  he  says,  “of  other  kinds,” 
that  is,  acts  different  from  acts  of  the  pantomime  variety. 
“There  are,”  he  says,  “many  acts  of  other  kinds,  such  as 
constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct  in  life,  which 
have  in  nature,  and  would  be  taken  by  any  indifferent  judge 
to  have  a signification,  and  to  imply  some  proposition,  as 
plainly  to  be  understood  as  if  it  were  declared  in  words ; and 
therefore  if  what  such  acts  declare  to  be,  is  not,  they  must 
contradict  truth,  as  much  as  any  false  proposition,  or  as- 
sertion can.”  Wollaston  tried  to  define  truth  in  Propo- 
sition II,  while  in  Proposition  III  he  sought  to  explicate 
goodness  by  comparing  it  to  truth.  It  is  here  that  he  has 
been  so  much  misunderstood.  This  is  particularly  unfor- 
tunate, because  it  constitutes  the  very  crux  of  his  argument. 
For,  as  Ueberweg  well  says,  the  entire  book  is  an  analogous 
treatment  of  morality.  “The  characteristic  of  this  treatise 
is  that  it  makes  virtue  to  consist  in  acting  according  to 
truth.” 

The  position  I wish  to  maintain  is  that  Wollaston  does  not 
identify  truth  and  goodness.  In  his  system  morality  is 
thought  of  as  really  affirming  a time  relationship,  but  that  is 
not  by  any  means  saying  that  morality  is  mere  assent  to  a 
true  proposition.  It  is  as  true  as  such  assent,  and  immor- 
ality is  as  false  as  the  denial  of  a self-evidently  true  propo- 
sition. The  two  processes  are  very  different,  the  one  is 
merely  intellectual  while  the  other  is  moral.  There  is  a 
great  difference  between  intellectual  assent,  which  is  deter- 
mined by  the  nature  of  things,  and  a moral  act,  which  is 
contingent  on  free  choice.  The  value  judgment  embodied  in 
a moral  act  is  expressive  of  the  self  and  of  character,  while 
the  intellectual  assent  to  a true  relation  involved  in  an 
existential  judgment  has  no  such  connection  with  the  will, 
the  character,  or  the  self.  It  has  been  said  that  Wollaston 
just  reduces  morality  to  existential  judgments,  when  he 
says,  “If  what  such  acts  declare  to  be,  is  not,  they  must 
contradict  truth,  as  much  as  any  false  proposition  or  asser- 

’'>  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

“ Ueberweg,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  382. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  3T 

tion  can.”  This  cannot  be  said  with  justice  for  Wollaston 
is  very  insistent  upon  the  fact  that  here  he  is  talking  about 
“such  acts  as  constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct 
in  life.” 

Just  what  is  Wollaston  saying  when  he  says,  “if  what  such 
acts  declare  to  be  is  not,  they  must  contradict  truth  as 
much  as  any  false  proposition  or  assertion  can”.'’  He  cer- 
tainly is  not  saying  that  this  is  but  another  way  of  denying 
or  contradicting  truth,  but  rather  is  he  not  saying  that 
immorality  is  as  contradictory  as  a false  proposition.?  The 
difference  is  this, — a man  cannot  deny  a true  proposition. 
As  intelligent  beings,  we  can  but  assent  to  what  convinces 
us  is  true.  But,  thanks  to  our  freedom,  we  can  act  con- 
tradictoi'y.  The  immoral  act  is  not  a lie,  as  many  of  Wol- 
laston’s critics  accuse  him  of  teaching,  it  is  not  a contradic- 
tory existential  judgment;  but,  what  he  says  is,  that  it  is 
just  as  absurd  as  to  fail  to  assent  to  truth  when  we  recog- 
nize a true  relation.  Wollaston  does  not  say  that  moral 
deeds  are  propositions.  What  he  does  say  is  that  a moral 
deed  is  an  affiimiation  of  true  relations,  and  that  an  immoral 
act  is  a denial  of  these  relations.  This  interpretation  is 
found  in  the  unsigned  article  on  Wollaston  in  the  Britannica : 
“He  claims  originality  for  his  theory  that  moral  evil  is  the 
practical  denial  of  a true  proposition  and  moral  good  the 
affirmation  of  it.”  This  I consider  to  be  one  of  the  best 
statements  of  his  position  that  I have  found.  The  word 
“practical”  is  generally  left  out,  with  the  result  that  an  ab- 
solutely different  meaning  is  given.  “Practical”  is  really 
the  key  word  in  the  statement  of  his  moral  theory,  and  when 
it  is  accentuated  immorality  is  not  defined  as  the  denial  of  a 
true  proposition.  The  theory,  rather,  is  that  immorality 
implies  the  truth  of  the  proposition  and  then  acts  as  if  it 
wei-e  not  true,  or  “practically”  denies,  the  admittedly  true, 
proposition. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  acts,  says  Wollaston.  He,  then, 
tries  to  show  the  very  great  difference  between  them.  The 
one  kind  of  acts,  he  says,  in  effect,  merely  expresses  inteH 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

“ Anon.,  Art.  on  Wollaston  in  Britan.,  vol.  28,  p.  776. 


38 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


lectual  meaning:  “It  is  certain  there  is  a meaning  in  many 
acts  and  gestures.”  The  other  kind  of  acts  are  moral  acts, 
“such  as  constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct  in  life.” 
The  very  same  action  may,  under  different  circumstances, 
have  these  two  very  different  meanings.  A bow  of  the  head, 
for  example,  may  be  merely  a gesture  expressing,  in  sign 
language,  the  proposition  to-day  is  Tuesday.  At  another 
time  and  under  other  circumstances  the  action  might  have 
a moral  quality,  in  that  the  one  who  performed  such  an  act 
might  thereby  deny  essential  human  relations,  might  thereby 
will  the  destruction  of  human  society.  In  so  acting,  says 
Wollaston,  one  “would  contribute  his  share  towards  the  in- 
troduction of  universal  disorder  and  misery,”  and  would  for 
his  part  deny  human  life  to  be  what  it  is,  would  deny  human 
society  to  be  what  it  is.^^ 

Illustrative  of  this  point  I wish  to  give  some  material 
which  I found  in  a work  on  criminal  psychology.  Gross 
says : “Purely  physiological  conditions  operate  in  many  di- 
rections, such  as  blushing,  trembling,  laughing,  weeping; 
and  very  few  men  want  to  show  their  minds  openly  to  their 
friends,  so  that  they  see  no  reason  for  co-ordinating  their 
symbolic  bodily  expressions.  Nevertheless,  they  do  so,  and 
not  since  yesterday,  but  for  thousands  of  years.  Hence 
definite  expressions  have  been  transmitted  for  generations. 
Characteristically,  the  desire  to  fool  others  has  its  predeter- 
mined limitations,  so  that  it  often  happens  that  simple  and 
significant  gestures  contradict  words  when  the  latter  are 
false.”  Gross  takes  as  a case  a man  who  “assured  us,”  in 
words,  of  course,  “that  he  lived  very  peaceably  with  his 
neighbors  and  at  the  same  time  clinched  his  fist.  The  latter 
meant  ill  will  toward  the  neighbor  while  the  words  did  not.” 
Gross  is  saying  that  gesture  language,  involuntarily,  speaks 
tlie  truth,  oftentimes,  even  Avhen  our  words  are  trying  to 
deceive.^® 

Clarke  is,  perliaps,  a little  clearer  than  Wollaston  on  this 
point  of  the  relation  of  the  intellectual  and  the  moral.  “The 
only  difference,”  he  says,  “is  that  assent  to  a plain  specu- 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  8 and  143. 

“Gross,  Kriminal  Psychologic,  Part  I,  Topic  3. 


39 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

lative  truth,  is  not  in  a man’s  power  to  withhold ; but  to  act 
according  to  the  plain  right  and  reason  of  things,  this  he 
may,  by  the  natural  liberty  of  his  will,  forbear.  But  the 
one  he  ought  to  do ; and  ’tis  as  much  his  plain  and  indis- 
pensable duty;  as  the  other  he  cannot  but  do,  and  ’tis  the 
necessity  of  his  nature  to  do  it.”  His  thought  is  that  as 
assent  to  plain  intellectual  truth  is  necessary  to  sanity,  so  to 
act  in  conformity,  while  not  necessitated,  is  necessary  to  the 
fulfillment  of  life  relations  and  so  to  moral  self-realization. 

Garve  undertook  to  offer  an  interpretation  of  this  para- 
graph of  Wollaston’s  treatise  and  for  some  reason  inclosed 
his  discussion  in  quotation  mai-ks.  These  statements  of  Garve 
are  for  the  most  part  fair  to  the  teachings  of  Wollaston, 
except  on  this  one  point  of  the  relation  of  the  intellectual 
and  the  moral.  Garve  begins  with  the  words  “Wollaston 
sagt,”  implying  that  what  follows  is  quoted  from  the  work 
of  Wollaston,  so  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  Von  Hart- 
mann and  other  German  writers  should  think  that  they  were 
quoting  from  Wollaston,  in  form  of  Garve’s  supposed  trans- 
lation, when  they  are  only  quoting  from  Garve’s  interpreta- 
tive remarks.  “Every  action  is  good  which  expresses  a true 
proposition.  Truth  is  the  highest.  To  recognize  truth  and 
to  represent  it  in  one’s  words  and  deeds,  alive  and  effective, 
is  the  ultimate  end  of  man.  The  ability  to  recognize  truth 
makes  a man  a rational  being,  and  through  the  endowments 
of  his  nature  to  express  truth  also  in  action  he  becomes  a 
moral  being  (durch  die  Anlagen  seiner  Natur,  Wahrheit  auch 
in  Handlungen  auszudriicken,  wird  er  ein  sittliches  We- 
sen).”  So  far  I have  no  fault  to  find  with  the  interpreta- 
tion, but  as  he  proceeds  we  see  that  he  interprets  the  Wol- 
lastonian  Ethics  as  based  on  an  essential  identification  of 
the  intellectual  and  the  moral.  He  says : “As  man  expresses 
his  ideas  and  words  by  means  of  language  he  can  indicate 
them  also  and  communicate  them  to  others  by  means  of  ac- 
tions. This  is  clear  to  everybody  in  the  form  of  gestures, 
but  only  the  most  attentive  observer  can  discover  that  every 

“ Clarke,  Evidences,  p.  188. 

” Garve,  Uebersicht  der  vornehmsten  Principien  Sittenl.,  p.  172.  Von 
Hartmann,  Phanomenologie  des  Sittlichin  Bewusstseins,  p.  345. 


40  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

action  without  exception  expresses  a certain  proposition 
(dass  jede  Handlung,  ohne  Ausnahme,  einen  gewissen  Satz 
ausdriickt).”  Garve,  it  is  clear,  does  not  make  any  distinc- 
tion between  gestures  and  other  forms  of  action  and  so  misses 
Wollaston’s  meaning  entirely.  This  is  even  more  evident  in 
what  he  next  says : “In  der  Wahrheit  oder  Unwahrheit  dieses 
Satzes  liegt  die  Sittlichkeit  oder  Unsittlichkeit  der  Hand- 
lung.”  This  is  not  Wollaston’s  meaning  at  all.  The  mor- 
ality does  not  lie  in  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  proposition 
but  in  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  action.  The  proposition 
is  just  as  true  when  the  action  is  false  as  when  it  is  true, 
otherwise  there  would  be  no  inconsistency  and  consequently 
no  wrong. 

Garve  gets  the  big  idea  in  the  Ethics  of  Wollaston,  namely, 
that  the  criterion  is  objective,  that  the  natures  of  things  de- 
termine how  they  should  be  treated.  Wollaston  does  insist 
that  inanimate  objects,  animals  and  human  beings  by  their 
very  different  natures  indicate  that  they  should  be  treated 
very  differently.  Since  animals  have  feelings  this  must  be 
taken  into  consideration  in  our  treatment  of  them,  and  since 
man  has  both  feelings  and  reason  he  should  be  treated  as 
possessing  both.  Wollaston  says  that  if  mankind  be  differ- 
entiated from  the  rest  of  the  animal  kingdom  by  reason,  then 
the  rational  nature  of  man  must  be  a large  factor  in  the 
determination  of  the  treatment  properly  to  be  accorded  a 
man.^®  Garve,  however,  fails  to  understand  Wollaston  be- 
cause he  seems  to  try  to  translate  an  immoral  action  into 
some  kind  of  false  proposition.  “If  I torment  an  animal,” 
he  has  Wollaston  say,  “I  express  thereby  the  proposition,  I 
take  this  animal  to  be  a being  without  feeling  and  therefore 
I treat  it  like  my  table  or  a stone.”  In  torturing  an  animal 
I do  not  thereby  express  the  proposition  “Ich  halte  diess 
Thier  fiir  ein  empfindungsloses  Wesen.”  On  the  contrary, 
I know,  and  must  as  an  intelligent  being  declare,  it  to  be  a 
creature  with  feelings.  It  is  true,  that  I “behandle  es  daher 
so,  wie  meinen  Tisch,  oder  einen  Stein.”  The  same  can  be 
said  of  the  next  statement  he  puts  into  Wollaston’s  mouth: 

Garve,  Uebersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  Sittenl.,  p.  173. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  27  and  128. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  41 

“If  I make  a slave  of  a person  I express  thereby  the  propo- 
sition ; this  man  is  an  irrational  being,  which  I can  use  for 
my  purpose  like  horses  and  oxen  without  his  consent.” 
But  by  treating  a man  like  hoi’ses  and  oxen  I only  act  as  if 
he  were  an  irrational  being.  I do  not  by  my  inhuman  treat- 
ment of  him  make  the  declaration  “dieser  Mensch  ist  ein 
vernunftloses  Wesen.”  In  fact,  implicit  in  my  mistreatment 
of  the  man  is  the  indubitable  truth  that  the  man  is  a rational 
being,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  inconsistency  in  my  be- 
havior. This  same  confusion  of  intellectual  contradiction 
with  moral  inconsistency  appears  in  the  generalization  which 
he  has  Wollaston  make:  “Wenn  ich  ungerecht  handle,  so 
erklare  ich  dadurch,  dass  ich  mich  fiir  kein  Glied  der  Mensch- 
lichen  Gesellshaft  halte.”  Wollaston  does  not  take  the 
position  that  when  a man  acts  immorally  he,  thereby,  de- 
clares that  he  does  not  consider  himself  a member  of  human 
society.  He  has,  it  is  true,  acted  as  if  there  were  no  human 
society  and  as  if  he  were  no  member  thereof ; but  the  im- 
morality does  not  consist  in  the  denial  of  the  evidently  true, 
as  Garve  thinks.  The  immorality  consist,  rather,  in  the 
inconsistency  of  the  actions  with  the  truth. 

John  Clarke,  Wollaston’s  contemporary,  says  that  he  is 
not  at  all  sure  “that  all  immoral  actions  deny  more  truth 
than  they  affirm,”  so  it  cannot,  he  thinks,  be  argued  that  they 
are  for  that  reason  immoral.  As  many  truths,  he  says, 
could  be  affirmed  in  regard  to  “any  species  of  vicious  action 
. . . as  for  the  denial  of  it.”  In  the  first  place,  I would 
answer,  it  is  not  the  position  of  Wollaston  that  immorality 
is  just  a denial  of  true  propositions.  In  the  second  place, 
considering  truth  in  the  broad  sense  as  true  to  the  relations 
and  meanings  of  life,  as  Wollaston  does,  John  Clarke  cer- 
tainly cannot  deny  that  vicious  actions  are  essentially  false. 
They  are,  to  be  sure,  in  conformity  to  some  particular  truth, 
but  tliey  contradict  the  larger  truths  and  deny  the  indis- 
soluble unity  of  life  and  the  world.  Wollaston  anticipates 
this  objection,  when  he  says  that  there  are  many  true  propo- 

Garve,  Uebersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  Sittenl.,  p.  173. 

^ Ibid.,  p.  174. 

Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  19. 


42 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollastoti 


sitions  which  imply  no  moral  relations,  since  persons  are 
not  involved.^^ 

In  regard  to  the  contention  of  Wollaston  “that  men  may 
by  their  actions  deny  truth,”  John  Clarke  says,  that  the 
only  meaning  this  can  have  is  that  “actions  . . . are  ex- 
pressive ...  of  propositions,”  that  they  are  ways  “of  con- 
veying . . . sense  ...  to  the  minds  of  others.”  This 
is  the  same  confusion  we  found  in  Garve.  The  confusion  is 
due  to  the  failure  to  understand  that  Wollaston  speaks  of 
actions  which  express  merely  intellectual  meaning,  such  as 
gestures  and  pantomimes,  and  also  of  actions  expressive  of 
character,  moral  action.  This  confusion  is  made  evident  by 
what  follows.  Clarke  says  that  all  that  Wollaston  can  mean 
is  that  an  action  may  convey  a false  impression  “even  where 
a person  has  no  intention  by  his  action  of  conveying  any 
such  sense  to  the  minds  of  others.”  Clarke  goes  on  to  say 
that  “the  difficulty  of  making  a determination  will  grow  with 
the  number  of  significations  the  same  action  may  have  . . . 
to  different  people.”  The  civility  of  a sharper,  for  ex- 
ample, makes  a very  different  impression  upon  a green-hom 
to  that  made  upon  a man  of  the  world.  His  actions,  how- 
ever, are  precisely  the  same  in  the  two  instances.^®  “But,” 
says  Clarke,  “supposing  actions  rightly  denominated  im- 
moral did  really  imply  a denial  of  the  truth  ...  a denial 
of  things  to  be  what  they  are;  yet  how  will  it  follow  from 
such  a denial,  that  those  actions  therefore  are  truly  and 
properly  Immoral,  that  is  contrary  to  the  will  and  good 
pleasure  of  God,  declared  by  the  voice  of  reason,  or  the 
light  of  nature?” 

Having  defined  truth  and  goodness  and  determined  the 
nature  of  each  Wollaston,  next,  proceeds  to  illustrate  each. 
His  first  case  is  an  example  of  an  act  which  affirms  a false 
proposition  to  be  true  or  denies  a true  proposition  to  be 
false.  It  is  that  of  a body  of  soldiers  firing  upon  another 
body  thinking  them  to  be  enemies  when  they  are  friends. 

“J.  Clarke,  etc.,  from  p.  19.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  31. 

“J.  Clai-ke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  20. 

'“Ibid.,  p.  19. 

Ibid.,  p.  21. 

Ibid.,  p.  35. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  43 

This  case  of  the  soldiers  illustrates  actions  that  express  or 
deny  true  relations,  but  not  acts  expressive  of  character, 
since  they  are  based  on  error.  True,  as  Wollaston  says, 
the  truth  or  falsity  “does  not  depend  upon  the  affirmer’s 
knowledge  or  ignorance” ; because  words  have  a fixed  mean- 
ing and  do,  as  a matter  of  fact,  conform,  “agree  or  disagree 
to  that,  concerning  which  the  affirmation  is  made.”  But  is 
he  not  confusing  the  intellectual  and  the  moral  when  he 
goes  on  to  say : “The  thing  is  the  same  still,  if  into  the  place 
of  words  be  substituted  actions?”  No,  for  actions  of  this 
kind  could  have  no  moral  character  and  so  would  be  ac- 
tions of  the  pantomime  order  expressing  meaning,  not  char- 
acter. “The  salute  here  was  in  nature  the  salute  of  an 
enemy,  but  should  have  been  the  salute  of  a friend;  therefore 
it  implied  a falsity,”  but  no  moral  character  attaches  to  it. 
This,  I take  it,  like  acts  of  the  gesture  and  pantomime  va- 
riety, “do  not  come  up”  to  Wollaston’s  “meaning.” 

Wollaston,  then,  gives  instances  of  the  “acts  of  the  other 
kind,  such  as  constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct 
in  life.”  “When  Popilius  Laenas  solicited  to  have  Cicero 
proscribed,  and  that  he  might  find  him  out  and  be  his  exe- 
cutioner, would  not  his  carriage  have  sufficiently  signified 
to  any  one,  who  was  ignorant  of  the  case,  that  Tully  either 
was  some  very  bad  man,  and  deserved  capital  punishment ; 
or  had  some  way  grievously  injured  this  man ; or  at  least  had 
not  saved  his  life,  nor  had  as  much  reason  to  expect  his 
service  and  good  offices  upon  occasion,  as  he  ever  had  to  ex- 
pect Tully’s?  And  all  these  things  being  false,  were  not  his 
behavior  and  actions  expressive  of  that  which  was  false,  or 
contradictions  to  truth?  It  is  certain  he  acted  as  if  those 
things  had  been  true,  which  were  not  true,  and  as  if  those 
had  not  been  true  which  were  true  (in  this  consisted  the  fault 
of  his  ingratitude)  ; and  if  he  in  words  had  said  they  were 
true  or  not  true,  he  had  done  no  more  than  talk  as  if  they 
were  so ; why  then  should  not  to  act  as  if  they  were  true 
or  not  true,  when  they  were  otherwise,  contradict  truth  as 
much  as  to  say  they  were  so,  when  they  were  not  so.” 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  9. 

“Ibid.,  p.  9. 


44 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


John  Clarke  thinks  that  this  criterion  of  Wollaston  which 
undertakes  to  explicate  morality  in  terms  of  truth  is  a fail- 
ure. He  thinks  that  the  matter  of  agreement  to  truth  is 
ethically  speaking  irrelevant  and  undertakes  to  prove  this 
by  a consideration  of  Wollaston’s  own  cases.  Clarke  says 
“It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  instances  of  actions,  very 
serious  in  their  significations,  some  of  which  would  be  agree- 
able to  truth,  others  not.”  Take  Wollaston’s  case  of  Popil- 
lius  Laenas’  solicitation  to  have  Cicero  proscribed.  The 
absolute  irrelevance  of  conformity  or  non-conformity  of  ac- 
tions to  truth  is  quite  apparent,  he  thinks.  Clarke  says  that 
by  Wollaston’s  own  confession  Laenas’  action  had  various 
significations  “to  any  one,  who  was  ignorant  of  the  case,” 
namely,  “that  Tully  either  was  some  very  bad  man,”  or  “had 
not  saved  his  life,”  or  “had  in  some  way  grievously  injured 
this  man.”  Clarke  asks  “what  would  that  carriage  of  his 
have  signified  to  any  one  that  was  not  ignorant  of  the  case, 
but  knew  Tully  to  be  ‘a  person  of  eminent  parts,  learning, 
eloquence  and  virtue,  that  had  merited  highly  from  his 
country,  and  particularly  from  Laenas,  whose  life  he  had 
saved  Why  ’tis  as  clear  as  the  sun  can  be  at  noonday, 
that  to  such  a person  it  would  have  had  no  one  of  those 
various  significations,  but  only  this,  that  Laenas  was  what 
the  world  calls  an  ungrateful  profligate  villain.’  ” I am 
very  sure  that  Clarke  has  not  refuted  Wollaston.  He  has 
not  proved  the  irrelevance  of  the  principle  of  agreeableness 
to  truth.  To  be  sure  the  actions  of  Laenas  would  have  had 
a much  more  definite  signification  to  one  familiar  to  the  case; 
but  Wollaston  says,  that  to  even  one  entirely  ignorant  of 
the  case,  his  “carriage”  clearly  “signified”  that  he  was  act- 
ing inconsistently  with  relations  of  a friendly  kind  obtaining 
between  Cicero  and  himself.  Wollaston  is  only  concerned 
to  say  that  Laenas’  actions  were  unfitting  to  the  circum- 
stances, that  his  action  would  naturally  lead  one  ignorant 
of  the  circumstances  to  infer  that  they  were  quite  otherwise. 
In  a word  his  “carriage”  was  indicative  of  evil,  not  good. 
But  says  Clarke  “since  the  same  actions  have  various  sig- 
nificances . . . our  author’s  new  scheme  of  morality  appears 
^J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  24. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  45 

clogged  with  insuperable  difficulties,”  because  we  cannot  tell 
“what  significations  we  are  to  have  regard  to,  in  forming 
a judgment  of  the  morality  or  immorality  of  human  ac- 
tions.” No,  Wollaston  says  the  relations  concerning  per- 
sons are  the  ones  to  have  particular  “regard  to”  although 
everything  should  be  treated  as  what  it  is.  However  various 
the  significations  of  the  actions  of  Laenas  to  the  different 
casual  observers  they  made  one  general  impression.^^ 

In  regard  to  these  two  instances  we  could  wish  more 
clearness  on  one  point,  namely,  that  of  making  clear  that 
in  the  first  example  the  objectively  inappropriate  act,  act 
not  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things,  was  done  ignor- 
antly and  innocently.  Whereas  in  the  second  instance  the 
objectively  inappropriate  and  incongruous  act  was  done  in- 
telligently and  wilfully,  and  was,  consequently,  not  only 
objectively  bad  but  also  morally  wrong.  Wollaston  makes 
the  distinction  but  not  as  clearly  as  he  might  have  done.  He 
should  have  emphasized  the  fact  that  in  the  first  instance 
there  was  conformity  of  acts  to  the  nature  of  things  as  they 
were  thought  to  be,  while  in  the  second  instance  the  non- 
conformity was  in  the  face  of  known  facts.  He  undoubtedly 
intended  for  these  two  instances  to  show  that  immorality  is 
as  self-contradictory  as  intellectual  contradiction.  “If  he 
in  words  had  said  that  they  were  true  or  not  true,  he  had 
done  no  more  than  talk  as  if  they  were  so ; why  then  should 
not  to  act  as  if  they  were  true  or  not  true,  when  they  were 
otherwise,  contradict  truth  as  much  as  to  say  they  were  so, 
when  they  were  not  so.”  I think  that  Wollaston  labors 
unnecessarily  hard  to  try  to  show  that  a truth  can  be  denied 
by  actions  as  well  as  by  words,  unless  he  means  thereby 
rnore  than  the  mere  fact  that  there  are  significant  acts. 

I think  that  these  two  illustrations  answer  the  objection 
that  the  intention  of  the  actor  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
morality  of  the  act.  I think,  however,  that  his  lack  of  clar- 
ity in  distinguishing  between  the  two  types  of  actions  was 
responsible  for  the  false  interpretation.  John  Clarke,  in 

®‘J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  25. 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  31. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  9. 


46 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


Wollaston’s  lifetime,  offered  this  criticism  of  his  system. 
John  Clarke  says  that  “actions  whether  words  are  deeds  can- 
not be  properly  said  to  deny  or  affirm  anything,”  since 
“affirming  and  denying  are  actions”  the  terms  are  only  “ap- 
plicable to  agents.”  Clarke  says  that  the  objection  may 
be  made  that  this  is  a “nice  distinction.”  He  answers  that 
“it  is  not  more  nice  than  necessary”  because  one  cannot 
affirm  or  deny  without  an  intention  to  do  so.  “A  man  is 
then,  and  then  only,  said  to  affirm  or  deny  a thing  when  he 
conveys  a pi’oposition  in  lus  own  mind  to  the  minds  of  others ; 
as  expressing  his  own  sense  of  apprehension  or  persuasion 
of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  things.”  Clarke  says 
that  it  matters  not  what  meaning  his  words  or  actions  may 
“excite  in  the  minds  of  those  that  hear  the  one,  or  see  the 
other”  a man  can  only  be  said  to  affirm  or  deny  when  he 
intends  to  do  so.  He  takes  the  case  of  “orders  given  in  a 
nation  under  the  apprehension  of  an  invasion  from  an  ene- 
my.” The  order  was  “that  beacons  should  be  fired,  or 
lights  set  up  ...  to  give  warning  of  the  enemy’s  approach.” 
The  lighting  of  the  beacons  “would  be  equivalent  to  the 
proposition,  the  enemy  is  come ; and  might  be  said  thereby  to 
affirm  a truth,  if  the  enemy  was  come,  and  a lie  if  he  was 
not,  because  this  was  really  meant  and  intended.”  But 
suppose  some  one  ignorant  of  the  orders  should  fire  a bea- 
con, “he  could  not  be  said  thereby  to  ‘affirm  that  the  enemy 
has  come,’  notwithstanding  their  actions  would  necessarily 
convey  that  proposition  to  the  minds  of  such  as,  being  ac- 
quainted with  the  orders,  should  see  the  lights ; and  that  for 
this  reason  only,  because  he  had  not  the  least  intention  to 
affirm  anything.”  This  is  a case  like  the  first  one  mentioned 
by  Wollaston.  It  is  illustrative  of  actions  of  the  non-moral 
type,  illustrative  of  actions  of  the  gesture  or  pantomime 
variety  which  express  only  meaning.  Wollaston  is  as  equally 
insistent  as  John  Clarke  that  no  moral  quality  attaches  to 
actions  of  this  kind.  Such  evil  as  results  from  mistakes  of 
this  kind  does  not  constitute  moral  but  only  natural  evil. 

“ J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  6. 

«Ibid.,  p.  9. 

« Ibid.,  p.  10. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  47 

So  of  course  an  innocent  action  cannot  “deny”  in  the  ethical 
sense  of  the  term. 

Wollaston  anticipates  this  objection  when  he  says:  “I 
lay  this  down  then  as  a fundamental  maxim,  that  whoever 
acts  as  if  things  were  so,  or  not  so,  doth  by  his  acts  declare, 
that  they  are  so  or  not  so ; as  plainly  as  he  could  by  words, 
and  with  more  reality.  And  if  things  are  otherwise,  his  acts 
contradict  those  propositions,  which,  assert  them  to  be  as 
they  are.”  Now  John  Clark  argues  that  if  one  is  mis- 
taken he  does  not  really  act.  He  violates  truth,  he  says, 
but  he  does  not  act  in  any  moral  sense.  He  thinks  that 
Wollaston  fails  to  make  this  all-important  distinction.  I 
am  very  sure  that  he  does  make  the  distinction,  for  he  says 
that  “No  act  of  any  being,  to  whom  moral  good  and  evil  is 
imputable,  that  interferes  with  any  true  proposition,  or 
denies  anything  to  be  as  it  is,  can  be  right.”  And  “to 
whom”  are  “moral  good  and  evil  . . . imputable?”  This 
he  answers  precisely  as  Clarke  does ; “That  act,  which  may 
be  denominated  morally  good  or  evil,  must  be  the  act  of  a 
being  capable  of  distinguishing,  choosing,  and  acting  for 
himself ; ...  an  intelligent  and  free  agent.  Because  in 
proper  speaking  no  act  at  all  can  be  ascribed  to  that  which 
is  not  indued  with  these  capacities.” 

John  Clarke  thinks  that  the  rightness  or  wrongness  of 
actions  is  determined  by  the  intention  of  the  actor  and  he 
understands  Wollaston  to  teach  that  “the  immorality  of  the 
action  is  exclusive  of  the  intention,”  that  he  who  has  no 
intention  to  deny  the  truth  is  equally  guilty  with  the  one 
who  knows  and  intends  to  deny  it.^°  “If  therefore  nobody 
can  be  said  to  affirm  or  deny  anything,  without  an  intention 
so  to  do,  I douht  the  greatest  villains,  will,  according  to 
Mr.  Wollaston’s  doctrine,  stand  discharged  from  the  guilt 
of  the  greatest  of  crimes ; since  they  are  so  far  from  intend- 
ing the  denial  of  any  truth,  any  true  proposition  whatso- 
ever, by  the  rapine  and  murder  they  are  guilty  of,  that 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  13. 

” Ibid.,  Prop.  IV,  p.  13. 

**  Ibid.,  Sec.  I,  Intro.,  p.  6. 

"J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  12. 


48 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


they  never  so  much  as  once  imagine,  their  actions  have 
any  such  tendency,  meaning  or  significance  at  all.”  Clarke 
must,  I think,  admit  that  the  criminal  is  conscious  of  deny- 
ing many  significant  life  relations.  A villain  who  demands 
a man’s  money  does  not,  he  says,  “intend  thereby  the  denial 
of  any  truth.”  He  says  “the  truth  that  the  money  belongs 
to  the  traveller”  is  not,  as  Wollaston  claims,  “denied  by  such 
an  action.”  The  action  has  rather  the  contrary  signfica- 
tion.'^^  To  be  sure  the  very  essence  of  wrong  consists  in 
denying  by  actions,  or  “practically  denying”  that  which 
must  be  assented  to  intellectually.  The  trouble  is  Clarke 
tliinks  that  there  is  only  one  way  to  deny  truth  and  strictly 
speaking  there  is  only  one  way,  but  treating  things  as  they 
are  not  denies  by  action  that  which  must  be  assented  to  as 
fact. 

John  Clarke  next  offers  a dilemmatical  argument  against 
Wollaston’s  doctrine:  “Take  it  which  way  you  will,  whether 
an  intention  to  deny  the  truth  be  made  necessary  or  not 
necessary  to  the  immorality  of  an  action,  Mr.  Wollaston’s 
doctrine  cannot  stand.  Upon  the  former  supposition,  the 
greatest  rogues  will  be  excusable  in  the  vilest  of  actions  for 
want  of  this  intention  to  deny  the  truth,  as  it  is  very  certain 
that  they  have  it  not.  . . . And  upon  the  supposition  that 
an  intent  to  deny  truth  is  not  necessary  to  the  inunorality 
of  an  action,  but  that  it  is  sufficient  to  render  an  action 
immoral,  that  it  has  a meaning  inconsistent  with  some  truth, 
though  the  agent  has  not  the  least  intention  of  denying  any 
truth ; I say  upon  this  supposition  it  will  be  a crime,  and  as 
great  a crime  to  deny  the  truth  through  ignorance,  as  to 
do  it  wittingly  and  knowingly,  with  a perverse  and  malicious 
intention.”  I would  like  to  ask  Clarke  what  the  intention 
of  the  rogue  is  if  it  is  not  to  take  something  for  liis  own 
that  belongs  to  some  one  else.?  The  rogue,  by  his  action, 
does  practically  deny  truth,  for  he  denies  things  and  rela- 
tions to  be  as  they  are,  and  he  intends  to  deny  these  essential 
relations.  Wollaston,  as  much  as  Clarke,  believes  that  the 

■“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  11. 

" Ibid.,  p.  11. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  13. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  49 

morality  of  an  action  is  dependent  upon  the  intention  of  the 
agent,  in  the  sense  that  no  act  could  be  said  to  be  good  with- 
out this  good  intention.  His  position  is  that  all  facts  must 
be  considered  and  that  an  act  is  not  really  good,  in  the  high- 
est sense,  unless  the  intention  as  well  as  the  results  are  good. 
Intentions  as  well  as  expected  consequences  must  enter  into 
the  motivation.^^  This  is  not,  however,  inconsistent  with  an 
objective  conception  of  morahty,  for  by  the  objectivity  of 
Ethics  we  only  mean  that  the  real  natures  of  things  deter- 
mine what  our  intentions  ought  to  be.  The  good  man  is  one 
who  strives  to  conform  to  the  nature  of  things. 

That  my  interpretation  of  Wollaston  is  the  correct  one 
is  made  even  more  evident  by  his  third  instance.  In  this 
case  a man  promises  that  he  will  never  do  a thing  and  then 
does  it.  The  act,  Wollaston  says,  interferes  with  his  prom- 
ise and  is  contrary  to  it,  and  is  as  contradictory  as  saying 
that  A made  the  promise  and  then  straightway  say  that 
he  did  not  make  it.  True,  the  proposition  is  as  much  denied 
by  A’s  behavior,  as  it  would  be  by  an  actual  verbal  denial; 
but  that  is  very  different  from  saying  that,  morally  or 
otherwise,  they  are  the  same  kind  of  denials.  If  he  thought 
that  they  were  the  same,  why  should  he,  over  and  over  again, 
mention  both  kinds.'’  He,  clearly,  it  seems  to  me,  means 
that  moral  inconsistency  is  a form  of  inconsistency;  but  he 
does  not  mean  to  identify  it  with  the  intellectual  inconsis- 
tency of  self-contradictory  propositions.  “If  then  the  be- 
havior of  A be  inconsistent  with  the  agreement  mentioned  in 
the  former  proposition,  that  proposition  is  as  much  denied 
by  A’s  behavior,  as  it  can  be  by  the  latter,  or  any  other 
proposition.  Or  thus,  if  one  proposition  imports  or  con- 
tains that  which  is  contrary  to  what  is  contained  in  another, 
it  is  said  to  contradict  this  other,  and  denies  the  existence 
of  what  is  contained  in  it.  Just  so  if  one  act  imports  that 
which  is  contrary  to  the  import  of  another,  it  contradicts 
this  other  and  denies  its  existence.  In  a word  A by  his 
actions  denies  the  engagements  to  which  he  hath  subjected 
himself.”  Acts  that  do  this,  though,  are  not  acts  of  the 

**  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  11. 


50 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


gesture  or  pantomime  variety  which  are  but  forms  of  lan- 
guage; but  are  “such  acts  as  constitute  the  character  of  a 
man’s  conduct  in  life”  and  have  a moral  “signification.” 
Wollaston  says  “In  common  speech  we  say  some  actions  are 
insignificant,  which  would  not  be  sense,  if  there  were  not 
some  acts  that  are  significant,  that  have  a tendency  and  a 
meaning.”  Acts,  he  is  sajung,  have  a significance  for  life 
and  character,  a moral  signification,  as  well  as  intellectual 
significance.  True,  he  again  uses  an  analogy  to  make  clear 
his  meaning,  and,  as  before,  he  succeeds  in  clouding  up  his 
meaning  instead  of  clearing  it  up.  Actions,  he  says,  are 
significant  or  insignificant;  “And  this  is  as  much  as  can  be 
said  of  articulate  sounds,  that  they  are  either  significant 
or  insignificant.”  Just  as  some  articulate  sounds  have  sig- 
nificance and  some  have  not,  so  of  actions.  He  is,  of  course, 
using  significance  in  two  very  different  senses, — moral  and 
intellectual.^® 

The  failure  of  Wollaston  to  clearly  differentiate  between 
moral  and  intellectual  signification  constitutes  the  ground 
of  the  criticism  by  John  Clai’ke.  He  says  that  in  regard  to 
this  case  of  A making  a promise  to  B not  to  do  a thing,  and 
then  doing  it,  there  are  ten  equally  possible  significations. 
Suppose  one  of  the  significations  to  be  true,  the  rest  would 
of  necessity  all  be  false.  Now,  according  to  Wollaston’s 
rule,  thinks  Clarke,  the  actions,  however  innocent,  must  be 
condemned  as  immoral;  because  “no  act  that  interferes  with 
any  true  proposition  can  be  right”  and  this  one  “has  so 
many  various  meanings,  all  inconsistent  with  the  truth.” 
But  none  of  the  nine  possible  significations,  are,  as  a matter 
of  fact,  time,  so  no  action  can  be  in  violation  of  them. 

I wish  to  mention  one  more  of  the  illustrations  of  Wollas- 
ton, because  it  is  the  original  source  of  the  most  common 
criticism  against  him,  namely,  that  he  reduces  all  immorality 
to  lying.  Isaac  told  Abimelek  that  Rebekah  was  his  sister, 
but  after  this  the  king  saw  Isaac  sporting  and  taking  con- 
jugal liberties  with  her.  These  acts,  says  Wollaston,  denied 
that  she  was  his  sister  and  affirmed  her  to  be  either  his  wife 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  11. 

*’J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  pp.  27-30, 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  51 

or  concubine.  A man  may  so  live  that  his  “whole  conduct 
breathes  untruth.  May  we  not  say”  of  such  a man  “that  he 
lives  a lie.?”  Wollaston  does  not  say,  as  his  critics  accuse 
him  of  saying,  that  bad  acts  are  just  different  ways  of  ly- 
ing;— that  would  reduce  all  actions  to  the  gesture  and  pan- 
tomime type  of  actions.  To  act  a lie  means  simply  to  be 
false  to  significant  life  relations  and  meanings,  and  certainly 
this  is  what  he  means  by  saying  “his  whole  conduct  breathes 
untruth”  and  “he  lives  a lie.”  The  immoral  act  in  this  case 
was  literal  lying.  Isaac,  knowingly  and  deliberately,  con- 
fused ontological  predicates  in  his  statement  to  Abimelek 
of  the  relations  that  obtained  between  Rebekah  and  him- 
self.'^s 

Wollaston  recapitulates  the  argument  of  this  division,  and 
this  recapitulation  might  well  serve  as  an  epitome  of  his 
analogous  treatment  of  truth  and  goodness : “I  lay  this 

down  as  a fundamental  maxim,  that  whoever  acts  as  if  things 
were  so,  or  not  so,  doth  by  his  acts  declare  that  they  are  so 
or  not  so ; as  plainly  as  he  could  by  words,  and  with  more 
reality.”  Is  not  his  meaning  very  clear.?  “As  plainly”: 
the  contradiction  is  as  evident,  but  not  the  same  kind  of 
thing,  ^or  the  one  is  logical  and  the  other  ethical  in  character. 
He  says  “with  more  reality,”  because  intellectually  speaking, 
true  propositions  cannot  be  denied.  Immoral  acts  do  not 
deny  true  propositions  to  be  intellectually  true,  but  they 
do  “practically”  deny  them  to  be  true.  In  the  practical 
denial  of  that  to  which  one  intellectually  assents  consists 
the  inconsistency  of  immorality.  The  critics,  from  the  time 
of  Garve  and  Clarke  to  the  present,  have  interpreted  this 
passage  as  meaning  that  immoral  acts  are  false  judgments 
in  regard  to  the  nature  of  things. 

IV 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  defines  morality  negatively 
by  saying  that  contradictory  acts  cannot  be  right.  “No 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  12. 

■“  Ibid.,  p.  ik 

Ibid.,  p.  13. 


52 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


act  of  any  being,  to  whom  moral  good  or  evil  is  imputable, 
that  interferes  with  any  true  proposition,  or  denies  any- 
thing to  be  as  it  is,  can  be  right.” 

1.  Wollaston’s  first  proof  of  this  proposition  is  as  fol- 
lows : “If  that  proposition,  which  is  false,  be  wrong,  that 
act  which  implies  such  a proposition,  or  is  founded  in  it, 
cannot  be  I’ight;  because  it  is  the  very  proposition  itself  in 
practice.”  Mere  propositions  cannot  be  right  or  wrong, 
if  right  and  wrong  are  given  an  ethical  connotation.  Were 
this  sentence  alone  considered  we  might  think  that  Wollaston 
is  using  “wrong”  with  an  ethical  connotation,  for  he  does 
use  “right”  with  an  undoubted  ethical  connotation  in  the 
same  sentence.  In  the  very  next  paragraph,  however,  he 
makes  it  very  clear  that  his  use  of  the  word  “wrong”  is  not 
moral  but  natural  and  intellectual.  This  constitutes  his 
second.  John  Clarke  very  properly  takes  Wollaston  to  task 
for  the  two  meanings  given  to  “wrong.”  He  says  “The 
terms  of  right  and  wi’ong  are  not  applicable  to  propositions 
at  all,  in  any  moral  sense.  . . . Right  and  wrong  are  de- 
nominations given  to  things,  upon  account  of  their  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  with  some  rule,  to  which  they  are  re- 
ferred, and  by  which  they  are  judged  of.  Now,  the  only 
rule  to  which  propositions,  considered  as  true  or  false,  are 
referred,  and  by  which  they  are  judged  of,  is  the  nature  and 
existence  of  tilings.  Such  propositions  as  are  conformable 
thereto  may  be,  and  are  properly  called  ‘right,’  those  that 
are  not,  ‘wrong.’  ” Clarke  says  that  this  means  that 
Wollaston’s  proof  will  reduce  to  the  “trifling”  statement 
“that  the  proposition  which  is  false  is  false.”  Wollaston  had 
set  out  to  prove,  “not  that  actions  which  imply  denial  of  the 
truth,  cannot  be  declarative  of  the  truth  they  deny,  . . . but 
that  such  actions  are  immoral.” 

2.  “Those  propositions,  which  are  true,  and  express 
things  as  they  are,  express  the  relation  between  the  subject 
and  the  attribute  as  it  is ; that  is,  this  is  either  affirmed  or 
denied  of  that  according  to  the  nature  of  the  relation. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  13. 

“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  37. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  39. 


63 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

And,  further,  this  relation  is  determined  and  fixed  by  the  na- 
tures of  the  things  themselves.”  In  other  words  one  cannot 
deny  such  relations,  as  actually  existent,  and  be  considered 
sane.  Then  follows  the  moral  part  of  the  argument:  “There- 
fore nothing  can  interfere  with  any  proposition  that  is  true, 
but  it  must  likewise  interfere  with  nature,  and  consequently 
be  unnatural  or  wrong  in  nature.”  In  criticising  tbis 
second  proof  that  nothing  can  interfere  with  truth  “but  it 
must  likewise  interfere  with  nature”  and  so  be  wrong,  John 
Clarke  says,  that  “interfering  with  nature  . . . can  here 
signify”  only  “false,”  not  moral  “wrong.”  So  that  Wol- 
laston’s way  of  proving  actions  . . . that  deny  truth  to  be 
immoral,  ...  is  but  affirming  over  and  over  again  . . . 
that  actions  that  deny  truth  deny  truth.®”  I do  not  see  the 
special  force  of  this  objection,  because  saying  that  truth  is 
conformity  to  nature  is  saying  something  more  than  that 
truth  is  truth.  It  is  sa}ung  that  truth  is  objective,  and  by 
saying  that  morality  is  in  conformity  to  nature  or  to  tiaith 
we  are  saying  that  morality  is  also  objective. 

3.  For  a third  argument  for  his  thesis  that  contradictory 
acts  cannot  be  right,  he  says,  “if  there  is  a Supreme  Being, 
upon  whom  the  existence  of  the  world  depends,”  then  there 
can  be  nothing  in  it  but  “what  he  causes”;  then  “to  own 
things  to  be  as  they  are  is  to  own  what  he  causes ; . . . and 
this  is  to  take  things  as  he  planned  them  in  his  constitution 
of  the  world.”  The  duty  of  man  consists  in  submitting  to  his 
will  “revealed  in  the  book  of  nature.”  The  “owning  of 
things,  in  all  our  conduct,  to  be  as  they  are,  is  obedience 
. . . to  the  author  of  nature.”  Wollaston’s  conception  of 
the  place  of  the  will  in  morality  is  made  quite  evident  here: 
“The  relation  that  lies  between  this  and  that  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  one  may  be  affirmed  of  the  other,  this  is  true; 
but  yet  to  me  it  shall  not  be  so ; I will  not  act  as  if  it  were 
so.”  Wollaston  says  that  one  can  say  for  himself ; I will 
not  follow  the  laws  of  nature,  “even  existence  shall  be  non- 
existence, when  my  pleasure  requires.  Such  an  impious 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  13. 

“ J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  39. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  14. 


54s 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


declaration  as  this  attends  every  voluntary  infraction  of 
truth.”  What  Wollaston  is,  here,  saying,  in  effect,  is 
this  “conformity  to  nature”  is  the  standard  of  both  truth 
and  goodness ; but  “to  own  things  to  be  as  they  are”  in  our 
thinking  is  necessitated,  while  the  “owning  of  things,  in  all 
our  conduct,  to  be  as  they  are”  is  a matter  of  freedom. 
This  constitutes  the  essential  difference  between  intellectual 
and  moral  relations.  John  Clarke’s  criticism  of  this  point 
fails  to  take  this  into  consideration.  He  thinks  that  every- 
thing in  the  world  is  as  God  would  have  it  be,  failing  to  con- 
sider the  ill  effects  wrought  by  men  through  the  mis-use  of 
their  freedom.  John  Clarke  says  that  for  the  rich  to  relieve 
the  poor  is  not  “taking  things  as  God  has  given  them,”  but 
“altering  things  that  God  has  caused  or  permitted  to  be.” 
The  neglect  of  the  poor  more  truly  “leaves  things  in  the 
condition  he  has  caused  or  permitted  to  be,  and  which  his 
constitution  of  things  suffered  to  remain  unaltered.®® 

4.  The  fourth  argument  for  the  thesis,  that  contradic- 
tory acts  cannot  be  right,  is  that  things  cannot  be  denied  to 
be  what  they  are  without  contradicting  axiomatic  and  eternal 
truth,  such  as  “everything  is  what  it  is.”  Now  there  are 
immutable  truths,  which  have  “always  subsisted  in  the  di- 
vine mind,”  the  denial  of  these  is  a denial  of  God.  The  na- 
ture of  things  cannot  be  denied  existentially,  but  only  mor- 
ally. Intellectually  we  cannot  deny  the  existence  of  things 
to  be  as  they  are,  and  morally  things  should  be  treated  as 
they  are. 

5.  This  fact  is  further  emphasized;  “Designedly  to 
treat  things  as  being  what  they  are  not  is  the  greatest  pos- 
sible absurdity.”  To  get  Wollaston’s  meaning  we  must  get 
the  full  force  of  the  word  “designedly.”  The  kind  of  con- 
tradiction which  immorality  makes,  is  that  of  “designedly” 
treating  “things  as  what  they  are  not.”  This  is  contradic- 
tory, because  one  must,  at  the  same  time,  assent  to  the  truth, 
that  is,  admit  things  to  be  what  they  are.  To  act  immorally 
is  to  act  inconsistently,  or  as  Wollaston  expresses  it,  “to 
put  bitter  for  .sweet,  darkness  for  light,  crooked  for  straight. 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  14. 

J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  41. 


65 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

It  is  to  subvert  all  science,  to  renounce  all  sense  of  truth, 
and  flatly  to  deny  the  existence  of  anything.  For  nothing 
can  be  true,  nothing  does  exist,  if  things  are  not  what  they 
are”;  and  he  who  acts  immorally,  thinks  Wollaston,  prac- 
tically wills  these  contradictions  an  existence.®® 

John  Clarke  comments  on  the  statement  of  Wollaston, 
“that  to  treat  things  as  not  being  what  they  are  is  to  put 
bitter  for  sweet,  darkness  for  light,  crooked  for  straight” 
by  saying  that  this  is  just  stating  “that  the  denial  of  truth 
is  the  denial  of  truth.®®  Clarke  fails  to  consider  that  Wol- 
laston is  saying  that  these  matters  of  fact  cannot  be  denied, 
“but  that  to  treat  things  as  not  being  what  they  are”  is  as 
equally  contradictory.  He  pretends  to  believe  Wollaston 
to  teach  that  immoral  men  have  actually  denied  these  mat- 
ters of  fact.  Wollaston  means  to  say  that  to  act  immorally 
is  as  contradictory  as  “to  put  bitter  for  sweet,  etc.  It  is  to 
subvert  all  science,  renounce  all  sense  of  truth,  flatly  to  deny 
the  existence  of  anything,”  but  this  Clarke  takes  literally. 
So  he  asks : “How  has  poor  science  done  to  subsist  in  the 
world,  under  such  terrible  and  furious  assaults,  from  the 
vices  and  follies  of  men.?”  ®^  This  criticism  is  based  entirely 
upon  a confused  interpretation.  Leslie  Stephen,  laboring 
under  the  same  mis-interpretation  says  that  Wollaston  is 
arguing  the  impossibility  of  immorality.®^  Both  men  fail 
to  get  the  significance  of  the  difference  between  denying 
truth  and  “practically”  denying  it.  The  truth  of  the  matter 
is  that  a man  can,  in  practice,  deny  truth;  but  even  while 
so  acting  one  gives  his  assent  to  the  truth  of  the  proposition 
practically  denied.  The  intellect  is  determined  in  its  reac- 
tions, the  will  is  not,  consequently  immorality  is  not  impos- 
sible. So,  in  acts,  one  can  deny  what  cannot  be  denied  as 
truth.  The  contradiction  consists  in  affirming  and  denying 
at  the  same  time;  and  this  is  what  all  immorality  does,  for 
morality  attaches  only  to  intelligent  and  free  acts.®® 

Wollaston  ends  this  paragraph  by  an  illustration  of 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  IS. 

‘“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  44. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  45. 

“L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  p.  7. 

“ S.  Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  188.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  14. 


56 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


“designedly  treating  things  as  being  what  they  are  not.” 
In  this  example  he  makes  very  clear  the  differentia  of  immor- 
ality. Immorality  is  as  absurd,  he  says,  as  saying  that 
things  that  are  are  not,  as  absurd  as  saying  that  A is  at 
the  same  time  both  A and  not- A.  But  Wollaston  does  not 
say  that  all  such  practical  denials  of  evident  truth  are 
immoral,  and  not  all  practical  affirmations  of  evident  truth 
are  moral.  The  first  sentence  in  the  work  of  Wollaston 
states  that  there  are  good,  bad  and  indifferent  acts  of  men. 
These  indifferent  acts  either  conform  to  truth  or  conflict 
with  truth.  Mere  conformity  to  some  truth,  then,  does  not 
make  an  act  good.  The  mere  violation  of  truth  is  not  im- 
moral. The  nature  and  importance  of  the  truths  conformed 
to  or  violated  is  an  important  factor  in  determining  whether 
an  act  has  moral  character  or  whether  it  is  morally  indiffer- 
ent. It  is  true  that  Wollaston  does  say  that  he  would  have 
everything  treated  as  what  it  is  and  that  the  thought  of  any 
truth  suffering  violation  is  shocking  to  him,  still  he  grants 
that  there  are  acts  that  are  practically  indifferent,  morally 
considered.®^  “To  talk  to  a post,  or  otherwise  treat  it  as  if 
it  was  a man,  would  surely  be  reckoned  an  absurdity.  Why.^ 
because  this  is  to  treat  it  as  being  what  it  is  not.”  It  is, 
though,  not  immoi'al  but  only  absurd  to  treat  a post  as  a 
man.  The  converse,  that  is  to  treating  a man  as  a post, 
constitutes  immorality.  He  says  “to  treat  a man  as  a post 
should  ...  be  reckoned  as  bad,”  because  it  practically 
denies  him  to  be  a man  and  treats  him  “as  if  he  had  no  sense 
and  felt  no  injuries,  which  he  doth  feel.”  Treating  a man 
as  a post  is  bad  and  not  only  absurd,  because  it  is  acting 
towards  him  “as  if  to  him  pain  and  sorrow  were  not  pain, 
happiness  not  happiness.  This  is  what  the  cruel  and  unjust 
often  do.”  It  is  quite  certain  that  Wollaston  does  not 
here  confuse  the  intellectual  and  the  moral  relations,  what- 
ever he  may  do  elsewhere.  It  is  not  immoral,  but  only  ab- 
surd, to  treat  a post  with  the  same  consideration  with  which 
one  would  treat  a man;  but  to  treat  a man  as  a post  is  a 
very  different  kind  of  thing,  for  such  treatment  violates  the 

Wollaston,  Reli.  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  20  and  23. 

Ibid.,  p.  15. 


57 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

nature  of  humanity.  The  one  is  merely  acting  incongru- 
ously or  absurdly.  The  other  action  is  equally  incongruous 
and  absurd,  but  since  personality  is  the  truth  here  violated 
the  act  is  also  morally  bad.  This  instance  also  meets  the 
criticism  that  Wollaston  gives  no  consideration  to  feelings, 
for  the  immorality  of  treating  a man  as  a post  he  makes  to 
consist,  largely,  in  the  disregard  of  the  man’s  feelings.®® 

.6.  His  last  argument  for  the  truth  of  his  proposition  is 
as  follows : “To  deny  things  to  be  as  they  are  is  a trans- 

gression of  the  great  law  of  our  nature,  the  law  of  reason.” 
When  we  choose  something  contrary  to  truth,  that  is,  make 
a moral  choice  which  contradicts  the  true  nature  of  things 
we  thereby  violate  reason;  “For  truth  cannot  be  opposed, 
but  reason  must  be  violated.”  Wollaston  here,  gives  us  his 
idea  of  conscience:  “If  I may  judge  by  what  I feel  within 
myself,  the  least  truth  cannot  be  contradicted  without  much 
reluctance;  even  to  see  others  disregard  it  “does  something 
more  than  displease;  it  is  shocking.”  It  violates  the  law  of 
our  being,  our  rational  nature.®^ 

V 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  says  that  truth  is  as  much 
violated  by  sins  of  omission  as  by  sins  of  commission.  He 
says  that  by  omissions,  or  failing  to  act  when  one  ought  to 
act,  a true  proposition  is  as  much  denied  as  by  acts  incon- 
sistent with  truth.  In  regard  to  these,  however,  he  gi-ants 
that  “much  more  latitude  must  be  allowed,  and  much  must 
be  allowed,  and  much  must  be  left  to  every  one’s  own  judg- 
ment and  ingenuity.”  There  are  many  omissions  “which  are 
manifestly  inconsistent  with  some  true  proposition,  these 
must  be  wrong.”  The  violation  of  solemn  promises,  for 
example,  is  a contradiction  of  truth.  Then  there  is  the  sin 
of  having  low  ideals  of  life.  Tliis  is  wrong,  because  it  is 
“failing  to  have  the  life  ends  required  by  the  nature  of 
things.”  The  failure  to  cultivate  my  mind  is  to  “deny  my 
mind  to  be  what  it  is  and  knowledge  to  be  what  it  is.”  This 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  15. 


58 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


principle  does  not  mean,  Wollaston  says,  that  if  I do  not 
always  give  to  the  poor  I am  acting  wrongly.  There  are 
times,  he  says,  “when  I might  contradict  truth  by  giving 
to  a poor  man.”  Many  things  are  to  be  considered  before 
we  can  pass  a moral  judgment  in  such  cases.  The  existen- 
tial judgment,  this  man  is  poor  is  true  in  every  case;  but 
the  moral  judgment  asserts,  in  addition,  my  relation  to  the 
case  and  to  the  problem  of  poverty  in  general.  If  my  cir- 
cumstances are  such  that  I can  give  something  for  charity 
and  I fail  to  do  so,  then  do  I “deny  the  condition  of  the  poor 
to  be  what  it  is  and  my  own  to  be  what  it  is.”  In  a word, 
according  to  Wollaston,  an  uncharitable  being  is  immoral 
in  that  he  violates  the  real  nature  of  things  by  not  living 
up  to  his  real  self  in  all  his  relations  to  other  real  things. 
His  general  principle  is  that  human  beings  are  to  always  be 
treated  as  human  beings,  and  when  they  are  otherwise 
treated  wrong  is  done  them.  Wollaston  here  comes  rather 
close  to  Utilitarianism,  but  his  criterion  is  more  inclusive 
than  that  of  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number. 

John  Clarke  says  that  in  this  case  Wollaston  “blundered 
upon  the  manner  of  proof,  commonly  called  petitio  prin- 
cipii,”  not  by  saying  that  “the  rich  man’s  neglect  of  the 
poor”  is  “immoral,  because  it  implies  a denial  of  this  truth, 
that  the  rich  are  obliged  to  relieve  the  poor” ; but  on  the 
ground  that  he  denied  his  condition  and  that  of  the  poor  to 
be  what  they  are.  “The  denial  of  property  in  the  owner 
did  so  visibly  imply  the  supposition  of  a law  of  nature, 
as  the  denial  of  obligation  did.”  Clarke  says  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  Wollaston  would  imply  that  the  relief  of  the  poor 
by  the  rich  was  a denial  that  the  circumstances  “are  what 
they  are,”  namely,  that  he  is  rich  and  they  poor.’’^®  Clarke 
says  that,  according  to  Wollaston,  the  rich  ought  not  to 
relieve  the  poor  for  that  is  denying  the  poor  to  be  what  they 
are.  The  poor  should  be  left  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
God  has  seen  fit  to  place  them. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  16. 

Ibid.,  p.  17. 

’“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  34. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  59 

VI 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  emphasizes  the  necessity  of 
considering  all  relations.  The  position  is  taken  that  a thing 
must  be  considered  in  all  its  relations  before  we  can  know 
what  it  is.  The  man  who  rides  a stolen  horse  is  acting  in 
conformity  with  the  nature  of  the  horse  in  riding  him,  but 
in  that  the  horse  is  stolen  he  violates  the  nature  of  the  horse 
as  some  one’s  else  property.  Because  each  thing  is  several 
things,  in  that  it  has  many  relations,  and  the  same  of  each 
and  every  person  there  are  many  conflicts  of  duties.  “Here 
the  importance  of  the  truth  on  the  one  and  the  other  side 
should  be  diligently  compared.  ...  In  short,  when  things 
are  truly  estimated,  persons  concerned,  times,  places,  ends 
intended,  and  effects  that  naturally  follow,  must  be  added 
to  them.”  So  it  is  all  a matter  of  judgment,  existential 
and  value.  In  many  life  situations  one  does  not  know  enough 
to  act  intelligently,  and  how  is  one  to  act  morally  without 
acting  intelligently.?  One  may  say  that,  in  such  cases,  con- 
science bids  one  be  true  to  himself,  but  when  this  is  given 
content  it  can  only  mean  being  true  to  one’s  relations.  The 
significant  thing  to  me  is  that  Wollaston  gives  due  place 
to  both  and  rightly  relates  the  a priori  and  the  a posteriori 
elements  in  knowledge  and  in  morality.  Prior  to  all  experi- 
ence we  can  say  that  a man  ought  to  conform  his  life  to 
the  nature  of  things,  and  it  is  only  experience  that  can  tell 
him  what  these  are.  There  is  an  absoluteness  and  a rela- 
tiveness about  it.  The  form  of  morality  is  a priori  and 
absolute;  it  is  that  there  should  be  conformity  of  life, 
through  freely  willed  acts,  to  reality.  The  content  of 
morality  is  relative  and  a posteriori  involving  judgment  both 
of  the  facts  and  of  duty  in  respect  to  the  facts : “Nothing 
can  be  true  any  further  than  it  is  compatible  with  other 
things  that  are  true.” 

Erdmann  in  commenting  on  this  passage  says  that  it  is 
Wollaston’s  idea  that  every  object  must  be  judged,  not  in 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  18  and  20. 

”Ibid.,  p.  19. 


60 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


isolation,  for  this  would  give  only  a one-sided  judgment; 
but  “a  person  must  consider,  at  the  same  time,  all  its  rela- 
tions and  must  consider  it  in  its  totality.  Otherwise  we 
are  not  taking  it  as  it  is  but  only  as  it  is  partly  and  partly 
as  it  is  not.”  He  says  that  this  is  of  the  very  greatest 
importance  in  evaluating  an  action  and  refers  to  Wollas- 
ton’s own  case  of  riding  a horse  which  belongs  to  some 
one  else.  One’s  action  is  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of 
things  when  the  horse  is  considered  only  as  a horse,  but 
when  the  horse  is  considered  as  being  a piece  of  property 
belonging  to  some  one  else  then  the  action  is  seen  to  be  in 
contradiction  to  the  nature  of  things.  Erdmann  says  that 
a proposition  is  true  only  when  it  considers  a thing  in  its 
totality,  “hence  only  that  is  really  true  which  is  in  accord 
with  the  nature  of  the  object  and  to  act  in  accord  with  its 
nature  is  acting  according  to  truth,  that  is,  good  (nur  das 
ist  wirklich  wahr,  was  der  Natur  des  Gegenstandes  gamass 
ist,  und  seiner  Natur  gemass  ihn  zu  behandeln,  ist  der  Wahr- 
heit  gemass,  d,h.  gut).” 

VII 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  merely  says  that  it  is  right 
not  to  do  wrong:  “When  any  act  would  be  wrong,  the  for- 
bearing that  act  must  be  right ; likewise  when  the  omission 
of  anything  would  be  wrong,  the  doing  of  it  must  be  right. 
Because  contrariorum  contraria  est  ratio.” 

VIII 

This  proposition  affirms  the  coincidence  of  good  and  right 
and  of  evil  and  wrong:  “Moral  good  and  evil  are  coincident 
with  right  and  wrong.  For  that  cannot  be  good,  which  is 
wrong;  nor  that  evil,  which  is  right.”  The  truth  of  this 
is  not  so  apparent  as  would  seem  to  be  the  case  nor  is  it  a 

” Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  116. 

Ibid.,  p.  116. 

’“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

Ibid.,  p.  19. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  61 

mere  tautological  statement.  Right  and  wrong  refer  to 
the  conformity  of  acts  to  the  moral  law,  while  good  and  evil 
refer  to  the  conformity  of  acts  to  the  nature  of  things. 

IX 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  takes  the  position  that  ther^ 
are  degrees  of  good  and  evil  and  undertakes  to  reconcile 
this  with  the  position  that  morality  consists  in  acts  that 
are  conformable  to  truth.  “Every  act”  of  an  intelligent 
free  being  and  “all  those  omissions  which  interfere  with 
truth  . . . are  evil  in  some  degree  or  other.”  When  he 
speaks  of  acts  inconsistent  with  truth,  he  says,  “I  mean  any 
truth,  any  true  proposition,  whether  containing  matter  of 
speculation  or  plain  fact.  I would  have  everything  taken 
to  be  what  in  fact  and  truth  it  is.”  Here  Wollaston  does 
identify  truth  and  goodness,  and  gives  ground  for  the 
criticism  that  he  reduces  all  immorality  to  lying.  But  this 
passage  must  not  be  taken  alone,  and  it  must  also  be  borne 
in  mind  that  he  is  here  discussing  degrees  of  immorality. 
He  can  well  say  that  every  violation  of  truth  is  to  some 
extent  evil.  He  would  say,  I am  sure,  that  even  his  rela- 
tively innocent  case  of  a man  speaking  to  a post  is,  to  an 
extent,  a violation  of  the  nature  of  personality,  in  that 
the  man  who  does  that  kind  of  thing  is  acting  absurdly  and 
is  consequently  not  treating  himself  as  a rational  creature, 
and  so  the  act  is  evil.  He  goes  on  to  say,  however,  that 
“neither  all  evil  nor  all  good  actions  are  equal.”  It  might 
be  argued  that  to  make  any  difference  in  degrees  of  morality 
he  must  resort  to  another  standard  than  that  of  conformity 
to  truth.  He  says  that  the  importance  of  the  truth  re- 
spected or  violated  determines  the  degree  of  virtue  or  vice. 
“For  neither  all  evil  nor  all  good  actions  are  equal.  Those 
truths  which  they  respect,  though  they  are  equally  true, 
may  comprise  matters  of  very  different  importance;  or 
more  truths  may  be  violated  one  way  than  another,  and 
acts  committed  by  the  violation  of  them  may  be  equally 
said  to  be  crimes  but  not  equal  ci-imes.”  In  his  example, 
” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  22. 


62 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


however,  he  apparently  resorts  to  the  hedonistic  criterion. 
He  says  that  it  is  far  worse  to  deprive  a man  of  an  estate 
than  it  is  to  steal  a hook  from  him,  because  the  one  is  worth 
far  more  than  the  other,  which  means  that  the  one  “is 
capable  of  conferring  more  happiness  than  the  other.” 

One  year  after  the  death  of  Wollaston,  Thomas  Bott 
wrote  a pamphlet  criticizing  his  ethical  philosophy.  Bott 
confines  his  criticism  almost  entirely  to  this  paragraph, 
which  is  perhaps  the  weakest,  or,  at  least  the  one  most  open 
to  misinterpretation,  of  any  in  the  entire  argument.  Bott 
says : “What  I design  is  to  Confine  myself  to  the  peculiar 
and  principal  notion  of  our  author;  and  enquire  whether 
it  is  right,  or  not.  His  notion  of  morality  we  have  in  his 
IX.  Proposition  where  he  makes  the  formal  ratio  of  moral 
good  and  evil  to  consist  in  an  agreement  or  disagreement 
with  truth:  and  by  truth,  he  immediately  tells  us,  he  means 
any  truth  whatever ; any  true  proposition  whatsoever, 
whether  containing  matter  of  speculation,  or  plain  fact.” 

I do  not  think  it  at  all  fair  to  say  that  this  passage  really 
gives  the  clearest  statement  of  the  ethical  principle  of 
Wollaston,  for  he  is  here  concerned  more  with  the  question 
of  the  degrees  of  good  and  evil  than  with  that  of  determin- 
ing the  criterion  of  morality.  The  criterion  is,  of  course, 
used  in  determining  the  degrees  of  good  and  evil;  but  since 
he  is  more  concerned  with  the  determination  of  the  degrees 
than  with  stating  the  differentia  of  good  and  evil,  he  is  not 
as  careful  in  that  regard  as  he  is  elsewhere.  The  thing  in 
this  passage,  that  makes  Wollaston  more  open  to  criticism 
here  than  in  any  place  else,  is  that  he  does  apparently 
identify  intellectual  and  moral  relations.  But,  it  must  be 
remembered,  that  he  has  labored  to  make  clear  that  there 
is  not  only  truth  of  propositions  but  also  truth  of  actions. 
His  position  is  that  all  truth  should  be  respected  and  that 
it  is,  to  some  extent,  wrong  to  violate  any  truth.  “I  would 
have  everything  taken  to  be  what  in  fact  and  truth  it  is.” 
We  are  told  by  Wollaston’s  biographer  that  he  had  such  a 

’"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 

’"Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  5. 

'“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  20. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated  63 

passion  for  accuracy  that  he  destroyed  many  manuscripts 
of  his  because  he  was  not  satisfied  with  them.  A man  can 
have  a scientist’s  passion  for  truth,  and  at  the  same  time 
grant  that  there  is  a great  difference  in  the  importance  of 
purely  academic  speculative  truth  and  that  which  more 
directly  concerns  human  hapiness  and  human  welfare.  The 
thing  that  Wollaston  is  here  insisting  upon  is  that  all  truth 
should  be  respected  and  that  it  is  wrong  to  violate  any 
truth,  however  theoretical  it  may  be  in  interest  and  in  im- 
portance. It  is  of  course  far  more  important  that  he  be 
true  to  human  life  and  to  truth  directly  concerned  there- 
with. So  instead  of  Wollaston  giving  up  absolutely  the 
distinction  between  truth  and  goodness,  as  Bott  accuses 
him  of  doing,  he  really  draws  up  a hierarchy  of  vices  and 
virtues.  By  the  principle  of  concomitant  variation  it  may 
be  shown  that  his  moral  criterion  is  that  of  truth  to  human 
happiness  and  welfare,  for  while  all  truth  should  be  re- 
spected and  while  it  is  wrong  to  violate  any  truth  there  are 
degrees  of  good  and  evil.  And  the  degree  of  good  or  evil 
is  to  be  detennined,  not  by  its  degree  of  conformability  to 
abstract  truth  but  by  the  importance  of  the  truth  conformed 
to  or  violated;  and  that  which  determines  the  importance 
of  the  truth  is  its  relations  to  human  life  and  to  human 
happiness.®^ 

Bott  is  insistent  upon  the  point  that  in  this  passage  is 
to  be  found  Wollaston’s  “principal  and  peculiar  notion  of 
morality.  And  it  is,”  he  says,  “visible  on  every  page,  how 
much  he  endeavors  to  carry  this  notion  through  the  whole 
book,  and  make  it  agree  to,  or  comprehend  all  virtues  and 
vices  whatsoever.”  He  says  that  “as  far  as  page  138  we 
find  him  proving  T guilty  of  immorality,  by  taking  from 
P something  that  was  P’s ; because  by  such  an  act,  T de- 
clared that  to  be  his  own,  and  so  acted  a lie;  in  which,  as 
he  adds,  consists  the  idea  and  formal  ratio  of  moral  evil. 
Indeed  this  is  the  peculiar  notion  of  the  book.”  It  is 
very  difficult  to  see  how  Bott  can  think  that  Wollaston  con- 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  20  and  38-40. 

®“Ibid.,  p.  138.  Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Re- 
futed, p.  5. 


64< 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


fuses  ethical  and  logical  relations  in  the  case  mentioned.  He 
states  that,  according  to  Wollaston’s  principle,  “T  was 
guilty  of  immorality”  because  he  treated  P’s  property  as 
if  it  were  liis  own  “and  so  acted  a lie.”  To  say  that  im- 
morality consists  in  acting  a lie  is  no  confusion  of  intel- 
lectual and  moral  relations.  It  is  very  clearly  implied  that 
the  one  belongs  to  the  world  of  knowledge  and  the  other 
to  the  realm  of  action.  But  Bott  thinks  that  the  two  are 
hopelessly  confused  for  he  says:  “I  think  his  notion  of 
moral  good  and  evil  make  all  truth  not  only  moral,  but 
equally  so ; or,  in  other  words,  all  truths  are  in  themselves 
of  equal  importance,  according  to  his  definition;  and  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  actions  with  them,  equally 
moral  or  immoral.”  Bott  certainly  must  have  read  the 
passage  very  carelessly  for  it  states  very  clearly  that 
“neither  all  evil  nor  all  good  actions  are  equal.  Those 
truths  which  they  respect,  though  they  are  equally  true, 
may  comprise  matters  of  very  different  importance.” 
He  makes  it  very  clear  also  that  he  has  in  mind  not  formal 
truth  but  true  life  relations.  As  I have  just  said,  Wollaston 
grants  that  all  truths  are  moral,  in  some  degree,  in  that 
truths  of  every  kind  should  be  respected;  but  it  cannot  be 
said  that  truths  are  considered  by  him  to  be  of  equal  im- 
portance.*’^ 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Wollaston  makes  it  very  clear 
that  morality  is  concerned  only  with  actions,  Bott  insists 
that  he  makes  morality  to  depend  upon  the  truth  or  falsity 
of  some  proposition.  He  goes  further  and  says  “if  the 
moral  goodness  or  evil  of  actions  consists  in  their  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  with  truth,”  then  “where  there  is  this 
agreement  or  disagreement,  there  is  moral  good  or  evil,  let 
the  truth  respected  be  what  it  will.”  This,  as  we  have 
seen,  Wollaston  grants.  Mathematical  truths  of  an  abso- 
lutely abstract  nature  should  be  respected,  not  alone  be- 
cause of  “the  respect  they  bear  to  human  beings”  for  mathe- 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  9. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  20. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  23. 

*“  Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  pp.  8-9. 


65 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 

matical  truths  often  come  to  have  very  close  relations  to 
human  welfare,  but  also  because  “the  least  truth  cannot  be 
contradicted  without  much  reluctance.”  Wollaston,  how- 
ever, is  very  far  from  saying  that  it  follows  from  this  that, 
morally  speaking,  “whatever  actions  have  an  equal  agree- 
ment or  disagreement”  with  truth  are  “equally  good  or 
evil.”  In  fact  he  denies  this  absolutely.  He  says,  “that 
though  to  act  against  truth  in  any  case  is  wrong,  yet,  the 
degrees  of  guilt  vary  with  the  importance  of  the  things.” 
In  some  cases  the  sin  is  great  and  in  others  it  amounts  to 
“almost  nothing.”  Inanimate  things,  for  example,  Wollas- 
ton thinks,  cannot  be  “considered  as  capable  of  wrong  treat- 
ment, if  the  respect  they  bear  to  living  beings  is  separated 
from  them.” 

Bott  grants  that  “the  author  often  speaks  of  truths  of 
importance,  or  weight,  etc.,  and  so  may  be  supposed  to  guard 
against  any  such  objection  as  this.”  Bott  thinks,  however, 
that  he  fails  to  guard  against  the  objection  because  he  did 
not  put  any  such  word  in  “his  definition  of  moral  good  and 
evil,  and  seems  only  incidentally  to  talk  of  the  different  im- 
portance of  truths,  when  he  is  as  it  were  forced  to  it  by  the 
cases  that  are  put;  and  to  which  no  tolerable  answer  could 
be  given,  without  allowing  such  difference.”  In  reply,  I 
will  say,  that  in  the  very  passage  that  Bott  is  considering 
Wollaston  does  say  that;  “Every  act  . , . wluch  interferes 
with  truth  ...  is  morally  evil,  in  some  degree  or  other.” 
He  also  says  that  “neither  all  good,  nor  all  evil  actions  are 
equal,”  because  the  “truths  which  they  respect,  though  they 
are  equally  true,  may  comprise  matters  of  very  different 
importance.”  I grant  that  Wollaston  does  not,  in  this 
particular  passage,  state  that  it  is  the  relation  to  human 
happiness  and  welfare  that  constitutes  the  standard  by 
which  the  importance  of  a truth  is  determined,  until  he 
takes  up  particular  cases.  He  does  state  in  the  proposi- 
tion itself  that  there  are  truths  of  very  different  impor- 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  16  and  31. 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  9. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  31. 

'"’Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  10. 

"^Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  20. 


66 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


tance,  and,  of  course,  this  could  only  be  a difference  of 
importance  for  human  lives,  otherwise  importance  could 
have  no  moral  connotation.  Incidentally,  it  may  be  said, 
that  Bott’s  criticism  here  is  quite  inconsistent  with  his  other 
criticism  of  Wollaston,  which  is  considered  at  length  in  the 
section  on  happiness,  namely,  that  Wollaston  makes  the 
importance  of  truths  to  depend  upon  their  relation  to  the 
production  of  human  happiness. 

X 

In  this  paragraph  Wollaston  takes  up  at  length  the  thesis 
stated  in  his  introductory  sentence.  He  there  said:  “The 
foundation  of  religion  lies  in  that  difference  between  the  acts 
of  men,  which  distinguish  them  into  good,  evil  and  indif- 
ferent.” He  thinks  that  he  has  proved  that  there  is  moral 
good  and  evil,  consequently  he  affirms  that  there  is  Natural 
Religion.  His  position  is  somewhat  different  from  that  of 
Kant ; both  rest  religion  on  morality,  but  Kant  bases  moral- 
ity on  a categorical  imperative,  an  immediate  and  indubitable 
inner  command,  while  Wollaston  bases  morality  on  the 
nature  of  things.  I think  that  this  objection  might  be  made 
to  the  position  of  Wollaston  on  this  point:  Religion  and 
morality  are  both  rational  and  are  demanded  by  the  nature 
of  things,  so  religion  cannot  be  said  to  rest  on  morality. 
It  is  true  that  morality  implicates  religion,  but  religion  just 
as  truly  implicates  morality.  They  are  in  fact  but  the  finite 
and  the  infinite  aspects  of  one  Weltanschauung,  and  this  is 
really  but  Wollaston’s  way  of  relating  them.  By  religion 
he  means  nothing  else,  he  says,  “but  an  obligation  to  do 
what  ought  not  to  be  omitted,  and  to  forbear  what  ought 
not  to  be  done,”  which  obligations  are  deterniined  by  the 
real  natures  of  things  due  to  their  cosmic  relations.  Re- 
ligion “follows  from  the  distinction  between  moral  good 
and  evil,”  which  distinction  is  “founded  in  the  respect  which 
men’s  acts  bear  to  truth.”  Truth  can  only  be  conformity 
to  the  real  and  ultimate  natures  of  things,  and  since  there 
are  ultimate  life  relations  based  on  the  real  nature  of  things 
Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nature  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  6. 


The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated 


67 


there  is  religion.  This  is  natural  religion  based  not  on  reve- 
lation but  on  the  uninspired  reason.  Rehgion  rests  on  the 
necessary  distinction  between  good  and  evil,  and  this  dis- 
tinction “is  founded  in  the  respect,  which  men’s  acts  bear 
to  truth.”  Truth,  in  turn,  depends  upon  the  real  nature 
of  things  “since  no  proposition  can  be  true,  which  expresses 
things  otherwise,  than  as  they  are  in  nature.”  Both  morality 
and  religion  are  objective,  their  nature  being  determined  by 
the  real  nature  of  things,  by  reality.®^ 

XI 

This  paragraph  epitomizes  the  argument  of  the  entire 
section  by  stating  the  rationale  of  Natural  Religion.  The 
one  great  law  of  Natural  Religion  is:  “That  every  intelli- 
gent, active,  and  free  being  should  so  behave  himself,  as  by 
no  act  to  contradict  truth;  or  that  he  should  treat  every- 
thing as  being  what  it  is.”  But  this  is  also  the  law  of 
morality.  Natural  Religion,  then,  teaches  that  man  should 
be  treated  as  being  what  he  is  and  God  as  what  he  is. 

Wollaston,  ReU.  of  Nat.  DeUn.,  p.  24. 

Ibid.,  p.  24. 


WOLLASTON’S  CRITICAL  INTERPRETATION 
OF  OTHER  SYSTEMS 


After  stating  his  own  view  of  Ethics  Wollaston  under- 
takes to  offer  a critical  evaluation  of  the  typical  ethical 
theories.  He  says  that  “our  main  subject  of  study  is  the 
distinction  between  moral  good  and  evil.”  The  existence 
of  any  such  distinction,  he  says,  “some  have  been  so  wild 
as  to  deny.”  He  thinks  from  what  he  has  said  already  it 
is  quite  evident  “that  there  is  as  certainly  moral  good  and 
evil  as  there  is  true  and  false,  and  that  there  is  as  natural 
and  immutable  a difference  “between  the  one  as  between  the 
other.”  He  then  proceeds  to  pass  judgment  on  the  various 
ways  of  finding  the  differentia  of  moral  good  and  evil.^ 

“They  who  place  all  in  following  nature,  if  they  mean 
by  that  phrase  acting  according  to  the  natures  of  things, 
or  according  to  truth,  say  what  is  right.  But  this  does 
not  seem  to  be  their  meaning.  And  if  it  is  only  that  a man 
must  follow  his  own  nature,  since  his  nature  is  not  purely 
rational,  but  there  is  a great  part  of  him,  which  he  has  in 
common  with  the  brutes,  they  appoint  him  a guide  which 
I fear  will  mislead  him,  this  being  commonly  more  likely  to 
prevail  than  the  rational  part.  At  best  this  is  loose  talk.”  ^ 
In  the  section  on  happiness  this  question  of  what  is  meant 
by  a life  conformable  to  nature  is  treated  more  completely. 
It  is  very  clear,  however,  that  he  is  not  in  agreement  with 
those  who  interpret  the  formula  “according  to  nature” 
hedonistically.  If  one  means  by  a life  “according  to  nature” 
a life  lived  conformably  to  the  real  and  ultimate  nature  of 
things,  or  according  to  reason’s  dictates,  then  does  Wollas- 
ton find  himself  in  agreement,  otherwise  not. 

“They  who  make  right  reason  to  be  the  law,  by  which 

* Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  22. 

* Ibid.,  p.  23. 


68 


Wollaston's  Critical  Interpretation  of  Systems  69 

our  acts  are  to  be  judged,  and  according  to  their  conform- 
ity to  this  or  deflection  from  it  call  them  lawful  or  unlawful, 
good  or  bad,  say  something  more  particular  and  precise,” 
than  do  the  hedonists.  Wollaston  says  that  they  are  right 
when  they  say  that  “whatever  will  bear  to  be  tried  by  the 
test  of  right  reason,  is  right;  and  that  which  is  condemned 
by  it  wrong.”  He  says  that  he  agrees  with  them  if  by 
“right  reason  they  mean  that  which  is  found  by  the  right 
use  of  our  rational  faculties,”  but  he  says  that  he  is  not 
at  all  sure  that  this  is  what  they  mean.®  He  is  rather  sure 
that  this  is  not  their  meaning,  but  that  they  think  that 
there  is  a special  kind  of  reason  which  passes  upon  moral 
matters.  He  would  not  agree  to  the  intuitional  conception 
of  the  term  “right  reason,”  for  when  so  conceived  “each 
man  has  a different  right  reason,  and  each  thinks  that  his 
alone  is  right.”  Wollaston  says  that  there  is  only  one  kind 
of  reason  and  by  “right  reason”  one  must,  to  be  true  to 
the  facts,  mean  the  “right  use  of  our  rational  faculties.” 
He  does  not  think  that  man  possesses  a moral  faculty  but 
that  moral  matters  are  decided  by  the  ordinary  reason.  He 
is  very  insistent  upon  the  point  that  he  will  accept  no 
intuitive  notion  of  “right  reason.”  He  makes  it  very  clear 
that  there  are  two  factors  involved  in  the  criterion  of 
morality,  the  empirical  and  the  rational,  and  also  that 
“rational”  is  not  given  an  intuitional  but  a ratiocinative 
connotation.  He  says : “And  besides,  what  I have  said, 
extends  further;  for  we  are  not  only  to  respect  those  truths, 
which  we  discover  by  reasoning,  but  even  such  matters  of 
fact,  as  are  fairly  discovered  to  us  by  our  senses.  We 
ought  to  regard  things  as  being  what  they  are,  which  way 
soever  we  come  to  the  knowledge  of  them.”  ^ As  morality  is 
“made  to  consist  in  the  conformity  of  men’s  acts  to  the 
truth  of  the  case”  we  have  a criterion  which  is  “undeniable, 
intelligible  and  practicable.” 

Wollaston  takes  the  same  attitude  towards  those  who 
would  make  the  criterion  of  morality  a special  sense  or 
innate  idea.  You  cannot,  he  says,  “deduce  the  difference 

* Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 

^Ibid.,  p.  23. 


70  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

between  good  and  evil  from  the  common  sense  of  mankind, 
and  certain  principles  born  with  us.  . . . For  it  is  much 
to  be  suspected  there  are  no  such  innate  maxims  as  they 
pretend,  but  that  the  impressions  of  education  are  mis- 
taken for  them ; and  besides  that,  the  sentiments  of  man- 
kind are  not  so  uniform  and  constant,  as  that  we  may  safely 
thrust  such  an  important  distinction  upon  them.”  ® So 
Wollaston  very  distinctly  denies  that  he  is  an  intuitionist 
or  an  intuitionalist.  He  believes  neither  in  a special  moral 
faculty  nor  in  innate  moral  ideas  nor  in  a moral  sense,  yet, 
as  we  shall  see,  critic  after  critic  has  identified  his  position 
wdth  that  of  Intuitionism. 

It  has  been  very  common  to  identify  the  intellectualists 
and  the  intuitionalists  in  morals,  and  historically  they  have 
been  associated  together,  because  they  have  both  been  op- 
posed to  the  sensationalists.  The  two  positions  are  really 
very  different,  and  Wollaston  is  careful  to  deny  the  identity 
of  his  position  and  that  of  Intuitionalism.  He  says  that 
one  cannot  know  immediately  and  indubitably  what  he 
should  do  in  any  life  situation,  but  that  this  can  be  known 
only  after  one  has  thought  of  the  relations  and  meanings 
of  things.  It  is  true  that  the  intellectualists  presuppose 
a common  rational  nature,  but  the  advantage  of  this  over 
the  idea  of  a moral  faculty  is  that  all  human  conduct  can 
be  evaluated  by  a common  standard,  that  of  inherent 
rationality.  “The  eternal  rule  of  morality  is  that  of  right 
reason.  This  is  the  Law  of  Nature  which  is  of  universal 
extent,  and  everlasting  duration.”  It  is  founded  in  the 
nature  and  reason  of  things,  and  is  of  the  same  original 
with  the  eternal  reason  of  things.  Its  obligations  “were 
from  eternity,  and  the  force  of  it  reaches  throughout  the 
universe.”  To  this  “Law  of  Nature”  the  reason  of  all  men 
everywhere  naturally  and  necessarily  assents.®  As  con- 
trasted to  the  standard  of  rationalism  the  criterion  of  the 
intuitionist  or  intuitionalist  is  private,  personal  and  peculiar, 
and  be  it  ever  so  indubitable  it  is  nevertheless  unintelligible. 
The  criterion  of  the  intellectualists  is  that  of  truth,  the 

'‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  24.  Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  IV.  5. 

"Ibid.,  p.  24. 


Wollaston’s  Critical  Interpretation  of  Systems  Tl 

principal  of  constancy  in  the  meanings  of  all  minds  and 
the  practical  conformity  in  all  living  to  these  universal 
meanings.  Perhaps  the  difference  between  the  two  views 
can  be  even  more  clearly  drawn  by  simply  characterizing 
the  one  as  subjective  and  the  other  as  objective. 

Wollaston  ends  this  section  of  his  treatment  by  criticizing 
the  systems  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  The  latter  on  the 
ground  that  the  Golden  Mean  is  often  “difficult  to  discern,” 
and  also  on  the  ground  that  “there  are  several  obligations 
that  can  by  no  means  be  derived  from  it.”  With  Plato  he 
agrees  that  virtue  “consists  in  such  a likeness  to  God  as  we 
are  capable  of,”  but  he  criticizes  Plato  on  the  ground  that 
he  does  not  tell  us  “by  what  means  we  may  attain  this  like- 
ness.” He  says  that  Plato’s  view  must  really  be  the  same 
as  his  own  for  we  must  understand  by  living  in  “likeness 
to  God”  nothing  other  than  “the  practice  of  truth,  God 
being  truth,  and  doing  nothing  contrary  to  it.”  ^ 

Wollaston  says  that  there  are  many  other  foundations 
upon  which  morality  has  been  built,  but  says  that  he  ques- 
tions whether  any  of  them  will  hold  any  better  than  the  ones 
he  mentions.  He  is  skeptical  of  all  subjective  principles 
and  insists  that  the  standard  of  morality  must  be  an  ob- 
jective one.  He  says:  “But  if  the  formal  ratio  of  moral 
good  and  evil  be  made  to  consist  in  a conformity  of  men’s 
acts  to  the  truth  of  the  case  or  the  contrary,  as  I have  here 
explained  it,  the  distinction  seems  to  be  settled  in  a manner 
undeniable,  intelligible,  practicable.  For  as  what  is  meant 
by  a true  proposition  and  matter  of  fact  is  perfectly  under- 
stood by  everybody ; so  will  it  be  easy  for  any  one,  so  far 
as  he  knows  any  true  propositions  and  facts,  to  compare 
not  only  words  but  also  actions  with  them.”  ® He  says  that 
things  themselves  must  be  our  standard,  that  we  must  con- 
stantly conform  our  thoughts  and  lives  to  the  real  natures 
of  things.  Any  system  of  morals  is  true  to  the  extent  that 
it  is  based  on  nature,  understanding  by  nature  the  true 
nature  and  relations  of  things. 

'Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  24-. 

* Ibid.,  p.  24. 


WOLLASTON  DEALS  WITH  POSSIBLE  OBJEC- 
TIONS TO  HIS  PRINCIPLE 


Wollaston,  before  ending  the  section  on  “Moral  Good  and 
Evil,”  takes  up  certain  objections  that  may  be  offered  to 
his  principle  of  determining  moral  relations. 

1.  “If  everything  must  be  treated  as  being  what  it  is”  it 
naturally  follows  that  “to  treat  my  enemy  as  such  is  to  kill 
him,  or  revenge  myself  soundly  upon  him.”  Not  so,  Wollas- 
ton answers,  because  my  enemy  is  something  more  than  my 
enemy,  and  I must  consider  him,  not  only  as  an  enemy,  but 
also  as  a human  being  who  is  due  the  treatment  properly 
due  a person.  If  all  truth  is  to  be  observed  my  enemy  must 
be  treated  not  only  as  my  enemy  but  also  as  a man  and  a 
citizen.  I must,  consequently,  prosecute  him  in  such  a way 
as  to  be  true  to  all  these  relations.  It  is  quite  evident  that 
the  taking  of  the  law  into  my  own  hands  would  not  do  this.”  ^ 

2.  “To  use  a creditor,  who  is  a spendthrift,  or  one  that 
knows  not  the  use  of  money,  or  has  no  occasion  for  it,  as 
such,  is  not  to  pay  him.”  Wollaston  answers  this  objection 
by  saying  that  to  act  in  such  a way  is  to  make  oneself  “the 
judge  of  his  creditor,  which  is  what  he  is  not.”  To  act  in 
such  a way  would  be  to  “arrogate  to  himself  more  than  can 
be  true,”  for  he  cannot  know  all  the  present  and  future 
circumstances  of  his  creditor.  Wollaston  says  that  to  pay 
a man  what  is  due  him  does  not  deny  “that  he  who  pays 
may  think  him  extravagant.”  The  only  significance  the  act 
of  paying  a debt  to  a spendthrift  has,  says  Wollaston,  is 
“that  he  who  pays  thinks  it  due  to  the  other.”  ^ John  Clarke 
accused  Wollaston  of  the  fallacy  of  Begging  the  Question 
in  his  manner  of  dealing  with  this  supposed  objection.  He 
says  that  Wollaston  presupposes  the  idea  of  property,  when 

’ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  25  and  27. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  25  and  28. 


72 


Wollaston  Deals  with  Objections  to  His  Principle  73 

he  says  that  the  debtor’s  act  “directly  denies  the  money 
which  is  the  creditor’s  to  be  the  creditor’s.”  He  says  that 
Wollaston  has  no  right  to  take  for  granted  that  which  he 
designs  to  prove.  “Since  property  is  founded  in  the  law 
of  nature,  ...  to  suppose  property,  is  to  suppose  that 
there  is  a law  of  nature,  the  very  thing  in  question,  and 
which  is  the  business  and  design  of  this  section  to  prove.”  ® 
Clarke  grants  that  this  is  not  an  obvious  petitio  principii. 
It  is  not  the  same  as  saying  the  obvious  thing  that  im- 
morality is  a denial  of  the  law  of  nature — or  the  religion  of 
nature.^ 

Bott  undertakes  to  criticize  Wollaston’s  answer  by  ask- 
ing “is  it  to  be  considered  above  all,  or  is  it  the  principal 
circumstances  in  the  debtor’s  guilt,  that,  by  refusing  to  pay 
his  debts,  he  denies  that  to  be  his  creditor’s,  which  really  is 
his?”  Bott  denies  that  this  is  the  case.  He  is  insistent 
that  immorality  does  not  consist  in  such  denials.  The  thing 
“to  be  considered  above  all,  . . . when  one  man  bastinadoes 
another  to  death,”  is  not  that  by  such  an  act  “he  denies 
him  to  be  a man,  or  to  have  a sense  of  feelings ; or,  in  other 
words,  asserts  him  to  be  a post.”  ® I am  very  sure  that 
Wollaston  would  agree  entirely  with  the  position  taken  by 
Bott,  in  another  passage,  that  the  immoral  act  implies  the 
truth  of  the  facts  in  the  case  and  so  cannot  consist  in  a 
denial  of  the  truth.®  Bott  simply  falls  into  the  common 
mistake  of  failing  to  distinguish  between  the  truth  of  acts 
and  that  of  the  propositions.  One  can  act  contrary  to 
truth.^ 

3.  In  Wollaston’s  third  instance,  he  asks,  “If  I want 
money  do  I not  act  according  to  truth,  if  I take  it  from 
somebody  else  to  supply  my  wants?”  Is  that  not  treating 
my  want  as  what  it  is  and  money  as  what  it  is?  If  I act  in 
any  other  way  “do  I not  act  contrary  to  truth?”  He  an- 
swers saying:  “Acting  according  to  truth,  as  the  phrase 
is  used  in  the  objection,  is  not  the  thing  required  by  my 

“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  31. 

* Ibid.,  p.  33. 

'Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  16. 

' Ibid.,  p.  5. 

' Ibid.,  p.  7. 


74  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

rule;  but,  so  to  act  that  no  ti'uth  may  be  denied  by  any 
act.”  ® Bott  intends  to  answer  this  objection  but  it  is  quite 
evident  that  he  has  it  confused  with  one  of  Wollaston’s 
illustrations.  This  case  is  concerned  with  the  taking  of 
money  to  satisfy  my  wants,  whereas  the  other  dealt  with 
the  case  of  giving  to  the  poor.  Bott  evidently  has  the  lat- 
ter in  mind  when  he  asks : “Who  would  have  expected  that 
such  a man,  as  our  author  appears  to  be,  should  be  capable 
of  telling  a poor  wretch,  just  upon  the  point  of  starving, 
that  if  he  cannot  get  relief  in  any  honest  way,  he  must  take 
it  as  his  fate.  This,  forsooth,  because  truth  is  truth ; That 
is  though,  such  a poor  creature  sees  at  his  feet  a penny  loaf 
of  his  neighbor’s,  which  his  neighbor  does  not  want,  he  must 
by  no  means  touch  it,  because  it  is  his  neighbor’s  and  not 
his  own.”  ® 

Bott  thinks  that  Wollaston  takes  an  extreme  position  in 
regard  to  the  reverence  he  says  men  should  have  for  the 
truth.  I do  not  think  that  this  is  the  case.  Wollaston 
thinks  that  formal  truth  should  be  respected,  but  that  there 
are  occasions  for  such  violations  when  it  is  necessary  to 
the  realization  of  a higher  truth.  Wollaston  takes  the  posi- 
tion that  there  are  almost  always  ways  of  supplying  one’s 
needs  without  the  violation  of  truth.  He  says  that  “the 
man  may  by  honest  labor  and  industry  seek  to  supply  his 
wants ; or  he  may  apply  as  a supplicant  not  as  an  enemy 
or  robber,  to  such  as  can  afford  to  relieve  him.”  He  does 
say  that  “if  there  is  no  way  in  the  world,  by  which  he  may 
help  himself  without  the  violation  of  truth  he  must  take  it 
as  his  fate.  Truth  will  be  truth,  and  must  retain  its  char- 
acter and  force,  let  the  case  be  what  it  will.”  I under- 
stand him  to  say  that  one  should  not  do  a criminal  thing 
even  in  a critical  situation.  He  does  not  say  that  no  truth 
whatever  should  be  violated  even  to  further  a higher  truth 
as  Bott  accuses. Granting  that  Wollaston  goes  too  far, 
in  this  case,  I do  not  see  that  that  constitutes  an  objection 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  25  and  27. 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  17. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  19  and  28. 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  8. 


Wollaston  Deals  with  Objections  to  His  Principle  76 

to  his  criterion  of  morality.  There  are  occasions  when  truth 
should  be  violated  for  the  sake  of  humanity,  but  this  does 
not  imply  a principle  other  than  that  of  truth.  It  only 
insists  that  there  is  higher  and  lower  truth  and  that  the  lower 
should  be  sacrificed  for  the  higher  when  they  come  into  con- 
flict. In  fact  it  is  the  idea  of  truth  to  humanity  that  makes 
Bott  reject  Wollaston’s  statement  in  this  case.  He  is  using 
the  criterion  of  truth  when  he  in  effect  insists  that  the  all- 
important  truth  is  that  men  must  always  be  treated  as  men. 
Wollaston  says  that  there  are  degrees  of  good  and  evil.  He 
admits  that  truth  concerning  humanity  is  the  all-important 
truth.^^ 

4.  “If  one,  who  plainly  appears  to  have  a design  of 
killing  a man  or  doing  him  mischief,  if  he  can  find  him,  should 
ask  me  where  he  is,  and  I know  where  he  is ; may  not  I,  to 
save  a life,  say  I do  not  know,  though  that  be  false?”  Wol- 
laston says  that  this  is  a very  unusual  situation.  He  says 
that  “It  is  certain  . . . that  nothing  may  willingly  be  done, 
which  in  any  manner  promotes  murder”  for  to  be  “accessory” 
to  murder  “offends  against  many  truths  of  great  weight.” 
It  may  be  possible,  however,  to  give  an  evasive  answer  or  to 
give  an  answer  verbally  false.^^  Bott  criticizes  Wollaston 
on  the  ground  that  he  does  not  justify  a lie  in  even  such  an 
extreme  case  as  this.  I do  not  understand  Wollaston  to  take 
such  an  extreme  position.  True,  he  insists,  that  “truth  is 
sacred,”  but  he  also  says  that  a denial  “by  words”  is  not  as 
bad  as  to  deny  truth  “by  facts.”  He  also  says  “all  sins 
against  tnith  are  not  equal,  and  certainly  a little  trespassing 
upon  it  in  the  present  case,  for  the  good  of  all  parties,”  is  to 
be  justified.^"^  Bott  thinks  that  Wollaston  teaches  that  one 
should  not  tell  a lie  even  to  save  a life  because  “truth  is 
sacred.”  He  asks  “Would  not  one  think  that  the  man’s  life 
was  much  more  sacred  than  such  a truth  as  tliis?  And  who 
would  not  think  that  such  a fellow,  as  should  either  by  say- 
ing Yes,  or  by  being  silent,  expose  his  neighbor  to  the  knife 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  27. 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  19.  Wol- 
laston, Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  27. 


76 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


of  a villain,  greatly  deserved,  nothwitlistanding  all  his 
scruples,  an  equal  punishment  with  the  ruffian  liimself.” 
Bott  thinks  that  Wollaston  “contradicts  himself,  by  his 
notable  distinction  between  denying  truth  by  words,  and  by 
facts,  and  making  the  latter  much  more  criminal,”  I do 
not  think  that  this  is  true  for  Wollaston  simply  means  to 
say  that  all  truth  should  be  respected,  and  when  one  is 
forced  by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  to  violate  some 
truth,  the  violation  of  a merely  verbal  truth  is  less  contra- 
dictory than  the  violation  of  truth  by  actions.  Anyway, 
Bott’s  criticism  on  this  point  is  very  inconsistent,  for  he  had 
criticized  Wollaston  on  the  score  that  he  did  not  distinguish 
between  formal  truth  and  truth  that  involves  human  lives. 
He  is,  now,  criticizing  him  on  the  ground  that  he  does  make 
that  distinction,  for  that  is  really  the  essential  difference, 
morally  speaking,  between  denying  truth  by  words  and 
denying  truth  by  facts. Wollaston  says  that  all  circum- 
stances should  be  considered  and  he  says  also  that  there  are 
degrees  of  good  and  evil.^^  Bott  is  not  able  to  properly 
appreciate  Wollaston,  due  to  the  fact  that  he  thinks  that 
his  system  is  based  on  an  identification  of  the  intellectual 
and  the  moral.  This  is  made  evident  by  this  quotation: 
“For  wherein  is  the  guilt  of  a wicked  deed?  has  it  not  been 
defined  to  lie  in  denying  a truth?  and  is  there  not  as  much 
of  this  in  a verbal  falsehood?  When  therefore  the  same  truth 
is  equally  affected  both  ways,  sure  the  guilt  is  the  same,  or 
equal.” 

5.  Wollaston’s  last  case  is  this:  If  a man  in  a frolic 
breaks  a glass  he  uses  it  as  that  which  it  is  not,  and  so  his 
act  is  immoral.  Does  this  not  pay  too  much  respect  to  an 
inanimate  object?  the  supposed  objector  asks.  Wollaston 
says  that  of  course  a drinking  glass  could  not  be  considered 
as  such,  or  to  be  what  it  is,  if  there  were  no  men  to  drink 
out  of  them.  To  wantonly  break  a glass  is  wrong,  because 
of  the  use  to  which  a glass  can  be  put  and  its  consequent 

“ Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  20. 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  23. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15.  Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.” 
Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  21. 


WoUaston  Deals  with  Objections  to  His  Principle  77 

value  to  men.  So  it  is  the  relation  to  persons  that  consti- 
tutes the  moral  relation.  Wollaston  says  that  “all  sins 
against  truth  are  not  equal,”  but  must  they  not  be  accord- 
ing to  the  criterion  of  truth.?  He  answers  that  “the  degrees 
of  truth  vary  with  the  importance  of  things.”  Again,  he 
says,  “inanimate  beings  cannot  be  considered  capable  of 
wrong  treatment,  if  the  respect  they  bear  to  living  things 
is  separated  from  them.”  Perhaps  here  as  strongly  as 
anywhere  Wollaston  states  just  what  kind  of  relations  con- 
stitute moral  relations.  He  says,  in  effect,  that  those  situ- 
ations are  moral  situations  where  human  beings  are  involved. 
“When  we  compute  what  things  are,  we  must  take  them  as 
being  what  they  are  in  reference  to  things  that  have  life” 
and  most  of  all  to  men.^® 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  30. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  31. 


GENERAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  SECTION  I 


I.  Morality  Treated  as  Analogous  to  Truth 

In  this  section  Wollaston  undertakes  to  delineate  the  na- 
ture of  goodness  by  comparing  it  with  truth.  I wish  to 
prove  that  he  did  not  identify  goodness  and  truth,  but  that 
he  merely  compared  the  one  with  the  other  in  order  to  ex- 
plicate the  nature  of  goodness.  The  very  use  of  the  term 
“delineated”  in  the  title  of  Wollaston’s  book  is  indicative 
of  the  analogous  method  which  he  employs.  Reasoning  by 
analogy  was  a favorite  method  in  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
Religion  and  morality  were  both  treated  in  that  way  by  many 
writers.  Wollaston  took  the  position  that  the  difference 
between  good  and  bad  is  as  immutable  as  that  between  true 
and  false.  He  goes  further  and  says  that  the  difference  is 
at  bottom  the  same,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  he  identi- 
fies them.  What  he  means  is  that  both  are  in  true  confor- 
mity to  things  as  they  are,  not  that  a moral  act,  or  a value 
judgment,  is  an  existential  judgment,  A is  A,  but  that 
every  one  ought  to  treat  A as  A.  He  does  not  confuse  the 
matter  at  all,  for  he  makes  good  “to  consist  in  a conformity 
of  men’s  acts  to  the  truth  of  the  case,  . . . evil  the  con- 
trary.” ^ Wollaston  thinks  that  the  nature  of  truth  is 
better  understood  than  the  nature  of  goodness,  so  tries 
to  delineate  goodness  in  terms  of  truth. 

Wollaston  takes  the  position  that  acting  according  to  the 
nature  of  things  as  the  moral  principle  is  as  self-evident  as 
the  law  of  identity.  This,  Sidgwick  says,  leads  Wollaston  to 
state  his  four  chief  rules  of  righteousness,  all  of  which  are 
as  self-evident  as  the  general  principle  on  which  they  depend. 
These  four  moral  rules  are:  “Piety  towards  God,  Equity 
and  Benevolence  towards  our  fellows,  and  Sobriety  towards 
^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

78 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 79 

our  own  self.”  This  does  not  mean  that  the  relations  must 
be  always  the  same,  but  it  does  mean  that  when  they  are  so 
and  so  a very  definite  moral  obligation  necessarily  follows, 
and  so  morality  is  immutable.  Sidgwick  grants  that  Wollas- 
ton merely  works  out  an  analogy  between  goodness  and 
truth,  but  still  he  says  that  the  analogy  is  pressed  so  far 
that  “the  essential  distinction  between  what  is  and  what 
ought  to  be  is  lost.”  ^ It  is  very  difficult  to  see  how  an 
analogy  could  be  pressed  so  far  as  to  confuse  goodness  and 
truth.  The  two  could  be  confused  only  by  failing  to  consider 
that  the  method  used  was  that  of  analogy. 

Saying  that  moral  relations  are  as  true  as  logical  relations 
is  very  far  from  the  identification  of  the  two,  because  while 
we  cannot  withhold  our  assent  to  speculative  truth,  “we  can 
refuse  to  act  up  to  a plain  moral  truth.”  ® Selby-Bigge 
very  properly  suggests  that  Wollaston’s  meaning  is  that 
“practical  truth  is  a metaphorical  phrase  and  that  the  prac- 
tical absurdity  of  refusing  to  perform  the  appropriate  act 
cannot  be  a formal  fallacy.”  ^ Clarke  had  used  this  same 
method:  “The  reason  which  obliges  every  man  in  practice 
so  to  deal  with  another  as  he  would  expect  that  others 
should  deal  with  him,  is  the  very  same  as  that  forces  him  in 
speculation  to  affirm  that  if  one  line  or  number  be  equal  to 
another,  that  other  is  reciprocally  equal  to  it.”  ^ Tbis  can 
only  mean  that  the  same  reason  that  pronounces  material 
absurdity  to  be  such,  also  pronounces  moral  absurdity  to  be 
such.  It  cannot  mean  that  material  absurdity  can  be  a test 
of  morality,  but  only  an  analogy  of  it.  Hobbes  had  used 
this  analogous  argument  for  the  obligation  of  justice.  In- 
justice, he  says,  is  as  if  a man  should  deny  in  the  end  what 
he  had  declared  in  the  beginning.®  Williams  very  properly 
speaks  of  the  relation  of  ethics  to  mathematics  and  logic  as 
“an  analogy  and  nothing  more,”  and  yet  he  goes  on  to  say 
that  the  writers  of  this  school  allowed  themselves  to  be  mis- 

’ Sidgwick,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  182. 

’Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  4:4. 

* Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  p.  XXXI. 

’ Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  500. 

'Hobbes,  Leviathan,  ch.  XIV. 


80  The  Ethics  of  William,  Wollaston 

led  by  the  analogy  and  so  failed  to  make  the  distinction 
between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be.^ 

Another  proof  that  Wollaston  did  not  confuse  or  identify 
goodness  and  truth,  but  only  sought  to  explain  goodness 
by  taking  the  position  that  morality  and  immorality  are 
analogous  to  truth  and  falsity  in  intellectual  relations,  is 
the  fact  that  Clarke’s  method  has  been  described  as  the 
method  of  analogy.  There  is  no  difference  in  the  two  mor- 
alists, in  this  respect,  except  that  Clarke  used  the  mathemati- 
cal analogy  while  Wollaston  used  the  analogy  of  logic  and 
physics.  In  the  unsigned  article  in  the  Britannica  on  Clarke 
the  statement  is  made  that  “His  theory  of  fitness  is  formu- 
lated on  the  analogy  of  mathematics.  He  held  that  in  rela- 
tion to  the  will  things  possess  an  objective  fitness  similar  to 
the  mutual  consistency  of  things  in  the  physical  universe. 
This  fitness  God  has  given  to  actions,  as  He  has  given  laws 
to  nature ; and  the  fitness  is  as  immutable  as  the  laws.”  ® 
The  article  states  that  Clarke’s  theory  has  been  criticized 
on  the  ground  that  he  “made  virtue  consist  in  conformity  to 
the  relations  of  things  universally.”  In  reply  to  these  criti- 
cisms, it  is  said,  that  “the  whole  tenor  of  his  argument  shows 
him  to  have  had  in  view  conformity  to  such  relations  only  as 
belong  to  the  sphere  of  moral  agency.”  The  view  is  ex- 
pressed that  Clarke  might  have  escaped  this  criticism  if  he 
had  emphasized  more  the  relation  of  moral  fitness  to  the 
will.  I think  that  both  Clarke  and  Wollaston  did  emphasize 
sufficiently  the  relation  of  the  will  to  morality,  in  fact  they 
made  the  difference  between  intellectual  propositions  and 
moral  acts  to  depend  upon  this.  Moral  relations  are  like 
intellectual  relations  in  the  respect  that  both  require  con- 
formity to  the  objective  nature  of  things,  but  moral  actions 
are  unlike  intellectual  judgments  in  that  the  former  belong 
to  the  woi’ld  of  freedom  while  the  latter  belong  to  the  world 
of  description  where  relations  are  determined  by  the  nature 
of  things.  The  article,  however,  does  say  that  it  is  a mis- 
take to  say  that  “Clarke  simply  confused  mathematics  and 

’ Williams,  Art.  Ethics  in  Britannica. 

’ Anon.,  Art.  Samuel  Clarke  in  Britannica. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 81 

morals  by  justifying  the  moral  criterion  on  a mathematical 
basis.  . . . He  compared  the  two  subjects  on  the  basis  of 
analogy.”  ® 

Williams,  in  his  article  on  ethics  in  connection  with  the 
exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  Price,  takes  occasion  to  re- 
mark that  Clarke  and  Wollaston  confused  the  ethical  ques- 
tion more  than  they  explicated  it  by  this  use  of  the  method 
of  analogy.  Price,  he  says,  regards  moral  ideas  as  derived 
from  the  “intuition  of  truth  or  immediate  discernment  of 
the  nature  of  things  by  the  understanding.”  He  regards 
“right”  and  “wrong”  as  “single  ideas  incapable  of  definition 
or  analysis.”  Williams  says  that  Price  conceives  the  notions 
of  “right,”  “fit,”  “ought”  as  coincident  and  by  so  doing 
“avoids.”  Williams  thinks,  “the  confusion  into  which  Clarke 
and  Wollaston  had  been  led  by  pressing  the  ‘analogy  be- 
tween ethical  and  physical  truth !’  ” As  I have  already 
said  I do  not  see  how  any  confusion  can  result  from  pressing 
an  analogy,  a confusion  can  only  result  from  forgetting  that 
the  relation  between  the  good  and  the  true  is  one  of  analogy. 
As  we  shall  see,  presently,  many  of  Wollaston’s  critics  fell 
into  confusion  in  their  interpretations  of  his  system  on  this 
very  point. 

This  analogous  method  of  treating  morals  has  been  very 
greatly  misunderstood,  and  this  misunderstanding  has  been 
largely  due  to  the  fact  that  Wollaston’s  critics  have  failed 
absolutely  to  consider  that  his  method  was  that  of  analogy. 
Long  ago  Warlaw  undertook  to  defend  the  principle  of 
Wollaston,  or  rather  he  was  determined  to  see  that  he  was 
given  a fair  deal.  Warlaw,  as  a matter  of  fact,  dissents  con- 
siderably from  this  principle  on  the  ground  that  it  is  entirely 
too  general,  and  also  because  he  believes  that  Christian 
ethics  is  the  only  adequate  system.  Sir  James  Mackintosh, 
in  criticizing  the  notion  that  a wicked  act  is  as  contradictory 
as  a logical  or  mathematical  contradiction,  said  that  as  it  is 
impossible  for  3 and  3 to  be  other  than  6,  it  ought  on  this 
ethical  principle,  “to  be  impossible  to  do  a wicked  act.”  To 

° Anon.,  Art.  Samuel  Clarke  in  Britannica. 

^“Williams,  Art.  Ethics  in  Britannica,  vol.  IX,  p.  833. 


82 


The  Ethics  of  William  WoUaston 


act  without  the  proper  regard  to  the  nature  of  things, 
“as  if  a man  were  to  use  fire  for  cooling,  or  ice  for  heating” 
is  absurd,  but  not  immoral.  Sir  James  goes  on  to  say  that 
the  murderer  who  poisons  conforms  to  the  nature  of  things 
as  much  as  does  the  physician  who  administers  the  emetic. 
All  men,  whether  they  mean  to  do  good  or  ill,  must  conform 
to  the  nature  of  things. Warlaw  answers,  that  when  it  is 
said  that  an  immoral  act  is  as  absurd  as  to  deny  obvious 
logical  or  mathematical  relations,  the  meaning,  of  course, 
is  “that  the  two  are  equally  absurd  in  their  respective  depart- 
ments, that  the  one  is  as  preposterously  contrary  to  the  fit- 
ness of  things,  which  constitutes  the  principles  of  morals,  as 
the  other  is  to  those  mathematical  relations  which  constitute 
the  principles  of  Geometry.”  He  continues,  “does  not  the 
very  fact  of  his  drawing  a comparison,  or  borrowing  an 
analogy,  from  the  one  to  the  other,  show,  that  he  considered 
the  two  descriptions  of  relations  as  essentially  different, 
and  moral  relations,  though  capable  of  such  analogical  il- 
lustrations from  logical  or  geometrical  relations,  as  quite 
distinct  from,  and  not  in  any  way  affected  by  them.'”’  Pre- 
cisely the  same  is  true  of  the  physical  relations  like  those  re- 
ferred to  by  Sir  James.  Warlaw  says:  “The  fact  that  the 
murderer  and  the  physician  act  alike  in  conformity  to  such 
relations  for  their  respective  ends,  is  so  far  from  bringing 
their  respective  actions  in  identity,  or  even  alliance  with 
each  other,  that  illustration  of  the  position  could  have  been 
made  as  easily  from  physical  as  from  mathematical  or  logi- 
cal relations.  One  could  say  that  the  act  of  murder  is  as 
absurd  a thing  in  the  department  of  morals,  as,  in  the  de- 
partment of  physics,  would  be  the  ‘choosing  of  fire  for  cool- 
ing or  ice  for  heating’.”  Warlaw  says  that,  of  course, 
“morality  is  not  founded  on  relations  universally  and  of 
every  sort,  but  only  on  those  capable  of  such  application, 
relations  involving  persons.”  No  one,  he  says,  could  imagine 
morality  to  attach  to  purely  abstract  things.  Mackintosh 
had  said  that  “it  seems  evident,  that  no  relations  are  to  be 

“ Mackintosh,  Preliminary  Dissertation. 

“Warlaw,  Christian  Ethics,  p.  303.  Mackintosh,  Preliminary  Disser- 
tation. Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nature  Deli.,  p.  15. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 83 

considered,  except  those  in  which  a living,  intelligent  and 
voluntary  agent  is  one  of  the  beings  related.”  This  Warlaw 
says  is  precisely  the  teachings  of  Wollaston,  “it  never  oc- 
curred to  me,  before  reading  Mackintosh,  that  this  moral 
principle  had  any  reference  to  mathematical  or  logical  ab- 
stractions.” The  system  teaches  that  there  ought  to  be  a 
conformity  of  actions  to  the  nature  of  things,  Warlaw 
says,  but  not  that  morality  consists  in  “relations  which  are 
entirely  extraneous  to  the  department  of  moral  agency,  but 
all  the  relations  in  which  such  agency  is  possible.  On  these 
universally  the  general  system  of  morals  rests,  and  in  con- 
formity to  these  universally,  virtue  consists.”  Wollaston 
anticipated  just  such  objections  as  those  offered  by  Sir 
James  Mackintosh,  and  his  answers  were  very  similar  to 
those  offered  by  Warlaw.^® 

Some  of  the  moralists  who  interpret  Wollaston’s  system 
idealistically  see  in  his  analogical  method  a pi-ofound  meta- 
physical significance.  It  is  said  that  such  an  analogy  be- 
tween the  good  and  the  true  can  be  found  only  because  of  the 
ultimate  coincidence  of  the  two.^^  I think  that  this  is  true 
but  we  do  not  want  to  interpret  this  in  such  a way  as  to  make 
Wollaston  confuse  logical  and  moral  relations.  Windel- 
band  says  that  “Wollaston  determined  the  .content  of  the 
moral  law  solely  by  metaphysical  relations,  and,  accordingly, 
in  the  last  instance,  by  logical  criteria.”  He  sought  to  find 
“an  objective  principle  of  morals  in  the  general  suitableness 
of  an  action  to  its  determining  relations,”  and  “claimed  for 
this  knowledge  a self -evidence  analogous  to  that  of  logical 
relations.”  He  though  also,  says  Windelband,  that  the 
feeling  of  obligation  which  determines  the  will  to  appropri- 
ate action  “comes  from  the  insight  as  to  natures  and  rela- 
tions.” This  same  metaphysical  interpretation  of  the 
method  of  analogy  is  implied  in  what  Blakey  has  to  say  of 
it.  He  says  that  a great  part  of  the  reasoning  on  the  eter- 
nal nature  of  virtue  is  grounded  upon  “a  principle  of 
analogy,  which  Clarke  and  Wollaston  said  existed  between 

“Warlaw,  Christian  Ethics,  pp.  303-5. 

“ Von  Hartmann,  Phanomenologie  des  Sittlichen  Bewusstseins,  p.  347. 

Windelband,  His.  of  Phil,,  p.  504. 


84. 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


our  perceptions  of  good  and  evil  and  our  mental  perceptions 
of  figure  and  quality.  Iniquity  is  the  very  same  in  action,  as 
contradiction  is  in  theory,”  Perhaps  this  metaphysical 
interpretation  is  even  more  pronounced  in  Grote  than  in  any 
of  the  moralists  who  so  interpret  Wollaston.  In  his  chap- 
ter “on  the  analogy  between  the  intellectual  and  the  moral 
ideals,”  he  says,  that  “man  is  social  to  the  bottom  of  his 
mind.”  It  is  for  this  reason,  according  to  Grote,  that  when 
a man  thinks,  he  thinks  generally.  When  we  think,  we  think 
not  for  our  own  intelligence  alone,  but  for  general  intelli- 
gence, and  we  verify  our  thoughts  accordingly.  Grote,  then, 
discusses  the  applicability  of  truth  to  action,  showing  the 
close  connection  of  our  active  and  intellectual  natures.  The 
two  historic  ideals  of  morality,  that  of  rightness  and  that 
of  good,  are  he  says,  analogous  and  also  historically  closely 
related  to  the  ideals  of  tnith,  empiricism  and  rationalism. 
The  one  view  of  knowledge  is  that  things  just  impress  them- 
selves on  us  as  they  are.  The  other  view  is  that  we  think  of 
things  as  we  should.  The  term  analogy  is  not  quite  strong 
enough,  thinks  Grote,  to  express  the  relation  between  the 
intellectual  and  the  moral.  “True,”  he  says,  “the  intellectual 
suggests  the  moral,”  but  “the  rightness  which  governs  ac- 
tions is  an  extension  or  wider  application  of  the  truth  which 
governs  thought.”  Moral  action  is  as  rational,  he  says,  as 
is  intellectual  truth,  “because  as  conformable  to  the  nature 
of  things.”  This  is  practically  a quotation  from  Wollaston, 
consequently  it  is  very  clear  that  Grote  is  discussing  him 
although  he  mentions  neither  Clarke  nor  Wollaston  by 
name.  He  has  them  in  mind,  of  course,  when  he  says  that 
“many  philosophers,  whom  we  may  call  the  intellectual  mor- 
alists, have  followed  out  this  view  extensively.”  The  relation 
of  the  good  to  the  intellectual  ideal  of  real  being  was,  he 
says,  worked  out  by  Plato  in  a very  beautiful  way.  The 
relation  of  rightness  to  truth  was,  he  says,  worked  out  in 
very  much  the  same  way  by  the  intellectual  moralists. 

“ Blakey,  His.  of  Moral  Sc.,  p.  212. 

” Grote,  A Treatise  on  Moral  Ideals,  pp.  60-7. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  1 


85 


II.  The  Search  for  an  Objective  Standard  of  Morality 

The  agreement  between  the  world  order  and  man’s  reason 
is  the  ground  of  moral  obligation.  It  is  essential  to  reason 
to  respect  order,  as  soon  as  the  idea  of  it  is  conceived.  This 
is  what  is  meant  by  the  objectivity  of  morality.  It  is  entirely 
consistent,  then,  to  say  that  the  reason  is  the  moral  faculty, 
and  at  the  same  time  say  that  the  nature  of  morality  is  de- 
termined by  the  objective  nature  of  things.  It  must  be 
understood,  however,  that  by  reason  we  do  not  mean  intuition 
or  innate  idea,  but  rather  the  interpretative  power  of  the 
mind.  At  first  sight,  it  would  appear  as  if  there  were  two 
very  different  criteria  of  morals  in  Wollaston’s  system, 
namely,  the  rationalistic  principle  which  should  guide  one 
in  all  his  acts,  and  the  objective  principle,  conformity  to  the 
nature  of  things,  which  must  characterize  every  action  that 
is  denominated  moral.  The  two  are,  however,  for  him,  en- 
tirely reconcilable,  in  that  rational  actions  are  precisely 
those  actions  which  are  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of 
things,  and,  apart  from  such  objective  reference,  one  cannot 
say  that  anything  is  either  rational  or  irrational.  Apart 
from  relations  one  cannot  say  that  anything  is  true  or  false, 
good  or  bad.  Both  our  theory  of  knowledge  and  our  theory 
of  morals  must  rest  on  an  objective  basis. 

The  law  of  identity  constitutes  the  one  ethical  law  for 
Wollaston.  True,  a judgment  expressing  identity,  A is 
A,  is  an  existential  judgment,  merely,  and  it  expresses  an 
ought  and  becomes  a moral  judgment,  only  when  it  is  ap- 
propriated by  a person.  Its  identity  may  then  be  affirmed 
or  denied  by  deeds.  Man  belongs  to  two  wox'lds,  is  and  ought, 
but,  after  all,  ought  is  just  acting  in  accordance  with  the 
rationality  of  things.  When,  duly  considered,  the  value 
judgment  is  just  an  existential  judgment  of  a higher  and 
more  ultimate  nature.  As  to  the  validity  of  this  principle, 
who  can  question  the  position  that  a man  ought  always  to 
act  in  such  a way  as  to  fulfill  his  rational  nature,  which  can 
be  done  only  by  living  conformably  to  the  real  nature  of 
things?  It  is  reason  which  differentiates  man  from  the  rest 


86 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


of  the  animal  kingdom.  The  true  life  of  man  must,  then,  be 
a rational  life.  A rational  life  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a life 
guided  by  self-knowledge,  self-reverence  and  self-control; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  a life,  all  acts  of  which  must  be 
characterized  by  self-consistency  and  coherency, — in  a word, 
a life  conformable  to  the  objective  nature  of  things.  This 
means  that  the  good  life  is  a life  lived  in  accordance  with  the 
logical  laws  of  identity  and  contradiction.  This  means  that 
no  action  should  deny  essential  relations  and  natures,  or 
stated  positively,  that  everything  should  be  treated  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  nature  and  relations.  Wrong  denies  the 
indissoluble  unity  of  life  and  the  world,  and  is  therefore 
self-contradictory.  Good  affirms  this  indissoluble  unity  of 
life  and  the  world,  and  is  therefore  self-consistent  and  co- 
herent. The  finite  fragmentary  self  realizes  itself  only  by 
coming  to  think  of  itself  as  a significant  member  of  this  unity 
of  life  and  the  world,  and  the  moral  choices  of  such  a life  are 
determined  by  this  realization  of  the  indissoluble  unity  of  the 
individual  life  with  the  entire  cosmic  order.  Everything  in 
the  world  gets  its  value  and  significance  from  its  relations 
to  other  things.  It  is  an  infinitely  related  system,  and  mor- 
ality consists  in  the  affirmations  of  these  in  thought  and  deed, 
whenever  and  wherever  human  lives  are  involved.  Man  being 
free  he  can  either  affirm  or  deny  these  essential  life  rela- 
tions by  his  actions,  and  it  is  this  freedom  which  constitutes 
him  a moral  being. 

This  type  of  philosophizing  came  as  a natural  reaction  to 
the  relativity  of  empiricism  and  hedonism.  Morality,  it  was 
felt,  should  possess  universality  and  necessity  in  order  to 
have  validity  and  authority.  Professor  Seth  says  that  a 
subjective  basis  failed  to  satisfy  these  conditions,  so  the 
intellectualists  made  the  appeal  not  to  any  moral  sense  or 
moral  faculty  which  is  subjective  and  relative,  but  to  the 
moral  reason  which  is  universal.^®  Wollaston  realized  that 
both  the  subjective  moral  principles  of  interest,  and  of  intui- 
tion are  insufficient,  and  that  an  objective  and  logical  prin- 
ciple is  necessary.  In  order  to  make  morality  objective  he 
tried  to  place  it  upon  an  intellectual  basis.  After  criti- 
“Seth,  Ethical  Principles,  p.  173. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 87 

cizing  the  extreme  intellectualism  of  the  system,  Vorlander 
grants  that  there  is  “a  certain  justification  for  this  because 
it  represents  a reaction  from  systems  of  ethics  which  based 
morality  upon  subjective  feelings  and  inclinations”  and 
which  paid  little  attention  to  the  relation  of  the  subject  to 
things  and  to  persons.^®  Von  Hartmann  says  that  Wollas- 
ton’s attempt  to  carry  out  a pure  rationalism  in  the  realms 
of  morality  is  most  noteworthy.  “For  he  has  seized  with 
philosophical  daring  and  carried  out  with  admirable  acumen 
the  standpoint  to  which  abstract  rationalism  of  conscious 
reflection  must  come.”  He  says  that  “consistent  rationalism 
is  bound  to  acknowledge  the  consistency  of  this  position.” 
Garve  says  that  Clarke  and  Wollaston  and  the  German 
Kant  must  be  considered  as  the  inventors  of  a new  moral 
principle  based  completely  on  the  reason.  Garve  is  right 
when  he  says  that  while  Kant  distinguished  sharply  between 
the  practical  and  the  theoretical  reason,  Clarke  and  Wollas- 
ton made  no  such  distinction.  Morality  is  based  on  a purely 
rational  principle  and  this  is  not  conceived  as  a peculiar 
kind  of  reason.  Garve  says  that  Clarke  and  Wollaston  think 
of  morality  “as  a practice  of  reason,”  but  rightly  says 
that  this  is  very  different  from  Kant’s  “practical  reason” 
or  moral  intuition.^^  Garve  understands  this  system  of 
morals  to  be  based  on  the  pure  reason  and  so  on  the  nature 
of  things  learned  by  experience.  Erdmann’s  interpretation 
is  the  same.  He  understands  Wollaston  to  teach  the  objec- 
tivity of  morals.  “What  determines  how  they  must  be  treated 
are  not  a priori  laws  in  one’s  reason,”  and  since  “there  are 
no  such  common  principles  given  (da  es  keine  solche  all- 
gemeine  Vernunftprincipien  geben)  a priori  to  the  human 
mind  men  must  think  out  on  the  basis  of  experience  and 
reason  how  they  shall  act.”  So,  he  says,  that  Wollaston 
teaches  “dass  grosse  Gesetz  der  Religion,  oder  der  Natur  ist, 
dass  die  Hinge  als  das  behandelt  werden,  was  sie  sind.”  It 
follows  from  this  “that  not  an  inner  imperative  but  the  na- 
ture of  things  determine  the  action  and  its  worth.”  Win- 

“ Vorlander,  Geschichter  der  Philosophiscen  Moral,  etc.,  p.  386. 

“ Von  Hartmann,  Phanomenologie  des  Sittlichen,  etc.,  p.  345. 

“ Garve,  Uebersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  Sittenl.,  p.  167. 

““Erdmann,  Gescb.  der  neuen  Philosophic,  vol.  II,  p.  116. 


88 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


delband  says  that  Wollaston  sought  to  find  “an  objective 
principle  of  morals  in  the  general  suitableness  of  an  action  to 
its  determining  relations.”  Vorlander  interprets  him  as 
finding  the  criterion  in  the  objective;  “Diejenige  Handlung 
is  gut,  welche  der  Natur  des  Gegenstandes  angemessen 
ist.” 

In  a system  of  ethics  that  is  both  rational  and  objective, 
morality  consists  in  the  suitableness  of  the  action  to  the  na- 
ture and  relations  of  the  object,  and  that,  in  the  last  analysis, 
it  is  coincident  with  truth.  This  dual  principle  is  clearly 
shown  in  Vorlander  exposition  of  Wollaston’s  principle; 
“The  great  commandment  of  Natural  Religion  or  the  great 
moral  principle  is  that  every  intelligent,  acting  and  free 
being  shall  thus  act,  that  it  does  not  contradict  truth  through 
any  action  or  that  it  treats  everything  according  to  what 
it  is.”  Vorlander  thinks  that  this  is  not  really  a dual  prin- 
ciple because  to  act  rationally,  “dass  es  durch  keine  Thatig- 
keit  einer  Wahrheit  widerspricht”  means  precisely  “dass  es 
jedes  Ding  als  das  was  es  ist  behandelt.”  Falckenberg  un- 
derstands Wollaston  in  the  same  way  as  Vorlander  : “That 
action  is  good  whose  execution  includes  the  affirmation  of  a 
truth  or  whose  omission  the  negation  of  a truth.”  Accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  nature,  a rational  being  ought  so  to  con- 
duct himself  that  he  shall  never  contradict  a truth  by  his 
actions,  i.  e.,  to  treat  each  thing  for  what  it  is.”  The 
highest  destination  of  man  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  know  the 
truth,  and,  on  the  other,  to  express  it  in  actions.  This  does 
not  mean  that  there  is  any  naked  truth,  for  all  truth  is  con- 
cerned with  things  and  relations.  Hall  says  that  Wollaston 
“has  an  interesting  discussion  of  moral  good  as  essentially  a 
correspondence  with  the  facts  of  the  universe.  . . . Truth  is 
the  good  because  it  corresponds  to  God’s  nature,  and  all  hu- 
man acts  are  statements  affirming  or  denying  in  various  de- 
grees God’s  eternal  truth.”  He  quotes  a passage  from  Wol- 
laston which  he  thinks  states  his  position:  “Every  intelli- 

“ Windelband,  His.  of  Phil.,  p.  504. 

^ Vorlander,  Gesch.  der  Philosophischen  Moral,  &c.,  p.  385. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  385.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

“ Falckenberg,  His.  of  Modern  Phi.,  p.  196. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 89 

gent,  active  and  free  being  should  so  behave  himself  as  by 
no  act  to  contradict  truth,  or  that  he  should  so  treat  every- 
thing as  being  what  it  is.” 

Windelband  says  that  the  philosophical  element  in  the 
system  of  Wollaston  “is  the  striving  after  an  objective  basis 
of  morality.”  He  says  that  Wollaston  “based”  morality 
“on  the  nature  of  things  themselves,”  and  to  this  he  also 
“gave  a logical  turn.  He  viewed  the  matter  from  the  stand- 
point that  there  is  involved  in  every  moral  action  a theoreti- 
cal proposition  and  therewith  a judgment  as  to  the  things 
treated  or  of  the  prevailing  circumstances.^®  He  thinks  that 
Wollaston  fails  to  distinguish  clearly  between  the  intellectual 
and  the  moral,  and  yet  he  says  that  “of  course  he  also  pointed 
out  that  a person  must  difPerentiate  from  this  judgment  not 
only  the  action  but  the  decisions  as  to  the  same.”  Windel- 
band says  one  finds  in  this  philosophy  a careful  investigation 
of  “the  difference  between  will  and  an  affirmative  judgment.” 
But  even  after  he  has  said  this  he  goes  right  on  and  makes 
a statement  that  makes  it  quite  evident  that  he  does  not 
really  get  the  significance  of  the  will  in  Wollaston’s  system: 
“Now,  although  Wollaston  thought  of  the  action  as  different 
from  the  judgment,  he  nevertheless  meant  that  the  worth  of 
the  action  stands  or  falls  with  the  worth  of  the  judgment, 
and  consequently  he  found  the  moral  criterion  in  that  this 
judgment  was  either  true  or  false.”  I think  that  Windel- 
band is  wrong  in  saying  that  with  Wollaston  “das  der  Werth 
der  Handlung  mit  dem  Werthe  dieses  Urtheils  stehe  und 
falle.”  It  is  not  true  that  a moral  action  is  one  that  truly 
recognizes  “the  object  or  relation  to  which  the  action  refers,” 
for  a wrong  action  as  truly  as  a right  action  recognizes  the 
truth  of  the  case,  but  rather  is  the  moral  action  one  that  is 
conformable  to  the  recognized  truth.  According  to  Wol- 
laston an  evil  action  also  recognizes  the  truth  of  the  nature 
and  relations  of  things  and  the  act  could  not  be  morally 
wrong  otherwise.^® 

*'  Hall,  His.  of  Christian  Ethics,  p.  453. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

® Windelband,  Gesch.  der  Neurn  Philosopbie,  vol.  II,  pp.  266-7.  Wol- 
laston, Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  7-8. 


90 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


Wundt  says  that  according  to  Wollaston’s  principle, 
moral  norms  possess  an  objective  reality  equal  to  that  of 
mathematical  or  physical  laws,  “so  that  a transgression  of 
law  in  the  moral  realm  is  like  a change  in  the  proportion  of 
bodies  which  breaks  the  laws  of  nature  in  the  physical 
world.  As  truth  consists  in  the  agreement  of  our  ideas  with 
the  nature  of  things,  so  good  consists  in  the  agreement  of 
our  acts  with  things.  . . . To  act  according  to  nature  is, 
in  Wollaston’s  opinion,  to  act  morally  and  in  obedience  to 
God.”  He  was  perhaps  influenced  by  the  natural  philosophy 
of  Newton,  Wundt  thinks,  in  thus  regarding  morality  “in 
the  light  of  a violation  of  the  laws  of  nature.”  While  Wundt 
thinks  this  to  be  a defect,  still,  he  says,  “this  attempt  to 
prove  the  objectivity  of  morals,  as  against  the  subjectivity 
of  current  views  of  morals,  was  historically  important.” 
Stewart  says  that  Wollaston  tried  to  reconcile  Locke’s 
theory  of  the  origin  of  ideas  with  the  immutability  of  moral 
distinctions  by  taking  tbe  position  that  virtue  consists  in 
conduct  conformable  to  truth.  He  said  that  right  and  wrong 
cannot  he  just  simple  ideas,  as  the  intuitionalists  taught, 
“but  that  morality  must  be  conformity  with  relations  per- 
ceived by  the  reason.”  In  discussing  the  historical  origin 
of  Wollaston’s  objective  principle  of  morality,  Erdmann  has 
this  to  say:  “Locke  placed  both  speculative  and  practical 
principles  in  the  same  class,  taking  the  position  that  neither 
are  innate.  He  went  further,  however,  and  made  the  posi- 
tive statement  that  the  speculative  principles  are  presented 
to  the  mind  by  the  external  world.”  Now,  says  Erdmann, 
Wollaston  took  the  same  positive  position  in  regard  to 
practical  principles : “The  mind  cannot  draw  the  principles 
of  action  from  within  itself,  they  must  come  to  it  from 
without.”  He  says  that  “ the  moral  law,”  for  Wollaston, 
“is  summed  up  in  the  formula:  We  should  follow  nature, 
or  treat  everything  as  that  which  it  is.  . . . In  our  actions 
we  should  act  as  things  prescribe.” 

“For  a man  to  act  virtuously,”  according  to  Blakey’s  un- 

Wundt,  Ethics,  p.  66. 

^ Stewart,  Works,  vol.  VI,  p.  290. 

“Erdmann,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  II,  pp.  116-20. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 91 

derstanding  of  Wollaston,  “he  must  square  his  conduct  ac- 
cording to  the  truth  of  things ; or  to  treat  everything  ac- 
cording to  its  real  character,  or  as  it  really  is.”  He  be- 
lieved in  the  stability  of  the  laws  of  nature,  says  Bailey, 
and  that  everything  in  the  world  is  regulated  by  infinite  wis- 
dom. His  system  of  ethics  is  “grounded  on  a simple  meta- 
physical principle  that  truth  in  everything  is  to  be  in  con- 
formity with  the  constituted  order  of  nature.”  Bain  says : 
“With  him,  a bad  action  contains  the  denial  of  a true  pro, po- 
sition. . . . Truth  can  be  denied  by  actions  as  well  as-  by 
words.  Thus  the  violation  of  a contract  is  the  denial  by 
action  that  the  contract  has  been  concluded.  . . . Robbing 
a traveler  is  the  denial  that  what  you  take  from  him  is  his. 
. . . An  action  that  denies  one  or  more  true  propositions 
cannot  be  good,  and  is  necessarily  bad.  A good  action  is 
one  whose  omission  would  be  bad  or  whose  contrary  is  bad, 
in  the  above  sense.” 

There  is  in  the  system  of  Wollaston  an  a priori  element, 
namely,  that  one  can  know  as  a universal  and  necessary  first 
principle  of  morality  that  an  intelligent  being  should  always 
act  rationally.  This  is,  however,  entirely  reconcilable  with 
the  demand  that  morality  be  objective,  because  acting  ra- 
tionally means  acting  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things. 
Wollaston  insists  that,  apart  from  such  objective  reference, 
we  cannot  say  that  any  action  is  either  rational  or  irrational. 
It  follows,  of  course,  that,  apart  from  such  objective  refer- 
ence, no  action  can  be  pronounced  either  good  or  bad.  He 
would  not  admit  that  an  action  can  be  called  good,  simply 
because  the  will  or  the  intention  is  good,  but  the  objectivity 
of  his  principle  demands  that  there  be  some  anticipatory 
consideration  of  consequences.  As  Von  Hartmann  says, 
though,  there  is  a tendency  for  one  who  has  accepted  the 
principle  that  morality  must  be  based  on  reason  to  “make 
the  immediate  basis  of  morality  that  theoretical  rationality 
with  which  he  is  best  acquainted”  and  to  “proclaim  truth 
as  the  principle  of  morality.”  There  is  no  truth  that  has 

“ Blakey,  His.  of  Moral  Sc.,  p.  152.  Briley,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  HI, 
pp.  7 and  8. 

Bain,  Moral  Sc.,  p.  152. 

“Von  Hartmann,  Phanomenologie  des  Sittl.  Bewusstseins,  p.  343. 


92 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


not  an  objective  reference  for  there  can  be  no  reality  to 
knowledge  that  is  not  a knowledge  of  reality ; consequently, 
when  morality  is  based  on  truth  it  is  based  on  the  nature  of 
things,  not  on  intuition, — truths  independent  of  objective 
reference,  for  there  are  no  such  truths.  Erdmann  very  truly 
says  that  only  those  propositions  are  true,  “which  define 
things  as  they  actually  are  (welche  die  Dinge  so  setzen,  wie 
sie  wicklich  sind),  or  truth  is  the  conformity  of  symbols 
or  names  with  the  things  themselves.”  Erdmann  says  that 
Wollaston  first  gives  his  principle  as  if  it  were  a purely  for- 
mal one,  but  later  explains  it  “more  definitely  to  the  effect 
that  that  action  is  good  which  is  in  accord  with  the  nature 
of  the  object  (die  Handlung  gut  ist,  welche  der  Natur  des 
Gegenstandes  gemass  ist).” 

Wollaston’s  assertion  that  truth  constitutes  the  moral 
principle,  together  with  his  view  that  ethics  must  have  an 
objective  basis  asserts,  or  at  least  implies,  an  idealistic  view 
of  the  world,  because  these  two  things  could  both  be  true, 
consistent  and  coherent,  only  if  they  both  belonged  to  a 
world  of  meaning,  a coherent  world  order.®’  Perhaps 
Clarke  brings  out  these  broader  relations  somewhat  more 
clearly,  in  some  respects,  than  does  Wollaston.  It  is  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  is,  in  the  nature  of  reality  and  man, 
says  Clarke,  that  moral  distinctions  are  founded.  The  in- 
dividual soul  stands  to  the  rest  of  nature  in  the  relation  of 
subject  and  object,  the  perceiving  mind  and  the  things 
perceived.  The  universe  is  reasonable  and  the  same  reason 
which  pervades  the  whole,  exists  also  in  each  individual.  He 
does  not  mean  that  this  exists  as  a divine  implantation,  for 
he  goes  on  to  say  that  the  reason  in  man  perceives  reason 
elsewhere.  “If  a natural  or  a fitting  thing  exists  it  will  be 
perceived  by  the  individual  mind.”  Rationality  demands 
conformity  not  only  in  thought,  but  also  in  life  to  “the 
absolute  reason  of  things.” 

Schmidt  says  that  Wollaston’s  norm  of  conduct  lies  not 
within,  but  in  things,  “to  whose  true  nature  our  deeds  and 

Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Philosophic,  vol.  II,  pp.  113-4. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  7-8  and  19. 

"“Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  42.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.,  etc.,  p.  23. 


General  Interpretation  of  Section  I 93 

words  must  simply  conform.”  This  does  not  mean,  says 
Schmidt,  that  Wollaston  thought  morality  consisted  in 
acting  conformably  to  things  viewed  singly,  but  each  thing 
is  to  be  thought  of  “in  connection  with  the  others,  in  its 
relations  to  all  others.”  This  is  one  of  the  best  interpreta- 
tions of  Wollaston.  It  implies  that  this  objective  order  has 
a metaphysical  meaning,  and  I am  very  sure  th-^^-'^^^onaston 
understands  it  that  way.  Wollaston  speaks  (P  ^^ral 

action  as  opposing  the  will  of  the  Author  of  as 

contradicting  nature  and  truth.  These  untrBui  juat- 

ural  things  are  wrong,  he  says,  because  they  “tai  .ce.^gh 
the  constitution  of  things.”  Gass  gives  Wokb^'^^-  X i*'  ifin" 
ciple  of  conformity  to  nature  a similar  metaoa3®-^V-a'^(  in  - 
terpretation.  In  a rational  system  of  morality,  at  of 

Wollaston,  Gass  says  “that  every  will  must  be  determined  by 
a universal  pui’pose  as  well  as  by  the  nature  of  the  individual 
case  (dass  jeder  Wille  durch  eine  allgemine  Zweckmassig- 
keit  sowie  anderseits  durch  die  Beschalfenheit  des  eigelnen. 
Falles  bestimmt  werde).”  Gass  says  that  the  “appropri- 
ateness of  acting  conformably  to  the  nature  of  things 
strongly  “recommends  itself  through  itself.  It  makes  the 
impression  of  the  fitting  by  which  disorder  and  extravagance 
are  excluded  and  through  its  rule  it  guarantees  also  happi- 
ness.” Gass  understands  Wollaston  to  mean  that  it  is 
inherently  rational  to  act  conformably  to  the  nature  of 
things.  He  also  understands  him  to  say  that  the  experiences 
of  life  justify  the  belief  in  the  rationality  of  the  criterion. 

Wollaston  is  considered  by  Morell  to  belong  to  the  move- 
ment characterized  him  as  English  Polemical  Idealism. 
He  says  that  in  England  Idealism  has  always  appeared  as 
an  opposition  movement.  The  English  mind  is  of  a practi- 
cal bent  and  not  naturally  inclined  to  speculation,  conse- 
quently in  England  “the  rationalistic  method  of  philoso- 
phizing has  seldom  been  carried  to  any  great  extent,  except 
it  has  been  occasioned  and  almost  necessitated  by  the  ex- 

“ Schmidt,  Das  Gewissen,  p.  296.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin., 
p.  38. 

“Gass,  Gesch.  der  Christlichen  Ethik,  p.  19.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  pp.  8,  11,  15,  38  and  52. 


94 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


cesses  of  the  opposite  school.”  Wollaston,  he  says,  must 
be  regarded  as  the  opponent  of  extreme  empiricism.  “The 
ground  he  takes  in  his  ethical  system,  namely,  that  virtue 
consists  in  acting  according  to  the  tinith  of  things,  is  a 
sufficient  proof  that  he  regarded  some  conception  as  abso- 
lutely necessary,  and  originating  in  the  very  constitution 
of  man’s  rational  nature.”  Since  Morell  says  that  this  abso- 
lutebckl  y lisary  conception  of  morality  is,  that  “virtue  con- 
sists'-iTiep  in  ag  according  to  the  truth  of  things,”  he  cannot 
mea^^stch  by  figijiating  in  the  very  constitution  of  man’s 
i-ati(ine.  ina]  jire,”  that  morality  is  based  on  innate  ideas. 
He  tha ^jcity  that  experience  is  involved  in  moral  knowl- 
b is  involved,  Morell  thinks,  in  Wollaston’s 

thoug’br'  '^"'i3<:  fhere  are  certain  fixed  relations  in  the  universe, 
cognizable  by  the  human  reason,  and  that  virtue  consists 
in  acting  conformably  thereto. 

The  idealistic  interpretation  of  Wollaston’s  ethical  sys- 
tem is  perhaps  shown  more  clearly  by  Victor  Catherein  than 
by  any  other  commentator.  We  are,  according  to  Catherein 
to  treat  everything  according  to  its  own  nature,  but  also 
“nach  seinem  Verhaltniss  zu  uns  und  zum  Weltganzen.”  He 
thinks  that  a thing  cannot  be  treated  according  to  its  na- 
ture, or  treated  as  what  it  is,  without  a due  consideration 
of  “its  relations  to  us  and  to  the  entire  universe.”  This 
is  true  because  a thing  is  really  nothing  apart  from  its  con- 
nections with  other  things.  Without  such  relations  it  cer- 
tainly could  have  no  ethical  significance,  “denn  alle  Dinge 
seien  so  eingerichtet,  das  sie  zusammen  ein  harmonisches 
Weltganze  bildeten.” 

“Morell,  His.  of  Modern  Phil.,  p.  137. 

“Catherein,  Moralphilosophie,  p.  215. 


WOLLASTON  AND  HIS  CRITICS 


I wish  to  consider  in  this  division  of  my  treatise  the  gen- 
eral criticisms  that  have  been  made  of  Wollaston’s  intellec- 
tual system  of  Ethics.  Specific  criticisms  of  specific  por- 
tions of  his  work  are  treated  in  the  appropriate  place.  I 
think  that  an  extensive  consideration  of  Wollaston’s  critics 
is  justified  on  the  ground  that  the  very  raison  d’etre  of 
writing  the  thesis  is  to  show  that  Wollaston  has  been  a very 
much  abused  man,  and  especially  to  show  that  he  was  not 
guilty  of  holding  the  nonsensical  views  he  has  been  supposed 
to  hold.  I will  now  take  up  in  a systematic  way  the  criti- 
cisms that  have  been  made  to  his  system. 

I.  Ceiticism 

THAT  HE  CONFUSES  EOGICAE  AND  MOEAL  EELATIONS 

The  criticism  that  has  been  most  frequently  offered  to 
Wollaston  is  that  he  confuses  logical  and  moral  relations. 
This  has  been  so  from  the  beginning.  John  Clarke,  a con- 
temporary of  Wollaston,  makes  this  criticism  of  his  cri- 
terion of  morality.  In  regard  to  the  contention  of  Wollas- 
ton “that  men  may  by  their  actions  or  omissions  deny  truth,” 
John  Clarke  says,  that  the  only  meaning  this  can  have  is 
that  “actions  . . . are  expressive  ...  of  propositions,” 
that  they  are  ways  “of  conveying  sense  ...  to  the  minds  of 
others.”  ^ This  is,  of  course,  just  the  common  confusion 
due  to  the  failure  to  understand  that  Wollaston  speaks  of 
actions  which  express  merely  intellectual  meaning,  actions 
of  the  pantomime  and  gesture  variety ; and  also  of  actions 
expressive  of  character,  moral  actions.  This  confusion  is 
made  evident  by  what  follows.  Clarke  says  that  all  that 
Wollaston  can  mean  is  that  an  action  may  convey  a false 
*J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Moral  Good,  p.  20. 

95 


96 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


impression  “even  where  a person  has  no  intention  by  his  ac- 
tion of  conveying  any  such  sense  to  the  mind  of  others.” 
Wollaston  says  that  in  such  cases  ‘moral  good  and  evil  is 
not  imputable.”  ^ 

I have  already  considered  several  of  the  specific  criticisms 
made  of  particular  portions  of  the  work  of  Wollaston  by 
his  contemporary,  Bott.  While  his  criticism  is  confined  al- 
most exclusively  to  Proposition  IX,  it  has  a general  appli- 
cation also,  because  he  thinks  that  in  this  proposition  Wol- 
laston states  his  “principal  notion”  of  morality.  Bott 
thinks  that  Wollaston  fails  to  give  a real  differentia  of  mor- 
ality. He  says  even  after  the  idea  of  importance  is  added 
to  that  of  truth,  it  is  still  inadequate  as  a moral  criterion, 
for  “those  acts  in  which  there  is  an  equal  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement, will  be,  in  an  equality,  morally  good  or  evil.”  ® 
He  thinks  that  this  will  not  hold,  for  if  it  did  then  two  mor- 
ally contradictory  acts  would  be  equally  moral,  which  is 
impossible.  He  states  a case  like  this.  Two  men  A and  C 
both  meet  a poor  wretch,  B,  at  the  point  of  starvation.  A 
“takes  notice  of  his  case,  says  everything  that  is  right  about 
it,  and  goes  his  way.  C comes  immediately  after,  sees  what 
B’s  case  is,  gives  him  relief  and  departs.  Here  A’s  words 
and  C’s  actions  are  supposed  perfectly  to  agree  with  B^s 
circumstances ; that  is,  in  the  language  of  our  author,  they 
each  of  them  say,  B’s  case  is  really  what  it  is:  and  there- 
fore, according  to  him,  because  the  agreement  is  equal,  the 
moral  goodness  of  their  acts  must  be  equal  too.  But  is  this 
true.^  Nay,  is  it  true,  even  though  we  should  suppose,  that 
A really  had  it  not  in  his  power  to  do  more?  It  won’t  im- 
mediately follow,  that  his  act  was  morally  as  good  as  C’s. 
Again,  D meets  the  wretch  B,  and  denies  his  case  to  be  what 
it  is,  and  calls  him  a cheat,  though  he  knows  to  the  con- 
trary. E meets  with  him,  and  beats  him  to  any  degree.  It 
will  be  impossible  not  to  find  both  these  pei*sons  equally 
moral,  according  to  our  author;  yet  certainly  they  are  not 
so.”  ^ This  confusion  has  been  dealt  with,  at  length,  else- 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

° Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  11, 

* Ibid.,  pp.  11-12. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


97 


where,  but  I will  say  that  it  rests  upon  a failure  to  distin- 
guish between  the  two  ways  in  which  truth  can  be  affirmed  or 
denied.  Wollaston  says,  “A  true  proposition  may  be  denied 
or  things  may  be  denied  to  be  what  they  are,  by  deeds,  as 
well  as  by  express  words.  It  is  certain  there  is  a meaning 
in  many  acts  and  gestures.  . . . But  these  do  not  come  up 
to  my  meaning.  There  are  many  acts  of  other  kinds,  such 
as  constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct  in  life.”  ® 

Bott,  then,  proceeds  to  state  another  case  where  there  is 
precisely  the  same  confusion  between  intellectual  tnith  and 
morality.  “If  P says  T’s  horse  is  his,  when  really  he  is  not, 
he  is  as  guilty  as  if  he  actually  stole  him.  For  the  dis- 
agreement in  both  these  instances  of  P’s  actions  with  the 
tnith  of  the  case,  is  equal.  In  short,  for  anything  there  is 
in  our  author’s  definition,  there  is  no  difference  betwixt  a 
man’s  talking  to  a post,  as  if  he  were  a man,  and  beating 
him  as  though  he  were  a post.”  ® Wollaston  practically  an- 
ticipates this  criticism  in  his  case  of  a man  stealing  a horse 
and  riding  away  upon  him.  He  may,  Wollaston  grants, 
conform  to  some  truth  by  so  acting,  for  he  is  treating  the 
horse  as  a horse.  He  is,  however,  acting  in  violation  of 
other  truths.^  The  mere  assertion  by  P that  T’s  horse  is 
his,  Wollaston  says,  violates  very  little  truth  compared  to 
actually  stealing  a horse.®  Wollaston  says  that  talking  to 
a post  is  not  so  wrong  as  it  is  absurd,  because  the  nature 
of  personality  is  not  greatly  violated  and  that  is  the  all-im- 
portant truth.® 

Bott  says  that  “the  author  has  put  into  his  definition  a 
qualifying  word  or  two,  in  order  to  escape  the  objection  of 
his  making  all  morally  evil  acts  . . . and  all  good  ones, 
equal.  He  brings  in,  Bott  says,  the  phrase  “in  some  degree 
or  other,”  because  there  can,  of  course,  be  no  “equalitv  of 
all  evil  or  all  good  actions.”  Wollaston  goes  further, 
says  Bott,  and  makes  the  qualifying  statement  that  “those 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

'Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  12. 

' Ibid.,  p.  12. 

“Ibid.,  p.  19. 

" Ibid.,  p.  20. 

“ WoUaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  20-1. 


98 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


truths  which  they  respect,  though  they  are  equally  true,  may 
comprise  matters  of  very  different  importance;  or  more 
truths  may  be  violated  one  way  than  another.”  Bott 
thinks  that  in  bringing  in  these  qualifying  terms  Wollaston 
really  gives  up  the  criterion  of  conformity  to  truth.  With 
this  criterion,  Bott  says,  that  “the  difference  of  actions  can- 
not depend  upon  the  different  importance  of  the  truths 
respected  by  them,”  because  any  “good  action  asserts  a 
thing  to  be  what  it  is,  . . . so  it  is  impossible  that  any  other 
good  action  . . . should  do  more  with  reference  to  the 
truth  respected  by  it.”  Bott  does  not  make  good  his 
criticism  because  he  has  no  reason  for  his  insistence  that 
either  morally  or  scientifically  considered  truths  are  of  equal 
importance.  Truths  are  equally  true  but  they  are  not 
equally  important.  He  implies  that  there  is  some  flaw  in  the 
argument  that  a thing  must  be  considered  in  all  respects  but 
he  offers  no  refutation  of  it.^^  An  action  may  conform  to  a 
truth  and  at  the  same  time  violate  a thousand  truths  far 
more  significant.  Every  immoral  act  conforms  to  some 
truths,  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  essentially  untrue  and  cannot 
be  made  to  fit  into  a coherent  world  order.  Such  a state- 
ment does  not  involve  the  denial  of  the  criterion  of  truth, 
as  Bott  supposes.^'*  The  same  kind  of  objection  could  be 
made  against  any  criterion  of  morality. 

Vorlander  understands  Wollaston  to  say  that  “every  bad 
action  is  a lie  ( jede  schlechte  Handlung  ist  eine  Liige)  ; to 
violate  an  agreement  means  actually  to  deny  it.  A wrong 
is  so  much  greater  the  more  true  propositions  it  denies ; the 
good  act  must  then  be  in  accord  with  all  relations  of  the 
object.”  If  we  had  only  the  last  statement  we  would 
think  that  Vorlander  understood  Wollaston,  but  a wrong 
deed  does  not  deny  true  propositions.  He  only  teaches  that 
a wrong  deed  is  as  false  to  world  and  life  relations  as  is  the 
denial  of  a true  proposition.  It  is  wrong  precisely  because 
it  is  based  on  assent  to  theoretical  truth  and  is  inconsistent 

Bott,  “Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.”  Considered  and  Refuted,  p.  13. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  14. 

**  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  15. 

“Vorlander,  Gesch.  der  Philosophischen  Moral,  etc.,  p.  385. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


99 


therewith.  Wundt  has  a somewhat  better  understanding  of 
Wollaston,  but  he  thinks  that  Wollaston  confuses  intellectual 
and  moral  relations.  He  takes  the  position  that  Wollaston 
considered  moral  wrong  and  intellectual  error  as  equally 
contradictory  “riickt  das  sittliche  Vergehen  auf  gleiche 
Linie  mit  intellectuellem  Irrthum.”  Moral  wrong  and  in- 
tellectual error  are  equally  contradictory,  because  they  are 
equally  inconsistent  with  the  true  nature  of  things.  Wollas- 
ton insists  that  this  is  so,  but  he  does  not  confuse  the  two 
very  different  kinds  of  things, — immoral  acts  and  intellectu- 
ally erroneous  judgments. Hume  says  that  error  is  not 
sin  as  he  understands  Wollaston  to  believe.  There  is  no 
immorality,  Hume  says,  in  merely  making  an  erroneous 
judgment,  but  “if  moral  distinctions  be  derived  from  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  these  judgments,  they  must  take  place 
whenever  we  form  the  judgment.”  This  is,  of  course,  true 
if  immorality  be  but  an  erroneous  judgment.  Wollaston 
does  not  say  that  immorality  is  just  an  erroneous  judg- 
ment, but  something  very  different,  namely,  that  immorality 
is  as  false  as  a false  judgment.^® 

Price  denies  that  all  immorality  can  be  reduced  to  that  of 
denying  truth,  or  affirming  a lie.  Nor  is  he  agreed  that  this 
can  serve  as  a formal  statement  of  morality ; because  he  says 
“there  may  be  no  intention  to  deny  anything  true,  or  to  as- 
sent to  anything  false.”  A falsehood  is  not  general  but  is 
“a  distinct  species  of  evil.”  Yet,  Price  goes  right  on  and 
grants  that  in  immorality  we  act  as  if  the  person  we 
sin  against  did  not  exist,  “which  upon  any  other  supposi- 
tion, is  inexcusable ; and  therefore,  figuratively  speaking, 
may  be  said  to  contradict  truth.”  He  even  grants  that  Wol- 
laston probably  “meant  in  reality  little  more  than  this.” 
Price  says  that  cruelty  can  certainly  be  considered  as  act- 
ing in  a way  that  is  contradictory,  but  denies  that  the  evil 
of  cruelty  can  be  regarded  as  the  same  as  that  of  telling  a 
lie.  It  seems  to  me  that  he  and  Wollaston  agree  entirely  as 

“Wundt,  Ethik,  p.  323. 

” Wollaston,  ReU.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

“ Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  460. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

“ Price,  Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  in  Morals,  p.  208. 


100 


The  Ethics  of  William  W ollaston 


to  the  relation  of  truth  and  morality,  but  Price  thinks  that 
Wollaston  identifies  the  intellectual  and  the  moral.^^ 

Balguy  takes  very  much  the  same  attitude  as  Price.  He 
says  to  treat  men  as  brutes  is  as  “dissonant  to  the  nature  of 
things,  as  would  be  the  attempt  to  form  an  angle  with  two 
parallel  lines;  because,  as  a matter  of  fact,  there  is  a great 
difference  between  the  nature  of  rational  creatures  and  that 
of  brutes.”  But  he  says  that  he  would  not  characterize 
such  conduct  as  acting  a lie,  because  “that  would  be  con- 
founding objective  and  subjective  truth.”  “Neither  would 
I,”  he  says,  “call  it  a contradiction  of  some  true  proposi- 
tion.” He  says  that  he  would  call  immorality  “a  counterac- 
tion to  the  truth  or  real  nature  of  things.  If  by  truth  is 
meant  the  truth  of  things,  it  may  be  truly  said  that  goodness 
consists  of  actions  in  conformity  thereto.”  Balguy  evi- 
dently agrees  with  Wollaston  and  is  simply  trying  to  make 
clear  the  fact  that  goodness  consists  of  actions  conformable 
to  the  real  natures  of  things,  just  as  truth  consists  of  ideas 
that  conform  to  the  real  nature  of  things.  I can  see  no 
reason  why  Balguy  should  object  to  calling  immorality 
“acting  a lie,”  for  there  is  certainly  a great  difference 
between  saying  that  immorality  is  “acting  a }ie”  and  saying 
that  all  immorality  reduces  itself  to  lying.  He  seems  to 
think  that  they  are  the  same,  so  he  accuses  Wollaston  of 
saying  that  all  immorality  is  simply  lying. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  critics  of  Wollaston  is  the 
French  philosopher  Jouffroy  who  states  the  essential  char-" 
acteristics  of  the  ethical  system  of  Wollaston  in  this  way: 
“According  to  this  philosophy,  good  is  truth,  and  the  funda- 
mental law  of  conduct,  the  duty  from  which  all  others  are 
derived,  is  to  act  conformable  to  the  truth,  or,  in  other 
words,  not  to  deceive  by  actions.”  He,  then,  asks  what 
method  Wollaston  uses  to  establish  his  doctrine,  and  he 
answers,  in  the  traditional  fashion  of  Wollaston’s  critics, 
that  he  “begins  with  the  assertion  that  actions,  like  words, 
are  signs,  and  that  the  truth  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  by 

“Price,  Review  of  the  Principal  Questions  in  Morals,  p.  693. 

“ Balguy,  The  Foundations  of  Moral  Goodness,  Brit.  Moral.,  p.  79. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  11. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


101 


actions  as  well  as  by  words.”  Jouffroy  fails  to  consider 
the  distinction  Wollaston  makes  between  actions  of  the  ges- 
ture variety  that  express  or  disguise,  actions  used  as  signs 
and  constituting  a kind  of  language,  and  actions  “such  as 
constitute  the  character  of  a man’s  conduct  in  life.”  He 
uses  “expressed  or  disguised”  and  “affirmed  or  denied”  with 
precisely  the  same  meaning,  whereas  they  mean  something 
very  different  for  Wollaston.  When  he  says  an  action 
affirms  a truth  he  is  not  saying  that  this  is  but  another  way 
of  expressing  the  same  truth  as  expressed  in  words,  but  this 
seems  to  be  Jouff'roy’s  interpretation  of  his  meaning.  To 
be  sure  the  one  kind  of  thing  is  as  much  conformable  to  true 
relations  as  the  other  but  there  the  resemblance  stops.  In 
a similar  way  he  misconceives  Wollaston’s  meaning  when 
he  understands  him  to  argue  “that  an  action  which  denies  a 
true  proposition,  is  equivalent  to  a false  proposition.  A 
false  proposition  is  bad;  therefore,  the  action  which  is 
equivalent  to  it  cannot  be  good.”  Now,  Wollaston  does 
not  say  that  an  action  which  denies  a true  proposition  is 
equivalent  to  a false  proposition,  but  what  he  says  is  that 
bad  actions  deny  the  real  natures  of  things  as  truly  as  do 
false  propositions.  Wrong  acts  are  as  false  and  as  contra- 
dictory as  false  propositions,  because  they  are  as  incon- 
sistent with  the  nature  of  things  in  a coherent  world,  but 
this  is  very  far  from  an  identification  of  truth  and  goodness. 
Then  Wollaston  does  not  say  that  a false  proposition  is 
morally  bad  but  only  intellectually  bad  or  false.^^ 

In  many  places  Jouffroy  seems  to  have  a very  clear  com- 
prehension of  Wollaston’s  thought:  “An  action  which  de- 
nies a true  proposition  denies  that  which  actually  is.  It  is 
a revolt  against  reason.  Such  an  action  is  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  man,  for  man  is  a rational  creature  and  the  peculi- 
arity of  rational  creatures  is  to  see  and  love  things  as  they 
are.”  Jouffroy  proceeds,  in  the  very  next  paragraph, 
to  misinteiq)ret  Wollaston  entirely:  “Wollaston  goes  one 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  pp.  334-5. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  335. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  14. 

“Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  p.  336. 


102 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


step  further  and  proves  that  a true  proposition  may  be  de- 
nied by  omissions  as  well  as  by  commissions  ; or,  what  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  that  the  omission  is  quite  as  much  a sign 
as  the  action,  and  that  we  may  affirm  what  is  false,  as  well 
by  the  former  of  these  signs  as  by  the  latter.”  He  is  still 
laboring  under  the  delusion  that  it  is  Wollaston’s  position 
that  actions  are  but  another  kind  of  language  or  medium 
of  expressing  thought.  He  thinks  that  this  identity  of 
truth  and  morality  is  brought  out  in  Wollaston’s  treatment 
of  the  development  of  morality.  “If  science  is  progressive 
morality  must  be  so  too ; for,  as  morality  is  nothing  more 
than  truth  expressed  in  conduct,  it  presupposes  a knowledge 
of  truth.”  Of  course  morality  advances  as  science  ad- 
vances, but  this  only  means  that  as  our  knowledge  increases 
we  can  act  more  and  more  in  conformity  with  the  nature  of 
things.  It  is  true  that  morality  is  truth  expressed  in  con- 
duct, but  this  is  saying  something  quite  other  than  that 
morality  is  just  a form  of  truth.  A distinction  must  be  made 
between  the  coherence  of  truth  and  goodness  and  their 
identity.  A coherent  world  demands  the  unity  of  the  two 
realms,  but  morality  demands  also  the  distinction  of  the 
world  of  appreciation  from  the  world  of  description.  Wol- 
laston did  not  swamp  morality  on  the  one  hand,  nor  did  he 
fail  to  realize  its  metaphysical  implications  on  the  other. 

Janet’s  understanding  of  the  ethical  philosophy  of  Wol- 
laston is  much  the  same  as  that  of  Jouffroy.  In  his  chapter 
on  the  True,  the  Good,  and  the  Beautiful,  he  says,  that 
Wollaston  is  “the  philosopher  who  most  emphatically  main- 
tained the  identity  of  the  true  and  the  good.”  He  under- 
stands Wollaston  to  maintain  that  virtue  consists  simply  in 
the  affirmation  of  the  truth.  And  so  he  does,  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  kind  of  affirmation  of  truth  Wollaston 
had  in  mind,  when  he  so  characterized  virtue,  is  that  of  a 
free  moral  act  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things.  Janet, 
apparently,  understands  this  in  the  examples  he  gives,  e.  g., 
to  steal  is  to  affinn  that  what  does  not  belong  to  us  does 
belong  to  us,  that  is,  our  action  is  contradictory  to  facts 
® Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  p.  337.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  16. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


103 


and  to  our  knowledge  of  them.®"  He  evidently  does  not 
understand  him,  though,  for  he  proceeds  to  make  the  tradi- 
tional criticism  that  Wollaston  reduces  all  vice  to  lying. 
Wollaston  had  only  said  that  all  vice  is  false  action,  lying 
actions,  you  might  term  them,  or  actions  that  contradict 
truth,  and  not  that  all  vice  is  lying.  Vice  is  as  absurd  as 
any  contradictory  proposition,  but  it  is  not  absurd  simply 
in  the  logical  sense  of  the  word.  The  absurdity  of  im- 
morality consists  in  acting  contrary  to  admitted  logical 
truth.  “Virtue  is  nothing  else  than  reason,”  Janet  under- 
stands Wollaston  to  mean,  but  this  interpretation  can  be 
accepted  only  when  due  consideration  is  given  to  the  fact 
that  he  insists  that  the  will  is  involved  in  all  moral  behavior. 
A better  interpretation,  then,  is  that  virtue  is  acting  ration- 
ally or  acting  conformably  to  the  true  nature  of  things.  He 
seems  to  interpret  him  in  this  way  when  he  says  that  Wol- 
laston is  “one  of  those  philosophers  who  regard  moral  veri- 
ties simply  as  eternal  and  necessary  relations,  conformable 
to  the  nature  of  things,”  but  he  straightway  proceeds  to 
criticize  him  on  the  ground  that  he  confuses  the  good  and 
the  true.  “It  is,”  he  says,  “quite  certain  that  moral  veri- 
ties are  truths,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  good  must 
be  the  true.”  But  Wollaston  never  says  that  the  good  is 
the  true,  but  only  that  it  is  conformable  with  the  true,  a very 
different  thing.®^ 

Janet  says  that  there  is  subjective  truth,  the  conformity 
of  thoughts  to  objects,  and  objective  truth,  the  necessary 
and  essential  relations  of  things;  but  neither  in  the  subjec- 
tive nor  in  the  objective  sense  is  truth  identical  with  good. 
Certainly  not,  but  the  good  is  the  conformity  of  life  to 
truth  and  to  reality.  This  is  really  Janet’s  own  position  as 
is  very  evident  from  his  discussion  of  the  subjective  and 
objective  good.  He  says:  “The  good,  like  the  true,  may 
also  be  understood  in  two  senses  . . . one  objective,  the 
other  subjective.  Objectively,  the  good  is  the  character, 

“Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  106. 

” Ibid.,  p.  107. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 


104  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

based  upon  the  essence  of  things,  which  imposes  an  obliga- 
tory law  upon  the  moral  agent.  Subjectively,  good  is  the 
conformity  of  the  will  to  this  obligatory  law.”  That  this  is 
his  view'  is  made  even  more  evident  in  his  discussion  of  the 
distinctions.  “Now,  the  objective  good  is  not  the  same  as 
the  objective  true;  . . . and  the  subjective  good  is  not  the 
same  as  the  subjective  true.  Subjectively,  the  true  is  the 
conformity  of  thought  with  its  object:  now,  good,  consid- 
ered subjectively,  is  the  conformity  of  the  will  with  its  ob- 
ject. The  true  concerns  only  the  understanding;  the  good 
concerns  only  the  will.  The  conception  of  truth,  as  such, 
when  it  appears,  is  inevitable:  moral  action,  . . . that  is, 
the  conformity  of  action  to  the  law  ...  is  not  inevitable. 
I cannot  wish  that  what  is  true  should  be  false,  nor  that  what 
is  false  should  be  true;  I cannot  wish  that  two  and  two 
would  make  five,  when  my  reason  shows  me  their  sum  is 
four;  but  I can  wish  that  my  actions  should  be  conformed  or 
not  conformed  to  what  my  reason  tells  me  is  true.”  Janet 
here  gives  his  own  view,  incidental  to  his  criticism  of  Wollas- 
ton, but  I do  not  know  of  a better  exposition  of  Wollaston’s 
principle  than  this.  His  criticism  of  Wollaston  is  based  on 
an  entire  misunderstanding  of  him.  I think  it  quite  probable 
that  he  did  not  know  Wollaston  at  first  hand  at  all,  for  he 
does  not  quote  him  or  give  any  of  his  examples,  illustrative 
of  his  position.  How  beside  the  point  is  this : “Criminal 
actions  are  always  accompanied  by  more  or  less  falsehood ; 
but,  as  regards  their  nature,  they  are  not  lies.”  “The  rob- 
ber who  takes  a watch,  does  not  by  this  act  affirm  that  the 
watch  belongs  to  him ; what  he  affirms  is  that  he  wishes  to 
get  the  good  of  it,  this  is  all  that  he  asks.  The  intrinsic 
truth  of  the  proposition  matters  little  to  him.”  But  that  is 
just  the  point.  . The  robber  is,  on  every  hand,  ruthlessly 
disregarding  truth,  acting  as  if  it  were  not  truth  while  as 
an  intelligent  being  he  can  but  admit  truth  to  be  tnith. 
His  other  example  is  even  more  absurd.  If  a man  robs  a 
wai’ehouse  his  denial  that  it  is  a warehouse  “is  only  an  inci- 
dental accompaniment  of  the  act,  it  is  not  its  basis.” 

Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  108. 

Ibid.,  p.  108. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


105 


Janet  thinks  that  we  must  have  a criterion  other  than  that 
of  rationality,  otherwise  we  would  not  know  which  kind  of 
truth  to  obey,  since  both  good  and  bad  actions  represent 
truth.  Unless  one  believes  that  there  is  a fundamental  dis- 
tinction between  good  and  bad  how  am  I to  know  always 
just  what  my  duty  is.^  But  what  more  universality  and 
necessity  could  be  desired  than  that  of  the  principle  that  the 
good  consists  in  the  conformity  of  life  to  the  nature  of 
things.? 

La  Rossignol  says  that  the  ethical  philosophy  of  Wollas- 
ton is  an  exaggeration  of  the  worst  aspects  of  the  system 
of  Clarke.  “To  say  that  a thing  is  true,  implies  intellectual 
assent ; to  say  it  is  right,  implies  moral  approval.”  La 
Rossignol  says  that  Clarke  confused  these  but  did  not  quite 
identify  them  as  Wollaston  afterwards  did.  He  says  that 
Wollaston  failed  to  notice  that  “nature  and  agreement  or 
conformity  of  action  with  nature  are  very  different  kinds  of 
ideas,  and  therefore  to  be  applied  to  different  things.  There 
is  the  same  distinction  between  them  as  between  is  and  ought, 
true  and  right,  real  and  ideal.”  He  states  that  Wollaston’s 
position  is  that  “all  sin  is  in  effect  the  denial  of  a true  pi-opo- 
sition,  and  moral  good  the  affirmation  of  it.”  He  gives  as 
his  reference  the  Britannica  article  on  Wollaston.  He  says 
that  this  represents  “a  curious  one-sided  development  of 
Clark’s  theory  of  ethics.  Clarke,  he  grants,  asserts  some- 
thing very  similar  “when  he  speaks  of  those  who  refuse  to 
live  according  to  the  laws  of  justice  and  truth,”  as  “endeav- 
oring to  make  things  to  be  what  they  are  not  and  cannot 
be,  which  is  the  greatest  absurdity  imaginable,  ...  in  a 
word;  all  willful  wickedness  and  perversion  of  right,  is  the 
very  absurdity  in  moral  matters  as  it  would  be  in  natural 
things,  for  a man  to  pretend  to  alter  the  certain  proportions 
of  numbers,  to  take  away  demonstrable  relations  of  mathe- 
matics, to  make  light  darkness,  or  to  call  sweet  bitter  and 
bitter  sweet.”  “This  strange  language  approaches  very 
nearly  to  the  assertion  that  ‘whatever  is  is  right’.”  La  Ros- 

Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  109. 

^ La  Rossignol,  The  Ethical  Phil,  of  Clarke,  p.  50  ff. 

Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  41. 


106 


The  Etjiics  of  William  Wollaston 

signol  says  that  such  a conclusion  can  be  logically  drawn 
from  Clarke’s  statements  that  those  who  fail  to  conform 
their  lives  to  “the  eternal  fitness  of  things  are  setting  up 
their  own  unreasonable  self-will  in  opposition  to  the  nature 
and  reason  of  things.” 

La  Rossignol  says  that  Wollaston  took  as  his  text  the 
statement  from  Clarke,  which  I have  just  given,  that  morality 
consists  in  the  conformity  of  life  to  the  reason  and  nature  of 
things.  La  Rossignol  says  that  Clarke  did  not  follow  this 
statement  to  its  logical  conclusion,  but  Wollaston  did.  He 
thinks,  also,  that  this  statement  of  Clarke’s  suggested  to 
Wollaston  the  “analogy  between  virtue  and  truth.”  If  it 
is  but  an  analogy  where  is  the  point  to  his  criticism?  As 
we  have  seen,  he  says  he  bases  his  interpretation  on  the 
Britannica  article  which  reads : “Moral  evil  is  the  practical 
denial  of  a true  proposition,  and  moral  good  the  affirmation 
of  it.”  But  La  Rossignol  fails  to  give  any  significance  to 
the  idea  of  its  being  a “practical,”  not  an  actual  denial  or 
affirmation,  and  he  forgets  that  he  has  himself  said  that  Wol- 
laston’s method  is  that  of  analogy.  So  interpreted  the  mean- 
ing is  that  bad  actions  are  as  false  as  false  propositions  and 
good  actions  as  true  as  true  propositions ; but  La  Ros- 
signol’s  interpretation  is  quite  different,  namely,  “That  every 
right  action  is  the  affirmation  of  a truth,  and  every  wrong 
action  is  the  denial  of  a truth.”  He  takes  as  a case  that 
of  stealing,  and  says  that  it  is  wrong  because  it  denies  that 
the  stolen  property  belongs  to  someone  else.  The  fact  is 
that  Wollaston  insists  that  the  rogue  admits  the  property 
to  belong  not  to  himself  but  to  someone  else,  and  herein 
consists  his  inconsistency  and  consequent  immorality  in  that 
he  “practically”  denies  that  to  which  he  must  give  assent. 

La  Rossignol  makes  a distinction  between  the  teachings  of 
the  two  moralists,  Clarke  and  Wollaston,  for  which  there  is 
no  ground.  He  says  that  while  Clarke  does  say  that  every 
wrong  action  is  absurd  he  does  not  mean  that  it  is  such  be- 

“ Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  43. 

Anon.,  Art.  Wollaston,  Britan. 

La  Rossignol,  The  Ethical  Phil,  of  Clarke,  p.  51. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  7-8. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


107 


cause  it  is  like  denying  A is  A,  as  did  Wollaston;  but  in  his 
thinking  “this  absurdity  had  rather  reference  to  the  clear- 
ness of  moral  perception  than  the  actual  denial  of  a fact.” 
Clarke’s  meaning,  he  says,  is  that  “it  is  unreasonable  to  act 
wrongly,”  not,  apparently,  because  immoral  acts  are  as 
absurd  as  the  denial  of  something  evidently  true,  but  “be- 
cause reason  is  the  moral  faculty,  and  it  is  unreasonable  to 
deny  a fact  because  reason  asserts  it.”  I am  very  sure 
that  this  is  not  Clarke’s  meaning,  but  that  his  conception  of 
the  relation  of  the  intellectual  and  the  moral  is  the  same  as 
that  of  Wollaston.  He  was  as  intellectualistic  as  Wollaston 
for  he  also  made  the  distinguishing  of  good  and  evil  a kind  of 
knowledge.  He,  even,  says  that  “reason  is  the  faculty 
whereby  we  are  able  to  distinguish  good  and  evil.”  La 
Rossignol  fails  absolutely  in  his  interpretation  in  that  he 
does  not  see  the  significance  of  “willful”  and  “practical,”  as 
used  by  Clarke  and  Wollaston  along  with  “affinnation”  and 
“denial,”  and  that  this  together  with  such  statements  as 
that  “the  very  absurdity  in  moral  matters  as  it  would  be  in 
natural  things”  does  make  the  distinction  between  natural 
and  moral,  between  the  is  and  the  ought. 

Many  of  the  critics  of  Wollaston  have  taken  the  position 
that  since  morality,  in  his  system,  consists  in  affirming  the 
truth  of  a true  proposition,  it  is  therefore  dependent  upon 
correct  knowledge.  Garve  says  that  it  is  a very  ingenious 
system  and  that  Wollaston  has  worked  it  out  very  skillfully, 
but  says  “unspeakable  compulsion”  is  used  to  make  “it  at 
all  probable  that  every  action  expresses  a proposition  and 
that  the  moi’al  worth  of  that  action  is  to  be  judged  according 
to  the  truth  or  untruth  of  the  proposition  (dass  jede  Hand- 
lung  einen  Satz  ausdriicke,  und  dass,  nach  der  Wahrheit 
oder  Unwahrheit  dieses  Satzes,  die  sittliche  Giite  jener  Hand- 
lung  zu  beurtheilen  sei).”^^  Wollaston  certainly  does  not 
mean  that  every  action  actually  expresses  a proposition,  but 
he  means  only  that  a good  action  is  conformable  to  reality 
and  so  in  practice  affirms  tnith.  The  morality  of  an  action 

La  Rossignol,  The  Ethical  Phil,  of  Clarke,  pp.  51  and  85-7. 

“Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  39. 

“ Garve,  Uebersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  Sittenl.,  p.  175. 


108 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


does  not  consist  in  the  tnith  of  the  proposition  but  in  the  true 
conformity  of  life  to  real  relations. 

Erdmann  says  that  Wollaston  founds  morality  on  truth 
and  so  “makes  acting  dependent  on  correct  knowledge  of 
things  (das  giite  Handeln  von  der  richtigen  Erkenntniss  der 
Dinge  abhangig  macht).”^®  Windelband  takes  the  same 
position.  He  thinks  that  Wollaston  reduces  immorality  to 
ignorance  and  morality  to  knowledge.  “Wollaston  says  that 
since  every  action  involves  a theoretical  judgment  as  to  its 
underlying  relations,  the  decision  as  to  whether  the  act  is 
right  or  wrong  in  the  ethical  sense  depends  upon  the  right- 
ness (correctness)  or  wrongness  of  this  judgment.”  In  his 
criticism  Windelband  says  that  immorality  consists  not  in 
having  an  incorrect  idea  of  cosmic  relations,  but  in  acting 
contrary  to  our  thinking  about  those  relations.  This  I 
understand  to  be  Wollaston’s  position.  The  theoretical 
judgment  as  to  relations  is  as  correct  in  the  case  of  wrong 
as  in  the  case  of  right  action.  Both  equally  involve  the 
assent  to  intellectual  tnith.  The  immorality  of  the  unsuit- 
able act  consists  precisely  in  the  practical  denial  of  ad- 
mittedly true  relations. 

Leslie  Stephen  says  that  the  intellectual  criterion  made 
quite  an  impression  upon  the  contemporaries  of  Wollaston, 
some  of  whom,  e.  g.,  Conybeare,  speak  of  the  theory  as 
though  it  were  a discovery  in  morals,  fit  to  be  placed  beside 
the  discoveries  of  Newton  in  astronomy.^®  But  Leslie  Ste- 
phen thinks  that  there  is  nothing  very  wonderful  about  it, 
since  instead  of  explicating  morals  it  merely  confuses  ethical 
and  logical  relations.  “He  who  acts  upon  the  hypothesis 
that  things  are  so  and  so,  proclaims  by  his  acts  that  they  are 
so  and  so ; and  no  act  that  interferes  with  a true  proposi- 
tion can  be  right.”  Stephen  says  that  “no  act  can  interfere 
with  a true  proposition.  Hence  I ought  not  to  kill  a man 
because  by  so  doing,  I deny  him  to  be  a man.  To  which  it 
was  obvious  to  reply  that  my  action  proclaims  the  very 

Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  107. 

**  Windelband,  His.  of  Phil.,  p.  504. 

" Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  20. 

“Conybeare,  Defence  of  Revealed  Reli.,  p.  239. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


109 


reverse.”  In  reply  I will  say  that  Wollaston  does 

not  take  the  position  that  a wrong  act  rests  upon  a false 
proposition.  He  misses  Wollaston’s  meaning  entirely.  Of 
course  “it  is  a verbal  juggle  to  call  an  action  a lie,”  but 
this  Wollaston  does  not  do.  His  position  is  simply  tins: 
one  must  assent  to  truth  when  clearly  apprehended,  but  it 
lies  within  a man’s  power  to  practically  deny  a true  propo- 
sition, namely,  by  acting  as  if  the  truth  were  not  the  truth. 
The  essence  of  immorality  in  this  is  inconsistency,  and  it  is 
the  conflict  between  the  truth  of  the  situation  and  the  false 
action  that  constitutes  the  inconsistency. 

Leslie  Stephen  thinks  that  this  view  of  ethics  is  related 
to  the  “common  theory  of  metaphysicians  which  identifles 
crime  with  error,  and  which  had  latterly  been  presented  in 
more  imposing  forms  by  many  more  famous  metaphysicians.” 
According  to  this  view  “all  immorality  involves  an  element  of 
intellectual  error.  To  one  who  had  adequate  conceptions 
of  the  universe,  and  to  whose  intellect,  therefore,  all  the  con- 
sequences of  his  actions  were  immediately  present,  the  wis- 
dom of  virtue  would  be  so  evident  that  crime  would  be  im- 
possible.” I can  see  the  reason  for  associating  Wollas- 
ton’s metaphysical  ethics  with  immediately  preceding  meta- 
physical systems  for  he  was  undoubtedly  influenced  by  them 
in  formulating  his  own  Weltanschauung,  but  I can  see  no 
reason  for  saying  that  he  held  any  such  view  as  to  the  rela- 
tion of  virtue  as  Leslie  Stephen  attributes  to  him.  I think 
that  this  misinterpretation  is  due  to  the  failure  to  under- 
stand that  Wollaston  is  merely  describing  virtue  in  terms  of 
truth.  Virtue  is  as  true  as  is  the  truth  for  it  is  as  con- 
formable to  the  nature  of  things,  but  it  does  not  follow  from 
this  that  men  live  up  to  all  the  knowledge  that  they  have. 
“Things  can  be  denied  to  be  what  they  are  by  deeds,”  says 
Wollaston,  which  can  only  mean  that  he  thinks  that  one  can 
fail  to  live  conformably  to  the  knowledge  that  one  has.^^ 

There  are  other  critics  of  Wollaston  who  take  the  position 
that  the  language  of  truth  is  inapplicable  to  the  moral 

L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  II,  p.  9. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  10. 

“WoUaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 


110  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

realm.  Martineau  says  that  intellectual  relations  do  not 
give  us  what  we  want  in  ethical  enquiries.  He  says  that  the 
understanding  belongs  exclusively  to  the  unmoral  world, 
the  world  of  science.  “Fitness  and  congruity  are  ideas  which 
in  themselves  are  by  no  means  equivalent  to  moral  concep- 
tions. They  have  a broad  usage.”  To  be  sure  “they  have  a 
broad  usage,”  and,  of  course,  they  mean  something  just  a 
little  different  in  each  connection.  But  Martineau  goes  so 
far  as  to  say  that  these  ideas,  when  applied  to  moral  situa- 
tions, have  nothing  to  do  with  constituting  it  moral.  He 
says  that  Wollaston’s  standard  of  morality,  namely,  “con- 
formable to  nature”  does  not  constitute  the  ethical  quality 
of  a moral  act.®^  His  own  system  is  so  exclusively  subjec- 
tive, being  that  of  Intuitionism,  that  he  can  see  no  good  in 
an  objective  principle.  Antonio  Aliotta  says  that  it  is 
simply  impossible  to  discuss  morality  with  an  intellectual 
vocabulary.  He  says  that  Wollaston  was  one  of  those  who 
tried  to  interpret  the  moral  life  in  terms  of  logic.  He  says 
that  Wollaston  took  the  position  that  “the  supreme  law  of 
duty  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  logical  relations.”  Ali- 
otta denies  that  this  can  be  done  on  the  ground  that  logical 
relations  have  to  do  with  the  truth  alone  and  so  are  inap- 
plicable to  the  moral  realm.®^  Leslie  Stephen  agrees  that 
this  criticism  is  applicable.  He  says  that  the  difficulty  that 
underlies  the  reasoning  of  Wollaston  is  an  obvious  one.  The 
logical  principle  is  not  applicable  to  the  moral  realm  but  only 
to  the  natural.  He  criticizes  Wollaston  on  the  score  of  hav- 
ing introduced  the  unphilosophical  idea  of  freedom,  and  then 
straightway  very  inconsistently  criticizes  him  on  the  ground 
that  he  neglects  to  consider  the  significant  difference  that 
the  will  makes  between  factual  and  moral  relations.  We 
might  say  A is  A and  then  say  that  a denial  of  it  would  in- 
volve contradiction,  “but  the  proposition  thou  shall  not 
kill  is  a command  addressed  to  the  will,  not  a statement  of 
truth  addressed  to  the  intellect.”  The  attempt  of  Wollas- 
ton “to  bring  the  two  kinds  of  propositions  under  the  same 

“ Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  p.  471. 

“Aliotta,  La  Reazione  Idealistica  Contro  La  Scienza — Subject  Wol- 
laston. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


111 


category  involves  confusion  fatal  to  the  whole  theory.” 
Wollaston  does  not  bring  them  under  the  same  category, 
thanks  to  his  use  of  what  Leslie  Stephens  characterizes  as 
the  “unphilosophical  idea  of  freedom.” 

Another  case  of  the  confusion  of  intellectual  and  moral 
truth  is  to  be  found  in  the  article  on  Wollaston  in  Franck’s 
dictionary  of  science  and  philosophy.  Many  of  the  sen- 
tences are  balanced  sentences  and  the  two  conceptions  of 
truth  are  frequently  found  in  the  same  sentence.  It  is 
stated  that  Wollaston  sought  to  define  the  idea  of  the  good 
and  to  prove  that  it  may  be  resolved  into  the  idea  of  the 
true,  but  whether  he  thinks  of  this  as  purely  abstract  truth 
or  truth  in  the  sense  of  true  to  all  of  life  is  not  clear.  “To 
act  conformably  with  truth  is  to  act  well;  every  bad  action 
is  a lie.”  The  first  part  of  the  statement  can  be  accepted, 
if  by  truth  be  meant  significant  life  relations  and  this  is 
apparently  the  meaning.  It  does  not  follow  from  this  that 
“every  bad  action  is  a lie,”  unless  he  means  that  acting  im- 
morally is  “acting  a lie,”  wliich  does  not  seem  to  be  his 
meaning.  Wollaston  does  not  reduce  all  immorality  to  ly- 
ing, except  in  the  sense  that  immoral  acts  are  equivalent  to 
“acting  a lie.”  He  says,  in  justification  of  the  phrase,  that 
a man  may  so  hve  that  “liis  whole  conduct  breathes  un- 
truth,” so,  he  asks,  “may  we  not  say  that  he  lives  a lie?” 
The  article  continues:  “Wollaston  says  that  a person  alters 
truth  by  actions  as  by  words.”  This  is  certainly  a mistaken 
interpretation,  for  Wollaston  insists  that  truth  cannot  be 
altered  but  that  assent  to  truth  is  determined.  He  does 
say,  however,  that  immorality  is  really  as  absurd  as  would 
be  the  attempt  to  deny  evident  truth.  The  same  thing  can 
be  said  of  the  statements  in  regard  to  the  violation  of  con- 
tracts: “To  violate  a contract  is  to  deny  it  in  action.” 
Intellectually  a contract  cannot  be  denied  but  it  can  be 
denied  in  action,  by  which  Wollaston  means  that  a man  can 
“practically”  deny  a contract,  act  as  if  he  had  made  no  con- 
tract. Thanks  to  the  fact  that  one’s  will  is  free  one  can 

”L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  II,  p.  7. 

Anon.,  Art.  Wollaston,  Francke  Diet.  Des  Sciences  Phil. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  DeUn.,  p.  11. 


112  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

act  as  if  that  which  is  were  not,  and  as  if  that  which  is  not, 
were.®’^  The  article  goes  on  to  say  that,  “Not  to  keep  one’s 
word  is  also  to  deny  the  promise  made,  to  do  the  contrary  of 
that  which  one  has  promised.”  Wollaston  does  not  say  that 
one  denies  a promise  by  breaking  a contract,  for  the  fact 
that  one  has  made  a promise  is,  according  to  Wollaston, 
absolutely  irrefragable.  But  one  can  “do  the  contrary,” 
which  would  be  just  as  contradictory  as  “to  deny  the  prom- 
ise made.”  The  one,  however,  is  possible  while  the  other  is 
impossible.  The  same  misunderstanding  of  the  relation  of 
the  intellectual  and  the  moral  is  evident  throughout  the  ar- 
ticle. For  example,  it  is  said  that,  “To  disfigure  truth 
through  one’s  acts  means  necessarily  to  do  evil.”  Yes,  but 
this  does  not  mean  what  he  says  it  does,  namely,  that  the 
disfiguration  of  truth  by  an  act  of  immorality  is  “the  same 
thing  as  to  uphold  a false  proposition.”  It  is,  however, 
says  Wollaston,  “as  contrary  to  the  nature  of  things”  as 
would  be  the  impossible  attempt  “to  uphold  a false  propo- 
sition.” 

Irons  says  that  Wollaston  “obliterated  all  distinctions 
between  the  moral  and  the  rational.”  In  proof  of  this,  Irons 
says  that  he  teaches  that  a rational  being  observes  that 
things  bear  certain  relations  to  other  things,  and  that 
because  of  these  evident  natures  and  relations,  thus  ob- 
served, he  can  discern  certain  moral  relations.  Reason, 
therefore,  not  only  enables  men  to  ascertain  what  is  true, 
but  also  to  recognize  how  they  ought  to  act.  Wollaston 
makes  the  difference  between  moral  good  and  evil  to  be  at 
bottom  the  same  as  the  difference  between  true  and  false, 
and  since  truth  consists  in  recognizing  things  to  be  what  they 
are,  virtue  consists  in  “treating  things  as  being  what  they 
are.”  He  teaches,  says  Irons,  that  virtue  is  the  practice 
of  truth,  and  vice,  therefore,  the  practice  of  lying.  But  this 
is  not  even  a confusion  of  the  two,  and  certainly  not  an  oblit- 
eration of  “all  distinctions  between  the  moral  and  the  ra- 

Francke,  Die.  Des  Sciences  Phil. — Art.  Wollaston,  p.  1728.  Wol- 
laston, Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  10.  Clarke,  Evidences,  p.  188. 

“ Francke,  Die.  Des  Sciences  Phil. — Art.  Wollaston,  p.  1728. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


113 


tional.”  His  quotation  from  Wollaston  certainly  does  not 
confuse  the  two : “A  true  proposition  may  be  denied,  or 
things  may  be  denied  to  be  what  they  are,  by  deeds  as  well 
as  by  express  words.”  Irons  says  that  “from  Wollaston’s 
standpoint  the  murder  of  a fellow  being  is  merely  an  action 
which  denies  an  evident  truth,  namely,  that  the  victim  is  a 
fellow  being.”  He  criticizes  Wollaston  on  the  ground  that 
he  ought  to  express  the  heinousness  of  the  crime  in  stronger 
terms,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  he  is  speaking  of  im- 
morality universally.®^  Wollaston  insists  that  there  are 
truths  of  very  different  values,  and  consequently  degrees  of 
morality  and  of  immorality.®^  Irons  continues:  “From  this 
point  of  view,  the  standard  of  right  and  the  criterion  of  truth 
are  the  same.”  “Since  reason  determines  what  ought  to  be 
done,  it  must  use  its  own  criterion,  namely,  self-consistency. 
. . . The  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  is  therefore 
the  same  as  the  distinction  between  true  and  false.  A vicious 
action  is  one  which  involves  a contradiction.”  ®®  This,  Irons 
thinks,  means  that  right  action  and  correct  thinking  are  es- 
sentially identical.  The  ti-uth  is  that  Wollaston  considers 
them  alike  only  in  the  respect  that  consistency  and  inconsist- 
ency can  be  considered  the  norm  in  each.  Wrong  actions  are 
as  inconsistent  with  reality,  as  contradictory  therefore,  as 
false  statements  in  regard  to  indubitable  facts.  The  neces- 
sary consequence  of  this  position.  Irons  says,  is  that  the 
dynamic  force  which  impels  us  to  act  rightly  is  the  same  as 
that  which  makes  us  think  correctly.  The  nature  of  things 
does  “impel”  man  to  act  morally  or  conformably  to  his  rela- 
tions, but  since  he  is  free  he  can  act  inconsistently.  Man’s 
intellect,  on  the  other  hand,  is  determined ; — the  mind  must 
assent  to  necessary  truth.  This  distinction  Wollaston  cer- 
tainly does  make.®^ 

The  criterion  of  morality,  according  to  Irons,  is  not  logi- 
cal consistency  but  harmony  with  the  possibilities  of  the 

‘'’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

“ Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Rev.,  vol.  12,  pp.  138-9. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 

“ Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Rev.,  vol.  12,  pp.  139  ff. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  7-8  and  62  if.  Irons,  Rational- 
ism in  Mod.  Eth.,  Phil.  Rv.,  vol.  12,  p.  140. 


114  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

nature  of  the  agent.  Wollaston  would  answer  that  the  na- 
ture of  the  agent  and  his  possibilities  constitute  important 
factors,  perhaps  the  most  important,  in  the  moral  situation, 
but  logical  consistency  would  still  be  the  best  formula  of 
morality.  Morality  is  as  consistent  with  the  nature  of 
things  as  is  the  logical  conformity  of  truth  to  the  nature  of 
things.  Irons  says  that  Kant  uses  the  criterion  of  truth 
but  that  he  “does  not  assert  with  the  earlier  rationalists  that 
a vicious  action  involves  a contradiction.  For  to  have 
said  that  would  have  been  to  grant  that  the  self-contradic- 
tory  can  exist,  which  would  be  the  same  as  admitting  that  a 
square  circle  is  a possible  fact.”  He  says  that  Kant  gets 
around  the  absurdity,  that  Wollaston  fell  into,  by  saying 
that  wrong  actions  would  be  contradictory  and  absurd  if 
universalized.®®  In  reply  to  this  I would  say  that  Kant  cer- 
tainly does  not  mean  that  the  particular  immoral  act  is  not 
absurd  and  contradictory.  He  only  says  that  we  perceive 
its  contradictoriness  by  trying  to  think  what  would  be  the 
inevitable  consequences  of  its  becoming  a universal  law.  The 
maxim  which  is  implied  in  the  breaking  of  a promise,  for 
example,  “could  never  hold  as  a universal  law  of  nature, 
but  would  necessarily  contradict  itself.”  The  very  point 
of  the  rationalistic  argument  is  that  a particular  wrong  act 
is  as  contradictory  as  would  be  the  maxim  on  which  it  is 
based  becoming  a universal  law  of  nature.®® 

II.  Criticism 

THAT  IMMORALITY,  AS  WELL  AS  MORALITY  CONFORMS 
TO  NATURE 

The  criticism  that  immorality  affirms  things  to  be  as  they 
are  as  truly  as  does  morality,  and  that,  consequently, 
truth,  or  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things,  cannot  consti- 
tute a true  criterion  of  morality  is  a criticism  frequently 
offered  against  the  Ethics  of  Wollaston.  This  criticism  is 
very  much  like  the  one  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

“ Irons,  Rationalism  in  Mod.  Eth.,  Phil.  Rv.,  vol.  12,  pp.  138-55. 

**  Kant,  Meta,  of  Morals,  Sec.  II.  Simmel,  Einleitung  in  die  Moral- 
wissenschaft,  vol.  2,  ch.  5.  Caird,  Critical  Phil,  of  Kant,  bk.  2,  ch.  2. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


115 


That  criticism  is  that  Wollaston’s  system  is  based  on  a con- 
fusion of  ethical  and  logical  relations.  Truth  and  falsity, 
it  is  said,  cannot  be  the  differentia  of  moral  and  Immoral 
because  that  would  simply  identify  the  very  different  cate- 
gories of  truth  and  goodness.  The  criticism  with  which  I, 
now,  wish  to  deal  is  that  truth  is  as  much  affirmed  by  im- 
morality as  by  morality,  that  we  are  conforming  our  ac- 
tions to  the  natures  of  things  just  as  truly  when  we  do 
wrong  as  when  we  do  right,  consequently  a moral  criterion 
other  than  that  of  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things  must 
be  sought.  Both  criticisms  are  based  on  the  same  confused 
interpretation  of  Wollaston,  namely,  that  of  failing  to  com- 
prehend what  he  means  when  he  says  that  truth  can  be  denied 
by  deeds  as  truly  as  by  words.®^ 

Selby-Bigge  states  well  this  objection  to  Wollaston’s  cri- 
terion of  morality.  He  says  that  it  is  quite  true  that  a moral 
act  “must  not  violate  the  physical  laws  of  the  universe,  and 
in  this  sense  must  be  suitable  to  the  nature  of  things,”  but 
“such  violation  would  constitute  folly  rather  than  vice.”' 
And,  furthermore,  Selby-Bibbe  says,  that  “an  action  which 
was  calculated  with  the  most  exact  reference  to  physical 
conditions  might  yet  be  a very  bad  one.”  Why  should 
suitable  to  the  nature  of  things  be  restricted  to  the 
physical  laws  of  the  universe.'’  Is  it  not  tnie  that  moral 
laws  also  violate  or  conform  to  the  nature  of  things.^  Wol- 
laston makes  it  very  clear  that  this  is  his  meaning.  He  re- 
alizes that  both  good  and  bad  acts  conform  to  physical 
laws,  but  bad  acts  violate  the  real  nature  of  things  in  that 
they  violate  the  nature  of  persons,  which  must  be  considered 
of  as  much  importance  as  physical  things  and  for  moral 
purposes  of  supreme  importance.  His  teachings  on  this 
point  are  brought  out  most  clearly,  perhaps,  in  his  cases 
of  bowing  to  a post  and  breaking  a drinking  glass.®®  To  be 
sure  it  is  just  folly  to  violate  the  laws  of  mere  things,  but 
it  is  both  folly  and  vice  to  violate  the  nature  of  personality. 
That  this  is  true  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  Wollaston 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

" Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  p.  XXXIV. 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  15  and  31. 


116 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


never  makes  moral  judgments  except  where  persons  are 
involved.  For  him  personality  always  constitutes  one  term 
of  the  proposition  or  else  it  is  not  a moral  judgment,  and  no 
morality  attaches  to  conduct  unless  it  involves  persons. 

Martineau  offers  this  same  criticism  in  very  much  the 
same  form  as  Selby-Bigge.  He  says  that  good  and  bad 
acts  both  confonn  to  the  nature  of  things.  “These  con- 
ceptions are  as  applicable  to  the  act  of  stabbing  a man  with 
a dagger  as  in  the  blow  that  turns  the  dagger  aside  and 
saves  a life.  Then,  too,  the  act  of  the  one  is  as  conformable 
to  the  character  of  the  man  as  is  the  other.”  Janet  takes 
the  same  position:  “Actions  regarded  as  criminal  do,  in 
reality,  represent  truth,  just  as  truly  as  do  honorable  and 
generous  actions.”  That  a man  can  dispose  of  the  lives  of 
his  fellow  creatures  because  of  his  strength  and  his  passions, 
is  a perfectly  true  proposition.  It  is  true  that  I can  appro- 
priate the  property  of  others.  These  propositions  are  just 
as  true  as  are  the  converse  ones.^^  The  answer  to  these 
criticisms  of  Martineau  and  Janet  is  very  simple  and  evident. 
True  propositions  are,  of  course,  afBrmed  by  criminal  acts, 
but  essential  truths  are  violated  by  acts  not  conformable 
to  the  nature  of  things.  Wollaston  says  that  truths  are  of 
very  different  degrees  of  importance,  and  he  says  also  that 
that  which  determines  the  importance  is  human  happiness 
and  welfare.^^  Von  Hartmann  thinks  that  the  principle  is 
far  too  broad  because  many  things  that  are  true  cannot  be 
convertible  into  action,  and  even  those  special  truths  which 
are  convertible  may  still  be  morally  speaking  entirely  indif- 
ferent. He  grants,  however,  that  it  is  a true  negative  prin- 
ciple of  morality,  because  immorality  is  always  in  contra- 
diction to  truth.  Wollaston  never  tries  to  prove  that  all 
truth  is  of  moral  significance  in  the  sense  that  every  intel- 
lectual proposition  can  be  converted  into  moral  actions.'^® 

John  Clarke  says  that  we  may  grant  that  “every  immoral 
action  denies  some  truth,  . . . but  then  he  must  be  forced 

Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  p.  472. 

” Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  108. 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Prop.  IX. 

”Von  Hartmann,  Phanomenologie  des  Sittlichen  Bewusstseins,  p.  344. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


m 


to  allow  that  every  such  action  . . . does  as  well  affirm  truth 
as  deny  it.”  He  thinks  that  from  this  fact  the  conclusion 
can  be  drawn  that  “let  the  action  deny  what  truth  you  will, 
yet  since  it  affirms  other  truth,  this  is  as  sufficient  to  bring 
it  under  the  denomination  of  virtuous.”  This  is  of  course 
true  provided  morality  consists  in  mere  affirmation  of  any 
kind  of  ti*uth,  but  this  is  not  Wollaston’s  view.  John 
Clarke  says  that  he  is  not  at  all  sure  “that  all  immoral 
actions  deny  more  truth  than  they  affirm,”  so  it  cannot,  he 
thinks,  be  argued  that  they  are  for  that  reason  immoral.'^® 
As  many  truths,  he  thinks,  could  be  affirmed  in  regard  to 
“any  species  of  vicious  actions”  as  “could  for  the  denial 
of  it.”  In  the  first  place,  I would  answer,  it  is  not  the  posi- 
tion of  Wollaston  that  immorality  is  just  a denial  of  a true 
proposition.  In  the  second  place,  considering  truth  in  the 
broad  sense  as  true  to  life  relations  and  meanings,  as  Wollas- 
ton does,  John  Clarke  certainly  cannot  deny  that  vicious 
actions  are  false.  They  are  in  conformity  to  some  particu- 
lar truths,  to  be  sure,  but  they  deny  the  larger  truths  of 
the  indissoluble  unity  of  life  and  the  world. 

The  rationalistic  system  of  Wollaston  was  criticized  by 
Hutcheson  who  said  that  moral  distinctions  must  be  re- 
ferred not  to  the  reason,  but  to  an  internal  sense.  He  says 
that  one  can  make  as  many  true  propositions  about  a bad 
action  as  about  a good  one,  consequently  moral  laws  must 
be  a good  deal  more  than  such  truths.  The  criterion  of 
truth  and  the  standard  of  right  are  different,  otherwise 
true  propositions  could  not  be  made  about  wrong  actions. 
Hutcheson  says  that  both  virtuous  and  vicious  actions  con- 
form to  truth,  and  so  truth  cannot  be  the  standard  of 
virtue.^’^  I am  very  sure  that  this  is  no  refutation  of 
Wollaston,  for  it  is  his  contention  that  only  true  proposi- 
tions can  be  made  about  matters  of  fact.  We  can,  how- 
ever, act  in  a manner  inconsistent  with  truth  and  thus 
virtually  deny,  in  practice,  what  we  must  assent  to  theoret- 

J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good,  etc.,  p.  17. 

” Ibid.,  p.  19. 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  48-9  and  71. 

" Hutcheson,  Essay  on  the  Passions,  Treatise  II,  sec.  1. 


118 


The  Ethics  of  William  W ollaston 


ically.  Of  course  pi’opositions  that  are  true  can  be  used 
in  describing  or  discussing  evil  actions,  but  this  constitutes 
no  disproof  of  tlie  thesis  that  evil  is  a denial  of  truth  and 
that  goodness  is  an  affii’mation  of  ti'uth.^®  We  constantly 
speak  of  men  acting  inconsistently,  meaning  thereby,  just 
what  Wollaston  means,  that  their  actions  are  untrue,  that 
they  are  not  living  conformably  to  the  true  nature  of 
things.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  truth  element  is  by 
any  means  all  that  there  is  to  vice  and  virtue,  nor  does 
Wollaston  claim  that  it  is.  In  fact  he  makes  a great  deal 
of  the  volitional  element,  going  so  far  as  to  insist  that  with- 
out it  there  can  be  no  morality.  It  is  not  moral  truth  until 
we  will  the  truth  to  be  actualized  in  our  lives. 

Sir  James  Mackintosh  made  an  objection  to  Wollaston’s 
rationalistic  method  similar  to  that  made  by  Hutcheson. 
Sir  James  insists  that  the  terms  relation  and  conformity 
to  nature  apply  as  much  to  vice  as  to  virtue  and  that  both 
good  and  bad  actions  must  conform  to  the  natures  and  rela- 
tions of  things.®®  Warlaw  answers  this  objection  by  say- 
ing that  of  course  every  act  must  in  adapting  means  to 
ends  conform  to  the  nature  of  particular  things  and  rela- 
tions. The  vicious  act  of  necessity  conforms  to  the  nature 
of  many  particular  things  and  relations,  but  it  also  vio- 
lates the  nature  of  things  in  many  essential  respects.  The 
virtuous  act  conforms  universally.  It  is  congruous  with 
its  relations.®^ 

Brown  questions  Wollaston’s  criterion  of  morality  on 
the  ground  that  both  virtuous  and  vicious  actions  are  con- 
formable to  the  nature  of  things.  He  takes  Wollaston’s 
case  of  talking  to  a post.  “Now,  you  see  that  on  his  scheme 
of  absolute  irrelative  truth,  the  absurdity  of  talking  to  a 
post  is  precisely  of  the  same  nature  with  that  of  injuring 
a man:  For  in  both  cases,  we  treat  the  post  and  the  man, 
as  being  what  they  are  not.  Consequently,  on  this  philoso- 
phy, if  it  be  morally  evil  to  injure  a man  it  is  likewise 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

Ibid.,  p.  7. 

Mackintosh,  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  Ethical  Phil. 

" Warlaw,  Christian  Ethics,  p.  306. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


119 


morally  evil  to  talk  to  a post.”  Wollaston,  he  says,  would 
not  claim  this,  of  course,  but  since,  according  to  his  system, 
truth  is  equally  violated  in  either  case  and  as  there  is  some- 
thing highly  immoral  in  the  one  and  nothing  immoral  in  the 
other  this  cannot  be  the  criterion  of  morality,®^  Saying 
that  all  immorality  is  absurd  and  contradictory  is  very 
different  from  saying  that  all  absurdity  and  contradiction 
constitutes  immorality.  It  is  the  simple  fallacy  of  conver- 
sion. In  the  process  of  conversion  an  A proposition  loses 
its  universality,  and  becomes  only  the  particular  proposi- 
tion I.  All  immorality  consists  in  absurdly  denying  a thing 
to  be  what  it  is  or  in  affirming  it  to  be  what  it  is  not.  It 
does  not  follow  that  every  case  of  absurdity  is  immoral, 
for  many  cases  would  be  nothing  more  than  stupid  mistakes 
or  jokes.  This  Brown  admits  and  argues  from  this  that 
Wollaston’s  principle  cannot  constitute  the  criterion  of 
morality.  A distinction  must  be  made  between  error  and 
immorality.  Error  is  only  a false  existential  judgment, 
and  it  is  only  when  we  act  falsely  that  we  are  immoral. 

No  morality  attaches  to  acts  that  do  not  violate  the 
nature  of  personality.  Treating  a post  as  a man,  then,  is 
essentially  different  from  treating  a man  as  a post.  There 
is  absurdity  in  both  cases  but  not  the  same  kind  of  ab- 
surdity. Then,  is  not  Brown  right  in  saying  that  this  is 
resorting  to  another  criterion  of  morality  .P  No,  because 
in  every  moral  situation  personality  must  be  involved,  and 
if  it  is  a case  of  immorality  it  must  be  the  nature  of  the 
person  rather  than  that  of  the  thing  that  is  violated. 
Wollaston  says  that  things  have  moral  relations  only  when 
attached  to  persons  in  some  way.®®  In  spite  of  the  denial 
of  John  Clarke  and  Brown,  it  is  also  true  that  the  intention 
of  the  actor  is  a factor  in  the  determination  of  the  quality 
of  the  act,  in  Wollaston’s  system.  In  fact  he  makes  it  a 
pre-condition  of  morality  that  the  agent  act  intelligently 
and  freely.®'*  This  certainly  means  that  the  intentions  of 

Brown,  Essays,  p.  263.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  DeUn.,  pp.  15  and  27. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  7.  J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Moral  Good, 
etc.,  pp.  5-11. 


120  The  Ethics  of  WiUiam  Wollaston 

the  agent  are  essential  factors  in  making  moral  evalua- 
tions. 

Brown,  then,  proceeds  to  criticize  Wollaston’s  statements 
in  regard  to  the  case  of  the  man  in  distress.  Wollaston’s 
position  is  that  to  refuse  to  help  a man  in  distress  is  to 
deny  the  man’s  distress  to  be  what  it  is  and  personality  to 
be  what  it  is.®®  “These  strange  denials  we  certainly  do 
not  make,”  Brown  insists.  I would  answer  that  of  course 
we  do  not,  nor  does  Wollaston  claim  that  we  do.  He,  in 
fact,  insists  upon  the  point  that  as  intelligent  beings  we 
cannot  deny  the  truth  to  be  the  truth.  What  we  can  do, 
however,  says  Wollaston,  is  to  act  as  if  the  truth  were 
not  the  truth  or  to  “practically  deny”  what  we  theoretically 
admit  to  be  true.®®  Brown  continues,  “All  which  we  tacitly 
declare  is,  on  the  contrary,  a truth,  and  a truth  of  the  most 
unquestionable  kind.”  To  be  sure  we  declare  all  of  these 
things  to  be  true,  Wollaston  would  say,  otherwise  there 
would  be  no  morality  attached  to  the  situation.  Brown 
says  that  “We  affirm  ourselves  to  be  what  we  are,  indif- 
ferent to  the  miseries  of  others ; and  if  to  affirm  a truth 
by  our  actions  be  all  which  constitutes  virtue,”  we  have 
acted  as  virtuously  as  we  would  have  had  we  gone  imme- 
diately to  the  aid  of  the  suffering  man.®’^  This  statement 
of  Brown’s  is  absurd  because  real  truth  is  denied  by  such 
action,  and  certainly  one  who  acts  in  such  a way  acts  con- 
trary to  the  real  nature  of  man. 

In  criticizing  Wollaston,  Jouffroy  says,  that,  “In  the 
appreciation  of  actions  we  must  come  to  judgments  whicih 
do  not  coincide  materially  with  moral  judgments.  There  is 
no  bad  action  which  does  not  express,  equally  with  a good 
one,  many  true  propositions.”  The  man  who  poisons  an- 
other conforms  to  many  true  propositions.  To  be  sure  he 
does  but  he  also  contradicts  true  propositions  and  those 
contradicted  are  the  one’s  essential  to  morality.®®  There 
are,  says  Wollaston,  many  true  propositions  which  imply 

“ Brown,  Essay  II,  Sec.  3.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  17. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  8 and  11. 

Ibid.,  p.  17.  Brown,  Essays,  p.  265. 

Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  vol.  II,  p.  336. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


121 


no  moral  relations,  since  persons  are  not  involved.*®  It  is 
not,  he  says,  immoral  to  speak  to  a post.  True,  this  is 
treating  the  post  as  a person,  but  it  does  not  violate  the 
nature  of  personality,®®  Jouffroy’s  case  of  administering 
arsenic  Wollaston  would  treat  in  this  way.  The  nature  of 
arsenic  is  not  violated,  but,  in  fact,  many  true  propositions 
are  conformed  to  in  the  action,  e.  g.,  arsenic  is  poison,  poison 
will  kill.  The  nature  of  the  person,  however,  is  violated  and 
many  true  propositions  are  thereby  denied,  the  principal 
one  of  which  is  that  a person  is  a person  and  should  always 
be  treated  as  such.  So  I cannot  agr^e  with  Joulfroy,  when 
he  says  that  Wollaston’s  fundamental  maxim  is  too  com- 
prehensive and  confounds  evil  with  good. 

“There  are,”  says  Joulfroy,  “many  truths  which  it  is 
morally  indifferent  whether  we  affirm  or  deny  by  actions.” 
As  a case  he  takes  two  cold  men,  one  of  whom  draws  near 
a fire  while  the  other  gets  near  a piece  of  ice.  The  act  of 
the  one  affirms  a true  proposition,  which  the  act  of  the  other 
denies.  But  says  Jouffroy,  there  is  no  morality  in  the  action 
of  the  first  man,  nor  immorality  in  the  action  of  the  second 
man;  but  only  reasonable  action  in  the  one  case  and  foolish 
action  in  the  other.  He  says : “Absurdity  and  immorality 
are  not  coincident.”  ®^  To  this  Wollaston  agrees,  but  he 
insists  that  immorality  is  absurd,  not  that  every  case  of 
absurdity  is  a case  of  immorality  but  that  immorality  is  al- 
ways absurd.®^ 

Because  absurdity  and  immorality  are  not  coincident  it 
by  no  means  follows  that  it  is  not  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  ethics,  that  moral  actions  are  those  which  affirm 
true  propositions  and  do  not  contradict  the  nature  of 
things.  Jouffroy  says  that  “when  we  meet  a traveler  in  a 
wood,  it  is  equally  a crime  to  maintain  that  his  purse  does 
not  belong  to  him,  as  to  take  it,  for  in  either  case  we  equally 
deny  the  same  true  proposition.”  ®*  Of  course  we  deny  true 
propositions  in  both  cases,  but  the  second  case  represents 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  31. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  27. 

“‘Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  vol.  II,  p.  338. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  27. 

“Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  p.  339. 


122 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


an  action  based  on  the  denial  of  a true  proposition  and, 
more  important  still,  it  represents  a case  of  an  action  which 
is  in  contradiction  to  the  most  important  of  all  truths, 
those  concerning  persons.®^  Joulfroy  further  argues  that 
tliis  moral  principle  would  equalize  virtues,  “for  if  morality 
consists  in  not  denying  a true  proposition,  then  all  good 
actions  are  equally  good,  and  no  difference  can  be  discov- 
ered between  them.”  It  is  the  essence  of  reason,  he  grants, 
to  respect  essential  relations  and  to  act  conformably  thereto, 
but  it  does  not  follow,  he  thinks,  that  because  these  rela- 
tions constitute  truth  that  they  also  constitute  goodness. 
Conduct  may  be  reasonable  without  being  virtuous  and  it 
may  be  unreasonable  without  being  wrong.  “We  are  in 
error,  and  act  without  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things, 
when  we  attempt  to  warm  ourselves  with  ice;  but  such  con- 
duct is  not  immoral;  the  two  spheres  of  absurdity  and  im- 
morality do  not  coincide.” 

Wollaston  does  not,  as  I have  just  said,  argue  for  the 
coincidence  of  truth  and  goodness,  but  it  by  no  means  fol- 
lows from  this  that  the  good  cannot  be  best  defined  in 
terms  of  conformity  to  objective  relations,  to  the  nature  of 
things.  The  case  just  mentioned  by  Jouffroy  as  being 
morally  indifferent  might  very  easily  become  a moral  situa- 
tion the  moment  the  conformity  or  non-conformity  to  the 
nature  of  things  involved,  not  merely  the  nature  of  fire 
and  the  natui’e  of  ice,  but  that  of  sentient  beings,  and  espe- 
cially that  of  persons,  the  conduct  would  take  on  a moral 
tone.  Wollaston  never  claims  that  all  relations  are  morally 
significant,  and  he  certainly  never  contends  that  immorality 
can  be  predicated  of  conduct  that  does  not  violate  the 
nature  of  sentient  beings.  He  considers  the  inhumane  treat- 
ment of  a lower  animal  and  says  it  is  wrong  both  because 
it  contradicts  the  sentient  nature  of  the  animal  and  also  be- 
cause the  man  who  does  such  a thing  violates  his 
own  nature.  The  last  factor  is  the  significant  one  because 
no  moral  character  can  attach  to  conduct  that  does  not 
involve  persons  either  as  subject  or  object.  He  would  have 

““Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Prop.  IX. 

'"jounroy.  Intro,  to  Ethics,  pp.  337-9. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


123 


everything  treated  as  what  it  is,  although  things  are  of  very 
different  importance.  One  is,  he  thinks,  mistreating  his 
mind  when  truth  is  disregarded.®® 

It  is  characteristic  of  rational  beings.  Irons  says,  to  act 
with  due  regard  to  the  nature  of  things  which  is  the  same 
as  acting  rationally,  but  this  has  no  moral  significance.  It 
is,  of  course,  true  that  we  cannot  say  that  all  acts  in  con- 
formity to  the  nature  of  tilings  are  moral  acts,  nor,  even, 
that  all  contradictions  are  immoral.  It  does  not  follow  from 
this,  as  Irons  thinks,  that  we  have  to  seek  elsewhere  for  our 
moral  criterion.  He  takes  the  position  that  if  conformity 
is  to.  constitute  the  criterion  of  right,  then  “every  act  which 
is  performed  by  an  intelligent  being  is  right.”  No,  an  A 
proposition  does  not  distribute  its  predicate  but  only  its 
subject;  consequently  it  does  not  follow  that  because  the 
right  is  always  that  which  conforms  to  the  truth,  that  the 
truth  is  always  moral  and  certainly  not  that  every  act  of  an 
intelligent  being  will  be  moral.  If  Wollaston’s  criterion 
be  true,  says  Irons,  it  follows  that  the  murderer  who  takes 
a life  conforms  his  conduct  as  much  to  the  nature  of  things 
as  does  the  good  Samaritan  who  saves  a life.®^  This  can- 
not be  said  with  truth  for  while  the  murderer  does  conform 
to  certain  laws  of  physics  his  act  virtually  denies  many 
essential  life  relations  and  meanings.  He  acts,  says  Wollas- 
ton, as  if  certain  tilings  which  are  true  were  not  time.®® 
The  act  of  the  good  Samaritan  is  quite  different  for  it  is 
consistent  with  the  true  nature  and  relations  of  things.  He 
conforms  not  only  to  a few  physical  laws  but  to  the  very 
nature  of  the  universe,  while  the  murderer’s  act  is  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  greater  truths  of  the  universe  and  in  con- 
formity only  to  a few  relatively  insignificant  physical  laws. 
As  Wollaston  expresses  the  matter,  “In  order  to  judge 
rightly  what  anything  is,  it  must  be  considered  not  only 
. . . in  one  respect,  but  also  what  it  may  be  in  any  other 
respect;  . . . the  whole  description  of  the  tiling  ought  to 
be  taken  in.  . . . All  tniths  are  consistent,  nor  can  any- 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  15,  2T  and  31. 

” Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Rev.,  vol.  12,  pp.  142-3. 

“^WoUaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  9. 


124  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

thing  be  true  any  further  than  it  is  compatible  with  other 
things  that  are  true.” 

The  most  absurd  criticism  passed  upon  Wollaston  from 
this  point  of  view  is  that  of  Hume.  In  discussing  judgments 
“which  are  the  effects  of  our  actions,  and  which  when  false, 
give  occasion  to  pronounce  the  actions  contrary  to  truth 
and  reason,”  Hume  makes  the  very  clever  assertion  that 
actions  never  cause  judgments  in  our  own  minds  but  only 
in  the  minds  of  others.  Hume^s  argument  is  very  subtle 
but  is,  I think,  false.  My  wrong  uct,  he  argues,  is  based 
on  a true  proposition,  for  I know  the  facts  to  be  as  they 
are.  He  takes  the  case  of  someone  seeing  through  a win- 
dow the  lewd  behavior  of  a man  with  his  neighbor’s  wife. 
The  innocent  spectator  might  suppose  the  woman  to  be 
not  the  wife  of  a neighbor  but  the  man’s  own  wife  and  so 
might  make  a false  judgment  in  regard  to  the  situation. 
“In  tliis  respect  my  action  resembles  somewhat  a lie;  only 
with  this  difference,  which  is  material,  that  I perform  not 
the  action  with  any  intention  of  giving  rise  to  a false  judg- 
ment in  another,  but  merely  to  satisfy  my  passion.  I cause, 
however,  a mistake  and  false  judgment  by  accident;  and 
the  falsehood  of  its  effects  may  be  ascribed,  by  some  odd 
figurative  way  of  speaking,  to  the  action  itself.”  In 
reply,  I will  say,  that  the  immoral,  as  Wollaston  thinks  of 
it,  always  rests  on  a true  judgment  of  the  actor  and  it  is 
this  which  constitutes  the  differentia  of  the  immoral  from 
the  merely  erroneous.  The  essence  of  immorality  consists 
in  acting  as  if  the  known  truth  were  not  the  truth.  Wollas- 
ton mentions  a case  very  much  like  that  of  Hume,  namely, 
that  of  Isaac  and  Rebecca.  In  discussing  this  case  Wollas- 
ton says  that  a man  may  act  a lie,  and  such  acted  lies  are 
such  because  there  is  a contradiction  between  the  actions 
and  the  evident  truth  of  the  situation.^®^ 

Hume,  even,  undertakes  to  refute  Wollaston’s  point  in 
regard  to  freedom,  saying  that  this  does  not  clear  up  the 
difficulty  in  regard  to  identifying  goodness  with  truth  be- 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Prop.  VI. 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  461. 

‘"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  11. 


Wollaston  amd  His  Critics 


125 


cause  freedom  does  not  explain  how  an  action  produces  in 
us  an  erroneous  conclusion.  He  argues  that,  according  to 
Wollaston’s  principle,  if  the  man,  who  was  having  illicit 
relations  with  his  neighbor’s  wife,  had  taken  the  precaution 
to  close  the  blinds  there  would  have  been  no  Immorality 
because  in  that  case  the  action  would  have  given  rise  to  no 
false  propositions.^*’^  Wollaston  would  answer  that  while 
neither  the  man  nor  the  woman  were  affirming  false  proposi- 
tions but  true  ones,  factually  speaking ; yet,  by  their  action, 
they  were  denying  true  propositions.  Intellectually  they 
could  but  assent  to  the  truth  of  their  natures  and  relations, 
and  yet  practically  they  were  denying  the  truth  of  those 
natures  and  relations.  All  the  while  things  were  as  they 
were,  and  to  that  they  could  not  refuse  to  give  their  assent, 
but  being  morally  free  they  could  by  action  deny  the  truth, 
that  is  act  as  if  the  truth  were  not  the  truth,  but  as  if  the 
truth  were  quite  otherwise.^®® 

III.  Criticism 

THAT  WOLLASTON  OBSCURES  THE  REAL  NATURE  OF  MORALITY 

One  very  common  criticism  against  Wollaston’s  system  is 
that  the  real  nature  of  morality  is  obscured  by  his  intel- 
lectualistic  criterion  and  that,  consequently,  no  content  is 
given  to  morality.  The  criticism  appears  in  several  forms. 
One  set  of  critics  simply  say  that  it  is  an  empty  form  and 
that  it  is,  consequently,  entirely  useless  as  a guide  to  one 
who  is  seeking  the  way  to  live  morally.  Others  object  to 
the  system  simply  because  they  have  no  faith  in  the  intellect 
as  the  criterion  and  guide  of  morality.  They  think  that 
the  criterion  is  a moral  sense  or  a moral  faculty  and  that 
reason  is  only  a means  to  an  end.  This  criticism  is  based 
largely  on  an  entirely  wrong  interpretation  of  Wollaston. 
In  the  first  place  this  intellectualism  is  given  an  intution- 
alistic  interpretation,  the  good  being  made  a matter  of 
simple  and  immediate  intellection ; while,  as  a matter  of  fact, 
it  is  really  an  objective  system  of  ethics  based  almost  en- 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  461. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 


126 


The  Ethics  of  William,  Wollasto^rb 


tirely  on  experience  and  ratiocination.^®^  Then,  too,  his 
notion  that  intellectual  assent  is  necessitated,  but  that 
moral  acts  are  free  is  not  properly  evaluated.^®®  We  cannot 
do  otherwise  than  assent  to  what  we  think  to  be  true.  This  he 
makes  to  be  the  very  corner-stone  of  his  system,  but  his 
critics  say  that  it  is  a mere  truism  to  say  that  we  must 
assent  to  the  truth.  It  is  a self-evident  fact  that  an  intelli- 
gent being  cannot  deny  intellectually  what  he  knows  to  be 
true,  and  that  a free  moral  being  can  act  contrary  to  the 
recognized  truth.  That  a thing  should  be  treated  as  what 
it  is  is  as  much  a truism  as  are  the  primary  laws  of  thought. 
Wollaston  sought  to  base  Ethics  on  a foundation  as  in- 
dubitable as  that  of  logic.  Just  as  surely  as  the  fact  that 
A is  A is  the  ethical  truth  that  A should  be  treated  as  A. 
But  an  intelligent  being  must  be  intelligent  and  assent  to 
truth,  but  he  is  under  no  compulsion  in  regard  to  acting 
morally.^®®  Immorality  is  as  inconsistent  as  intellectual 
contradiction,  because  the  immoral  person  realizes  that  he 
is  acting  on  the  assumption  that  something  he  knows  to  be 
false  is  true  or  that  something  he  knows  to  be  true  is  false. 
So  the  critics  say  that  if  this  is  all  there  is  to  the  system 
of  Wollaston,  then,  his  conception  is  self-evident  but  that 
his  system  is  purely  formal. 

Wundt  says  that  the  extreme  intellectualism  of  Wollas- 
ton’s system  “almost  entirely  obscures  the  specific  content 
of  morality  (der  specifische  Inhalt  des  Sittlichen  vollig  zum 
verschwinden  kommt).”^®’  If  he  objects  to  Wollaston’s 
system  on  the  ground  that  it  does  not  give  content  to 
morality.  We  might  say  that  this  same  objection  can  be 
made  against  any  principle  of  morality.  The  content  of 
morality  cannot  be  prescribed  in  any  theory  of  morals. 
Circumstances  will  largely  determine  the  content  of  mo- 
rality, and  judgment  must  decide  in  the  particular  situations 
of  life  just  what  is  the  right  thing  to  do.  An  ethical  ideal 
can  only  guide  the  judgment  and  only  a legalistic  principle 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 

Ibid.,  pp.  7-8  and  42. 

Ibid.,  p.  8. 

Wundt,  Ethik,  p.  323. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


in 


of  morals  can  do  more  than  this.  Wollaston  does,  however, 
give  copious  suggestions  as  to  the  application  of  his  prin- 
ciples to  the  various  kinds  of  situations  of  life. 

Jouifroy  says  that  he  grants  that  a good  act  is  never 
false  but  is  always  in  harmony  with  truth,  that  it  is  con- 
formable with  the  relations  resulting  from  the  nature  of 
things.  He  thinks,  though,  that  there  are  only  “certain 
relations  which  are  moral,  only  certain  true  propositions, 
which  we  are  bound  to  express  by  our  acts.”  He  says  that 
Wollaston’s  system  fails  in  that  it  does  not  give  the  dif- 
ferentia of  morality  in  such  a way  that  one  can  know  just 
what  acts  are  moral.  He  does  not,  Joufifroy  says,  differ- 
entiate between  moral  and  reasonable  or  between  immoral 
and  unreasonable.  The  defect  of  his  system  is,  Jouffroy 
thinks,  “confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  psychological  coin- 
cidence is  equally  wanting  with  the  external  coincidence.” 
He  grants  that  we  do  find  it  necessary,  oftentimes,  to  con- 
sider both  our  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  other  beings 
and  the  relations  existing  between  them  and  ourselves  be- 
fore we  can  decide  what  we  ought  to  do.  This,  he  says,  is 
to  enable  us  to  ascertain  what  is  good  and  what  we  ought 
to  do.^°®  This  is  Wollaston’s  position  only  he  contends  that 
this  is  all  that  is  needed  to  determine  what  ought  to  be  done 
in  any  situation  of  life.  Wollaston’s  criterion  is  an  ob- 
jective one.  He  says:  “Just  let  things  speak  for  them- 
selves,” which  means  that  we  are  to  find  out  what  things 
are  and  then  treat  them  accordingly.^*^®  Jouffroy,  unlike 
Wollaston,  thinks  that  there  must  be  some  specific  moral 
principle.^^® 

If  all  truth  be  so  very  sacred,  says  John  Clarke,  that 
men  should  have  regard  for  it  in  all  their  conduct  and  if 
vice  consists  entirely  in  its  opposition  to  truth,  it  follows 
that  “the  affirming  of  truth,  any  truth  whatever  by  word 
or  deed  . . . should  be  looked  upon  as  a virtue.”  He, 
then,  attempts  a reductio  ad  absurdum  argument.  He  says 
that  silly  idle  consequences  follow  from  such  a view.  The 

Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  pp.  336-8. 

^“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

“"Jouffroy,  Intro,  to  Ethics,  p.  339. 


128 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


affirmation  of  every  truth  becomes  a duty.  He  says,  “it 
will  be  a glorious  exercise  for  a man  to  spend  his  time  in 
thrumming  over  such  worthy  and  weighty  propositions  as 
these,  a man’s  no  horse,  a horse  no  cow,  a cow  no  bull,  nor 
a bull  an  ass.”  Mr.  Wollaston’s  general  idea  of  moral 
good  and  evil  cannot  be  a true  conception,  thinks  John 
Clarke,  “because  it  does  not  rest  upon  the  tendency,  wherein 
precisely  the  moral  good  or  evil  of  human  actions  consists; 
and  besides  ...  it  is  hardly  applicable  to  any  species  of 
human  actions,  except  those  of  affirming  or  denying  truth 
by  words.”  He  says  that,  “To  pretend  that  cruelty  and 
injustice  is  denying  a man  to  be  a man,”  is  nothing  but 
“mere  rant,”  borrowed  from  a hyperbolical  way  of  aggra- 
vating the  absurdity  of  such  behavior,  without  ever  strictly 
meaning  what  is  said.” 

John  Clarke  says  that,  “He  everywhere  speaks  of  own- 
ing things  to  be  as  they  are,  as  in  itself  a matter  of  the 
highest  importance,  as  the  ne  plus  ultra,  beyond  which  no 
man  needs  or  ought  to  go  in  his  enquiries,  what  is  fit  or 
proper  to  be  done  or  not  ...  as  if  that  alone  was  a thing 
desirable  in  and  for  itself.”  This  Clarke  says  “is  a con- 
tradiction to  the  common  sense  and  experience  of  mankind. 
For  a little  reflection  may  quickly  satisfy  anyone  that  noth- 
ing but  pleasure  or  happiness  is  or  can  be  desirable  upon 
its  own  account,  without  reference  to  anything  else.  And 
that  other  things  are  desirable  and  pursued  by  us,  only  so 
far  as  they  are  considered  by  us  to  be  the  means  of  attain- 
ing pleasure  or  happiness.  . . . Happiness,  in  short,  is  the 
ultimate  end  of  all  our  aims  and  designs,  all  our  wishes  and 
desires.  This  ...  we  constantly  and  steadily  pursue.  Nor 
can  it  be  otherwise.  And  for  the  truth  of  this  I appeal  to 
the  inward  feeling  and  experience  of  all  mankind.” 
Clarke  says  that  Wollaston  practically  admits  this,  when 
he  says  that  “pain  considered  in  itself,  is  a real  evil ; pleasure 
a real  good.  . . . Pleasure  is  in  itself  desirable,  pain  to  be 

’“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Moral  Good,  p.  19. 

Ibid.,  p.  56. 

Ibid.,  pp.  46-7. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


129 


avoided.”  Clarke  says  that  “owning  things  to  be  what 
they  are”  is  not  in  itself  desirable,  but  “desirable”  only  “as 
. . . a means,  more  or  less  conducive  to  the  end  of  all  our 
wishes  and  desires,  happiness.” 

John  Clarke  accuses  Wollaston  of  insisting  that  things 
be  treated  as  they  are  “without  regard  to  consequences.” 
But,  as  a matter  of  fact,  Wollaston  is  very  insistent  upon 
the  fact  that  things  cannot  be  treated  as  they  are  without 
entering  into  a consideration  of  possible  consequences,  espe- 
cially as  to  human  happiness.  Clarke  says  that  Wollaston 
talks  like  one  who  is  a stranger  to  human  nature  w'hen  he 
speaks  as  if  happiness  were  a “matter  of  secondary  con- 
sideration to  abet  the  practice  of  truth.”  He  says  that 
instead  of  the  Author  of  Nature  appointing  happiness  “to 
encourage  the  practice  of  truth,”  the  “regard  due  to  truth 
. . . is  purely  and  solely  with  a view  to  the  well-being  and 
happiness  of  mankind.”  This,  of  course,  Wollaston  does 
not  deny  but  he  insists  that  welfare  and  happiness  are  what 
is  meant  by  truth  of  ethical  signification.  The  essential 
difference  betw'een  an  objective  system  of  morals,  like  that 
of  Wollaston,  and  a view  of  morals,  which  makes  the  right- 
ness or  wrongness  to  depend  upon  the  intentions  entirely, 
is  that  consequences,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  anticipated, 
are  duly  considered.  The  consequences  expected  to  result 
from  an  action  is  the  determining  factor  in  the  motivation 
when  conduct  is  objectively  evaluated.  It  would  certainly 
be  the  height  of  irrationality  to  disregard  consequences. 
While  Wollaston  considers  happiness  to  be  a matter  of  the 
highest  importance  and  insists  that  nothing  can  be  really 
good  which  makes  for  the  destruction  of  human  happiness, 
he  would  not  go  as  far  as  John  Clarke  when  he  says  that 
“mankind,  neither  are,  nor  can  be  concerned  for  anything 
but  happiness.  . . . Owning  things  to  be  Avhat  they  are,  or 
a conduct  conformable  to  truth,  can  signify  nothing  to 

”■*  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  35. 

“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Moral  Good,  etc.,  p.  48. 

Ibid.,  p.  48. 

Ibid.,  p.  48. 


130 


The  Ethics  of  William  W oUaston 


mankind  any  further  than  it  is  a means  to  promote  their 
happiness.” 

Hume  says  that  no  conclusion  as  to  the  nature  of  virtue 
can  he  drawn  from  the  mere  assertion  that  “we  perceive  an 
act  in  certain  relations  to  be  virtuous  or  vicious,”  nor  can 
we  say  what  faculty  perceives  the  relation.  It  may  be 
granted  that  the  same  act  in  the  same  relation  is  always 
virtuous  or  vicious,  “if  relations  be  taken  in  the  widest 
possible  sense,  but,”  says  Hume,  “that  is  a barren  proposi- 
tion.” To  be  sure  it  is  barren  in  the  sense  that  it  does 
not  state  the  content  of  morality,  but  to  give  definite  and 
fixed  content  to  morality  is  legalism.  No  ethical  theory 
undertakes  to  give  the  specific  content  of  morality.  It  is 
true  that  some  of  the  intuitionists  say  that  certain  acts  are 
always  and  ever3rwhere  virtuous  or  vicious  in  all  relations, 
e.  g.,  telling  the  truth  and  keeping  faith.  Wollaston  thinks 
that  even  these  are  but  instrumental  or  the  mere  means  to 
the  realization  of  personality  and  that  there  are  circum- 
stances when  to  be  true  to  real  relations  would  involve 
breaking  a covenant  or  the  violation  of  some  other  general 
moral  rule.  He  would  say  that  no  particular  thing  is  al- 
w'ays  right  or  wrong.  It  is,  he  says,  generally  right  to  tell 
the  truth  but  there  are  occasions,  when  the  telling  of  truth 
would  contradict  truths  moi’e  important  to  humanity  than 
merely  verbal  lying.  To  “merely  deny  truth  by  words  . , . 
is  not  equal  to  a denial  by  facts.”  He  says  that  “all  sins 
against  truth  are  not  equal,  and  certainly  a little  trespass- 
ing upon  it  in  the  present  case,  for  the  good  of  all  parties,” 
and  where  humanity  demands  it,  is  justifiable.^^® 

After  Von  Hartmann’s  long  quotation  from  Garve,  which 
he  thought  to  be  Garve’s  translation  of  Wollaston,  in  which 
he  gives  cases  of  morality  explicated  in  terms  of  the  criterion 
of  truth,  he  makes  this  criticism : “Aside  from  the  partial 
inaptitude  of  this  concrete  exposition  there  appears,  at  first 
sight,  a forced  and  artificial  nature  in  the  whole  mode  of 

*“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Moral  Good,  etc.,  p.  51. 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  469.  Selby-Bigge,  British 
Moralists,  p.  XXXV. 

““  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  30. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


131 


action.”  I undei’stand  Von  Hartmann  to  mean  that 
when  Wollaston  says  “that  to  make  a slave  of  a man  is  the 
same  as  to  say:  dieser  Mensch  ist  ein  verounftloses  Wesen, 
which  I can  treat  as  horses  and  oxen,”  that  he  understands 
him  to  merely  assert  that  a man  is  a creature  without  feel- 
ing and  that  he  does  not  at  all  show  wherein  the  wrongness 
consists.  He  says  that  Wollaston  presupposes  that  every 
action  is  consciously  a logical  consequence  of  certain  pre- 
mises and  that  the  consciousness  of  the  immorality  of  the 
action  consists  in  the  consciousness  of  the  fallaciousness  of 
one  or  more  of  the  premises.  “To  tell  the  truth,  however, 
an  action,”  says  Von  Hartmann,  “hardly  ever  comes  about 
in  the  manner  here  supposed,  and  whei*e  tliis  is  really  the 
case  and  the  fallaciousness  of  one  of  the  premises  really 
enters  into  consciousness,  this  theoretical  consciousness  is 
only  an  incidental  circumstance  and  no  how  identical  with 
the  consciousness  of  the  immorality  of  the  action.” 

Von  Hartmann  says  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  system 
of  Wollaston  wliich  is  not  a truism  and  gives  that  as  the 
explanation  of  its  unfruitfulness  and  for  the  fact  that  it 
had  little  influence  on  subsequent  systems.  At  the  very 
most  the  demand  of  objective  reasonableness,  the  moral  prin- 
ciple of  truth,  is  an  inadequate  solution  of  the  problem,  for 
it  only  teaches  us  how  to  avoid  wrong  and  directs  us  to  the 
right  path  for  the  solution  of  the  problem.^^^  I would  an- 
swer that  Wollaston’s  principle  is  supposed  to  be  accept- 
able to  all  rational  beings.  It  is  supposed  to  be  as  in- 
dubitable as  the  laws  of  thought,  and  this  I suppose,  is  the 
pre-condition  of  its  being  true.  Wollaston,  everywhere,  in- 
sists that  reasonableness  of  principle  coincides  with  objec- 
tive reasonableness.  He,  everywhere,  pre-supposes  that  act- 
ing rationally  means  the  same  as  acting  in  conformity  to 
the  nature  of  things. 

Falckenberg  makes  a similar  criticism  to  that  of  Von 
Hartmann:  “The  course  of  moral  philosophy  has  passed 

“‘Von  Hartmann,  Phanomnologie  des  Sittlichen,  etc.,  p.  345. 

““  Ibid.,  p.  345. 

““  Hartmann,  Phanomnologie  des  Sittlichen  Bewusstseins,  p.  345. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Paragraph  V. 


132 


The  Ethics  of  William  WollasioTH 


over  the  Ethics  of  Clarke  and  Wollaston  as  an  abstract  and 
unfruitful  idiosyncrasy.”  Of  course  Ethics  must  be 
abstract  in  principle,  for  how  else  could  it  be  universal 
and  ideal And  if  by  unfruitful  he  means  lacking  in  con- 
creteness, I would  answer  that  the  content  of  morality  can 
be  as  easily  supplied  to  this  as  to  any  other  system  of 
Ethics,  It  can,  in  fact,  be  supplied  more  easily  because 
the  natures  and  relations,  the  conformity  to  which  consti- 
tutes morality,  determine  the  specific  content  of  morality. 
Falckenburg,  however,  says  this  of  the  effort  to  find  an 
objective  and  universal  standard  in  place  of  the  subjective 
and  individual  standard  of  the  school  of  Hedonism ; that 
while  these  thinkers  had  plans  greater  than  their  per- 
formance still  “the  search  for  an  ethical  norm  which  should 
be  universally  valid  and  superior  to  the  individual  will  did 
not  lack  justification,” 

Leslie  Stephen  characterizes  Wollaston’s  system  as  In- 
tuitionism.  “He  tried  to  argue  from  our  a priori  knowledge 
of  the  essence  of  the  divine  and  human  nature,  and  not  from 
the  a posteriori  experience  of  their  relations.”  He  says 
that  this  effort  of  Wollaston  represents  an  attempt  to  use 
a method  belonging  to  the  theological  stage  of  thought. 
The  a pxuori  method,  he  says,  could  be  used  appropriately 
in  a system  of  theological  Ethics.  A set  of  rules  inde- 
pendent of  experience  might  be  deduced  from  the  belief  in  an 
omnipotent  ruler,  for  given  such  a Supreme  Being  “it  was 
easy  to  infer  what  should  be  the  conduct  of  his  creatures.” 
But  Leslie  Stephen  thinks  that  this  method  is  inapplicable 
when  for  the  God  of  traditional  theology  is  substituted  the 
“conception  of  a supreme  nature.”  I agree  entirely  with 
him  that  the  doctrine  of  an  infallible  conscience  must  go 
with  the  giving  up  of  the  doctrine  of  a personal  God.  I 
do  not,  however,  agree  with  his  characterization  of  Wollas- 
ton’s system  as  intuitional.  Stephen  says  that  “the  nuga- 

““  Palckenberg,  His.  of  Modem  Phil.,  p.  190. 

““Ibid.,  p.  190. 

“'Leslie  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  II,  p.  8. 


W ollaston  and  His  Critics 


133 


tory  character  of  Clarke’s  system  appears  in  the  curious 
development  given  to  it  by  Wollaston.”  He  says  that 
Clarke  “wished  to  elevate  morality  into  the  sphere  of  pure 
mathematics  where  the  promptings  of  passion  and  the  les- 
sons of  experience  should  be  entirely  excluded.”  He  thinks 
that  Wollaston’s  development  from  Clarke  is  in  the  direc- 
tion of  considering  absolute  and  abstract  logical  tnith  as 
the  criterion  of  morals.  I cannot  think  this  to  be  a true 
interpretation.  I think  that  Wollaston  did  develop  from 
the  position  of  Clarke,  but  not  in  the  direction  of  Intui- 
tionalism. The  development  was  towards  a more  completely 
rationalistic  position,  or,  perhaps,  it  would  be  better  to  say 
that  it  was  a development  in  the  direction  of  a more  purely 
rationalistic  position.  Clarke  thought  that  the  reason  is  an 
all-sufficient  moral  guide  but  thought  that  revelation  was 
necessary  to  reveal  the  sanctions  of  morality,  without  which 
the  majority  would  not  have  strength  enough  to  do  that 
which  their  reason  prescribes.  Wollaston  thought  revela- 
tion to  be  entirely  unnecessary.^^® 

I cannot  reconcile  Leslie  Stephen’s  statement  that  “he 
refused  to  interrogate  nature,  in  order  to  discover  what  is 
pleasing  to  the  God  of  nature,”  with  Wollaston’s  injunction 
to  “just  let  things  speak  for  themselves  and  they  will  pro- 
claim their  own  rectitude  or  obliquity.”  Wollaston  can 
only  mean  by  this  that  the  nature  of  things  detennine  moral 
obligation.  I am  very  sure  that  Leslie  Stephen  is  wrong 
in  thinking  that  Wollaston  bases  all  truth  upon  intuition. 
He  says  that  Wollaston’s  system  was  based  upon  an  ob- 
jective basis  but  claims  that  this  objective  truth  is  deduced 
intuitively.^®®  The  only  ground  for  this  intei*pretation  is 
the  fact  that  Wollaston  believed  that  there  is  a rational 
factor  in  knowledge  and  in  morality.  In  regard  to  the 
rational  and  necessary  factor  in  morals,  Wollaston  only 
said  that  it  is  necessarily  true  and  so  can  be  known 
a priori,  that  one’s  acts  should  conform  to  the  truth  of 

Anon.  Art.,  Wollaston,  Chambers’  Ency.,  vol.  16,  p.  709. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  II,  p.  9. 


184 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


things.  As  to  what  things  are  and  our  relations  thereto,  that 
belongs  to  the  a posteriori,  the  empirical  factor.^ 

Jodi  thinks  that  Wollaston’s  moi'al  criterion  is  not  ulti- 
mate. He  does  not  believe  that  even  Wollaston  himself  is 
guided  by  such  a relative  standard.  He  says  that  accord- 
ing to  such  a method  there  can  be  no  absolute  distinction 
between  good  and  evil,  “because  it  nowhere  leaves  the  neigh- 
borhood of  relativity.”  Jodi  characterizes  Wollaston  as 
a symptomatic  moralist,  “sympotmatische  Ethiker”  by 
which  he  meant  that  Wollaston  really  resorted,  in  the  last 
analysis,  to  a higher  ethical  standard  and  that  conformity 
to  nature  was  not  his  criterion  but  only  a symptom  of  the 
ethical.  Jodi  says  that  he  did  not  deny  the  influences  of 
religion  and  that  he  believed  that  the  human  being  is  de- 
pendent upon  “another  of  endless  goodness.”  Jodi  says 
that  Wollaston  believes  that  “from  this  source  as  well  as 
from  the  unity  of  all  individuals  arise  the  virtues  of  piety 
and  justice,  of  kindness  and  sobriety  in  connection  with 
the  Golden  Rule  of  the  gospel.” 

In  connection  with  his  exposition  of  the  ethical  teachings 
of  Hume,  Von  Gizycki  takes  occasion  to  offer  a criticism 
of  the  ethical  system  of  Wollaston.  He  thinks  that  Wollas- 
ton was  the  most  consistent  thinker  of  his  school,  but  he 
agrees  with  Hume  that  his  method  was  artificial  and  that 
he  was  guilty  of  reasoning  in  a circle.  He  says  that 
“Wollaston’s  doctrine  has  the  relative  merit  to  have  ex- 
pressed with  naive  frankness  the  actual  consequences  of 
this  entire  tendency.”  He  understands  this  to  be  purely 
formal  Intellectualism. 

In  his  exposition  of  the  Ethics  of  Home  of  Karnes,  Norden 
gives  some  consideration  to  the  Ethics  of  Wollaston.  H^ 
agrees  with  Lord  Karnes  in  his  estimation  of  Wollaston. 
Norden  characterizes  his  Ethics  as  resting  on  an  autonom- 
ous foundation,  “autonomer  Grundlage,”  and  he  agrees  with 
Karnes  that  this  is  an  impossible  foundation  upon  which  to 
rest  a system  of  Ethics.  It  may  be  said  that,  as  a matter 

“‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  42  ff. 

Jodi,  Ethik,  p.  145  ff. 

Von  Gizycki,  Ethik  Hume,  p.  7. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


135 


of  fact,  Wollaston  did  not  believe  that  Etlucs  could  rest 
on  an  “autonomer  Gnindlage,”  but,  rather,  that  he  was 
very  insistent  upon  the  fact  that  morality  must  be  made  to 
depend  upon  real  objective  relations.  Lord  Karnes’  system 
is  also  objective  in  a sense.  He  says  that  “any  action  con- 
formable to  the  common  nature  of  the  species,  is  considered 
by  us  as  regular  and  good.”  This  “common  nature  . . . 
every  person  . . . who  is  not  a monster  possesses.  It  is 
fit  and  proper  . . . and  it  is  a beautiful  scene  to  find  crea- 
tures acting  according  to  their  nature.”  Karnes,  like 
Wollaston,  says  that  the  moral  rule  “by  which  we  ought  to’ 
regulate  our  actions”  is  that  of  “acting  according  to  nature, 
acting  so  as  to  answer  the  end  of  our  creation.”  Karnes, 
however,  differs  very  greatly  from  Wollaston  in  regard  to 
the  way  we  discover  what  is  and  what  is  not  conformable 
to  nature.  He  thinks  that  we  have  a moral  sense,  for  he 
says  “thus  we  find  the  nature  of  man  so  constituted,  as  to 
approve  certain  actions  and  to  disapprove  others ; to  con- 
sider some  actions  as  fit,  right  and  meet  to  be  done,  and  to 
consider  others  as  unfit,  unmeet  and  wrong.”  Norden 
and  Karnes  agree  that  Wollaston  is  right  when  he  makes 
morality  to  consist  in  a life  conformable  to  nature  but 
wrong  in  that  he  “puts  reason  in  the  place  of  feeling.”  It 
can  be  said  that  their  interpretation  of  Wollaston  makes 
him  an  intuitionalist  rather  than  a rationalist.  It  may  be 
also  said  that  Karnes  and  Norden  believe  in  an  “autonomer 
Grundlage”  and  that  their  Ethics  is  really  intuitionistic, 
for  a moral  sense  as  truly  as  an  innate  idea  of  morality  is 
equivalent  to  an  intuition.  Norden  agrees  with  the  conten- 
tion of  Karnes  that  Wollaston’s  reduction  of  all  immorality 
to  the  lie  is  unnatural  and  forced.  He  also  agrees  that 
Wollaston  is  guilty  of  the  fallacy  Petitio  Principii.  “Why,” 
asked  Karnes,  “is  theft  a lie.?”  He  answers,  “Of  course 
because  the  thief  has  obliterated  the  distinction  between 
mine  and  thine.  But  what  is  meant  by  this  is  mine.?  Noth- 
ing but : I have  a right  to  that  particular  one,  and  it  is 
therefore  wrong  if  someone  else  robs  me  of  it.  So  the  idea 

Norden,  Die  Ethik  Henry  Home  of  Karnes,  pp.  27-8. 

Karnes,  Essay  on  the  Prin.  of  Morality,  Brit.  Moralists,  300  IF. 


136 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


of  right  and  wrong  are  here  already  presupposed.”  He 
says  that  what  is  said  of  theft  may  be  said  of  other  vices ; 
we  know  that  they  are  wrong  immediately.  Norden  says 
that  one  would  naturally  expect  for  Wollaston  to  tell  why 
the  lie  is  immoral  but  he  does  not  do  so.  “He  has,”  says 
Norden,  “left  it  to  everybody’s  conviction,  with  the  same 
right,  however,  he  could  have  left  the  other  vices  to  our 
inner  conviction  (unserer  inneren  Uherzengung).” 
Karnes  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that:  “To  maintain  that  the 
qualities  of  riglit  and  wrong  are  discoverable  by  reason  is 
no  less  absurd  than  that  truth  and  falsity  are  discoverable 
by  the  moral  sense.” 

Von  Hartmann  thinks  that  Wollaston  used  the  criterion 
of  truth  in  a purely  formal  way.  Von  Hartmann,  however, 
accepts  truth  as  his  own  standard  of  morality,  but  supposes 
that  he  is  using  it  in  a very  much  broader  sense  than  did 
Wollaston.  This  is  not,  by  any  means,  the  case,  for  “truth 
to  all  of  life”  and  not  just  formal  truth  is  certainly  Wollas- 
ton’s idea  of  morality.  He  thought  that  Wollaston’s  use 
of  truth  is  quite  other,  so,  he  says : “If  we  ask  what  remains 
of  the  moral  principle  of  truth  when  we  have  removed  the 
erroneous  presupposition  upon  which  it  rested  with  Wollas- 
ton we  find  the  demand  for  the  objective  reasonableness  of 
our  actions  for  which  a criterion  other  than  that  of  Wollas- 
ton’s formal  theoretical  principle  must  be  sought.”  And 
we  find,  also,  “that  all  moral  laws  and  ethical  rules  are  com- 
prised in  their  systematic  connection  in  the  principle  of 
truth.”  This  does  not  mean  that  every  individual  act  can 
show  in  all  cases  harmony  with  individual  truth,  which  he 
tliinks  to  be  Wollaston’s  idea;  theory  and  practice  are  far 
too  independent  for  that,  and  besides  our  entire  knowledge 
of  the  phenomenal  world  may  not  suffice  to  form  the  basis 
of  absolute  morality.  In  fact,  he  says,  only  that  theoretical 
knowledge  is  capable  of  tliis  “which  leads  beyond  the  phe- 
nomenal world  to  the  reality  revealing  itself  in  it,  that  is 

138  Norden,  Die  Ethik  Henry  Home  of  Karnes,  p.  29.  Karnes,  Essays 
on  the  Prill,  of  Morality,  Brit.  Moral.,  306. 

Home,  Sketches. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


137 


metaphysics.”  So,  Von  Hartmann  says,  “if  one  under- 
stands by  truth  . . . the  true  metaphysical  knowledge, 
then  Wollaston’s  principle  receives  a significance,  of  course, 
far  from  being  recognized  by  Wollaston  himself, 
namely  that  true  Ethics  can  be  based  only  on  time  meta- 
physics.” 


IV.  Criticism 

THAT  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE  IS  NOT  DEFINED  BUT  ASSUMED 

There  is  another  criticism  which  has  frequently  appeared 
to  the  system  of  Wollaston,  namely,  that  he  does  not  define 
the  nature  of  virtue  but  merely  assumes  it.  Those  who 
make  this  type  of  criticism  are,  as  a general  thing,  those 
who  hold  either  the  view  that  virtue  is  sui  genesis  or  else 
that  it  is  based  on  feeling.  If  one  believes  that  the  criterion 
of  morals  is  an  inner  sense  or  an  intuition,  which  is  imme- 
diate and  indubitable  requiring  neither  experience  nor  ratio- 
cination, it  follows,  of  course,  that  any  attempt  to  state  a 
moral  ideal  in  rational  terms  is  a gratuitous  procedure. 
The  same,  of  course,  can  be  said  of  the  view  of  the  world 
that  would  make  morality  a matter  of  feeling. 

This  criticism  was  first  offered  by  the  contemporary 
ethical  writer,  John  Clarke,^^®  who  asked:  “But  supposing 
actions  rightly  denominated  immoral  did  really  imply  a 
denial  of  truth,  ...  a denial  of  things  to  be  what  they  are; 
yet  how  will  it  follow  from  such  a denial,  that  those  actions 
therefore  are  truly  and  properly  immoral,  that  is  contrary 
to  the  will  and  good  pleasure  of  God,  declared  by  the  voice 
of  reason,  or  the  light  of  nature.'”’  For  this,  he  says, 
Wollaston  offers  several  reasons.  Clarke  goes  on  to  say 
that  “the  difficulty  of  making  a determination  will  grow 
with  the  number  of  significations  the  same  action  may  have 
. . . to  different  people.”  The  “civility  of  a sharper,”  for 

Hartmann,  Phanomonologie  des  Sittlidien  Bewusstseins,  p.  345. 

Ibid.,  p.  346. 

^“J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  WoUaston’s  Notion  of  Good,  etc.,  p.  19. 


138 


The  Ethics  of  WilliaTn  Wollaston 


example,  makes  a very  different  impression  upon  a green- 
horn to  that  made  upon  a man  of  the  world. 

Selby-Bigge  is  rather  typical  of  those  who  make  this 
criticism.  He  says  that  “relation”  can  only  be  used 
“figuratively”  in  morals.  He  says : A “good  deal  of  the 
intellectualist  argument  turns  upon  merely  verbal  ambig- 
uitjf ; relation,  agreement,  congruity,  suitableness,  fitness 
form  a series  which  lead,  conveniently  but  loosely,  from  the 
non-moral  to  the  moral.”  These  terms  are  meaningless, 
Selby-Bigge  thinks,  except  when  thought  of  in  connection 
with  happiness  or  some  other  end  without  which  they  have 
no  moral  connotation.  Abstract  conformability  of  actions 
to  things  “is  certainly  not  sufficient  to  constitute  virtue, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  give  a definition  of  virtuous  conform- 
ability without  including  in  the  definition  the  idea  of 
virtue.”  Conformity  of  life  to  the  nature  of  things  does, 
it  seems  to  me,  define  morality  as  clearly  as  does  any  other 
ideal  of  morality.  Any  ideal  must  be  stated  in  an  abstract 
and  formal  way,  or  else  it  will  not  be  universal  and  conse- 
quently not  an  ideal  at  all.  The  content  always  comes  from 
experience  and  involves  moral  judgment.  It  is  a stock  argu- 
ment and  has  been  offered  against  many  ethical  systems 
that  another  criterion  is  implied  in  the  very  statement  of 
the  ideal.  Intellectualists  can  certainly  use  it  as  effectively 
as  can  any  other  school,  for  they  all  presuppose  the  uni- 
verse to  be  consistent  and  so  must  think  of  morality  as  acts 
that  cohere  with  the  I’est  of  things.  So  can  we  not  say  that 
the  other  ethical  systems  all  presuppose  the  idea  of  con- 
sistency.^ Wollaston  does,  in  fact,  do  just  that  thing  with 
happiness  when  he  says  that  no  one  can  refuse  to  consider 
happiness  as  what  it  is  for  it  is  a part  of  the  real  nature 
of  man.^^^ 

In  criticism  of  Wollaston,  Rogers  says  that  to  say  that 
right  action  is  reasonable  or  natural  appears  to  mean  little 
more  than  that  it  is  reasonable  and  natural  to  do  what  is 
right.  Rogers  says  that  these  moralists,  Clarke  and  Wollas- 
ton, constantly  insisted  upon  the  fact  that  moral  and  scien- 

Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  p.  XXXIII. 

“^Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  37. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


139 


tific  truth  have  the  same  rational  characteristics  in  order 
to  show  that  all  truths  are  universal  and  objectived'*^  Say- 
ing that  it  is  reasonable  and  natural  to  do  what  is  right  does 
not  preclude  the  idea  of  reasonableness  and  naturalness  as 
the  standard  of  what  is  right,  nor  does  the  belief  that  moral 
truth  is  as  universal,  as  rational,  and  as  objective  as  scien- 
tific truth  preclude  the  possibility  of  morality  being  essen- 
tially another  kind  of  thing  from  intellectual  truthd'*^ 

Martineau  agrees  with  Wollaston  that  morality  cannot 
rest  on  the  senses.  “But  the  next  step,”  he  says,  “I  find 
impossible  to  take;  I cannot  say  that  this  exclusion  from 
the  category  of  sense  drives  the  moral  insight  into  that  of 
the  understanding.”  He  thinks  that  there  is  a middle 
ground  between  sense  and  intellect.  He  believes  that  there 
are  “intuitive  rules  of  the  will,”  which  present  themselves 
to  us  not  as  “theoretical  disclosure”  but  as  a “practical 
imperative.”  The  moral  consciousness  does  not  present  it- 
self to  us  as  “so  it  is”  but  as  “so  it  ought  to  be.”  Very 
true,  but  it  is  an  intellectual  matter  and  is  based  on  the  real 
nature  of  things  empirically  and  rationally  arrived  at.  I 
cannot  believe  that  there  is  any  middle  ground  between  sen- 
sationalism and  rationalism  in  morals.  Wollaston  recon- 
ciles the  empirical  and  rational  factors  in  knowledge  and 
says  that  both  experience  and  ratiocination  have  a part  in 
determining  what  our  duty  is.^'*®  A true  intellectualism 
will  also  treat  the  entire  sense  life  as  good  when  properly 
controlled  by  intelligence. 

Hume  says  of  Clarke  and  Wollaston:  “They  thought  it 
sufficient  if  they  could  bring  the  word  relation  into  the  argu- 
ment without  troubling  themselves  whether  it  was  to  the 
purpose  or  not.”  He  thinks  that  it  is  an  incorrect  theory 
of  morals  which  places  virtue  and  vice  in  relations,  because 
if  the  virtue  of  an  act  is  a relation,  then  “all  relations  dis- 
coverable by  reason  obtain  as  much  between  inanimate  ob- 

Rogers,  Short  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  151. 

-■“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  p.  478. 

““Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  43. 

Ibid.,  p.  45. 


140  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

jects  or  animals,  as  between  persons.”  No,  Wollaston 
would  reply,  the  same  kind  of  relations  cannot  obtain  be- 
tween mere  things  and  animals  as  obtain  between  persons 
and  things,  persons  and  animals,  and  persons  and  persons. 
The  correlatives  have  considerable  to  do  with  the  determina- 
tion of  the  relations.  Wollaston  takes  the  position  that 
breaking  drinking  glasses  is  different  from  breaking  heads 
and  that  treating  a post  as  a man  is  different  from 
treating  a man  as  a post.  He  says  in  effect  that  a 
person  must  be  one  of  the  correlatives  in  moral  relations. 

Hume  denies  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  a moral  rela- 
tion. I understand  Wollaston  to  take  the  same  position. 
It  is  not  the  relation  itself  that  determines  whether  the 
situation  be  moral  or  non-moral  but  the  things  related.  An 
act  of  man  is  moral,  immoral  or  non-moral  according  to  its 
conformity  to  the  real  nature  of  things,  including  persons 
and  God.  I cannot  see  the  force  of  the  criticism  that  this 
leaves  the  nature  of  the  moral  relation  unexplained  and  that 
the  standard  of  morality  is  either  assumed  or  still  to  be 
found. Hume  says  that  there  must  be  an  “oughtness 
relation”  in  order  for  morality  to  be  a matter  of  relations. 
And  he  thinks,  also,  that  this  relation  must  be  perceived 
by  a different  kind  of  reason.^®^  This  objection  is  based 
on  a misunderstanding  of  Wollaston,  namely,  in  regard  to 
the  distinction  between  existential  and  moral  judgments. 
The  different  thing  involved  in  the  moral  relation,  the  thing 
that  can  convert  almost  any  factual  relation  into  a moral 
relation,  is  the  clear  recognition  by  a moral  agent  of  the 
nature  and  relations  of  things  and  of  his  relation  thereto. 
Morality,  then,  from  this  point  of  view,  is  just  the  form  of 
action  which  devolves  upon  us  because  of  the  relation  of 
ourselves  to  the  rest  of  things,  because  of  the  indissoluble 
unity  of  life  and  the  world.’^^^ 

Hume  says  that  the  person  who  takes  the  property  of 
another  does  in  a manner  declare  it  to  be  his  own.  “This 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  464. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  27  and  p.  15. 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  464. 

Ibid.,  p.  467. 

““  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  50-1. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


141 


falsehood  is  the  explanation  of  injustice,  but  these  notions 
of  property  right  and  obligation  presuppose  an  antecedent 
notion  of  morality.”  Wollaston’s  explanation  only  shows 
why  any  wrong  act  is  wrong,  but  what  wrong  itself  is,  that, 
Hume  says,  is  presupposed.  So  he  is  driven  back  to  answer 
the  question  why  truth  is  virtuous  and  falsity  vicious. 

In  answer  I will  say  that  Wollaston  did  not  say  that  truth 
is  virtuous  or  falsity  vicious,  but  only  that  virtuous  acts 
are  acts  which  are  conformable  to  true  natures  and  rela- 
tions.^®^ 

Janet  says  that  if  there  were  in  nature  only  factual  rela- 
tions, “relations  of  parts  to  whole,  of  orders,  species,  law 
and  phenomena,  there  would  be  mathematical,  logical,  and 
physical  sciences,  but  there  would  be  no  moral  sciences.”  I 
cannot  see  that  Ethics  requires  relations  other  than  these, 
or  rather  that  these,  when  related  to  human  lives,  become 
ethical  relations.  Janet  follows  Malebranch  in  saying  that 
moral  science  implies  that  there  are  between  things  “rela- 
tions of  perfection,  of  dignity,  and  excellence.  ...  It  is 
because  one  thing  is  better  that  it  is  our  duty  to  prefer  it.” 
Janet  says  that  the  idea  “good  implies  that  there  is  between 
things  or  attributes,  an  order  of  quality  distinct  from  the 
order  of  quantity,  whether  mathematical  or  logical.  If  you 
suppress  the  quality  of  things,  you  suppress  all  that  renders 
one  thing  more  estimable  than  another.”  The  moral 
judgment  is  certainly  a quality  judgment,  but  is  this  quality 
not  determined  by  relations  of  truth.?  But  Janet  says  that 
“if  you  refuse  to  accept  an  objective  liierarchy  of  goods, 
nothing  remains  but  a subjective  scale  of  pleasures.” 
Wollaston  agrees  that  this  is  the  case.  He  is  as  insistent 
as  Janet  upon  the  belief  that  a true  system  of  Ethics  must 
be  objective.  He  believes  that  there  is  “an  objective 
hierarchy  of  goods”  but  thinks  that  these  are  constituted 
by  the  real  relations  of  things  and  persons  and  that  all 
relations  are  capable  of  becoming  moral  relations.^®®  The 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  462. 

^Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  9. 

Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  109. 

“"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 


142 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


mere  mathematical,  logical  and  physical  become  moral  when 
human  lives  become  involved  with  them.  There  are  between 
things  “relations  of  perfection,  of  dignity,  and  of  excel- 
lence,” but  this  does  not  mean  that  one  thing  is  per  se  better 
than  another,  that  all  depends  entirely  upon  circumstances 
and  relations.  Shakespeai*e  has  one  of  his  characters  say : 
“I  perceive  that  there  is  nothing  good  without  respect.” 
Janet  continues:  “Truth  in  general  comprises,  then,  all 

kinds  of  objective  relations:  good  concerns  only  relations 
of  perfection.”  To  this  Wollaston  would  agree  pro- 
vided he  means  that  there  can  be  morality  only  when  human 
ideals  and  human  volitions  are  involved.  Wherever  these 
are  involved  we  have  “relations  of  perfection,”  in  addition 
to  the  mathematical,  the  logical  and  the  physical  relations. 
It  is  not  true  that  there  are  any  things  that  are  always  and 
everywhere  good  or  bad,  only  their  relations  to  human  lives 
constitutes  them  good  or  bad.^®® 

Janet  grants  that  when  the  question  is  pushed  back  into 
metaphysics  the  good  and  the  true  become  the  same  kind 
of  eternal  relations.  “Can  it,  then,  be  said  that  the  good 
and  the  true  have  not  mutual  and  profound  affinities,  or 
even  that  they  do  not  flow  from  a common  source.'*  The 
good  and  the  true,  which  are  separate  in  human  vision,  must 
mingle  at  their  source.  From  the  same  origin  comes  the 
being  and  the  goodness  of  things.”  He  agrees  with  Descartes 
that  God  is  the  author  of  eternal  verities.  The  ideal  for 
man  is  not,  Janet  says,  something  foreign  to  him,  but  “it 
is  his  own  essence.  Being  born  a man,  he  ought  to  try  to 
be  a man  so  far  as  is  possible.”  To  do  tliis  often  involves 
a struggle  between  a man’s  larger  self  with  his  narrow  in- 
dividual self.  “But  the  individual  himself  has  a distinct 
essence  which  he  should  respect.”  This,  he  says,  is  our 
author’s  view  and  it  is  also  Kant’s  idea.  It  is  the  view  that 
attributes  to  the  human  personality  an  intrinsic  worth,  an 
absolute  value.  Janet  admits  that  it  is  this  worth  of  per- 
sonality which  must  constitute  the  relations  of  perfection, 
dignity,  and  excellence,  but  he  does  not  seem  to  realize  the 

Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  110. 

Ibid.,  p.  31. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


143 


implication  of  his  admission.^^®  Consistency  would  demand 
that  he  recognize  that  there  is  no  great  difference  between 
Wollaston’s  philosophy  and  his  own.  He  makes  the  good  to 
consist  in  the  coordination  of  all  ends,  which  is  precisely 
Wollaston’s  view,  who  is  very  insistent  on  the  point  that  all 
relations  must  be  considered.^®®  But  still  Janet  speaks  of 
morality  as  if  it  were  sui  genesis  saying  that  good  and  per- 
fection are  ends  for  man,  and,  he  says,  “it  would  be  more 
exact  to  define  the  end  as  being  the  good,  than  the  good  as 
being  the  end.” 

Garve  says  that  this  system  of  Wollaston  would  be  one 
of  the  most  complete  if  it  were  not  too  metaphysical  for  use, 
and  if  a moral  philosophy  is  to  set  forth  only  the  nature 
of  an  already  accepted  virtue  and  not  also  the  origin  and 
development  of  virtue  in  human  nature.  Garve  says  that 
people  had  ideas  of  virtue  long  before  any  such  criterion,  as 
conformity  to  nature,  was  proposed.  So  instead  of  this 
being  the  true  and  original  idea,  it  is  rather  a derived  and 
artificial  formula  to  which  they  attach  their  original  and 
natural  conception  of  virtue.^®^  I think  that  Garve  has 
a wrong  conception  of  the  task  of  Ethics.  I understand 
Ethics  to  be  a normative  science,  the  business  of  which  is 
to  evaluate  human  conduct,  wliich  it  must  do  in  the  light 
of  an  ideal  or  criterion  of  morality.  The  natural  history 
of  morals  is  a most  interesting  and  enlightening  study,  but 
it  belongs  rather  more  to  psychology  and  anthropology  than 
to  ethics.  Garve  criticizes  Wollaston,  also,  on  the  ground 
that  “no  man  in  acting  morally  or  immorally  is  conscious 
of  making  any  such  speculation  in  regard  to  the  moral  judg- 
ment of  his  action.  He  says  that  it  is  not  the  testimony  of 
moral  consciousness  that  his  conscience  accuses  him  of  noth- 
ing but  lack  of  veracity,  when  it  accuses  him  of  unjust  and 
treacherous  actions,  and  that  accords  approval  for  chari- 
table and  beneficent  acts  only  because  he  has  expressed  true 
propositions  thereby.”  Garve  says  that  since  this  is  true 
we  must  look  elsewhere  for  a criterion  for  what  does  not 

Janet,  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  111. 

^"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

Garve,  Ubersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  Sittenl.,  p.  171. 


144!  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

really  move  man  to  virtue  can  also  not  be  the  human  prin- 
ciple of  virtue,  “Was  aber  keinen  Menschen  zur  Tugend 
wirklich  bewegt,  das  kann  auch  nicht  das  menschliche  Prin- 
cipi  der  Tugend  sein.”  Now,  as  a matter  of  fact,  Wollas- 
ton does  not  say  that  one  makes  such  speculations  at  the 
moment  of  action.  He  only  says  that  a bad  man  in  acting 
in  a manner  unsuitable  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  things 
is  acting  in  a contradictory  manner.  He  is  not,  according 
to  Wollaston,  making  false  existential  judgments,  but  his 
actions  are  as  false  as  such  judgments, 

Brown  thinks  that  this  system  is  dependent  upon  some 
other  for  the  determination  of  virtue  and  vice.  He  says : 
“If  we  had  no  previous  notions  of  moral  good  and  evil,  no 
love  of  the  happiness  of  others  more  than  their  misery,  it 
would  be  absolutely  impossible  to  determine  whether  virtue 
or  vice  were  truth  or  falsehood.”  If  we  make  the  presup- 
position or  take  for  granted  that  it  is  the  true  nature  of 
the  child  to  love  its  parents.  Brown  says,  that,  of  course, 
we  can  say  that  when  the  child  acts  tenderly  in  its  dealing 
with  its  parent,  that  it  “treats  the  parent  according  to  his 
true  nature,”  and  that  if  his  treatment  were  unkindly,  that 
“he  would  not  be  treating  his  parent  according  to  his  true 
nature,  but  as  if  he  were  a foe,  to  whose  true  nature  such 
usage  would  be  accordant.”  So,  Brown  says,  that  Wollas- 
ton takes  virtue  for  granted  in  the  conception  of  true  nature. 
He  thinks  that  this  principle  is  worthless  and  that  it  really 
implies  another  criterion  of  virtue,  namely,  that  of  Intui- 
tionism.  Immorality  is  conduct  which  “is  false  to  nature, 
but  it  is  false  to  nature  only,  because  it  is  false  to  that 
virtue,”  which  is  “a  natural  idea”  in  the  minds  of  men.^®^ 
This  objection  can  be  made  of  any  principle  which  tries  to 
explain  morality,  but  to  denominate  virtue  “native,”  “intui- 
tive,” “immediate”  is  certainly  not  to  explain  it.  Wollaston 
dealt  with  this  type  of  ethical  theory  in  this  way;  the  dif- 
ference between  good  and  evil  cannot  be  deduced  from  the 
common  sense  of  mankind:  “For  it  is  much  to  be  suspected 

Garve,  Ubersicht  der  vornehmsten  Prin.  der  SittenJ.,  p.  175. 

“’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

Brown,  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  264. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


145 


there  are  no  such  innate  maxims  as  they  pretend,  but  that 
the  impressions  of  education  are  mistaken  for  them:  and 
besides  that,  the  sentiments  of  mankind  are  not  so  uniform 
and  constant,  as  that  we  may  safely  trust  an  important  dis- 
tinction upon  them.” 

Blakey  takes  Brown  to  task  for  his  superficial  criticism 
of  Wollaston.  How  can  anyone.  Brown  had  said,  believe 
that  parricide  is  a crime,  only  because  it  is  absurd,  “only 
for  the  same  reason  which  would  make  it  a crime  for  any 
one  to  walk  across  a room  on  his  hands  and  feet,  because 
he  would  then  be  guilty  of  the  practical  untruth  of  using 
his  hands,  not  as  if  they  were  hands,  but  as  if  they  were 
feet,  as,  in  parricide,  he  would  be  guilty  of  the  practical  un- 
truth of  treating  parents  as  robbers.”  This,  Blakey 
says,  is  a strange  misconception  of  the  reasoning  of  Wollas- 
ton. To  treat  parricide  as  no  worse  crime  than  walking 
across  the  floor  on  hands  and  feet,  “is  not  to  treat  those 
two  actions  according  to  the  nature  of  things,  or  as  being 
what  they  really  are,  but  the  contrary.”  He  mentions  the 
fact  that  Wollaston  anticipates  this  very  objection  in  his 
case  of  a man  talking  to  a post,  which  act  he  characterizes 
as  absurd  but  not  immoral. 

In  his  defence  of  Wollaston  against  the  misinterpretation 
of  Brown,  Blakey  seems  to  understand  the  position  of  Wol- 
laston, but  later  in  his  treatment  he  says  that  this  philoso- 
phy, really,  goes  back  to  an  ultimate  Intuitionism.  He 
thinks  that  man  has  a special  faculty  for  discerning  moral 
relations,  that  the  ordinary  reason  is  impotent  as  to  the 
decision  of  moral  questions.  If  this  is  really  Wollaston’s 
position,  of  course,  Blakey  is  right  in  saying  that  “this 
amounts  to  the  same  as  a moral  sense,  a moral  intuition.” 
I do  not  think,  however,  that  his  argument,  which  attempts 
to  prove  Wollaston  an  Intuitionist,  is  at  all  convincing.  He 
says  that  Wollaston  takes  the  position  that  when  a man 
performs  a given  moral  action,  that  action  bears  a certain 
relation  to  the  constitution  of  things  that  all  men  are  capable 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  34. 

Blakey,  His.  of  Moral  Science,  pp.  195-6. 

Brown,  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  364.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  15. 


146  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

of  discerning  this  relation.  How  is  this  to  be  done?  How 
are  men  to  perceive  those  relations  between  moral  actions 
and  the  natures  of  things?  Wollaston  has  not  shown,  he 
says,  “that  this  power  differs  in  any  respect  from  moral 
sense.”  Wollaston’s  idea,  according  to  Blakey,  is  that  men 
“approve  of  moral  actions  by  the  power  of  perceiving  a 
relation  between  those  actions  and  other  things,”  which  is 
certainly  a fair  characterization.^*'®  These  two  interpreta- 
tions cannot  be  reconciled  and  the  fact  is  that  the  last  one 
must  be  accepted  for  there  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  for 
the  position  that  Wollaston  believed  in  a moral  sense.  For 
Wollaston  reason  is  the  only  guide  and  he  did  not  believe 
in  any  special  moral  reason,  but,  rather  he  thinks  that  moral 
relations  are  discerned  by  the  same  reason  as  logical  and 
mathematical  relations.^®**  Wollaston  definitely  denies  that 
he  believes  in  innate  ideas  of  morality  or  in  a moral  sense. 
He  says  “They,  who  . . . deduce  the  difference  between 
good  and  evil  from  . . . certain  principles  that  are  born 
with  us,  put  the  matter  upon  a very  infirm  foot,  for  it  is 
much  to  be  suspected  there  are  no  such  innate  maxims.” 
Price  says  that  wdrich  determines  whether  an  action  is 
right  or  wrong  is  “the  truth  of  the  case,”  by  which  he  means 
“the  circumstances  and  relations  of  the  agent  and  the  ob- 
jects.” In  certain  relations  “there  is  a certain  right  thing 
to  do.  A certain  manner  of  behavior  we  approve  as  soon 
as  the  circumstances  and  relations  are  known.  What  is 
good  or  bad,  it  is  certain,  must  vary  according  to  the  dif- 
ferent natures  and  circumstances  of  beings.”  Price 
thinks  that  if  the  relations  were  otherwise  a different  kind 
of  behavior  would  be  demanded  by  the  situation,  and  this 
different  kind  of  behavior  would,  then,  be  right.  After  prac- 
tically stating  Wollaston’s  view  as  his  own.  Price  proceeds 
to  say  that  such  expressions  as  “acting  suitably  to  the 
natures  of  things,  treating  things  as  they  are,  conformity  to 
truth,  congruity  and  incongruity  between  actions  and  rela- 

Blakey,  His.  of  Moral  Science,  pp.  201-2. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  23. 

Ibid.,  p.  24. 

Price,  Questions  in  Morals,  p.  205. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


147 


tions,  have  little  meaning  if  they  are  intended  to  define 
virtue.”  These  expressions,  he  says,  “evidently  presuppose 
an  idea  of  virtue.”  Saying  that  virtue  consists  in  con- 
formity to  the  relations  of  persons  and  things  does  not  define 
virtue.  Price  says,  “and  we  will  still  have  to  tell  why  it  is 
right  to  conform  ourselves  to  these  relations.”  To  answer 
this,  he  thinks,  that  we  can  only  fall  back  on  “something 
ultimately  approved  for  which  no  justifying  reason  can  be 
assigned.”  Saying  that  virtue  is  the  conformity  of  our 
actions  to  reason  is  just  saying  “that  our  actions  are  such 
as  our  reason  discerns  to  be  right.”  Price  says  so  far  from 
conformity  to  nature  being  a guide  to  us  in  critical  situa- 
tions of  life,  as  a matter  of  fact,  when  we  cannot  determine 
what  is  right  we  are  equally  unable  to  tell  what  is  conform- 
able to  the  nature  of  tilings. He  is  saying  that  we  must 
have  a more  ultimate  criterion  than  that  of  truth  because 
we  cannot  always  discover  the  true  nature  of  things  or 
decide  just  what  conduct  is  conformable  thereto. 

Price  is  wrong  in  saying  that  a more  ultimate  definition 
of  virtue  is  implied  by  this  one  for  no  more  ultimate  con- 
ception can  be  conceived  than  that  of  conformity  to  the 
real  nature  of  things.  This  conformity  of  life  to  reality 
must  be  the  ground  of  morality  and  so  must  be  the  criterion 
of  every  view  of  Ethics.  For,  as  Wollaston  says,  “if  the 
formal  ratio  of  moral  good  and  evil  be  made  to  consist  in  a 
conformity  of  men’s  acts  to  the  truth  of  the  case  . . . the 
distinction  seems  to  be  settled  in  a manner  undeniable,  in- 
telligible, practicable.  For  as  what  is  meant  by  a true  prop- 
osition and  matter  of  fact  is  perfectly  understood  by  every- 
body.” But  Price  thinks  that  there  is  a more  ultimate 
conception  and  that  it  is  a matter  of  immediate  perception. 
He  says  that  morality  is  not  a matter  of  any  deductions  of 
reasoning;  but,  he  says,  morality  is  determined  by  the 
natures  and  relations  of  things.  “Treating  an  object  as 
being  what  it  is,  is  treating  it  as  it  is  right  such  an  object 
should  be  treated.”  Conforming  ourselves  to  truth  is  the 
same  as  doing  what  is  right  to  be  done  in  the  situation  in 

172  Price,  Questions  in  Morals,  pp.  206-7. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  25. 


148 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


which  we  find  ourselves,  and  Price  seems  to  think  that  we 
have  immediate  knowledge  as  to  what  we  ought  to  do.  He 
thinks  that  the  notion  of  right  and  wrong  is  presupposed  in 
acting  according  to  truth.  He  says  that  Wollaston  is  wrong 
in  making  his  notion  of  good  and  evil  to  consist  in  the 
“signifying  and  denying  of  timth,”  because  it  is  an  attempt 
to  reduce  “all  virtue  and  vice  to  these  particular  instances 
of  them.”  This,  he  says,  leaves  the  nature  of  them  unde- 
fined, “nor  does  he  tell  us  how  we  come  to  the  idea  that 
virtue  is  observing  truth  and  vice  the  violation  of  it.”  Price 
says  that  Wollaston  merely  takes  these  as  self-evident  truths. 
Price  agrees  that  they  are  such  but,  he  says,  “not  more  so, 
than  our  ideas  of  the  other  principles  of  morality.”  Cruelty, 
for  example,  is  for  Price  a vice  sui  genesis  and  it  cannot  be 
made  to  consist  of  the  denying  of  truth,  because  when  one 
acts  cruelly  he  may  have  “no  intention  to  deny  anything 
true.”  One  may.  Price  says,  be  said,  figuratively  speaking, 
to  contradict  truth  when  he  acts  in  a cruel  manner.”  One 
could  not,  however,  use  such  language  did  he  not  “perceive 
antecedently  to  this  application,  that  such  a manner  of  act- 
ing, in  such  circumstances,  is  wrong.”  Price  grants  that 
Wollaston  used  the  relation  in  a figurative  way,  so  the  real 
difference  between  them  is  not  this,  but  as  to  the  real  nature 
of  the  moral  judgment.  Price  makes  it  “a  simple  percep- 
tion, . . . something  ultimately  approved  for  which  no 
justifying  reason  can  be  given.”  When  virtue  is  said  to 
consist  in  the  conformity  to  the  relations  of  persons  and 
things,  one  cannot  be  said  to  have  really  defined  virtue  in 
the  sense  of  giving  a guide  to  life,  for  saying  that  virtue  is 
conformity  of  our  actions  to  reason  is  just  saying  that 
virtuous  actions  are  such  as  our  reason  discerns  to  be 
right. Wollaston  does  not  agree  with  this,  for  he  says 
the  conformity  of  our  actions  to  reason  is  precisely  what 
we  mean  by  acting  virtuously,  and  he  would  also  say  that 
we  must  use  our  reason  to  find  out  just  what  is  the  rational 
thing  to  do.^^'^ 

Price,  Questions  in  Morals,  pp.  207-8. 

Ibid.,  p.  206. 

Ibid.,  p.  209. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Paragraphs  VI  and  IX. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


149 


John  Gay  says  that  most  moralists  agree  as  “to  what 
are  virtuous  and  vicious  actions,”  that  is  as  “to  what  par- 
ticular actions  are  virtuous  and  what  otherwise,”  but  he 
says  they  differ  “very  much  . . . conceiming  the  criterion 
of  virtue,”  He  says  that  some  “have  placed  it  in  acting 
agreeably  to  nature,  or  reason;  , . . others  in  conformity 
with  truth ; others  in  promoting  the  common  good ; others 
in  the  will  of  God,  etc.”  Now,  he  thinks,  that  this  agree- 
ment as  to  what  particular  actions  are  right  and  wrong, 
along  with  this  great  disagreement  concerning  the  criterion 
of  morality,  makes  one  suspect,  “either  that  they  had  a 
different  criterion”  or  “that  all  of  them  have  the  same 
criterion  in  reality.”  He  takes  the  latter  view  saying  that 
they  all  have  the  same  ultimate  standard  and  that  this  is 
that  of  acting  agreeably  to  the  will  of  God,  Because  God 
is  infinitely  good  “he  could  have  no  other  design  in  creating 
mankind  than  their  happiness,”  consequently  my  own  duty 
consists  in  “promoting  the  happiness  of  mankind.  How 
shall  I know  what  is  for  the  happiness  of  mankind  He 
says  that  “this  is  to  be  known  only  from  the  relations  of 
things.” 

Gay  takes  Wollaston’s  criterion  of  virtue  and  makes  it 
his  criterion  of  happiness.  He  asks  how  one  is  to  discover 
what  does  conform  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  things, 
and  he  answers  “either  from  experience  or  reason.”  So  he 
agrees  with  Wollaston  as  to  the  method  of  ascertaining 
truth  and  the  nature  of  the  actions  that  are  conformable 
thereto.  “Thus  the  criterion”  of  conformability  to  the 
nature  of  things  “may  in  general  be  said  to  be  reason ; which 
reason,  when  exactly  conformable  to  the  things  existing, 
i.  e.,  when  it  judges  of  things  as  they  are,  is  called  right 
reason.”  He  gets  very  near  to  Wollaston’s  position 
when  he  says  that  we  speak  “of  the  reason  of  things,”  mean- 
ing “that  relation  which  we  should  find  by  our  reason,  if 
our  reason  was  right.”  He  says  that  “reason,”  “truth,” 
“conformity  to  relations,”  “fitness  and  unfitness  of  things,” 

Gay,  Concerning  the  Fundamental  Prins.  of  Virtue,  Brit.  Moralists, 
pp.  270-2. 

Ibid.,  p.  273. 


150  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

“the  happiness  of  mankind” ; “may  in  some  sense  be  said  to 
be  criteria  of  virtue;  but  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
they  are  only  remote  criteria  of  it ; being  gradually  subor- 
dinate to  its  immediate  and  proper  criterion,  the  will  of 
God.”  Wollaston  would  answer  that  virtue  is  acting 
confonnably  with  the  will  of  God  but  that  this  is  revealed 
to  us  in  the  very  nature  of  things.  In  discussing  the  idea 
of  Plato  that  virtue  is  “likeness  to  God”  Wollaston  says 
that  such  likeness  can  be  attained  only  by  “the  practice  of 
truth,  God  being  truth,  and  doing  nothing  contrary  to 
it.”  Again,  he  says,  the  great  law  of  natural  religion, 
“the  law  of  nature  or  the  Author  of  natui’e,  is,  that  every 
intelligent,  active,  and  free  being  should  so  behave  himself, 
as  by  no  act  to  contradict  truth;  or,  that  he  should  treat 
everything  as  being  what  it  is.”  Instead  of  admitting 
that  Gay  is  right  in  his  position  that  every  ethical  standard 
can  be  reduced  finally  to  that  of  conformity  to  the  will  of 
God,  I would  say,  rather,  that  Gay  is  compelled  to  use  the 
criterion  of  conformity  to  truth  in  order  to  give  any  mean- 
ing to  his  criterion.  This  means  that  conformity  to  nature 
is  his  real  criterion  for,  like  Wollaston,  when  he  asks  “Lord 
what  would  Thou  have  me  do.^”  he  can  get  no  other  answer 
than  that  of  Wollaston’s  principle  of  conformity  to  the 
nature  of  things.  He  admits  that  God’s  will  is  revealed  in 
the  nature  of  things.  Man’s  duty,  he  says,  is  to  promote 
“the  happiness  of  mankind,”  and  what  this  is  can  “be  known 
only  from  the  relations  of  things.” 

V.  Ckiticism 

THAT  Wollaston’s  system  is  over  intellectualistic 

This  criticism  is  that  Wollaston’s  system  is  exclusively 
intellectualistic  and  that  it  neglects  the  proper  considera- 
tion of  feeling  as  the  real  dynamic  of  moral  action.  I do 
not  believe  that  this  criticism  can,  with  justice,  be  made 

““Gay,  Fundamental  Prins.  of  Virtue,  Sec.  V,  p.  374. 
lei  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  34. 

Ibid.,  Sec.  I,  Paragraphs  X and  XI. 

Gay,  Fundamental  Prins.  of  Virtue,  Sections  I and  II. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


151 


against  his  system  of  Ethics.  It  is  true  that  his  criterion 
is  based  upon  reason,  rather  than  upon  feeling,  but  he  also 
insists  that  everything  is  to  be  considered.  It  is  reasonable 
to  consider  happiness  and  other  feelings,  so  these  must  go 
into  the  motivation  of  the  man  who  is  trying  to  do  the  moral 
thing  and  not  alone  the  rationality  of  things.  An  objective 
standard  of  morals  is  one  that  is  based  on  the  nature  of 
things,  which  is  learned  through  experience.  Moral  rela- 
tions are  dependent  upon  real  relations  and  the  moral  law 
is  that  everything  is  to  be  treated  as  what  it  is.  Feelings 
are  included  in  this  catalogue. 

In  his  defence  of  the  thesis  “Moral  distinctions  are  not 
derived  from  reason,”  Hume  takes  occasion  to  criticize 
Wollaston  severely  as  the  most  outstanding  defender  of 
the  opposite  thesis.  He  says  that  “there  are  in  men’s  minds 
two  kinds  of  things,  namely,  impressions  and  ideas.”  This 
distinction,  he  says,  gives  rise  to  the  ethical  question  as  to 
whether  our  distinctions  of  right  and  wrong,  are  based  on 
the  senses  or  on  reason.  Hume  takes  the  position  that 
philosophers,  like  Wollaston,  affirm  that  virtue  is  but  the 
conformity  of  actions  to  reason  and  that  morality,  like 
truth,  is  “discerned  merely  by  ideas.”  Now,  says  Hume, 
“in  order  to  judge  of  these  systems,  we  need  only  consider 
whether  it  be  possible,  from  reason  alone,  to  distinguish 
between  moral  good  and  evil,  or  whether  there  must  concur 
with  some  other  principles  to  enable  us  to  make  that  distinc- 
tion.” He  thinks  that  reason  can  indicate  the  means  of  at- 
taining a desired  end,  but  it  cannot  itself  determine  that 
end.  Reason,  he  further  objects,  is  powerless  to  move  the 
person  to  moral  action,  and  “can  never  be  the  source  of 
so  active  a principle  as  a conscience  or  a sense  of  morals.” 
He,  therefore,  concludes  that  the  principles  of  morality 
cannot  be  “conclusions  of  the  reasons.” 

Reason,  Hume  argues,  has  to  do  only  with  truth  and 
truth  consists  of  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas  to 
ideas  and  to  real  existence.  Now,  actions  and  volitions  can 
have  no  such  relations  “ ’Tis  impossible,  therefore,  they 
can  be  pronounced  either  true  or  false,  and  be  either  con- 
Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  pp.  413-18  and  456-7. 


152 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


trary  or  conformable  to  reason.”  Literally  speaking,  he 
is  right,  and  Wollaston  agrees  with  him  on  that  point.  As 
has  been  shown,  at  length,  Wollaston  does  not  identify 
morality  and  truth,  but  just  takes  the  position  that  morality 
is  conformity  of  life  to  the  real  nature  of  things  and  is  as 
true  as  is  the  conformity  of  thought  to  the  real  nature  of 
things.^*®  Hume  goes  on  to  say  that : “Actions  do  not 
derive  their  merit,  nor  their  blame  from  a contrariety  to 
it.  Moral  distinctions  are  not  the  offspring  of  reason.” 

He  says  that  reason  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  offer  either 
moral  blame  or  approbation.  The  reason  can  only  judge 
betw'een  a question  of  fact  or  of  relations  and  there  is  a 
great  difference  between  a question  of  fact  and  one  of  right. 
He  takes  as  an  example,  a case  of  ingratitude,  and  asks 
how  it  can  be  shown  by  reason  alone  that  ingratitude  is  im- 
moral and  “wherein  the  crime  consists  Wollaston 

might  very  easily  ask  Hume  how  he  is  to  show  “wherein  the 
crime  consists”  by  any  faculty  other  than  that  of  reason, 
for  Hume  grants  that  only  the  reason  is  capable  of  judging 
facts  and  relations. 

He  tries,  further,  to  show  the  impotency  of  reason  as  a 
moral  guide,  by  saying  that  “there  is  the  same  contrariety 
in  returning  good  for  evil  as  in  returning  evil  for  good,  and 
yet  the  moral  aspect  is  entirely  different.”  This  means,  he 
thinks,  that  moral  distinctions  cannot  rest  on  the  reason, 
but  they  must  depend  “on  some  internal  sense  or  feeling 
which  nature  has  made  universal  in  the  whole  species.^®® 
Wollaston  has  an  entire  division  devoted  to  answering  this 
very  objection.  He  says  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
consider  a thing  in  all  its  relations  before  we  can  pass  a 
correct  moral  judgment.  He  takes  the  case  of  riding  a 
stolen  horse.  A man  who  rides  a stolen  horse  both  conforms 
to  reality  and  violates  the  nature  of  things.  So,  Wollaston 
says,  that  a consideration  of  all  relations  would  show  that 
returning  good  for  evil  conforms  to  the  larger  relations  and 

Ibid.,  p.  457. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 

Ibid.,  p.  458. 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  p.  458. 

““  Hume,  Inquiry  Concerning  the  Prins.  of  Morals,  App.,  Sec.  I. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


153 


so  is  conformable  to  the  bigger  truth  and  the  more  impor- 
tant natures  and  relations.^®®  There  is,  this  principle  would 
admit,  some  contrariety  in  returning  good  for  evil,  but  in 
the  returning  of  evil  for  good  one  acts  contrary  to  the  larger 
truth,  one  acts  in  violation  of  the  more  essential  life  rela- 
tions. 

Wollaston  anticipates  this  criticism  of  Hume  in  his  case 
of  a man  treating  an  enemy  as  an  enemy.  He  says  “If 
everything  must  be  treated  as  being  what  it  is,  what  rare 
work  will  follow.?  For  to  treat  my  enemy  as  such  is  to 
kill  him,  or  revenge  myself  soundly  upon  him.  . . . To  this 
it  is  easy  to  reply  from  what  has  been  already  said.  For  if 
. . . the  enemy  . . . was  nothing  more  than  an  enemy, 
there  might  be  some  force  to  the  objection;  but  since  he 
may  be  considered  as  something  else  besides  that,  he  must 
be  used  according  to  what  he  is  in  other  respects,  as  well 
as  in  that  from  which  he  is  denominated  my  enemy.  For 
my  enemy  in  the  first  place  is  a man ; and  as  such  may  claim 
the  benefit  of  common  humanity.”  Not  only  is  he  a man 
and  so  demanding  to  be  treated  as  such  but  he  is  also  a 
citizen  and  so  as  such  should  not  be  punished  without  due 
process  of  law.  If  truth,  therefore,  be  observed,  the  result 
will  be  this  “I  must  treat”  my  enemy  “as  something  com- 
pounded of  a man,  a fellow-citizen,  and  an  enemy,  all  three; 
that  is  I must  only  prosecute  him  in  such  a way,  as  is  agree- 
able to  the  statutes  and  methods,  wliich  society”  has  estab- 
lished.^®^ 

Blakey  says  that  Wollaston’s  principle,  that  when  a man 
acts  virtuously  his  actions  are  in  confonnity  with  the 
nature  of  things,  is  capable  of  being  understood  in  two 
ways.  It  may,  he  says,  merely  state  that,  as  a matter  of 
fact,  the  virtuous  actions  of  mankind  are  in  conformity 
with  the  nature  of  things.  It  may  mean,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  ideal  of  moral  obligations  is  derived  from  the  per- 
ception of  this  conformity  between  moral  actions  and  the 
nature  of  things.  Blakey  says  that  it  is  not  at  all  clear 
whether  Wollaston  means  to  say  that  the  conception  of  this 

““Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

““  Ibid.,  p.  24. 


154  The  Ethics  of  William  W ollaston 

conformity  is  the  reason  why  men  act  virtuously,  or  merely 
the  source  of  their  notions  of  moral  relations.  He  says  that 
it  is  inconceivable,  though,  that  the  mere  perception  of  con- 
formity between  actions  and  things  could  possess  the  power 
to  prompt  one  to  moral  action.  In  a word,  he  criticizes 
Wollaston’s  system  on  the  grund  that  it  is  merely  intellectual 
and  consequently  has  no  dynamic.  “If  I fly  to  the  succor  of 
my  child  in  distress,  can  my  sympathy  be  said  to  be  moved, 
or  my  sense  of  duty  awakened,  by  viewing  an  agreement 
between  the  hitherto  unperformed  act  of  rendering  assist- 
ance and  the  nature  of  things?  Certainly  not.” 

Blakey,  very  properly,  says  that  the  principal  part  of 
Wollaston’s  moral  theory  rests  upon  the  third  proposition 
of  the  first  section,  “A  true  proposition  may  be  denied,  or 
things  may  be  denied  to  he  what  they  are,  by  deeds  as  well 
as  by  express  words,”  but  I am  not  at  all  sure  that  he  gets 
Wollaston’s  point,  that  things  may  be  affirmed  or  contra- 
dicted by  practice.  Blakey  takes  the  same  view  as  to  the 
impotence  of  the  intellect  as  does  Hume  “It  shows  the  dif- 
ferent paths  and  the  direction  to  take,  but  it  does  not  choose 
one  path  rather  than  another.”  Wollaston  says  that 
man  possesses  intelligence  and  freedom  of  will.  It  may  be 
asked  if  Ethics  has  not  accomplished  its  task  when  it  has 
shown  us  what  our  duty  is,  and  assured  us  that  we  are  free 
to  do  our  duty?  That  Wollaston  is  somewhat  deficient 
as  to  the  psychology  of  feeling  and  volition  I would  gladly 
admit,  but  I cannot  see  that  that  constitutes  a criticism 
of  his  ethical  criterion.  The  psychology  of  action  is  one 
thing,  the  ethics  of  action  is  quite  another.  The  first  is  a 
descriptive,  a matter  of  fact,  study;  the  second  is  a study 
of  norms,  a study  of  criteria  of  conduct.  Wollaston  was 
a moralist,  primarily,  and  was  interested  mainly  in  the 
normative  study. 

The  faculty  of  reason  is  impotent,  says  Hutcheson,  “not 
being  able  either  to  justify  or  to  condemn.  Those  who 

Blakey,  His.  of  Moral  Science,  p.  192. 

Ibid.,  p.  193. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

Ibid.,  Sections  III  and  IV. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


155 


identify  moral  goodness  and  conformity  to  truth  uncon- 
sciously employ  the  moral  sense  criterion.”  Hutcheson 
says  that  it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that  there  “is  a natural 
and  immediate  criteria  of  morality,  a sense  or  instinct,  for 
it  is  inconceivable  that  God  should  have  made  us  so  that  we 
would  be  left  at  the  mercy  of  the  slow  and  uncertain  proc- 
esses of  reason.”  By  the  use  of  his  reason  Hutcheson 
tries  to  prove  that  the  reason  is  incompetent  to  decide  moral 
matters  and  impotent  to  move  one  to  act  morally.  He 
admits,  however,  that  we  must  depend  upon  the  reason  to 
supply  all  the  meaning  and  content,  and  to  suggest  all  the 
means  towards  the  attainment  of  the  moral  end.^®^  The 
question  might  well  be  asked  just  what  function  the  moral 
sense  or  instinct  performs  in  the  moral  life.^  It  is  granted 
that  it  is  a blind  guide  in  the  sense  that  it  must  depend 
upon  the  ordinary  knowing  processes  for  all  its  knowledge 
and  upon  the  reason  for  suggestions  as  to  just  what  should 
be  done  in  any  given  life  situation.  If  the  intellect  is  to 
tell  us  what  we  ought  to  do,  if  that  is  admitted  to  be  a 
matter  of  judgment,  what  is  the  use  of  a power  that  can 
only  tell  us  to  do  our  duty  when  we  find  out  what  it  is.f* 
Why  not  make  the  other  a matter  of  reason  also.'*  Is  the 
moral  sense  a blind  giant  carrying  on  his  back  a lame  in- 
tellect who  can  see.^  One  certainly  gets  that  impression 
of  the  moral  faculty  from  the  writings  of  the  intuitionists. 
Wollaston  thinks  that  no  endowment  is  necessary  to  make 
one  a moral  being.  The  possession  of  reason,  of  intelligence, 
alone,  is  sufficient  explanation.  An  intelligent  being  will 
inevitably  perceive  the  natures  and  relations  of  things  and 
his  own  connection  therewith.  He  will  naturall}^  and  neces- 
sarily perceive  that  his  actions  should  conform  to  the 
natures  and  relations.^®® 

Leslie  Stephen  says  that,  in  a sense,  the  universe  is  rea- 
sonable throughout.  The  fall  of  a stone  is  as  reasonable 
as  the  working  of  a logician’s  brain.  From  this  point  of 
view,  every  conceivable  event  is  reasonable,  therefore  no  kind 

^“Hutcheson,  System  of  Moral  Philosophy,  pp.  56-8  and  272. 

Inquiry  into  the  Origin  of  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtue,  p.  195. 

“®WoUaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Par.  Ill,  and  Sec.  III. 


156  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

of  conduct  can  be  considered  more  reasonable  than  any 
other.  In  another  sense  only  the  conduct  of  a being  capable 
of  knowing  what  he  is  doing  is  reasonable.  “We  may  say 
that  a man  is  reasonable  in  so  far  as  reason  controls  his 
passions.  And  again  we  call  a man  reasonable,  in  propor- 
tion as  he  apprehends  certain  general  principles,  and  as 
they  affect  his  conduct.”  Stephen  says  “Reasoning  and 
feeling  are  bound  together  in  an  inseparable  unity.  Every 
choice  is  a struggle  between  passions  involving  more  or  less 
reasoning,  but  not  resolvable  into  an  emotionless  process. 
Every  moral  struggle  has,  not  feeling  on  one  side  and  reason 
on  the  other,  as  is  often  supposed,  but  feeling  and  reason 
on  both  sides,  or  there  could  be  no  struggle.”  He  says 
that  the  mere  intellectual  perception  could  have  no  effect 
on  a man  tempted  to  drink  “if  the  sense  of  duty  and  love 
of  family  did  not  represent  a strong  fund  of  emotion 
capable  of  being  called  into  vigorous  operation.”  Wol- 
laston would  not  be  disposed  to  deny  this.  This  would  all 
be  involved  in  a full  and  complete  consideration  of  the 
natures  of  things.  A man  is,  what.^  Why,  in  this  case,  the 
husband  of  a loving  wife,  etc.  Even  though  we  grant  the 
impotence  of  the  “mere  intellectual  perception”  of  what 
one  ought  to  do,  what  is  established  thereby  with  reference 
to  truth  or  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things  as  the 
criterion  of  virtue.^  Nothing,  because  a criterion  has  per- 
formed its  function  when  it  has  prescribed  the  appropriate 
conduct  in  any  given  life  situation. 

Leslie  Stephen  says  that  reason  can  make  anything  seem 
consistent  to  our  prejudiced  minds.  Perhaps  so,  but  are 
we  not  even  more  likely  to  be  prejudiced  through  feeling 
tlian  through  i-eason.^  “To  give  a merely  formal  consistency 
to  my  conduct,  it  is  sufficient  that  this  cause  should  become 
a reason ; that  the  motives  by  which  I am  actually  deter- 
mined should  be  represented  in  the  general  rules  which  I 
frame.  If  hatred  to  the  red-haired  actually  influences  me, 
I have  only  to  dislike  the  red-haired  man  in  theory  to  make 

““  I>.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  p.  56. 

L.  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethics,  pp.  58-66, 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


157 


my  conduct  consistent.”  Wollaston  would  answer  this 
by  saying  that  a certain  limited  consistency  would  char- 
acterize such  conduct,  but  that  moral  conduct  means  actions 
that  are  in  entire  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things.  He 
insists,  in  this  connection,  upon  the  necessity  of  considering 
things  in  all  relations.  He  says  that  “any  thing  . . . must 
be  considered  not  only  ...  in  one  respect,  but  . . . the 
whole  description  of  the  thing  ought  to  be  taken  in.” 
Again  he  says  “all  truths  are  consistent,  nor  can  anything 
be  true  any  further  than  it  is  compatible  with  other  things 
that  are  true.”  It  is  not  consistent  with  all  life  and 
world  relations  for  me  to  hate  the  red-haired  and  such  con- 
duct is  therefore  wrong.  Wollaston  considers  this  objection 
to  the  criterion  of  truth  in  the  case  of  the  proper  treatment 
of  an  enemy.  I do  conform  to  a small  segment  of  truth, 
says  Wollaston,  when  I mistreat  my  enemy  but  I violate  a 
world  of  truth  by  so  doing.  So  to  hate  the  red-haired  I make 
my  conduct  consistent  with  a small  segment  of  life’s  circle 
but  it  is  inconsistent  and  immoral  behavior,  because 
it  neglects  to  consider  the  red-haired  man  in  all  rela- 
tions.^®^ 

Leslie  Stephen  takes  a position  like  that  of  Wollaston’s 
contemporary  critic,  John  Clarke,  which  position  is  an  abso- 
lute denial  of  the  entire  objective  point  of  view  in  Ethics. 
They  hold  that  the  motive  alone  determines  the  morality  of 
an  act.  John  Clarke  said  that  “in  order  to  a person’s 
affirming  or  denying  the  truth,  an  intention  to  affinn  or  deny 
is  required,  without  which  he  cannot  be  said  to  affirm  or 
deny  it.  . . . It  matters  not,  what  notions  or  propositions 
his  words  or  actions  may  naturally  excite  in  the  minds  of 
those  that  hear  the  one,  or  see  the  other;  if  he  himself  had 
no  such  propositions  in  his  own  mind,  had  no  intentions 
of  communicating  any  such  propositions  to  others,  he  can- 
not in  any  propriety  of  language  be  said  to  affirm  or  deny 

L.  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethics,  p.  66. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  19  and  24. 

Ibid.,  p.  25. 

Ibid.,  p.  24. 


158 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


them.”  Leslie  Stephen  says  that  a man  who  gives  to  the 
pool’  conforms  externally  to  the  rule  dictated  by  charity, 
but  his  act  is  not  charitable  unless  his  motives  are  those  of 
sympathy.  This  proves,  he  thinks,  that  motives  and  not 
external  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things  determine  the 
morality  of  an  act.^*^®  How  would  our  author  answer  this 
objection.^  He  would  say  that  both  right  motive  and  con- 
formity to  the  situation  are  required  to  constitute  an  act 
completely  conformable  to  the  natures  of  things.  Just  as 
everything  enters  into  the  motivation  of  the  act  so  every- 
thing enters  into  the  evaluation  of  the  act.  Wollaston  does 
not  deny  that  motive  is  an  important  factor  in  the  evalua- 
tion. It  is  true  that  his  standard  is  that  of  conformity  to 
the  nature  of  things,  that  he  insists  that  “if  things  are  but 
fairly  permitted  to  speak  for  themselves  . . . they  will  pro- 
claim their  own  rectitude  or  obliquity”;  but  it  is  just  as 
true  that  he  insists  that  “That  act  which  may  be  denomi- 
nated morally  good  or  evil,  must  be  the  act  of  a being 
capable  of  distinguishing,  choosing,  and  acting  for  himself ; 
or  more  briefly  of  an  intelligent  and  free  agent,  because  in 
proper  speaking  no  act  at  all  can  be  ascribed  to  that,  which 
is  not  indued  with  these  capacities.”  Why  this  insist- 
ence upon  intelligence  if  he  does  not  regard  motive  as  an 
all-important  factor  in  evaluation.^  Wollaston  goes  further 
and  says  that  for  an  act  to  be  a moral  act  “it  must  be  the 
act  of  an  agent”  and  that  he  must  act  “from  an  internal 
principle.” 

Irons  offers  the  criticism  that  this  system  “attempts  to 
eliminate  the  feeling  and  the  will  from  the  sphere  of  action, 
and  moral  obligation  from  morality.”  He  grants  that  rea- 
son “is  a light  which  guides  our  steps,  but  not  the  power 
which  makes  us  move.”  It  might  be  asked,  if  it  is  not  the 
exclusive  business  of  a moral  standard  “to  guide  our  steps,” 
to  enlighten ; and  if  this  is  true  can  'Nationalism  in  Ethics 
be  said  to  have  failed  only  because  it  is  impotent  to  make 

““  J.  Clarke,  Exam,  of  the  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil  in  the  “Reli.  of 
Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  9. 

L.  Stephen,  Science  of  Ethic.s,  p.  311. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  7. 

““Ibid.,  p.  8. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


159 


men  do  what  they  know  they  ought  to  do?  But  Irons  next 
proceeds  to  criticize  the  system  of  Wollaston  on  the  ground 
that  it  makes  of  reason  not  only  the  faculty  which  perceives 
moral  relations,  but  also  the  impulse  by  means  of  which  they 
are  realized  in  action.^®®  Surely  Irons  would  not  deny  that 
when  a man  acts  morally  his  will  is  guided  and  determined 
by  intelligence.  Wollaston  does  not  deny  the  place  of  feel- 
ing and  will  in  morality.  The  feeling  accompanying  the 
thought  when  we  make  a mere  existential  judgment  is  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  accompanies  thoughts  of  personal 
duty  and  responsibility,  nevertheless  it  is  the  natures  and 
relations  of  things  which  constitute  the  moral  situation  and 
the  moral  obligation.  Yet,  he  would  say,  with  Clarke,  “the 
faculty  which  determines  what  things  are,  determines  what 
ought  to  be.”  But  this  does  not  mean  the  identification 
of  the  two  processes,  as  Irons  thinks.  The  position  is  not 
that : “The  same  faculty  which  decides  in  regard  to  the  law 
of  right  supplies  the  dynamic  force  which  is  necessary  for 
the  realization  of  the  law.”  Clarke  and  Wollaston  do 
not  rule  out  feeling  as  the  dynamic  nor  the  fiat  of  the  will. 
But  since  morality  must  not  be  individual  and  subjective 
and  since  the  feelings  are  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  criterion  of  morality  cannot  be  based  on  the  feel- 
ings. It  is  reason  which  constitutes  the  universal  in  man, 
consequently  morality  must  be  grounded  on  the  reason.^^^ 
Morality  when  so  conceived  is  objective,  because  the  reason 
in  the  individual  man  is  but  the  conformity  of  thought  to 
the  real  nature  of  things. 

Simmel  takes  the  position  that  “the  notion  of  good  and 
evil  is  a merely  subjective  category,  possessing  no  objec- 
tivity.” Rashdall  undertakes  to  refute  this  position.  He 
asks,  how  can  we  tell  that  the  notion  of  duty  is  not  a mere 
emotion  as  Simmel  claims?  He  answers,  in  the  same  way 
that  I know  that  the  judgment,  six  is  greater  than  four,  is 
no  mere  feeling.  We  have,  says  Rashdall,  the  same  reason 

Irons,  Rationalism  in  Mod.  Ethics,  Phil.  Rv.,  vol.  XII,  p.  86. 

“’Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  86. 

“ Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Ph.  Rv.,  vol.  XII,  p.  141. 

“’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  45-6. 

Ibid.,  pp.  50-1. 


160  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

for  believing  in  the  objectivity  validity  of  moral  conscious- 
ness, as  we  have  for  supposing  that  the  proposition  two 
and  two  make  four  is  objectively  true.  The  notion  of  duty, 
he  thinks,  is  as  inexpugnable  a notion  of  the  human  mind 
as  the  notions  of  quantity  or  cause  and  we  have  as  much 
reason  to  believe  in  the  validity  of  our  moral  judgments,  as 
we  have  for  confidence  in  the  validity  of  those  other  cate- 
gories.” Rashdall  believes  that  moral  judgments  are  the 
work  of  reason  and  that  there  are  such  things  as  self-evident 
moral  judgments.  “The  real  ethical  judgment,”  he  says, 
“is  the  judgment  of  value  which  affirms  that  such  and  such 
things  are  good.”  They  must  come  from  “the  rational  or 
intellectual  part  of  our  nature,”  for  they  “represent  one 
particular  activity  of  the  same  self  which  gives  us  the  funda- 
mental intellectual  truths.”  His  answer  to  Simmel  is  very 
much  the  same  answer  that  Wollaston  makes  to  that  type 
of  moral  theory,  and  his  idea  of  the  moral  judgment  is  very 
much  the  same  as  that  of  Wollaston,  namely,  the  discern- 
ment of  the  really  congruous  act  in  any  life  situation.^^^ 
Irons  says  that  all  purposive  action  is  to  make  things 
different  from  what  they  are,  consequently  we  could  better 
define  morality  by  saying  that  it  is  “the  effort  to  make 
things  other  than  they  are.”  The  question  for  Ethics,  then 
is : what  is  the  ideal  which  ought  to  be  actualized  in  the 
world  Irons  says  that  reason  cannot  answer  this  question, 
consequently  rationalism  as  the  method  of  Ethics  must  be 
abandoned.  It  is  not  true  that  in  the  moral  world  things 
of  every  kind  are  now  treated  according  to  their  true  nature, 
as  Irons  thinks.  He  says  that  to  treat  everything  as  that 
which  it  is  cannot  be  denominated  moral  because  it  is  nat- 
ural to  treat  things  in  that  way.  He  thinks  that  morality 
belongs  to  the  world  that  ought  to  be,  not  to  the  world  that 
is.  The  identification  of  truth  and  goodness  would  result 
in  the  annihilation  of  the  ideal  world.  Irons  thinks.  This, 
Wollaston  would  gladly  admit,  but  he  would  say  that  an 
intellectual  system  of  morals  need  not  identify  the  intel- 
lectual and  the  moral.  As  I have  tried  to  show  Wollaston 

Simmel,  Einleitung  in  die  Moralwissenschaft,  vol.  II,  p.  347.  Rash- 
dall, Is  Conscience  an  Emotion?  p.  36  ff. 


Wollaston  and  His  Critics 


161 


certainly  does  not  identify  the  two.  Irons  says  that  the 
identification  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  would  annihilate 
the  ideal  world,  because  reason  deals  with  that  w'hich  is  and 
that  only,  so  the  rules  of  conduct  prescribed  by  the  reason 
must  be  limited  in  the  same  way.  If  we  act  according  to 
reason  alone,  we  must  act  in  accordance  with  things  as  they 
are,  and  Wollaston,  Irons  says,  did  not  hesitate  to  define 
the  whole  duty  of  man  as  treating  things  as  they  are.^^^ 

Wollaston  denies  that  the  moral  ideal  of  truth,  or  that 
of  acting  conformably  with  the  real  natures  of  things,  is 
the  annihilation  of  the  ideal  world.  The  whole  duty  of  man 
does  consist  in  living  a life  every  act  of  wliich  is  consistent 
and  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things,  but  Wollaston 
insists  that  the  ideal  life  is  that  kind  of  life.  If  everything 
was  treated  as  that  which  it  is,  the  world  that  is  would  be 
the  world  that  ought  to  bo.  If  God,  man,  beast,  bird  were 
so  considered,  then  would  this  world  be  an  ideal  world.  It 
is  certain  that  the  ideal  cannot  be  realized  by  disregarding 
the  actual,  but  only  by  living  truly  which  can  only  mean 
acting  conformably  to  the  natures  and  relations  of  things. 
Clarke  well  expresses  this  conception  of  the  ideal  of  life  by 
saying  that  virtue  consists  in  considering  things  to  be  what 
they  are  and  that  vice  consists  in  “the  endeavor  to  make 
things  to  be  what  they  are  not  and  cannot  be.”  I do 
not  understand  this  to  be  a static  view  of  life  and  the  woidd. 
Things  may  very  well  be  different  each  moment  and  for  each 
person  in  all  the  world,  but  things  are  always  as  they  are 
and  our  duty  as  free  rational  beings  is  to  be  found  by  truly 
conforming  our  lives  to  the  natures  of  things.  Wollaston 
thus  expresses  it : “In  view  of  the  eternal  and  necessary 
relations  which  exist  between  things,  reason  lays  an  obliga- 
tion upon  us;  but  what  is  this  obligation.'*  simply  that  our 
actions  be  in  conformity  with  these  eternal  and  necessary 
relations.”  Our  entire  duty  is,  then,  “that  we  should 
act  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  things.” 

Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Rv.,  Vol.  12,  p.  142. 

^“Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  66. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  Sec.  I,  Paragraph  X. 


A CRITICAL  EXPOSITION  OF  WOLLASTON’S  SEC- 
TION ON  HAPPINESS 


I 

EXPOSITION  OF  SECTION  II  “OF  HAPPINESS” 

“That  which  demands  to  be  next  considered,  is  happi- 
ness ; as  being  in  itself  most  considerable ; as  abetting  the 
cause  of  truth;  and  as  being  indeed  so  nearly  allied  to  it, 
that  they  cannot  well  be  parted.  We  cannot  pay  the 
respect  due  to  one,  unless  we  regard  the  other.  Happi- 
ness must  not  be  denied  to  be  what  it  is ; and  it  is  by  the 
practice  of  truth  that  we  aim  at  that  happiness,  which  is 
true.”  Wollaston  says  that  a being  may  be  said  to  be 
happy  the  sum  total  of  whose  pleasures  exceeds  the  sum 
total  of  his  pain.  “To  make  itself  happy,”  Wollaston  says, 
“is  a duty,  which  every  being,  in  proportion  to  its  capacity, 
owes  to  itself ; and  that,  which  every  intelligent  being  may 
be  supposed  to  aim  at  in  general.”  ^ This,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted, when  taken  alone,  reads  like  Hedonism.  And  we 
can  admit  that  Wollaston  does  rank  happiness  very  high 
among  the  hierarchy  of  the  real  and  true  things  of  life. 
It  is  not  true,  however,  as  some  have  thought,  that  he  con- 
sidered happiness  as  the  end  and  truth  only  as  the  means 
to  that  end.  It  is  not  time  to  his  teachings  to  define  Wol- 
laston’s system  as  the  search  of  happiness  by  the  practice 
of  truth.^  Wollaston  does,  in  the  metaphysical  portion 
of  his  treatise,  profess  his  faith  in  the  rationality  of  the 
universe  and  so  his  belief  in  the  ultimate  coincidence  of 
truth  and  happiness;  and,  from  that  point  of  view,  says 
that  Natural  Religion  may  be  regarded  “as  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  by  the  practice  of  reason  and  truth.”  ® This  is 

'Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  37. 

' Anon.,  Art.  Wollaston,  in  Britannica. 

® Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  52. 

162 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  163 

the  basis  of  Hurst’s  statement  that  his  “creed  was  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness  by  the  practice  of  reason  and  truth.”  ^ 
It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  one  who  takes  the  intel- 
lectual attitude  towards  morals,  as  does  Wollaston,  should 
give  so  much  attention  to  happiness.  I think  that  the  ex- 
planation is  to  be  found  partly  in  the  historic  situation, 
and  partly  in  the  fact  that  an  objective  system  of  morality 
must  regard  human  happiness  as  of  the  highest  importance. 
Many  of  his  predecessors  and  contemporary  ethical  writers 
sought  to  find  in  happiness  the  criterion  of  morality.  Wol- 
laston grants  that  the  consideration  is  of  the  highest  im- 
portance, but  he  denies  that  it  alone  can  be  the  criterion. 
Happiness,  like  everything  else,  must  be  treated  as  what  it 
is.  “We  cannot,”  says  Wollaston,  “act  with  respect  to 
either  ourselves,  or  other  men,  as  being  what  we  are  and 
they  are,  unless  both  are  considered  as  being  susceptive  of 
happiness  and  unhappiness.”  This,  however,  is  not  all  that 
must  be  considered,  as  Hedonism  teaches,  but  happiness  is 
only  one  of  the  things  that  must  be  considered  in  treating 
men  as  what  they  are.  So  far  from  happiness  being  the 
ultimate  criterion  for  him,  he  says,  that  “the  true  and  ulti- 
mate happiness  of  no  being  can  be  produced  by  anything 
that  interferes  with  truth,  and  denies  the  natures  of  things ; 
so  neither  can  the  practice  of  truth  make  any  being  ulti- 
mately unhappy.”  ® The  ultimate  criterion,  then,  is  truth 
and  not  happiness,  for  truth  of  every  kind  cannot  be  re- 
duced to  happiness,  but  happiness  is  significant  for  morals 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  reducible  to  truth.  So  far  from 
Wollaston  going  over  to  Hedonism,  as  some  of  his  critics 
accuse  him  of  doing,  he  compels  Hedonism  to  come  to  his 
standard.  There  are,  he  says,  higher  and  lower,  true  and 
false  pleasures.® 

Wollaston  takes  the  position  that  to  treat  people  “as 
being  what  they  are”  is  to  treat  them  “as  beings  both  de- 
sirous of  happiness  and  as  requiring  happiness  for  their  self- 
realization.  He  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that:  “To  make  it- 

* Hurst,  His.  of  Rationalism,  p.  101. 

“Wollaston,  ReU.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  38. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  38. 


164 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


self  happy  is  a duty  which  every  being  . . . owes  to  itself, 
and  which  every  intelligent  being  aims  at.”  While  all  men 
desire  happiness  and  seek  to  realize  it,  all  do  not  find  it. 
The  reason  for  this  failure  is  due  to  the  fact  that  their  lives 
are  not  guided  by  the  light  of  truth.  Happiness,  says  Wol- 
laston, is  closely  allied  to  truth,  and  it  is  “by  the  prac- 
tice of  tnith”  that  men  attain  “that  happiness,  which  is 
true.”  The  false  life  cannot  be  a happy  life,  says  Wollaston, 
but  only  that  life  which  is  lived  in  conformity  to  its  own 
true  self  and  to  the  real  nature  of  things  can  be  a happy 
life.  He  is  especially  insistent  upon  the  fact  that:  “The 
happiness  of  every  being  must  be  something  that  is  not  in- 
compatible with  ...  its  nature.  . . . For  instance,  noth- 
ing can  be  the  true  happiness  of  a rational  being,  that  is  in- 
consistent with  reason.  ...  If  anything  becomes  agreeable 
to  a rational  being,  which  is  not  agreeable  to  reason,  it  is 
plain  his  reason  is  lost,  his  nature  deprest,  and  that  he  now 
lifts  himself  among  irrationals,”  for  “a  rational  being  can 
like  nothing  of  that  kind  without  a contradiction  to  itself. 
For  to  do  this  would  be  to  act,  as  if  it  were  the  contrary  of 
what  it  is,”  and  “whatever  interferes  with  reason,  interferes 
with  truth.”  ^ According  to  Wollaston  there  are  two  things 
that  “are  to  be  religiously  regarded  in  all  our  conduct,”  and 
“these  are  met  together  and  embrace  each  other.”  These  are 
truth  and  happiness.  Wollaston  does  not  subordinate  either 
to  the  other,  but  he  does  define  happiness  in  terms  of  truth, 
which  is  the  same  as  saying  that  truth  is  a more  ultimate 
category.  He  says  that  happiness  is  the  natural  and  neces- 
sary consequence  of  a life  of  truth,  and  consists  of  “such 
pleasures,  as  company,  or  follow  the  practice  of  truth,  or  are 
not  inconsistent  with  it.”  The  criterion  of  morality  is  truth 
and  one  can  be  happy  only  by  living  a life  that  is  conform- 
able to  truth.® 

Wollaston  argues  for  the  ultimate  coincidence  of  happi- 
ness and  truth  on  the  ground,  that  “that  which  contradicts 
nature  and  truth  opposes  the  will  of  the  Author  of  nature.” 
Because  of  the  freedom  he  possesses  as  his  birth-right,  a 

’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  38-9. 

« Ibid.,  p.  39. 


Exposition  ofWollaston' s Section  on  Happiness  166 

finite  being  may  act  in  opposition  to  the  Divine  will,  and,  in 
so  doing,  may  “break  through  the  constitution  of  things”  or 
violate  the  nature  of  reality.  He  denies,  however,  that  hap- 
piness can  be  attained  in  that  way.  In  a consistent  universe, 
he  says,  in  effect,  those  who  live  conformably  with  the  true 
nature  of  things  must  be  ultimately  happy;  and  those  who 
live  contradictory  lives  must  be,  in  the  long  run,  unhappy.® 
Things  could  be  othenvise  only  in  a crazy  world.  In  a 
consistent  world  the  true  way  of  life  must  lead  to  happiness, 
so  the  way  to  truth  and  the  way  to  happiness  must  be  ulti- 
mately the  same.  He  postulates  religion  as  the  necessary 
ground  of  the  unity  of  truth  and  happiness.  An  intelligible 
world  must  be  a rational  and  consistent  world,  a world  in 
which  good  and  evil,  true  and  false  are  grounded  upon  the 
real  and  ultimate  nature  of  things.  Happiness  must,  also, 
somehow  find  its  time  place  in  the  scheme  of  things.  The 
rationality  shown  in  this  cosmic  unity  is  natural  religion. 
“The  way  to  happiness  and  the  practice  of  timth  incur  the 
one  in  the  other.”  He  had,  in  an  earlier  passage,  said  that 
“nothing  can  produce  the  ultimate  happiness  of  any  being, 
which  interferes  with  truth;  and  therefore  whatever  doth 
produce  that,  must  be  something  which  is  consistent  and  co- 
incident with  this.”  These  two  things,  then,  “are  both  to 
be  religiously  regarded  in  all  our  conduct.  And  since  both 
these  units  unite  so  amicably,  and  are  at  last  the  same,  here 
in  one  religion  which  may  be  called  natural  upon  two  ac- 
counts.” 

Wollaston  certainly  did  not  think  himself  to  be  a Hedonist, 
not  even  a universalistic  one,  of  this  fact  I think  we  can 
make  sure  from  his  own  writings.  He  says  that  the  im- 
mutable distinction  between  right  and  wrong  is  the  same  as 
that  between  true  and  false,  that  is  in  conformity  or  non- 
conformity to  the  real  nature  of  things.  They  who  say  that 
goodness  consists  in  “following  nature”  are  correct,  he  says, 
if  by  “following  nature,”  not  the  acting  according  to  one’s 
desires  as  the  Hedonists  teach,  but  “the  acting  according  to 

® Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  38,  40  and  15. 

Ibid.,  pp.  40,  49  and  179-3. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  173-4. 


166 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


the  natures  of  things,”  the  “treating  of  everything  as  being 
what  they  are  in  nature  or  according  to  truth.”  Wollaston 
says  that  “this  does  not  appear  to  be  their  meaning.  And 
if  it  is  only  that  a man  must  follow  his  own  nature,  since 
his  nature  is  not  purely  rational,  but  there  is  a part  of  him, 
which  he  has  in  common  with  the  brutes,  they  appoint  him 
a guide  wdiich  I fear  will  mislead  him,  this  commonly  being 
more  likely  to  prevail,  than  the  rational  part.”  By  fol- 
lowing nature,  he  in  effect  says,  we  must  mean,  if  this  for- 
mula is  to  serve  as  a criterion  of  virtue,  not  the  following 
of  our  pliysical  desires  and  appetites,  which  nature  we  have 
in  common  with  the  brutes,  but  the  following  of  our  higher 
and  rational  nature,  that  nature  which  is  the  peculiar  endow- 
ment of  man.  This  is  certainly  very  far  from  a hedonistic 
conception  of  life.  Pleasure  and  happiness,  like  everything 
else  good  and  true,  must  get  their  due  realization,  but  the 
criterion  is  not  in  the  senses  nor  in  the  feelings,  but  in  the 
reason.  Wollaston,  to  be  sure,  grants  that  human  nature 
is  not  purely  rational,  a part  of  his  nature  being  like  that 
of  the  brutes,  but  this  animal  side  of  man  is  not  his  essential 
nature.  The  essential  thing  about  man  is  his  reason,  and 
Avhatever  will  stand  the  test  of  reason  is  right  and  that  which 
will  not  stand  that  test  is  wrong.  “Right  reason”  mean- 
ing that  “which  is  found  by  the  right  use  of  our  rational 
faculties,”  is  “coincident  with  truth.” 

Wollaston  offers  still  another  argument  against  Hedonism; 
he  says  that  those  who  undertake  to  define  morality  in  terms 
of  pleasure  and  pain  end  in  leaving  it  undefined,  because  men 
are  even  more  different  in  their  ideas  and  tastes  as  to  what 
constitutes  happiness  than  as  to  what  constitutes  the  good. 
“As  men  have  different  tastes,  different  degrees  of  sense 
and  philosophy,  the  same  thing  cannot  be  pleasant  to  all; 
and  if  particular  actions  are  to  be  proved  by  this  test, 
the  morality  of  them  will  be  very  uncertain;  the  same 
act  may  be  of  one  nature  to  one  man,  and  of  another  to  an- 
other.” He  goes  further  and  says  that  “unless  there  be 
some  limitation  added  as  a fence  for  virtue,  men  will  sink 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  22. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  23. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  167 

into  gross  voluptuousness,  as  in  fact  the  generality  of  Epi- 
curus’ herd  have  done  (notwithstanding  all  his  talk  of  tem- 
perance, virtue,  tranquillity  of  mind,  etc.).”  He  then  pro- 
poses a “limitation  as  a fence  for  virtue.  For  not  all  pleas- 
ures, but  only  such  pleasures  as  are  true,  or  happiness,  may 
be  reckoned  among  the  fines,  or  ultima  bonorum.”  Bishop 
Butler  in  commenting  upon  this  passage,  has  this  to  say: 
“A  late  author  of  great  and  deserved  reputation  says,  that 
to  place  virtue  in  following  nature,  is  at  least  a loose  way  to 
talk.  And  he  has  reason  to  say  this,  if  what  I think  he  in- 
tends to  express  be  true,  that  scarce  any  other  sense  can  be 
put  upon  these  words,  but  acting  as  any  of  the  several  parts, 
without  distinction,  of  a man’s  nature,  happened  most  to 
incline  him.” 

A rather  strong  case  can  be  made  against  Wollaston  on 
the  charge  of  Hedonism,  and  I have  no  disposition  to  evade 
the  charge.  The  charge  takes  about  this  form.  Wollaston 
does  say  that  the  criterion  of  morality  is  truth  or  conformity 
to  reality.  But,  when  he  is  asked,  what  truth  must  be  con- 
formed to,  to  constitute  virtue.'*  he  is  compelled  to  answer, 
truths  concerning  personality.  And  when  he  is  pushed  back 
still  further  and  asked,  but  how,  in  particular,  can  one  con- 
tradict the  nature  of  personality  or  conform  to  the  nature 
of  personality.?  he  has,  practically,  said  that  we  must  be- 
have in  such  a way  as  to  promote  human  happiness.  One 
cannot  be  said  to  be  living  true,  when  he  is  promoting  human 
misery.  The  case  mentioned  by  Wollaston  of  failing  to  go 
to  the  assistance  of  a man  grevously  hurt  is  a case  in  point ; 
after  saying  that  by  so  acting,  one  denies  “human  nature 
to  be  what  it  is,”  he  then,  to  all  appearance,  explicates  his 
meaning  in  terms  of  Hedonism.  He,  who  so  treats  a human 
being,  thereby  denies  “those  desires  and  expectations,  which 
I am  conscious  to  myself  I should  have  under  the  like  misfor- 
tune, to  be  what  they  are.”  The  same  resort  to  Hedonism 
is  made  when  Wollaston  wishes  to  explain  degrees  of  crime. 
It  is  true  that  he  says  that  immorality  consists  in  the  viola- 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  24. 

“ Butler,  Preface  to  Sermons. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 


168 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


tions  of  truth,  but  when  he  tries  to  explain  these  violations 
of  truth  in  concrete  human  terms,  it  appears  that  it  is  hu- 
man happiness  which  is  violated.  The  one  who  steals  a book 
deprives  the  proprietor  of  happiness,  “It  is  true  A is 
guilty  of  a crime  in  not  treating  the  book  as  being  what  it 
is,  the  book  of  B,  whose  happiness  partly  depends  upon  it ; 
but  still  if  A should  deprive  B of  a good  estate  he  would  be 
guilty  of  a much  greater  crime.”  Why.?  Because  of  the 
greater  happiness  accruing  to  B from  the  estate  than  from 
the  book.  Wollaston,  though,  takes  the  position  that  hap- 
piness violated  is  just  truth  violated,  and  so  makes  his  ulti- 
mate criterion  not  happiness  but  truth. 

There  is  a notion  held  by  some  moralists  that  a purely 
intellectual  system  of  ethics  will  be  absolutely  abstract,  and 
consequently  entirely  unrelated  to  the  actual  world  of  lives 
among  which  we  live.  This  has  certainly  characterized  the 
intuitional  intellectualism  in  morals,  A proper  evalua- 
tion of  happiness,  it  is  said,  relates  morals  more  closely  to 
real  life.  I think  that  there  is  considerable  truth  in  this 
contention.  Certainly  a view  of  ethics  that  entirely  disre- 
garded such  an  important  human  consideration  can  be  no 
true  guide  to  life.  In  fact  those  who  interpret  Wollaston 
intuitionally  say  that  he  would  have  one  conform  to  the 
absolute  truth,  regardless  of  all  human  consequences.  They 
mention  especially  his  hesitancy  to  tell  a lie,  even  to  save  a 
life.^® 

Now,  one  can  take  a position  that  considers  happiness  of 
the  very  highest  importance  without  going  over  to  Hedon- 
ism. It  is  possible  to  treat  happiness  purely  objectively, 
and  when  so  considered  it  is  evaluated  according  to  the 
criterion  of  truth  just  as  other  life  values.  I think  that  Car- 
neri  is  correct  in  thinking  that  Wollaston  truly  harmonized 
truth  and  happiness.  He  says  that  “the  sensualistic  prin- 
ciple . . . lent  . . . the  weight  of  experience  or  at  least 
never  permitted  Wollaston  to  lose  himself  in  metaphysical 

” Wollaston,  Rell.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  21. 

“ Ibid.  Bott,  Refutation  of  “The  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  20.  J. 
Clarke,  Examination  of  “The  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,”  p.  61.  Wollaston, 
Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  27. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  169 

flights.”  Carneri  characterizes  his  ethics  as  “realistic”  or 
objective.  It  was  rationalistic  in  the  sense  that  the  nature 
of  morality  was  “deduced  not  from  a specific  impulse  of  the 
individual,  but  from  the  fitness  of  things.”  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, rationalistic  in  the  sense  that  human  feelings  were  dis- 
regarded. There  results  from  the  life  lived  “conformably 
with  the  nature  of  things  ...  a general  harmony  for  the 
individual.”  He  says  that  Wollaston  determined  the  good, 
not  abstractly  but  in  view  of  “the  results”  that  may  natur- 
ally be  expected.  So  the  good,  he  came  to  regard,  as  that 
which  can  be  expected  to  lead  to  the  happiness  and  well  be- 
ing of  the  individual  and  of  society.  Carneri  very  truly  says, 
that  this  placing  of  “the  mark  of  the  good  on  an  objective 
basis  (das  Mai*kmal  des  Guten  in  die  Objectivitat)”  neces- 
sarily had  the  “fruitful  result  of  reinterpreting  tnith.” 
When  speaking  morally,  anyway,  truth  must  mean  not  just 
“abstract  coherency  (Zusammenhang)”  but  real  human  de- 
sires and  life  relations,  that  is  die  Wahrheit  must  also  be 
thought  of  objectively.^® 

Windelband  says  that  in  order  for  Wollaston  to  prove 
that  actions  which  have  “diese  logische  Richtigkeit  . . , 
nothwendig  auch  zur  Gliickseligkeit  fiihren,”  he  must  sub- 
stitute for  his  abstract  logical  criterion,  which  is  purely  in- 
tellectual, Clarke’s  idea  of  “fitness.”  I do  not  feel  this  dif- 
ference between  the  two  systems.  I think  that  Wollaston’s 
system  is  as  objective  as  is  Clarke’s.  Wollaston  says  that 
morality  is  acting  in  conformity  to  the  nature  and  relations 
of  things.  It  is  simply  being  as  true  in  action  as  in  thought. 
Clarke,  it  seems  to  me,  just  used  somewhat  different  lan- 
guage to  express  the  same  general  meaning.  He  says  that 
the  moral  act  is  the  fitting  act.  In  one  place  in  Wollaston’s 
work  he  used  Clarke’s  term.®®  Windelband  says  that  in 
order  to  prove  that  the  moral  act  which  is  in  agreement  with 
truth,  i.  e.,  “has  a correct  logical  content,”  also  leads  to 
happiness  one  must  show  “how  the  treatment  of  relations, 
which  rest  on  a correct  knowledge  of  the  same,  brings  about 

“ Carneri,  Grundlegung  der  Ethik,  p.  407. 

“ Windelband,  Gesch.  der  Neuen  Phil.,  vol.  I,  p.  266.  Wollaston,  Reli. 
of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  43.  Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  45. 


170 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


for  the  agent  a favorable  form  of  the  same.”  This  does  not 
seem  to  me  to  be  true.  Why  can  we  not  believe,  with  Wollas- 
ton, that  happiness  really  ought  to  be  the  result  of  a life  of 
truth  and  that  it  would  really  be  the  most  contradictory 
thing  conceivable  for  it  to  result  otherwise.?  Just  as  it  would 
be  inconceivable  for  morality  to  be  contradictory  to  truth 
and  reality,  so  also  is  it  inconceivable  for  goodness  and  truth 
not  to  lead  to  happiness. 

Gass  interprets  Wollaston  as  meaning  that  a life  of  truth 
leads  necessarily  to  happiness.  The  life  of  conformity  to 
the  true  nature  of  things  ought  to  result  in  happiness,  for  it 
would  not  be  according  to  the  nature  of  things  for  it  to  re- 
sult otherwise.  It  would  be  unfitting  for  a good  life  to 
result  in  unhappiness.  Gass  says  that  the  “appropriateness 
recommends  itself  through  itself  (das  Wohlbemessene  emp- 
fiehlt  sich  durch  sich  selbst).  It  makes  the  impression  of  the 
fitting,  . . . and  through  its  rule  it  guarantees  also  happi- 
ness (verbiirgt  durch  seine  Herrschaft  auch  die  Gliickselig- 
keit).”  I understand  Gass  to  say  that  Wollaston  teaches 
that  the  life  of  truth  is  to  be  lived,  not  primarily,  because 
it  leads  to  happiness  but  because  it  is  appropriate  and  fit- 
ting. He  very  truly  says,  however,  that  Wollaston  does 
teach  that  the  true  life  will  be  happy.  He  goes  so  far  as  to 
say,  as  we  will  see  later,  that  the  next  life  must  make  right 
the  contradictions  of  this.^^ 

Noack  also  interprets  Wollaston’s  system  as  an  effort  to 
reconcile  the  inclinations  and  the  reason.  Happiness  is  not 
to  be  thought  of  as  an  additional  principle,  thinks  Noack, 
but  instead  he  understands  Wollaston  to  teach  that  “with 
the  moral  purpose  of  the  truth  that  of  happiness  coincides” 
for  happiness  is  nothing  but  “the  sum  of  true  pleasures.” 
In  other  words,  he  says,  that  Wollaston  insists  that  happi- 
ness is  to  be  treated  just  as  we  treat  other  things  and  that 
it  is  to  be  similarly  evaluated  according  to  its  true  place  and 
purpose  in  life.  “A  being  is  to  be  pronounced  happy  to  the 

“Windelband,  Gesch.  der  Neuen  Phil.,  vol.  I,  p.  267.  Wollaston,  Reli. 
of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  38-9  and  43. 

“ Gass,  Gesch.  der  Christlichen  Ethik,  p.  19.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  pp.  72  and  113-14. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  171 

extent  that  its  pleasures  are  true.  ...  A rational  being 
cannot  find  happiness  in  irrational  pleasures  without  con- 
tradiction; therefore  only  that  makes  man  happy  which  is 
in  accord  with  reason.  Therefore  the  way  to  happiness  and 
the  realization  of  truth  blend,  and  it  is  therefore  the  duty 
of  every  being  to  strive  honestly  after  the  realization  of  rea- 
son (aufricMig  nach  der  ausiibung  der  Vernunft  zu  stre- 
ben).”  This  should  be  done  for  there  is  no  other  way  to 
realize  either  goodness,  truth  or  happiness,  except  through 
a life  lived  conformably  to  reason,  both  in  theoretical  and  in 
practical  matters. 


II 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  HEDONISTIC  INTERPRETATION  OF 
WOEXASTON 

I think  that  there  is  far  more  ground  for  the  criticism 
that  Wollaston’s  system  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  hedonistic 
than  for  any  of  the  other  objections  that  have  been  offered 
to  his  ethical  philosophy.  He  certainly  reacted  very  strongly 
against  the  asceticism  and  rigorism  that  have  generally  char- 
acterized rationalistic  ethics,  but  the  question  is,  did  he 
go  over  to  the  other  extreme, — that  of  Hedonism.^  Many 
think  that  he  did. 

The  writer  of  the  unsigned  article  in  the  Britannica  on 
Wollaston  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  subordinated  truth 
to  happiness.  “Wollaston  starts  with  the  assumption  that 
religion  and  morality  are  identical  and  labors  to  show  that 
religion  is  the  pursuit  of  happiness  by  the  practice  of  truth 
and  reason. He  then  proceeds  to  say,  continues  the  ar- 
ticle, that  moral  evil  is  the  practical  denial  of  a true  propo- 
sition, and  moral  good  the  affinnation  of  it.  The  article 
makes  it  very  clear  that  Wollaston  discusses  the  nature  of 
good  and  evil,  primarily,  because  to  be  happy  a man  must 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  38-9.  Noack,  Geschichtliches 
Lexikon  der  Philosophie,  p.  931. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  43-4  and  52.  Anon.,  Art.  Wol- 
laston, in  Britan. 


172  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

pursue  the  one  and  avoid  the  other.  Truth  and  goodness 
must  be  practiced  because  these  are  the  necessary  precondi- 
tions of  happiness,  which  is  for  Wollaston  the  goal  of  life. 
Granting  this  to  be  a true  interpretation,  it  is  not,  truly 
speaking,  a hedonistic  interpretation  of  morality  for  the 
criterion,  even  though  it  be  but  instrumental,  is  not  feeling 
but  truth.  Happiness  is,  to  be  sure,  thought  to  be  the  end 
of  life  but  it  is  given  an  objective  signification.  The  goal  of 
life  is  happiness  but  to  attain  happiness  one  must  be  good. 
The  way  to  be  good  is  to  conform  one’s  life  to  the  truth, 
which  means  living  conformably  with  the  real  nature  and 
relations  of  things,  or  “treating  everything  as  that  which  it 
is.”  I think  that  it  can  be  shown  from  Wollaston’s  own 
writing  that  he  makes  truth  the  real  end  of  life  rather  than 
happiness,  and  that  he  considers  happiness  one  of  the 
things  which  should  be  sought,  both  for  ourselves  and  for 
others,  because  it  is  one  of  the  true  goods  of  life.^®  “There 
are,”  he  says,  “some  ends  which  the  nature  of  things  and 
truth  require  us  to  aim  at,  and  at  which  therefore  if  we  do 
not  aim,  nature  and  truth  are  denied.  If  a man  does  not 
desire  to  prevent  evils,  and  to  be  happy,  he  denies  both  his 
own  nature  and  the  nature  of  happiness  to  be  what  they  are. 
And  then  further,  willingly  to  neglect  the  means,  leading  to 
such  an  end,  is  the  same  as  not  to  propose  the  end,  and  must 
fall  under  the  same  censure.”  I understand  Wollaston 
to  be  saying  in  this  passage,  and  this  passage  is  truly  repre- 
sentative of  his  position,  that  it  is  our  duty  to  be  happy 
and  that  it  is  wrong  not  to  seek  our  own  happiness,  but  I do 
not  understand  him  to  say  that  this  is  the  only  goal  of  life, 
and  that  happiness  should  be  sought  at  the  expense  and  to 
the  exclusion  of  other  true  things  of  life. 

Hurst  says  that  Wollaston’s  “creed  was  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  by  the  practice  of  reason  and  truth,”  but  he  does 
not  stop  here  but  goes  on  and  gives  this  an  extreme  interpre- 
tation, namely,  that  “he  was  the  Epicurean  of  the  system 
which  he  adopted.”  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  an  entirely 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  8,  13,  38-9,  and  43-4. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  40-2. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  18.  Anon.,  Art.  Wollaston,  in  Britan. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  173 

wrong  interpretation  of  that  passage,  because  Wollaston 
is  here  discussing  the  ultimate  coincidence  of  truth  and  hap- 
piness. In  this  sense,  namely,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
eternity  he  can  define  Natural  Religion  “as  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  by  the  practice  of  reason  and  truth.”  Bent- 
ham  interprets  the  ethics  of  Wollaston  in  the  same  way  as 
does  Hurst.  He  reduces  the  extreme  intellectualism  of  Wol- 
laston to  nothing  but  the  necessary  means  to  the  getting  of 
happiness.  “We  have,”  says  Bentham,  “one  pliilosopher, 
who  says  that  there  is  no  harm  in  anything  in  the  world  but 
in  telling  a lie ; and  that  if,  for  example,  you  were  to  murder 
your  own  father,  this  would  only  be  a particular  way  of 
saying,  he  was  not  your  father.  Of  course,  when  this  phil- 
osopher sees  anything  that  he  does  not  like,  he  says,  it  is  a 
particular  way  of  telling  a lie.  It  is  saying,  that  the  act 
ought  to  be  done,  when,  in  truth,  it  ought  not  to  be  done.” 
Bentham  thinks  that  all  systems  of  ethics  appeal,  in  the 
last  analysis,  to  the  principle  of  happiness,  so,  quite  natur- 
ally, he  makes  of  Wollaston’s  intellectualism  the  mere  rules 
for  the  attainment  of  happiness,  the  one  thing  desirable  in 
life.  Things  other  than  happiness  may  be  sought  but  only  as 
means  to  the  attainment  of  happiness.  Wollaston  was  an 
exceedingly  wise  calculator,  but,  nevertheless,  he  was  a hed- 
onist, a seeker  of  happiness  and  that  only.  In  commenting  on 
Wollaston’s  notion  of  morality  as  conformity  to  nature,  he 
says:  “To  say  that  an  act  is  unnatural  or  repugnant  to 

nature  means,  ultimately,  that  I do  not  like  it.  It  is,  there- 
fore, repugnant  to  what  ought  to  be  the  nature  of  everybody 
else.”  Very  similar  to  that  of  Hurst  and  Bentham  is  the 
interpretation  of  La  Rossignol.  He  says  that  for  Wollas- 
ton: “Happiness  is  the  ethical  end,  and  virtue  the  means 
to  it.”  This  estimation  of  Wollaston  gives  the  impression 
that  he  considered  virtue  only  instrumental,  that  he  would 
advocate  virtue  only  when  it  seemed  the  necessary  means  to 
happiness ; or,  at  least,  that  he  does  not  teach  that  men 
ought  to  live  virtuously  for  any  other  reason  than  that  a 

“Hurst,  His.  of  Rationalism,  p.  101.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin., 
p.  53. 

“Bentham,  Principles  of  Morals  in  British  Moralists,  p.  348. 


174  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

life  of  virtue  is  the  necessary  pre-condition  of  a life  of  hap- 
piness.^® 

John  Brown’s  interpretation  is  very  much  the  same  as 
those  I have  just  considered.  He  tries  to  convict  Wollaston 
of  Hedonism:  “In  every  instance  that  Wollaston  brings, 
the  happiness  of  man  is  the  single  end  to  which  his  rule  of 
truth  verges  in  an  unvaried  manner.”  Brown  undertakes  to 
prove  that  Wollaston  really  made  the  differentia  of  virtue 
and  vice,  not  truth  but  pleasure,  and  as  a proof  of  this  he 
considers  Wollaston’s  own  case  of  talking  to  a post.  “He 
considered,”  says  Brown,  “the  talking  to  a post  as  an  ab- 
surdity,” but  “he  is  far  from  condemning  it  as  an  immoral 
action.”  Why  did  Wollaston  consider  talking  to  a post 
absurd  but  not  immoral,  he  asks,  if  conformity  to  the  nature 
of  things  is  his  real  criterion  of  morality  “for  certainly  one 
who  talks  to  a post  is  far  from  conforming  his  actions  to 
the  nature  of  things”.^  Brown  says  that  in  the  very  same 
passage  in  which  Wollaston  discusses  talking  to  a post  he 
gives  an  instance  of  the  violation  of  moral  truth.  In  giving 
this  instance  he  has,  says  Brown,  recourse  to  man,  “and 
not  only  so  but  to  the  happiness  of  man”  as  the  only  possible 
kind  of  case  of  the  violation  of  moral  truth.  He  says  that 
the  only  reason  Wollaston  gives  for  saying  that  it  is  morally 
wrong  to  treat  a man  as  a post  and  not  wrong  to  treat  a 
post  as  a man  is  that  a man  is  capable  of  happiness  while 
a post  is  not.  Brown  claims,  further,  that  Wollaston  judges 
truth  entirely  by  the  standard  of  happiness,  proving  it  to 
be,  in  his  estimation,  a more  ultimate  moral  principle  than 
that  of  truth.  “And  I would  gladly  know,”  Wollaston  asks, 
“how  one  truth  can  be  more  important  than  another,  unless 
upon  this  principle,  and  in  reference  to  the  production  of 
happiness.”  (This  supposed  quotation  is  not  found  in 
Wollaston.)  Brown  goes  on  to  say  that  “Wollaston,  indeed, 
confirms  his  interpretation  when  he  speaks  as  follows:  The 
truth  violated  in  the  former  case  was,  B had  a property  in 
that,  which  gave  him  such  a degree  of  happiness ; that  vio- 
lated in  the  later  was  a greater  violation  ...  in  that  it 
gave  him  a happiness  vastly  superior  to  the  other.  The  vio- 
“La  Rossignol,  Ethical  Philosophy  of  Samuel  Clarke,  p.  88. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston' s Section  on  Happiness  175 

lation  therefore  in  the  later  case,  upon  this  account,  is  a 
vastly  greater  violation  than  in  the  former.”  I under- 
stand Wollaston’s  position  to  be  that  happiness  is  a real 
aspect  of  true  personality  and  so  persons  can  be  violated  in 
that  way,  but  equally  so  by  the  violation  of  anything  per- 
taining to  persons.  Wollaston  says  that  when  he  speaks 
of  acts  inconsistent  with  truth  he  means  any  truth  whatso- 
ever: “I  would  have  everything  taken  to  be  what  in  fact  and 
truth  it  is.”  Elsewhere,  however,  he  says,  that  there  are 
degrees  of  good  and  evil  dependent  upon  and  determined  by 
the  importance  of  the  truth  violated.  But,  asks  his  hedonis- 
tic critics,  what  determines  this  importance?  and  they  are 
very  sure  that  he  is  compelled  to  answer  that  human  happi- 
ness is  the  measure  of  the  importance  of  truth.  Wollastor 
does  say  that  it  is  worse  to  steal  an  estate  than  a book, 
because  the  owner  of  the  estate  is  deprived  of  more  happi 
ness.  In  a sense  he  may  be  said  also  to  anticipate  Utib 
tarianism,  in  this  instance,  for  he  says  that  not  only  the  max, 
himself  but  also  his  family,  his  descendents,  will  be  deprived 
of  happiness  if  he  is  deprived  of  an  estate,  whereas  the  depri- 
vation in  case  of  the  book  is  a trifling  matter  in  comparison. 
It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  Wollaston’s  position  in  these 
cases  where  happiness  is  specifically  mentioned  as  suffering 
violation  is  really  that  nature,  reality,  personality  is  vio- 
lated.^^  Albee  says,  in  this  connection,  that  “Wollaston 
professed  to  vindicate  the  absolute  chai'acter  of  virtue  . . . 
really  introduced  hedonistic  considerations  at  the  crucial 
point.”  There  is  considerable  ground  for  this  estimation 
of  his  philosophy.  In  reply,  however,  we  can  say  that  there 
is  just  as  much  reason  to  say  that,  in  the  last  analysis. 
Hedonism  “inti'oduced”  other  “considerations  at  the  crucial 
point.”  I refer  particulaidy  to  the  qualitative  distinctions 
between  pleasures,  implying  a critei'ion  other  than  that  of 
pleasure. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  23,  20  and  172-3.  Brown,  Es- 
says on  the  Characteristics,  pp.  172-3. 

^'Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  21. 

®^Alhee,  His.  of  English  Utilitarianism,  p.  84. 


176 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


III 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  UTILITARIAN  INTERPRETATION  OF 

WOLLASTON 

The  only  objection  that  I have  to  classifying  Wollaston 
as  a utilitarian  is  the  historic  identification  of  Utilitarianism 
with  Universalistic  Hedonism.  It  is  true  that  John  Stuart 
Mill’s  principle,  “the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number,” 
is  a fair  statement  of  Wollaston’s  ethical  ideal.  In  order, 
however,  for  this  to  serve  as  his  formula  it  must  be  given  a 
very  decided  objective  interpretation  and  it  must  be  abso- 
lutely divorced  from  Psychological  Hedonism.  Mill,  and 
this  has  been  true  of  the  utilitarians  generally,  uses  the 
formula  “the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number”  inter- 
changeably with  the  formula  “the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number.”  Wollaston  does  not  identify  the  two 
meanings  but  would  subsume  happiness  under  the  other  as 
a case  of  something  which  makes  for  human  welfare.  But 
more  important  than  this  is  the  other  difference,  namely, 
their  very  different  attitudes  towards  happiness  itself.  Mill 
makes  a great  advance  over  his  predecessors  in  that  he 
universalized  happiness,  but  it  is  also  true  that  he  never 
disconnected  his  system  from  that  of  Psychological  Hedon- 
ism. In  fact  he  still  holds  to  Psychological  Hedonism  and 
starts  from  it  as  a self-evident  fact.  He  says  that  the  only 
reason  why  everyone  should  seek  to  realize  “the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number”  is,  because  each  one  does, 
as  a matter  of  fact,  desire  his  own  happiness. Wollaston 
makes  a great  deal  of  happiness  but  he  thinks  of  it  as  an 
objective  good  that  should  be  sought  for  ourselves  and  for 
all  men.  He  thinks  of  happiness  as  being  an  effect  of  true 
living,  but  he  thinks  that  we  should  plan  with  reference  to 
happiness  in  so  far  as  we  can  anticipate.  He  would  agree 
with  Clarke  that  actions  are  only  good  or  evil  according 
as  they  tend  to  the  benefit  or  disadvantage  of  all  men. 
Lines  of  conduct  that  result  in  human  misery  can  be  de- 
J.  S.  Mill,  Utilitarianism,  chap.  IV.  Bradley,  Ethical  Studies,  p.  103. 
Sidgwick’s  Method  of  Ethics,  Bk.  Ill,  chap.  XIII,  p.  3. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  17T 

nominated  bad,  and  those  that  make  for  human  happiness 
are  good.  But  Wollaston  says  that  this  is  only  saying  that 
in  treating  things  according  to  their  natures,  in  acting  con- 
formably with  the  real  nature  of  things,  that  above  all  else 
human  beings  should  he  considered,  and  that  this  means 
looking  out  for  their  happiness  and  their  welfare.^® 

In  discussing  moral  laws  and  natural  relations  Selby-Bigge 
has  a line  of  argument  by  which  he  thinks  he  proves  that 
Wollaston’s  intellectual  principle  of  evaluating  conduct  re- 
duces finally  to  Utilitarianism.  It  is  possible  to  show  “that 
immoral  action  is  absurd”  in  the  sense  that  it  defeats  “its 
own  end,”  in  that  it  commits  the  “material  absurdity”  of 
“seeking  satisfaction  in  pursuits  which  cannot  afford  it.” 
Wollaston  uses  “material  absurdity  as  a test  of  vice,”  says 
Selby-Bigge.  “It  appears  as  the  absurdity  of  treating 
things  as  other  than  they  are,  the  absurdity  of  treating 
men  as  brutes  and  brutes  as  stones,  of  ignoring  the  natures 
of  things.  . . . This  line  of  argument  . . . leads  easily  into 
Utilitarianism,  for  to  treat  men  as  they  are  is  to  treat  them 
primarily  as  capable  of  happiness.”  Taking  Wollaston’s 
entire  system  into  consideration  this  only  means  that  man’s 
real  nature  and  happiness  and  the  good  of  society  must  be 
considered  as  things  essentially  real  and  so  deserving  of 
realization.  I cannot  see  that  this  is  going  over  to  Utili- 
tarianism, for  treating  men  as  men,  as  creatures  desiring 
and  capable  of  happiness  is  but  confonning  to  an  aspect  of 
their  nature,  or  treating  them  as  what  they  are.  What  Wol- 
laston really  does  is  to  treat  men  not  as  creatures  capable 
of  desiring  happiness  and  as  that  only,  but  he  treats  them  as 
that  and  treats  happiness  as  one  essential  aspect  of  man’s 
nature.^^ 

Leslie  Stephen  says  that  “Wollaston  slides  into  Utili- 
tarianism.” From  the  bare  formula  that  “what  is,  is,”  and 
as  necessarily  following  from  that  that  everything  should 
be  treated  accordingly;  he  passes  to  the  statement  “that 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  40-2.  Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in 
British  Moralists,  524. 

“Selby-Bigge,  British  Moralists,  pp.  XXXI-II.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of 
Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  24  and  38. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  37-9. 


178  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

happiness  must  not  be  denied  to  be  what  it  is.”  He  goes 
still  further  towards  Utilitarianism,  thinks  Leslie  Stephen, 
when  he  says  “it  is  by  the  practice  of  truth  that  we  arrive 
at  that  happiness  which  is  true.”  I do  not  think  that  he 
makes  good  the  accusation  that  Wollaston  finally  resorts  to 
Utilitarianism  for  his  ultimate  principle  of  morality.  It 
seems  to  me  that  what  he  really  proves  is  that  Wollaston  ex- 
tends the  principle  of  truth  to  include  happiness.  His  quo- 
tations from  Wollaston  prove  that  he  makes  truth  the  cri- 
terion of  morality,  and  since  true  happiness  is  a desirable 
human  state  that  it  should  be  sought  as  anything  else  that 
is  true  and  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  things.^® 

In  one  passage  Erdmann  gives  Wollaston  an  interpreta- 
tion that  would  be  denominated  utilitarian.  “He  proceeds 
to  the  consideration  of  mankind  and  after  he  has  designated 
happiness  as  the  purpose  of  the  society  of  mankind,  also 
as  the  purpose  of  the  living  together  of  people  in  general,  he 
deducts  therefrom  the  law  that  nothing  must  happen  which 
disturbs  the  happiness  of  other  people,  but  then  it  is  finally 
not  only  a privilege  to  further  one’s  own  happiness,  but  a 
duty,  since  the  neglect  of  the  same  involves  the  proposition 
that  happiness  is  not  happiness.”  Erdmann  is  right  in  say- 
ing that  Wollaston  ranks  happiness  very  high,  but  I do 
not  think  that  we  can  say  that  he  considered  it  the  purpose 
of  human  society. 

Historically,  intellectualism  in  morals  in  England  has 
been  largely  of  the  intuitional  type.  For  this  reason  Sidg- 
wick  says  the  other  school  triumphed.  Because  intuitional 
methods  were  discredited  the  emotional  view  of  morals  be- 
came popular,  with  the  result  that  duty  lost  its  objectivity 
and  morality  became  a subjective  matter.  “Only  after  the 
extreme  position  to  which  Hume  finally  carried  this  view, 
was  its  dangerous  character  perceived  and  also  the  neces- 
sity of  bringing  into  prominence  again  the  cognitive  element 
in  moral  consciousness.”  Sidgwick  thinks  Wollaston  signifi- 

“L.  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  II,  p.  10. 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  52. 

" Ibid.,  pp.  39-40. 

" Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  Neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  122. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  179 

cant  in  that  he  duly  considered  the  objective  side  of  morals 
and  the  intellect  as  the  moral  faculty.  “Rightness  and 
wrongness,”  he  says,  “must  be  made  dependent  upon  certain 
general  characteristics  of  the  action,  agent  and  circum- 
stances ; and  accordingly  that  the  moral  truth  apprehended 
must  be  essentially  universal,  though  particular  in  our  ap- 
prehension of  it.”  He  says  in  another  passage  that 
“Wollaston  sought  to  exhibit  the  more  fundamental  of 
the  received  rules  as  axioms  of  perfect  self-evidence,  neces- 
sarily forced  upon  the  mind  in  contemplating  human  be- 
ings in  their  relations,  but  Wollaston  also  took  the  position 
that  the  results  of  actions,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  antici- 
pated, are  to  be  considered  and  constitute  important  facts  in 
the  motivation.^®  It  is  this  consideration  of  results  of  ac- 
tions that  make  his  system  objective.  The  most  important 
result  that  can  be  anticipated  and  that  consequently  enters 
into  the  motivation  is  happiness.  Considering  happiness  as 
one  of  the  results  of  actions  to  be  taken  into  consideration, 
is  very  different  from  psychological  Hedonism,  which  takes 
the  position  that  the  action  is  determined  by  feeling.  Wol- 
laston’s position,  then,  is  really  rationalistic  and  objective 
for  he  considers  everything.^^ 

Wollaston’s  attempt  to  consider  all  sides  of  life  and  to 
make  ethics  objective,  by  insisting  that  happiness  or  unhap- 
piness as  the  probable  result  of  an  action  must  enter  into 
the  motivation,  was  misunderstood  from  the  very  first.  Bott, 
a contemporary  of  his,  thinks  that  Wollaston  is  forced  to 
desert  the  standard  of  truth,  which  he  started  out  to  main- 
tain, and  to  accept  in  its  stead  the  standard  of  happiness. 
He  thinks  that  Wollaston  resorts  to  Hedonism,  because  there 
is  no  other  way  by  which  the  importance  of  truths  can  be 
estimated.  That  which  most  promotes  human  happiness  is 
the  most  important.  Wollaston  thinks  that  tliis  is  only 
applying  the  criterion  of  truth  to  all  of  life,  but  this  is  not 
Bott’s  interpretation.  After  considering  Wollaston’s  intel- 

“Sidgwick,  Method  of  Ethics,  pp.  100-2.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  p.  19. 

“Sidgwick,  Method  of  Ethics,  pp.  100-4.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  pp.  11,  14,  and  19. 

« Ibid.,  pp.  38-9. 


180 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


lectual  criterion,  he  says,  that  “it  is  observable  that  he  does 
not  always  keep  strictly  to  his  definition.”  He  is,  says 
Bott,  occasionally  “forced  ...  to  vary  his  notion  of  mo- 
rality ; and  to  consider  truth,  not  merely  as  truth,  but  ac- 
cording to  the  importance  of  it,  or  its  influence  upon  the  state 
and  circumstances  of  men.”  Wollaston  goes  so  far 
towards  Hedonism  as  to  define  “Natural  Religion  to  be  the 
pursuit  of  happiness,  by  the  practice  of  reason  and  truth.” 

In  another  passage,  says  Bott,  Wollaston  says  “I  have 
shown  in  what  the  nature  of  moral  good  and  evil  consists, 
namely,  a conformity  or  disagreement  to  truth,  and  those 
things  that  are  coincident  with  it,  reason  and  happiness.” 
Bott  interprets  these  passages  to  mean  that  Wollaston  “takes 
into  his  notion  of  morality,  not  only  the  practice  of  truth, 
but  also  the  influence  of  that  truth  upon  the  welfare  and 
happiness  of  mankind.  So  that  morality,  according  to  him, 
is  the  practice  of  such  reason  and  truth,  as  will  have  an  in- 
fluence upon  human  happiness.”  He  says  “if  there  be  any 
such  truth,  as  in  its  nature  has  no  influence  this  way,  nor 
can  have  any,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  morality.”  Bott 
is  disposed  to  accept  this  view  of  morality  as  true,  but 
he  does  not  see  how  Wollaston  can  reconcile  it  with  his 
criterion  of  truth.'^®  This  reconciliation,  Wollaston  seeks 
to  effect,  by  saying  that  it  is  true  human  happiness  and  true 
human  welfare  that  constitutes  the  most  important  of  all 
truths.  It  is  this  that  constitutes  the  standard  “by  which 
the  importance  of  truths  ought  to  be  measured.” 

Wollaston  agrees  entirely  with  Bott  that  all  other  truths, 
except  those  related  to  human  life  are,  morally  speaking, 
relatively  unimportant.  It  by  no  means  follows  from  this 
that  truth  is  not  his  ultimate  criterion,  for  his  treatment  of 
happiness  is  objective.  This  fact  Bott  entirely  overlooks. 
It  is  very  significant  because  when  happiness  is  considered 

Bott,  Defence  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil,  p.  6. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  52. 

Ibid.,  p.  65. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  40-42. 

* Bott,  Defence  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil,  p.  7. 

“Ibid.,  p.  16. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  181 

objectively  it  becomes  an  object  of  knowledge  and  a relation 
to  be  considered.  Bott’s  failure  to  understand  Wollaston 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  he  thinks  Wollaston  means  by  con- 
formity to  truth,  conformity  to  purely  abstract  formal 
truth.  That  this  is  by  no  means  the  case  is  proven  by  his 
many  illustrations.  Wollaston  uses  abstract  propositions 
only  as  representative  of  values  innumerable.  There  could, 
of  course,  be  no  real  conformity  to  mere  abstract  truth,  ex- 
cept in  a formal  way,  for  such  truths  have  no  factual  exist- 
ence and  morality  must  be  acts  conformable  to  the  facts  of 
the  universe.  Wollaston  would  agree  entirely  with  what 
Bott  says  about  the  writing  pen.  “Indeed,  let  a truth  be 
ever  so  trifling,  e.  g.,  that  the  pen  I am  writing  with  is  four 
inches  long;  if  I know  it,  and  yet  assert  it  is  but  three,  I 
am  guilty  of  an  immorality:  why.^  Not  because  I offend 
against  truth,  or  assert  what  is  really  false,  but  because  I 
assert  what  I think  or  know  to  be  false;  and  so  am  guilty  of 
such  an  act,  as  tends  to  breed  disti’ust  and  uneasiness.  That 
this  is  the  true  reason  and  not  the  other  is  evident ; because 
the  guilt  would  be  the  same,  if,  though  the  pen  were  really 
four  inches  long,  I,  through  a mistake,  thought  it  was  but 
three,  and  yet  asserted  it  was  four.”  This  simply  means, 
from  our  author’s  point  of  view,  that  one  must  above  all  else 
be  true  to  human  relations,  the  most  important  of  all  truths. 
Bott  is  not  true  to  the  facts  when  he  says  that  one  does  not 
offend  against  ti*uth  when  he  wills  to  deceive  unless  the  state- 
ment made  is  contrary  to  fact.  “An  act  which  tends  to  breed 
distrust  and  uneasiness”  is  false  to  human  relations,  morally 
speaking  the  all-important  thing.  After  saying  what  he  does 
about  even  “trifling”  truths  being  respected,  Bott  ought  to 
appreciate  Wollaston’s  hesitation  to  advocate  a lie,  for 
lying  tends  to  disrupt  human  relations  and  to  reduce  the 
world  to  a chaos. 

I think  that  Bott’s  view  of  Ethics  was  essentially  the 
same  as  that  of  Wollaston,  I mean  as  to  the  naturalness  of 
morality  and  as  to  the  ultimate  coincidence  of  truth,  good- 

“ Bott,  Examination  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  7-8. 

“Ibid.,  p.  8. 


182 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


ness  and  happiness.  In  proof  of  this  I wish  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  contents  of  his  chief  work:  “An  Answer  to  the 
Rev.  Mr.  Warbuton’s  Divine  Legation,  &c.,”  in  which  he  cen- 
sures Warburton  for  making  morality  dependent  upon  the 
command  of  a superior  being.  There  is  also  an  extant  ser- 
mon of  his  called,  “Morality  Founded  in  the  Reason  of 
Things.” 

John  Clarke,  a contemporary  of  Bott,  makes  a similar 
criticism  of  the  position  of  Wollaston.  He,  too,  thinks  that 
Wollaston  finally  resorts  to  happiness  because  the  intellectual 
criterion  is  inadequate.  He  says  that  “the  practice  of 
truth,  or  conduct  conformable  to  truth”  can  be  recom- 
mended, not  as  a thing  desirable  in  and  for  itself,  without 
reference  to  aught  else,  but  only  as  a means  for  the  attain- 
ing of  happiness.  This  conformity  to  truth,”  Clarke  admits, 
to  be  “the  way  to  happiness,  the  true  end  of  life.  He  says 
that  Wollaston,  however  inconsistently,  came  finally  to  this 
view.  He  says  that  this  is  proven  by  his  own  case  of  seek- 
ing to  determine  the  difference  of  crime  between  stealing  a 
book  and  an  estate.  The  importance  of  the  truth  violated 
he  makes  to  depend  upon  how  much  or  how  little  “they  con- 
duce to  happiness.”  So  he  says  that  Wollaston  comes  to 
the  view  that  conformity  to  truth  receives  its  value  and  im- 
portance from  its  tendency  to  produce  happiness.®®  So 
Wollaston  must  finally  grant,  says  John  Clarke,  “that  what 
has  in  its  nature,  a tendency  to  promote  the  well  being  and 
happiness  of  mankind,  is  morally  good,  and  what  has  a con- 
trary tendency,  morally  evil.” 

John  Clarke  says  “supposing  every  immoral  action,  and 
none  but  such,  did  interfere  with,  or  imply  a denial  of  truth, 
. . . then  indeed  the  interfering  with  or  denying  truth 
would  be  a certain  criterion,  whereby  to  distinguish  immoral 
actions  from  what  is  not  so ; but  still  the  nature  of  immo- 
rality . . . would  not  consist  of  that  denial,  but  something 
else;  for  if  it  did,  the  degrees  too  of  moral  evil  would  de- 
pend upon  that  only.”  There  would,  on  that  assumption,  be 
a concomitant  variation  between  immorality  of  acts  and 

'’J.  Clarke,  Exami.  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  51-2. 

^ Ibid.,  p.  54. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  183 

the  number  of  truths  denied,  which  is  not  true.  This  proves 
that  the  criterion  of  morality  is  not  that  of  conformity  to 
truth.®®  Wollaston  uses  the  method  of  concomitant  varia- 
tion; but,  he,  inadvertently,  proved  thereby,  that  the  real 
criterion  of  morality  is  happiness  rather  than  truth.  Wol- 
laston does  not  pretend,  says  Clarke,  to  determine  the  degrees 
of  morality  by  the  number  of  truths  affirmed  nor  the  degrees 
of  immorality  “by  the  number  of  truths  violated,  which  he 
ought  to  have  done,  did  immorality  consist  barely  and  pre- 
cisely in  the  violation  of  truth,  as  he  affirms  when  he  tells 
us,  that  the  idea  and  formal  ratio  of  moral  evil  consists  in 
acting  a lie.®®  He  has  thought  fit  to  take  in  the  importance 
of  truths  violated  as  well  as  number.®^  The  degrees  of  evil 
. . . are  as  the  importance  and  number  of  truths  vio- 
lated.” ®®  The  importance  of  truths  is  determined  by  the 
principle  of  happiness.  Clarke  takes  Wollaston  to  task  for 
saying  that  “all  denial  of  truth  . . . is  . . . immoral.” 
This  means  that  happiness  becomes  the  real  criterion,  be- 
cause it  alone  can  determine  the  importance  of  the  truths 
conformed  to,  or  violated.®®  There  is  no  immorality  in  vio- 
lating many  truths,  but  only  those  conducive  to  human 
happiness.  There  are  cases,  says  Clarke,  when  the  moral 
principle  of  the  happiness  of  mankind  demands  that  we 
violate  truth.  Like  Bott  he  makes  a great  deal  of  Wol- 
laston’s hesitation  to  violate  truth  for  even  humanity’s 
sake.®®  As  a matter  of  fact  his  position  is  that  “an  abuse 
of  language  is  allowable”  in  sucb  extreme  cases.  He  says 
“all  sins  against  truth  are  not  equal,  and  certainly  a little 
trespassing  upon  it  in  the  present  case,”  a case  of  saving 
a man  from  a murderer,  “for  the  good  of  all  parties”  is 
“as  little  a one  as  any.”  ®^ 

“J.  Qarke,  Exami.  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good  and  Evil,  p.  56. 
Wollaston,  ReU.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  31. 

“Wollaston,  ReU.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  138. 

« Ibid.,  p.  22. 

“J.  Clarke,  Examination  of  Wollaston’s  Notion  of  Good,  p.  59. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  60-3. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  51.  Bott,  Consideration  of  Wollaston’s  Notion,  p.  21. 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  27. 


184 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


IV 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  DUALISTIC  INTERPRETATION  OP 
WOLEASTON 

Some  of  the  critics  of  W^ollaston  take  the  position  that 
there  is  an  ultimate  dualism  in  his  system.  They  are  not 
entirely  agreed  as  to  whether  this  is  a dualism  as  to  the 
criterion  of  morality  or  as  to  the  ideal  of  life.  The  former 
say  that  the  moral  criterion  is  a dual  one,  made  up  of  rea- 
son and  happiness.  The  later  say  that  there  is  a dualism  as 
to  goodness  and  happiness  as  the  end  of  life.  Wollaston 
seems  to  have  tliought  that  truth  is  the  way  both  to  a life 
of  goodness  and  to  a life  of  happiness.  Happiness  enters 
into  the  motivation  but  objectively,  consequently  it  is  not 
an  aspect  of  the  criterion.  Perhaps  there  is  more  ground 
for  the  dualistic  interpretation  “in  regard  to  the  goal  of 
life,”  but  I think  that  he  had  a profound  faith  in  the  ulti- 
mate coincidence  of  truth,  goodness  and  happiness. 

Sidgwick  says  that  Wollaston  clearly  recognized  “the 
duality  of  the  regulative  principles  in  human  nature,”  a 
thing  which  the  Greek  and  Roman  Stoics  did  not  recognize. 
The  Stoic  formula  of  “living  according  to  nature”  is  also 
liis  formula,  but  whereas  the  Stoics  had  only  one  regulative 
principle,  tliat  of  reason,  Wollaston  has  two,  reason  and 
happiness.”  Sidgwick  says  that  “here,”  in  Wollaston’s 
book,  “for  the  first  time,  we  find  moral  good  and  natural 
good  or  happiness  treated  separately  as  two  essentially  dis- 
tinct objects  of  rational  pursuit  and  investigation;  the 
harmony  of  them  being  regarded  as  a matter  of  religious 
faith,  not  moral  knowledge.”  His  consideration  of  happi- 
ness as  a “justly  desirable”  end,  at  which  every  rational 
being  ought  to  aim,  Sidgwick  interprets  hedonistically,  say- 
ing that  it  “corresponds  exactly  to  Butler’s  conception  of 
self-love  as  a natural  governing  impulse.  He  says,  also,  that 
“the  moral  arithmetic”  with  which  he  compares  pleasures  and 
pains  is  an  endeavor  “to  make  the  notion  of  happiness 
quantitatively  precise,”  and  anticipates  Benthamism.®® 

Sidgwick,  His.  of  Ethics,  p.  197. 

® Ibid.,  p.  198. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  185 

Falckenberg  says  that:  “To  the  equation  of  truth  and 
morality  happiness  is  added  as  a third  identical  member.” 
He  seems  to  think  that  Wollaston  makes  of  happiness  an 
entirely  distinct  principle  that  acts  along  with  truth  and 
morality.  He  makes  neither  truth  nor  happiness  the  one 
criterion  of  morality,  according  to  Falckenberg,  but  they 
are  both  involved.®^  I do  not  think  that  he  understands 
Wollaston,  because  he  certainly  speaks  of  true  and  false 
pleasures  and  of  morality  as  true  and  of  immorality  as 
false.®®  It  is  also  true  that  Wollaston  says  that  morality 
and  happiness,  as  well  as  ti-uth,  are  conformity  to  the  nature 
of  things.  True  the  former  are  in  practical  conformity,  the 
later  in  theoretical  conformity.  A rational  being  contra- 
dicts itself  when  it  pursues  irrational  pleasures  or  does  an 
immoral  act.®® 

Hall  says  that  “Wollaston  leaves  an  unresolved  antimony 
between  the  ought  and  happiness.  He  says  plainly  that  ‘to 
make  itself  happy  is  a duty  which  every  being,  in  propor- 
tion to  its  capacity,  owes  to  itself,  and  which  every  intelli- 
gent being  may  be  supposed  to  aim  at  in  general,’  but  as  to 
a correspondence  between  duty  and  happiness  he  can  only 
say:  Now,  present  pleasure  is  for  the  present  agreeable, 
but  if  it  be  not  true  and  he  who  enjoys  it  must  pay  more 
for  it  than  it  is  worth,  it  cannot  be  good  for  him.  This 
therefore  cannot  be  happiness.”  And  he  has  a robust  faith, 
says  Hall,  that  the  practice  of  truth  cannot  make  any  being 
ultimately  unhappy,  but  Hall  thinks  that  Wollaston’s  own 
doctrine  of  probalism,  “where  certainty  is  not  to  be  had,” 
reveals  the  fact  that  the  correspondence  between  truth  and 
happiness  is  not  so  easily  proven  as  his  theory  demands.®’’’ 
There  is,  we  must  admit  an  unresolved  antimony  between 
the  ought  and  happiness  so  far  as  this  life  is  concerned; 
but  if  the  universe  is  rational  consistency  will  demand  that 
we  believe  in  the  ultimate  happiness  of  the  good.®® 

“Falckenberg,  His.  of  Modern  Phil.,  p.  189. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  13  and  38. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  42. 

“ Ibid.,  Sec.  Ill,  16.  HaU,  Christian  Ethics,  p.  453. 

“Ibid.,  pp.  172-3  and  113-14. 


186  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

I think  that  some  of  the  writers  have  inferred  that  Wol- 
laston has  a dual  criterion  because  Clarke  has.  While 
Clarke,  with  the  Stoics,  affirms  the  theoretical  self-sufficiency 
of  virtue  and  insists  that  it  is  reasonable  to  choose  virtue, 
yet  lie  is  equally  insistent  upon  the  point  that  men  cannot 
be  expected  to  choose  it,  if  it  be  not  rewarded  with  happiness. 
Clarke  sought  to  reconcile  the  apparent  contradiction  be- 
tween reason  and  happiness,  which  are  irreconcilable  from 
the  purely  rationalistic  point  of  view  of  Stoicism,  by  bring- 
ing in  the  sanctions  of  religion,  rewards  and  punishments 
of  a future  life.  There  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in  Wollaston. 
He  deals  with  the  problem  purely  rationalistically  and  says 
of  happiness  simply  that  it  is  reasonable  to  treat  it,  like 
every  other  true  thing,  as  what  it  is,  a desirable  human 
state.®®  Men  are  virtuous  when  they  act  according  to  the 
nature  of  things.  Happiness,  of  course,  both  in  this  life  and 
in  the  life  to  come  will  be  the  natural  result  of  a life  lived 
truly,  but  such  prospects  are  not  treated  as  the  necessary 
incentive  to  make  one  do  his  duty.'^®  Clarke  just  brought  in 
happiness  as  a sanction,  whereas  Wollaston  did  not,  that 
is  the  main  difference  between  the  two  philosophers.  In  the 
main  they  agree  even  as  to  the  subject  of  happiness.  “The 
Deity,”  says  Clarke,  “acts  according  to  the  eternal  rela- 
tions of  things,  in  order  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  uni- 
verse,” and  subordinate  moral  agents  ought”  to  be  governed 
by  the  same  rules  for  the  good  of  the  public.”  He  thus,  very 
rightly,  sees  the  social  order  as  a part  of  the  divine  order, 
moral  rules  as  a part  of  a higher  rationality.'^^  I would 
agree  with  Burnett  that  this  is  just  about  the  way  Wollas- 
ton thought  of  the  general  happiness  of  mankind.  He  says 
that,  according  to  Wollaston,  what  makes  the  desire  of 
public  happiness  a reasonable  end  is  the  truth  “that  it  is 
best  that  all  should  be  happy.  That  it  is  best  that  all 
should  be  happy  is  necessarily  perceivable  by  all  rational 
natures.” 

“‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Ddin.,  p-p.  38-40.  Clarke,  Evidences,  p.  14. 

’“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  37-40. 

’’Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  482. 

’*  Burnett,  Art.  in  London  Journal,  p.  214. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  187 

After,  to  all  appearance,  completely  understanding  tlie 
moral  principle  of  Wollaston  to  be  an  objective  one,  that  of 
conformity  of  life  to  the  nature  of  things,  Erdmann  then 
proceeds  to  say  that  he  brought  in  happiness  as  an  addi- 
tional principle.  He  says  that  Wollaston  made  the  distinc- 
tion between  basing  morality  upon  a subjective  basis,  of  an 
inner  imperative  or  a priori  laws  of  morality,  and  of  basing 
it  on  an  objective  foundation.  Since  there  are  no  common 
principles  innate  in  the  mind  of  man  morality  must  be  based 
on  the  objective  foundation  of  confonnity  to  nature.  But, 
says  Erdmann,  this  distinction  seems  not  to  have  satisfied 
Wollaston  and  so  he  introduces  into  his  ethics  still  another 
idea,  the  idea  of  happiness.  He,  now,  tries  to  prove  “that 
seeking  happiness  coincides  with  the  realization  of  truth  (das 
Suchen  Gliicklichkeit  mit  dem  Verwirklichen  der  Wahrheit 
zusammenfalle).”  Both,  he  says,  are  so  bound  up  together 
that  neither  is  thinkable  without  the  other,  and  the  one  is 
determined  by  the  other.  Erdmann  intei’prets  Wollaston  as 
believing  that  virtue  is  its  own  reward,  but  that  he  “is  not 
content  with  this,  but  points  also  to  the  reward  which  such 
action  is  to  have.  This  reward  consists  in  happiness,  the 
balance  of  pleasure  over  pain.”  He  then  undertakes  to 
explicate  Wollaston’s  treatment  of  happiness.  In  order 
to  define  the  idea  of  happiness  he  starts,  says  Erdmann,  with 
pleasure  and  he  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  happiness  is 
nothing  but  the  sum  of  true  pleasures.  Happiness,  since 
pains  must  be  considered,  consists  in  the  excess  of  pleasure 
over  pain,  namely,  in  pure  and  true  pleasure.  “Tliis  cannot 
exist  in  something  which  contradicts  one’s  own  nature 
(Dieses  kann  nicht  in  Etwas  bestehn,  was  der  eignen  Natur 
widerspricht)  ; Whatever  conflicts  with  one’s  own  nature  or 
is  destructive  of  it  cannot  be  pleasant,  and  just  therefore  it 
cannot  render  one  happy.”  Erdmann  thinks  that  Wollas- 
ton does  not  really  prove  the  proposition  that  combines  the 
principle  of  happiness  and  that  of  truth.  In  order  to  prove 
the  coincidence  of  happiness  and  truth,  Wollaston,  he  thinks, 
is  compelled  to  resort  finally  to  the  idea  of  God.  He  tries 
to  show  that  if  a creature  were  unhappy  by  opposing  its  own 
"Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  pp.  118-20. 


188  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

nature  and  God’s  plans,  it  would  thereby  show  itself  more 
powerful  than  God,  which  would  be  absurd.  That  there  is  a 
gap  here,  Erdmann  thinks,  cannot  be  denied ; and  it  is  due, 
he  thinks,  to  the  fact  that  Wollaston  “stand  here  on  the 
threshold,  so  to  speak,  which  leads  to  a more  advanced  view 
of  ethics  which,  with  an  empirical  basis,  is  inevitable,  namely, 
pure  Eudsemonism.  But  only  on  the  threshold,  and  there- 
fore he  asserts  throughout,  that  the  objective  nature  of 
things  determines  actions,  at  the  same  time,  however,  he 
already  divines,  that  the  determining  factor  is  only  one’s 
own  pleasure.” 

It  is  very  interesting  that  Erdmann  should  differ  so  ab- 
solutely in  his  conception  of  happiness  in  Wollaston’s  sys- 
tem, from  Hume  and  from  English  Hedonists  generally. 
While  they  take  the  position  that  Wollaston  neglects  feel- 
ing as  the  necessary  dynamic  to  action,  Erdmann  criticizes 
him  on  the  very  ground  that  his  Eudjemonism  is  mixed  with 
Pledonism,  that  while  his  ideal  and  criterion  of  morality  is 
objective  he  still  thinks  that  the  subjective  principle  of 
pleasure  largely  determines  actions.  Erdmann  thinks  that 
Wollaston  found  himself  in  the  same  difficulty  in  wliich 
Mill  found  himself,  years  afterwards,  I mean  in  regard  to 
the  gap  between  psychological  and  ethical  Hedonism. 
Everyone  desires  pleasure,  this  is  a psychological  fact,  but 
what  is  there  that  is  ethical  about  it.'’  And  how  can  we 
reason  from  that  evident  psychological  fact  to  the  moral 
idea  that  everyone  should  seek  the  greatest  happiness  of 
the  greatest  number.^  Mill,  as  is  well  known,  made  the  leap 
by  a fallacy  of  Ambiguous  Middle,  namely,  by  giving 
“desired”  and  “desirable”  the  same  connotation.^®  Erd- 
mann represents  Wollaston  as  finding  as  a connecting  link 
(“Mittleglied”)  the  fact  that  pleasure  and  pain  are  only 
“what  is  in  accord  with  one’s  own  nature  and  purpose  (was 
der  eignen  Natur  und  Bestimmung  entspreche).” Erd- 
mann says  that  “this  Mittleglied,  however,  remains  an  as- 

” Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  pp.  117-8.  Hume,  Treatise 
on  Human  Nature,  p.  462. 

Utilitarianism,  p.  53. 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  39. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  189 

surance  only.”  He  says  that  Wollaston  thinks  that  he  has 
established  the  truth  of  the  position  and  proceeds  as  if  he 
had  really  proved,  what  he  only  postulates,  that  truth  and 
happiness  coincide.  He  goes  on  in  his  depiction  of  Wollas- 
ton: “Only  that  can  give  true  happiness  what  is  in  accord 
with  the  purpose  of  the  being.  If  the  being  is  of  a double 
nature,  animal  and  human,  like  man,  the  principle  of  truth 
would  require  that  true  happiness  could  be  realized  only  by 
that  which  is  in  accord  with  his  noble  part  (was  der  Be- 
stimmung  seines  edlern  Theils  entspricht).  Therefore  only 
that  makes  men  happy  which  corresponds  with  reason.  If 
the  irrational  gives  man  pleasure,  he  thereby  contradicts 
himself  (Macht  dem  Menschen  das  Unverniinftige  Verg- 
niigen,  so  setzt  er  sich  mit  selbst  in  Widerspruch).  By  the 
enjoyment  of  the  irrational  pleasure  one  declares  himself 
to  be  an  irrational  being  (ein  unverniinftiges  Wesen),  which 
is  an  untrue  proposition.”  It  may  be  that  Wollaston  did 
not  take  the  position  that  immorality  is  the  affirmation  of  a 
false  proposition,  but  rather  that  it  is  a practical  denial 
of  a true  proposition,  a very  different  thing.’’^® 

Erdmann  thinks  that  Wollaston  has  faith  in  the  rational- 
ity of  the  universe  and  that  this  faith  is  Natural  Religion. 
“Since  the  realization  of  truth  and  the  seeking  of  happiness 
are  one  and  the  same  thing,  all  Natural  Religion  is  based 
on  the  harmony  of  truth,  reason  and  happiness ; and,  as 
real  definition,  it  is  declared  that  it  is  the  seeking  of  happi- 
ness through  the  realization  of  truth  and  reason  (das  Suchen 
der  Gliickseligkeit  durch  Verwdrklichen  der  Wahrheit  und 
Vernunft).” From  Erdmann’s  previous  discussion,  we 
would  not  have  expected  him  to  agree  to  this  hedonistic  defi- 
nition of  religion.  This  definition  certainly  subordinates 
truth  to  happiness,  whereas  Erdmann  has,  so  far,  inter- 
preted Wollaston  as  treating  them  as  dual  principles  of 
morality.  The  only  possible  way  of  reconciling  these  very 
different  interpretations  is  to  say  that  Erdmann  under- 

" Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  117.  Wollaston,  Reli. 
of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  39-40. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  9.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

’“Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  119. 


190  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

stands  Wollaston,  to  not  only  subordinate  truth  to  happi- 
ness, but  to  make  of  morality  itself  only  a necessary  means 
to  happiness  and  not  an  end  in  itself.  It  is  not  unfair  to 
say  that  Wollaston  considers  reason  in  an  instrumental  way, 
that  is,  as  instrumental  to  the  realization  of  life.  He  does 
not  agreed  with  Kant  that  the  actual  literal  truth  should 
be  told  in  every  case  in  life.  While  he  hesitates  to  violate 
the  least  truth,  still  verbal  truth  is  subordinated  to  life’s 
true  meanings.®®  While  Wollaston  does  treat  truth  instru- 
mentally,  it  is  not  true  that  he  ever  subordinates  truth  to 
happiness  in  his  moral  system.  If  there  is  any  subordination 
it  is  the  other  way,  and  Erdmann’s  own  interpretation, 
taken  as  a whole,  conveys  that  impression.  Happiness  is 
good  only  when  founded  on  truth,  on  the  real  nature  of 
things.  This  is  undoubtedly  Wollaston’s  position.®^ 

Vorlander  takes  a position  very  similar  to  that  of  Erd- 
mann, in  fact  there  is  some  evidence  of  dependence  of  the  one 
on  the  other.  Vorlander,  though,  differs  from  Erdmann  in 
that  he  does  not  find  Wollaston  at  all  self-contradictory  in 
his  treatment  of  truth  and  happiness.  He  says  that  Wollas- 
ton was  able  to  show  that  “the  moral  aim  of  tnith  coincides 
with  that  of  happiness  (das  mit  dem  sittlichen  Ziel  der 
Wahrheit  das  der  Gliickseligkeit  zusammenfalle),”  because 
a being  can  be  called  happy  “only  when  his  pleasures  are 
true.”  ®^  Vorlander  is  very  true  to  Wollaston  in  his  inter- 
pretation in  that  he  says  that  true  happiness  is  to  be  found, 
not  so  much  in  freedom  from  pain  or  in  excess  of  pleasure 
over  pain,  but  in  conformity  to  the  nature  of  personality 
and  to  the  nature  of  things.  “The  true  and  highest  happi- 
ness of  a being  cannot  be  produced  by  something  which  con- 
tradicts truth  and  denies  the  nature  of  things  (Das  wahre 
und  hochste  Gliick  eines  Wesens  kann  nicht  durch  etwas  her- 
vorgebracht  werden,  was  der  Wahrheit  widerspricht  und  die 
Natur  der  Dinge  velengnet).”  Vorlander  interprets  Wollas- 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  28. 

Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  p.  119.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  pp.  38-9. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  38.  Vorlander,  Gesch.  der  Philosophischen  Moral,  etc.,  p. 
385. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  191 

ton  to  mean  that  the  true  happiness  of  any  man  must  be 
found  in  that  which  “is  not  incongruous  with  its  nature  (das 
nicht  unvertraglich  ist  mit  seiner  Natur),”  but  in  those 
activities  which  correspond  to  the  purpose  and  meaning  of 
human  life.  It  is,  says  Vorlander,  absolutely  essential  to 
morality  that  a man  find  his  “echte  Gliick”  in  that  wliich  is 
consistent  with  his  “nobler  part,”  with  his  “reason.”  He 
understands  Wollaston  to  mean  that  a rational  being  can- 
not find  delight  in  those  pleasures  which  are  irrational  with- 
out contradicting  its  own  nature,  which  practically  means 
that  a man  cannot  get  real  happiness  except  from  that  which 
is  consistent  with  reason.  “Daher  macht  den  Menschen  nur 
das  gliickhch,  was  der  Vemunft  entspricht.”  So,  he  says, 
the  way  to  happiness  and  the  exercise  of  truth  merge,  and 
that  Natural  Religion  is  based  on  the  unity  of  them  in  the 
furtherance  of  human  welfare,  “die  menschliche  Natur  zu 
fordren.” 

In  the  article  on  Ethics  in  the  Britannica  Williams  takes 
the  position  that  “the  dualism  of  governing  principles,  con- 
science and  self-love,  in  Bishop  Butler’s  system,  and  perhaps, 
too,  his  revival  of  the  Platonic  conception  of  human  nature 
as  an  ordered  and  governed  community  of  impulses,  is  per- 
haps most  nearly  anticipated  in  Wollaston’s  ‘Religion  of 
Nature  Delineated.’  Here  for  the  first  time,  we  find  ‘moral 
good’  and  ‘natural  good’  or  ‘happiness’  treated  separately 
as  two  essentially  distinct  objects  of  rational  pursuit;  the 
harmony  between  them  being  regarded  as  a matter  of  reli- 
gious faith.”  I think  that  this  criticism  can  be  best  an- 
swered by  showing  the  connection  of  the  ethical  philosophy 
of  Wollaston  with  the  entire  stream  of  moral  thought  of  the 
time,  particularly  its  relations  to  the  systems  of  Cudworth 
and  Shaftesbury.  Wollaston  took  the  position  that  there  is 
truth  in  both  of  these  supposedly  conflicting  systems,  and 
that  a true  moral  philosophy  must  be  a higher  synthesis  of 
the  two.  Now,  Cudworth  had  presented  the  principle  of 
social  duty  as  abstract  reason,  intuition  as  liable  to  conflict 

Vorlander,  Gesch.  der  Philosophischen  Moral,  etc.,  p.  386. 

**  Williams,  Art.  Ethics  in  Britan. 


192 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


with  the  desire  of  happiness.®®  Shaftesbury,  on  the  other 
hand,  tried  to  show  the  naturalness  of  man’s  social  affec- 
tions and  to  prove  that  there  is  no  contradiction  between 
his  social  affections  and  his  self-regarding  impulses.®®  Wol- 
laston looked  the  situation  over  and  reached  the  conclusion 
that  if  reason  be  thought  of  as  a faculty  which  is  to  perceive 
the  real  natures  of  things  and,  in  the  light  of  our  relations 
to  them,  determine  our  duty,  then  both  the  emotional  im- 
pulses that  prompt  to  social  duty  and  the  a priori  rational 
principle  that  demands  that  men’s  acts  be  consistent  will  be 
realized.®^ 


V 

THE  ETHICS  OF  WOLLASTON  EECONCILES  RATIONALISM  AND 

HEDONISM 

In  this  division  of  my  treatise  I wish  to  defend  the  thesis 
that  the  Ethics  of  Wollaston  is  really  a reconciliation  of 
the  two  equally  extreme  positions  of  Rationalism  and 
Hedonism. 

Ethical  Rationalism  takes  two  forms,  an  extreme  and  a 
moderate.  According  to  the  extreme  form  of  Rationalism 
the  good  life  is  a life  of  pure  reason  from  which  all  sensi- 
bility has  been  eliminated.  Moderate  Rationalism,  on  the 
other  hand,  teaches  that,  while  the  good  life  contains  sensi- 
bility as  an  element,  it  is  fundamentally  rational,  a life  of 
sensibility  guided  by  the  reason.  The  ancient  Stoics  and  the 
modem  Kant  are  good  examples  of  the  former  and  Clarke 
and  Wollaston  are  good  examples  of  the  latter.  Wollaston’s 
rationalism  is  very  far  from  Intuitionalism  for  he  does  not 
believe  in  innate  ideas  of  morality.  He  is  a Rationalist  in 
the  sense  that  the  reason  is  thought  by  him  to  be  the  guide 
in  life,  but  he  thinks  of  reason  as  dependent  upon  experience 
for  its  data.  Knowledge  is  a rational  organization  of  ex- 
perience, according  to  Wollaston,  and  morality  is  determined 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  38-9.  Cudworth,  Intel.  System, 
pp.  730-4. 

“Shaftesbury,  Enquiry  Concerning  Virtue,  Part  II,  Sec.  3. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  19  and  45-6, 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  193 

by  the  nature  of  things,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  thus  at- 
tained. He  treats  sensibility  in  the  same  way.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  the  realization  of  life  and  should  be  treated  as  what 
it  is,  a true  aspect  of  human  life.  The  reason,  however, 
must  be  given  the  entire  emphasis  in  the  evaluation  of  con- 
duct, Wollaston  thinks,  in  that  it  alone  can  control  the  life 
of  sensibility.  So  far  from  being  an  ascetic  he  says  that 
the  good  life  is  a life  of  sensibility  guided  by  the  reason.®® 
Sidgwick  considers  it  a characteristic  difference  between 
ancient  Stoicism  and  modem  British  Ethics  that  the  former 
considered  only  the  universal  reason,  whereas  the  latter  con- 
siders both  the  universal  reason  and  the  egoistic  reason. 
This  is  true,  in  general,  but  I think  that  it  must  be  said  that 
with  Wollaston  the  principle  of  happiness  is  as  much  uni- 
versalized and  rationalized  as  is  the  universal  reason.  His 
principle  is  that  happiness  just  like  anything  else  is  to  be 
treated  as  what  it  is.®® 

The  relation  of  reason  to  the  rest  of  life  is  stated  by  Pro- 
fessor Seth  in  a way  that  would,  I think,  entirely  meet  the 
approval  of  Wollaston;  “The  assertion,  which  is  repeated 
again  and  again  in  the  rational  school,  of  the  dignity  and 
independence  of  man  as  a rational  being,  is  a sublime  and 
momentous  truth.  For  man  rises  out  of  nature,  and  has  to 
assert  his  infinite  rational  superiority  to  nature.  Goodness 
means  the  subjugation  of  nature  to  spirit.  The  good  life  is 
the  rational  life;  the  life  of  mere  nature  is,  in  a rational  be- 
ing, irrational.  And  it  may  well  seem,  in  the  great  crises 
of  the  struggle,  as  if  all  else  but  the  rational  self  were  un- 
worthy to  live,  and  must  absolutely  die.  Yet  nature  also 
has  its  ethical  function;  and  the  moral  life  is  not  so  stern 
and  joyless  as  Stoic  and  Kantian  moralists  would  say.” 
Wollaston  says  that  “nothing  can  be  the  true  happiness  of 
a rational  being,  that  is  inconsistent  with  reason.  ...  If 
anything  becomes  agreeable  to  a rational  being,  which  is 
not  agreeable  to  reason,  it  is  plain  his  reason  is  lost,  his 
nature  deprest,  and  that  he  now  lifts  himself  among  irra- 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  45. 

Sidgwick,  His.  of  Ethics,  pp.  196-7. 

Seth,  Ethical  Principles,  p.  179. 


194)  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

tionals,,  ...  a rational  being  can  like  nothing  of  that  kind 
without  a contradiction  to  itself.” 

Wright  takes  a position  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  sen- 
sibility and  reason  that  is  very  similar  to  the  position  of 
Seth  and  well  states  the  attitude  of  Wollaston  on  the  ques- 
tion. “When  the  rationalist  recommends  the  life  of  reason 
as  the  highest  human  good  he  inevitably  thinks  of  this  in- 
tellectual activity  as  superior  to  feeling  and  sensation.  He 
is  bound  to  insist,  therefore,  that  the  demands  of  feeling 
and  sense  be  strictly  subordinated  to  the  requirements  of 
reason.  An  extreme  rationalism  has  sometimes  claimed  that 
a free  exercise  of  reason,  in  which  consists  the  highest  good, 
would  demand  the  complete  suppression  of  all  natural  feel- 
ings, impulses  and  desires.  “A  moderate  rationalism  finds 
the  good  in  control  rather  than  in  the  entire  suppression  of 
the  life  of  sense  and  feeling.”  Wright  grants  that  intel- 
lectualism  has  often  fallen  into  several  faults,  namely,  asceti- 
cism and  individualism ; but  he  very  truly  says,  that  the 
faults  of  the  opposing  systems  have  been  far  greater. 

The  prerogative  of  a human  being  is  to  be  able  to  guide 
his  life  by  the  law  of  universal  reason.  This  is  due  entirely 
to  man’s  possessing  reason,  and  it  is  reason  alone  which  dif- 
ferentiates man  from  the  rest  of  the  animal  kingdom.  A 
purely  animal  life  is  determined  entirely  from  without  by 
sensory  stimuli;  and  if  man  were  merely  animal,  his  life, 
too,  would  be  guided  by  instincts  and  sensibility.  Man,  of 
course,  is  both  animal  and  human  and  this  is  the  explanation 
of  the  war  among  his  members.  To  be  human  and  moral  is 
to  guide  the  life  by  reason,  instead  of  allowing  it  to  be 
determined  from  below  by  the  senses  and  instincts.  But  Wol- 
laston’s position  is  superior  to  that  of  Stoicism  and  of 
asceticism  generally,  in  that  it  does  not  utterly  disregard 
man’s  lower  nature,  but  rather  seeks  to  realize  it  as  well  as 
man’s  higher  nature.  All  of  life,  sentient  as  well  as  rational, 
must  have  its  true  and  proper  place  in  the  completely  reali- 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  39. 

Wright,  Self-Realization,  p.  113.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin., 
p.  40, 


Exposition  of  Wollaston's  Section  on  Happiness  195 

ized  life.  Because  it  is  reason  which  differentiates  man  from 
the  rest  of  the  animal  kingdom,  his  life  must  therefore,  to 
be  human  and  to  be  moral,  be  guided  by  reason  rather  than 
by  sense;  but  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  the  entire 
animal  nature  must  be  disregarded  in  the  realization  of  the 
moral  life.  Much  of  the  life  of  sensibility,  thinks  Wollas- 
ton, is  entirely  rational,  in  the  sense  that  a rational  world 
requires  its  due  and  proper  expression.  When  Wollaston 
says  that  for  acts  to  be  moral  they  must  be  rational  he  has 
reference  not  to  their  rational  form  but  to  their  conformity 
to  the  real  natures  of  things.  He  says,  that  not  the  motive 
alone  but  all  the  consequences  must  be  considered  in  the  de- 
termination of  the  character  of  an  act.  A rational  being 
ought  to  act  rationally,  means  that  he  must  always  act  in 
such  a way  as  tends  to  fulfill  his  rational  nature.  Such 
actions  are  those  which  are  conformable  to  the  nature  of 
things,  and  the  choice  of  actions  calculated  to  result  in  hu- 
man happiness  is,  therefore,  as  rational  as  any  other  when 
the  happiness  is  true;  but  it  is  contrary  both  to  the  laws 
of  universal  reason  and  to  the  nature  of  things  for  a ra- 
tional being  to  enjoy  an  irrational  pleasure.®^ 

The  position  has  often  been  taken  that  there  is  no  middle 
ground  between  extreme  formal  and  ascetic  Rationalism,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Hedonism  on  the  other.  I think  that 
there  is  such  a middle  course  and  that  Wollaston  has  taken 
it.  He  used  the  methods  of  logic  and  insisted  upon  the  ab- 
solute preeminence  of  the  rational  aspect  of  human  nature, 
but  he,  also,  insisted  that  the  whole  of  man  must  be  taken 
into  consideration  in  treating  a man  as  what  he  is.  Wollas- 
ton says  that  a man  must  be  thought  of  not  just  as  a reason- 
ing being,  but  also  as  a person  with  feelings  and  desires  that 
must  be  considered  in  the  realization  of  personality.  But 
this  does  not  mean  that  he  went  over  to  Hedonism,  nor  that 
he  regarded  the  reasoning  powers  of  man  as  but  means  to 
the  securing  of  happiness.  Man’s  reason  is  also  to  be 
treated  as  what  it  is,  treated  as  an  end  as  well  as  a means. 
He  took  the  position  that  consequences,  in  so  far  as  they 
“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  39. 


196  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

can  be  anticipated,  should  be  considered,  and  certainly  one 
cannot  act  rationally  without  the  due  consideration  of  all 
possible  consequences,  sentient  and  rational. 

Professor  Fite  says : “The  being  who  acts  rationally  acts 
consistent  with  principle,  and  his  rule  of  conduct  is : Let 
your  conduct  be  constantly  determined  by  principle.” 
The  question  is,  did  Wollaston  think  of  a rational  being  as  a 
mere  reasoning  being  in  the  sense  of  purely  formal  logic.'* 
“The  Kantian  being,”  says  Fite,  “is,  in  fact,  the  personifi- 
cation of  the  syllogism.  As  such  he  is  indifferent  to  the 
nature  of  his  conclusions,  provided  only  that  they  are  de- 
duced without  contradiction  from  his  premises;  he  is  in- 
different to  the  ends  attained  by  his  conduct,  provided  only 
that  his  conduct  be  self-consistent.”  Fite  says  that  there 
are  no  such  beings  as  this,  that  a being  of  this  kind  is  a 
psychological  impossibility.®®  Wollaston’s  criterion  of  mo- 
rality is  that  of  consistency,  but  this  principle  is  not  con- 
cerned with  the  principle  alone  but  with  consequences.  The 
“good  will,”  the  intention,  constitutes  an  important  factor 
but  the  objective  factor  is  of  equal  importance.®^ 

Wollaston’s  Ethics  is  that  of  self-realization,  understand- 
ing thereby  “that  the  realization  of  the  self  is  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  purpose  implied  in  the  capacities  of  one’s  nature. 
. . . Life  as  a whole  will  be  an  attempt  to  attain  a complete, 
perfect  and  harmonious  expression  of  all  his  several  capaci- 
ties.” The  one  who  has  this  ideal  of  complete  self-realiza- 
tion for  all  men,  as  has  Wollaston,  “is  not,”  as  Fite  well 
says,  “impartial  with  regard  to  his  premises,  nor  indifferent 
with  regard  to  the  ends  to  be  achieved,  but  on  the  contrary, 
distinctly  prejudiced  in  favor  of  those  ends  which  are  im- 
plied in  his  fundamental  tendencies  and  capacities.  These 
constitute  the  premises  of  his  reason  and  their  consistent 
realization  constitutes  the  rational  process.”  ®®  Moral  ac- 

“ Fite,  Intro.  Study  of  Ethics,  170. 

Ibid.,  p.  206. 

” Kant,  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Pt.  I,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  2.  Wollaston, 
Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  19. 

““  Fite,  Intro.  Study  of  Ethics,  pp.  198-9.  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat. 
Delin.,  pp.  37-9. 


Exposition  of  Wollaston’s  Section  on  Happiness  197 

tivity  is  consistent  conformity  to  rational  principles,  but 
this  is  not  just  logical  consistency,  that  is,  consistency 
merely  for  consistency’s  sake.  This  involves  the  realization 
of  concrete  life  desires  and  feelings  as  well  as  logical  con- 
sistency. This  simply  means  that  the  Ethics  of  Wollaston 
was  objective  as  well  as  subjective.  He  would  not  admit  that 
a life  could  be  denominated  moral  on  the  basis  of  consis- 
tency, which  failed  to  take  into  consideration  human  in- 
stincts, desires  and  feelings  and  evaluated  conduct  purely 
subjectively  and  formally;  but  he  would  insist  that  in  the 
good  life  every  kind  of  consequence  that  can  be  anticipated 
enters  somewhat  into  the  motivation.®® 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  37  and  128. 


PRACTICAL  RELIGION  AND  PRACTICAL 
MORALITY 


Under  this  head  I am  including  Wollaston’s  teachings  of 
a practical  nature  in  sections  VI,  VII,  VIII  and  IX,  which 
includes  a very  large  part  of  the  book,  namely,  from  the 
128th  to  the  214th  page.  The  teachings  of  this  practical 
part  of  his  book  may  be  stated  summarily  in  these  words : 
How  to  so  live  this  life  that  one  may  realize  the  possibili- 
ties of  life ; this  can  be  done  only  by  living  happily  and  well 
and  in  right  relations  with  the  world  of  things,  with  all  man- 
kind and  with  God. 


Section  VI 

“truths  respecting  mankind  in  general,  antecedent 

TO  ALL  HUMAN  LAWs” 

Wollaston  begins  this  section  of  his  work  with  a discus- 
sion of  the  principle  of  individuation,  which  for  our  pur- 
poses means  simply  this,  since  the  natures  and  circumstances 
are  different,  duty  is  somewhat  different  for  each  man.  This 
does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  universal  principle,  but  rather 
that  one  aspect  of  this  universal  principle  of  morality 
is  that  individuality  is  a thing  that  must  be  always  con- 
sidered in  determining  duty.  Wollaston,  after  establishing 
the  supreme  worth  of  the  individual,  proceeds  to  universalize 
this  principle  of  individuation  and  to  make  the  general  good 
the  test  of  morality.  He  says  that  “whatever  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  general  peace  and  welfare  or  good,  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  laws  of  human  nature,  wrong  and  intoler- 
able.” He  seems  to  go  still  further  towards  Utilitarianism 
when  he  says  that,  “those  maxims  may  be  esteemed  natural 
and  true  laws  of  any  particular  society,  which  are  most 
proper  to  procure  happiness  to  it.  Because  happiness  is 

198 


Practical  Religion  and  Practiced  Moralitg  199 

the  end  of  society  and  laws ; otherwise  we  might  suppose 
unhappiness  to  be  proposed  as  the  right  end  of  them;  that 
is,  unhappiness  to  be  desirable,  contrary  to  nature  and 
truth.”  ^ Wollaston  is  not  giving  up  the  idea  of  conformity 
to  nature  as  the  moral  criterion,  but  he  is  taking  pre- 
cisely the  same  attitude  towards  happiness  that  he  took  in 
the  section  on  happiness,  namely,  that  it  should  be  treated 
as  what  it  is.  Now  happiness  in  human  society  is  very  de- 
sirable, consequently  the  principle  of  conformity  to  the  na- 
ture of  things  would  say  that  to  treat  happiness  as  the 
important  thing  that  it  is  would  be  to  seek  its  realization. 
That  he  is  using  the  same  logic  and  the  same  criterion  in 
this  section  that  he  used  in  the  previous  sections  is  evident 
from  this  statement;  “It  is  contradictory  to  say  that  any- 
thing can  be  a general  law  of  nature,”  which  does  not  make 
for  the  general  happiness  of  men,  “who  partake  of  the  same 
common  nature.  . . . The  transgression  of  these  laws,  con- 
ducing to  the  general  good  of  the  world,  is  wrong  and  mor- 
ally evil.”  For  if  mankind  be  differentiated  from  the  rest 
of  the  animal  kingdom  by  reason,  then  the  general  welfare 
of  mankind  “must  be  the  welfare  of  the  rational  nature 
and  therefore  that,  and  the  laws  which  advance  it,  must  be 
founded  in  reason.”  The  only  rule  by  which  mankind  could 
govern  itself  for  the  general  good  of  the  world,  “would  be 
one  conformable  to  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  man- 
kind, that  is  a principle  founded  on  reason.”  ^ 

Wollaston  anticipates  Kant  in  bringing  in  the  test  of  uni- 
versality. He  asks : “What  would  be  the  consequence,  if 
all  men  should  transgi'ess  this  rule.?”  He  answers  that  the 
result  would  be,  “a  general  evil,  or  something  disagreeable 
to  our  nature  and  the  truth  of  our  circumstances,  for  of 
contrary  practices  there  must  be  contrary  effects.”  Who- 
soever should  violate  that  rule,  “would  contribute  his  share 
towards  the  introduction  of  universal  disorder  and  misery,” 
and  would  for  his  part  deny  human  life  to  be  what  it  is, 
would  deny  human  society  to  be  what  it  is,  and  human  hap- 
piness to  be  what  it  is.  Because  the  world  is  coherent,  act- 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  128. 

’ Ibid.,  p.  129. 


200  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

ing  rationally  is  both  the  way  to  rectitude  and  the  way  to 
happiness.  Acts  that  are  disagreeable  to  truth  are  wrong 
and  tend  to  make  men  unhappy.^  Selby-Bigge  says  that 
Wollaston  constantly  confuses  the  violation  of  truth,  which 
constitutes  immorality  for  him,  with  another  kind  of  ab- 
surdity, namely,  “untruthfulness.”  Strange  to  say  Selby- 
Bigge  takes  the  position  that  “untruthfulness”  . . . can 
certainly  be  practiced  without  absurdity  though  it  cannot 
be  imagined  a universal  practice  without  some  absurdity ; 
lying  would  cease  to  be  profitable  to  the  liar  if  no  one  spoke 
the  truth  or  expected  others  to  speak  the  truth.”  ^ Selby- 
Bigge  fails  both  in  his  understanding  of  Wollaston  and  of 
Kant.  Wollaston  does  not  claim  that  all  absurdity  is  im- 
moral but  only  that  immorality  is  essentially  absurd,  for  it 
is  as  self-contradictory  as  intellectual  self-contradiction.® 
His  understanding  of  Kant  is  not  correct.  He  understands 
Kant  to  teach  that  things  can  only  be  denominated  wrong 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  social  chaos  that  would  result 
from  their  universalization.  It  is  true,  both  for  Wollaston 
and  for  Kant,  that  it  is  the  exceptional  nature  of  the  act 
which  makes  it  morally  wrong,  but  that  does  not  mean  that 
it  would  have  to  be  practiced  by  everybody  before  it 
would  become  absurd  behavior  and  so  morally  wrong.  The 
one  immoral  act  is  absurd  precisely  because  it  could  not 
become  universal.  One  may,  with  Kant  and  Wollaston, 
consider  that  the  consequences  of  the  universalization  of 
immorality  would  be  the  disruption  of  society,  but  the  par- 
ticular immoral  act  is  absurd  and  immoral  precisely  because 
it  is  exceptional.  So  our  author  seeks  merely  to  delineate 
the  nature  of  morality  by  comparing  it  to  truth.  Morality 
is  like  truth  in  that  it  is  conformable  to  the  nature  of  things, 
but  the  one  consists  of  thoughts  and  the  other  of  acts.  To 
act  immorally  is  to  treat  things,  as  Clarke  expresses  it,  as 
they  are  not  and  cannot  be.®  Society  would  go  to  pieces  if 
men  generally  acted  otherwise  than  in  conformity  with  true 

® Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  143. 

^ Selby-Bigge,  English  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  p.  xxxii. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  15  and  23. 

“Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.  in  British  Moralists,  489. 


Practical  Religion  and  Practical  Morality  201 

relations.  Wollaston  thinks  that  an  immoral  act  denies  the 
indissoluble  unity  of  life  and  the  world  and  practically 
affirms  the  universe  to  be  a chaos,  not  a cosmos.'^ 

Section  VII 

“tkuths  respecting  paeticueae  societies  of  men  and  of 
governments” 

Wollaston  takes  up  in  this  section  the  treatment  of  man 
as  a social  creature.  He  takes  the  position  that  man  cannot 
live  well  except  in  the  society  of  his  fellows.  He  says  that 
it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  live  a life  of  the  highest 
order,  a life  of  the  reason,  a life  enriched  by  the  arts  and 
sciences,  except  in  society.  He  says  a good  many  things  of 
a utilitarian  nature:  “The  end  of  society  is  the  common 
welfare  and  good  of  the  people  associated,”  and  all  the  laws 
and  customs  of  that  society  must  be  evaluated  from  that 
point  of  view.® 

Section  VIII 

“truths  concerning  families  and  relations” 

The  teachings  of  this  section  are  of  very  much  the  same 
nature  as  those  in  the  previous  section.  They  are  even  more 
concrete  and  practical,  and  consists  of  practical  advice  in 
regard  to  rearing  a family.  Presumably  Wollaston  was 
competent  to  speak  on  the  subject  since  he  was  the  father 
of  eleven  children.® 


Section  IX 

“truths  respecting  a private  man,  and  respecting 
(directly)  only  himself” 

This  is  the  longest  section  in  the  book.  Were  this  all  that 
we  have  from  Wollaston  we  might  accuse  him  of  individual- 
ism. The  practical  teachings  of  the  section  are  naturally  of 

’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  128  and  143. 

“Ibid.,  pp.  145-53. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  154-66. 


202  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

a prudential  nature,  reminding  one  somewhat  of  those  manu- 
als of  wholesome  advice  once  so  common.  He  says  that  a 
man  ought  to  consider  “all  that  he  is,  in  possibility,  that  he 
is  an  animal,  but  that  he  is  also  a rational  creature.”  He 
will  find  from  experience  that  his  instincts,  desires  and  pas- 
sions are  apt  to  take  him  in  the  wrong  direction.  If  he  is 
to  be  true  to  his  real  nature  he  must  subject  his  animal  na- 
ture to  the  law  of  reason.  He  will  find  that  acting  according 
to  reason  will  coincide  with  acting  according  to  truth,  or 
the  true  nature  of  things.^®  As  I have  said  there  is  a good 
deal  of  the  prudential  in  this  section.  “A  man  must,”  says 
Wollaston,  “take  care  not  to  bring  upon  himself  want,  dis- 
ease, trouble;  but  must  provide  for  his  comfortable  subsis- 
tence, as  far  as  he  can  without  contradicting  any  truth,  that 
is  deny  any  matter  of  fact.”  A man  must  not  act  as  if 
he  were  “a  sensitive  being  only,  but  also  as  a sensitive-rational 
being.”  Physical  satisfactions  are,  however,  to  be  enjoyed, 
and  it  is  irrational  to  despise  such  things.  “Bodily  inclina- 
tions and  passions,  when  they  observe  their  due  subordina- 
tion to  reason,  and  only  take  place,  where  that  leaves  it 
open  for  them,  or  allows  them  to  be,  as  it  were,  assessors  to 
it  upon  the  throne,  are  of  admirable  use  in  life,  and  tend 
many  times  to  noble  ends.” 

Wollaston  dwells  upon  the  dangers  of  temptation  and 
the  weakness  of  the  flesh,  and  gives  some  practical  advice  on 
meeting  temptation  and  the  duty  of  self-denial.^®  “Every 
man  is  obliged  to  live  virtuously  and  piously,  because  to 
practice  reason  and  truth  is  to  live  after  that  manner.” 
The  man  who  practices  reason  behaves  himself  both  rever- 
ently and  dutifully. To  live  virtuously  is  to  practice  rea- 
son and  act  conformably  to  truth,  and  he  who  lives  so  must 
be  ultimately  happy,  so  both  the  commands  of  reason  and 
the  desire  for  happiness  will  oblige  a man  to  live  conformably 
to  truth.^^  “The  natural  and  usual  effect  of  virtue  is  hap- 

“ Wollaston,  Relin.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  167-9. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  171. 

“Ibid.,  pp.  172-3. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  175-7. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  179. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  181. 


203 


Practical  Religion  and  Practical  Morality 

piness ; and  if  a virtuous  man  should  in  some  respects  be 
unhappy,  yet  still  his  virtue  will  make  him  less  unhappy ; 
for  at  least  he  enjoys  inward  tranquillity.”  Overton  says 
that  Wollaston  argued  for  immortality  on  the  ground  that 
some  place  is  demanded  by  reason  “where  the  proper  amends 
could  be  made.”  And  Wollaston,  himself,  says,  that  “He 
who  would  act  according  to  truth,  must  not  only  consider 
what  he  is,  and  how  circumstanced  in  this  present  state, 
and  provide  accordingly;  but,  further,  must  consider  him- 
self also  as  one  whose  existence  proceeds  on  into  another, 
and  provide  for  that  too.” 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  182. 

“Overton,  His.  of  the  Eng.  Church  1714-1800,  p.  36. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  218. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  TEACHINGS  OF 
WOLLASTON 


Only  such  metaphysical  teachings  of  Wollaston  as  are 
indissolubly  bound  up  with  his  etliics  are  here  considered. 
It  is  impossible  to  treat  ethical  problems  without  some  con- 
sideration being  given  to  more  ultimate  problems.  Selby- 
Bigge  characterizes  this  period  of  English  ethics  as  unmeta- 
physical.^ This  is  true  in  the  sense  that  the  Eighteenth 
Century  British  moralists  gave  little  attention  to  meta- 
physical discussions,  but  this  was  because  they  took  their 
metaphysics  for  granted.  Professor  Perry  says  that  it  is 
characteristic  of  the  English  to  treat  each  case  on  its  own 
merit  and  apparently  without  reference  to  theory.^  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  Englishman,  and  this  is  especially 
true  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  moralists,  has  no  episte- 
mology nor  metaphysics  in  mind  when  he  philosophizes  about 
moral  matters.  He  is  not  so  departmental  in  his  thinking 
as  many  have  thought,  nor  is  he  destitute  of  ideas  concerning 
ultimate  reality.  The  Englisliman  is  generally  concrete 
in  his  treatment  of  ethics,  but  he  has  general  ideas  in  mind 
and  his  general  view  of  the  world  is  always  clearly  implicated. 
Wollaston  is  typical  in  this  respect  and  it  can  be  clearly 
shown  that  he  was  aware  of  the  metaphysical  implications 
of  his  ethical  philosophy. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  Enlightenment  ac- 
cepted the  Cartesian  dualistic  view  of  the  world.  Most  of 
the  philosophers  just  took  that  for  granted  and  made  it 
the  presupposition  of  all  their  practical  philosophy.  Wol- 
laston was  a true  representative  of  the  Enlightenment.  Per- 
haps Blakey’s  statement  of  his  position  is  a very  fair  char- 
acterization in  most  respects.  He  says  that  Wollaston 

’ Selby-Bigge,  English  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  p.  XIX. 

“Perry,  Present  Conflict  of  Ideals,  ch.  XXXII. 

204 


The  Metaphysical  Teachings  of  Wollaston  205 

belongs  to  the  class  of  theoretical  moralists  rather  than 
metaphysicians.  But,  says  Blakey,  his  ethical  speculation 
rested  upon  a system  of  metaphysics  “that  might  be  classi- 
fied as  the  epistemology  of  common  sense  and  as  metaphysi- 
cal dualism.  Its  fundamental  principles  are  that  man  is 
constituted  of  two  elements,  mind  and  body,  the  former  of 
which  is  thought  of  as  a real  spiritual  entity ; that  it  has  in- 
nate powers  of  reflection,  and  notions  of  right  and  wrong, 
good  and  evil,  irrespective  of  the  influence  of  the  senses, 
or  the  conventional  rules  of  society.  He  believes  in  the 
stability  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  that  everything  in  the 
world  is  regulated  by  infinite  wisdom.  His  system  of  ethics 
is  grounded  on  a simple  metaphysical  principle  that  truth 
in  everything  is  to  be  in  conformity  with  the  constituted 
order  of  nature.”  He  says  also  that  Wollaston  insists  that 
“Every  act  of  a rational  being  must  be  the  act  of  one  cap- 
able of  distinguishing  and  choosing  by  the  powers  of  one’s 
own  will,”  ® I agree  entirely  with  this  interpretation,  with 
the  exception  of  the  statement  in  regard  to  man’s  mind  pos- 
sessing “notions  of  right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil.”  There 
is  a certain  idealism  in  Wollaston’s  Weltanschauung,  of 
that  there  can  be  no  doubt,  but  it  was  of  the  theistic  type 
and  therefore  thought  to  be  consistent  with  dualism. 

Morell  classifies  Wollaston  with  the  idealists  and,  it  must 
be  admitted,  has  very  good  grounds  for  so  doing  because 
Wollaston  teaches  that  truth  is  the  moral  criterion  and  that 
there  is  an  ultimate  coincidence  between  truth,  goodness  and 
happiness.^  Idealism  is  involved,  Morell  thinks,  in  Wollas- 
ton’s thought  that  there  are  certain  fixed  relations  in  the 
universe,  cognizable  by  the  human  mind,  and  that  virtue  con- 
sists in  acting  conformably  thereto.  Ultimate  coherency,  a 
consistent  world  order,  is  the  presupposition  of  a system  of 
morality  based  on  truth  as  a criterion,  when  truth  is  con- 
ceived of  as  Wollaston  conceives  it,  namely,  not  as  an  innate 
idea  but  as  ascertained  truth  involving  both  experience  and 
reason.®  This  is  true  because  truth  in  actuality  is  the  pre- 

^ Blakey,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  Ill,  1,  3,  7 and  8. 

‘ Morell,  His.  of  Modern  Phil. 

® Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  51  and  45-6. 


206 


The  Ethics  of  William  WollastOTb 


condition  of  truth  being  found  by  empirical  and  rational 
processes.  The  fact  that  Wollaston  insists  upon  both  the 
rationality  of  morality  and  upon  the  objectivity  of  it  de- 
mands an  ultimate  idealism  as  a metaphysics,  because  for 
morality  to  be  both  reasonable  and  in  conformity  to  the  na- 
ture of  things  both  minds  and  things  must  belong  to  one  all- 
comprehending  world  of  meaning,  one  coherent  world  order.® 
It  is  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  as  Clarke  says,  that  is, 
in  the  very  nature  of  reality  and  man,  that  moral  distinc- 
tions are  founded.  The  individual  soul  stands  to  the  rest  of 
nature  in  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  the  perceiving 
mind  and  the  things  perceived.  The  universe  is  rational, 
there  is  a certain  preestablished  harmony  between  minds  and 
things,  and  the  same  reason  which  pervades  the  whole  exists 
also  in  each  individual  mind.  This  is  the  metaphysical 
presupposition  of  knowledge  in  general  and  of  moral  knowl- 
edge in  particular,  when  conceived  objectively  as  Wollas- 
ton conceives  it.^ 

As  we  have  seen,  Wollaston  conceives  of  the  world  relations 
as  grounded  in  theism.  “If  there  is  a supreme  being,  upon 
whom  the  existence  of  the  world  depends ; and  nothing  can 
be  in  it  but  what  He  either  causes,  or  permits  to  be ; then  to 
own  things  to  be  as  they  are  is  to  own  what  He  causes ; and 
this  is  to  take  things  as  He  gives  them,  to  go  into  His  con- 
stitution of  the  world,  and  to  submit  to  His  will  revealed  in 
the  books  of  nature.  . . . The  owning  of  things,  in  all  our 
conduct,  to  be  as  they  are  is  obedience  ...  to  the  Author  of 
Nature.  . . . Things  cannot  be  denied  to  be  what  they  are 
. . . without  contradicting  truths  eternal.”  And  since  God 
has  “constituted”  things  as  they  are  the  violation  of  the 
nature  of  things  “is  to  act  in  opposition  ...  to  His  nature.”  ® 

Wollaston’s  conception  of  the  universe  is  involved  in  his 
conception  of  the  relation  of  morality  and  religion.  In  a 
sense  his  view  of  the  relation  of  morality  and  religion  is 
that  of  Deism,  namely,  the  practical  identification  of  the 
two.  It  is  also  true,  however,  that  he  begins  his  work  with 

‘Wollaston,  Roll,  of  NaL  Delin.,  p.  24. 

’ Clarke,  Natural  Reli.,  p.  42. 

‘Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  8. 


The  Metaphysical  Teachings  of  Wollaston  207 

a statement  of  the  relation  of  the  two  that  is  so  like  Kant’s 
conception  of  that  relation  that  some  thinkers  are  inclined 
to  believe  that  Kant  derived  his  conception  from  Wollaston. 
How  like  Kant  are  these  opening  words  of  The  Religion  of 
Nature  Delineated:  “The  foundation  of  religion  lies  in  that 
difference  between  the  acts  of  men,  which  distinguish  them 
into  good,  evil  and  indifferent.  For  if  there  is  such  a dif- 
ference, there  must  be  religion!”  Like  Kant,  he  takes  the 
position  that  morality  is  imperative  and  indubitable  in  its 
demands  and  that  the  necessary  implications  of  the  moral 
consciousness  are  equally  imperative  and  indubitable.  Kant 
says  that  the  postulates  of  the  moral  law  are  God,  freedom 
and  immortality.  Wollaston  says  “the  foundation  of  re- 
ligion lies  in  the  difference  which  men  naturally  and  neces- 
sarily make  between  good  and  evil.  But  while  Wollaston, 
like  Kant,  starts  from  the  practical  side,  he  would  not  like 
him  say  that  the  moral  proof  is  the  only  proof,  that  the 
theoretical  reason  is  inadequate.  He  would  not  say  that 
religion  is  dubious  when  theoretically  considered  and  that 
the  great  tenets  of  religion  can  only  be  established  by  the 
moral  proof.  Wollaston  thinks  that  what  Kant  called  the 
pure  reason  is  really  the  only  kind  of  reason;  he  believes, 
however,  that  there  are  two  elements  in  the  reason,  the  em- 
pirical and  the  rational.  This  reason,  he  thinks,  is  able  to 
tell  us  both  what  is  true  and  what  we  ought  to  do.  Wollas- 
ton seeks  to  delineate  the  religion  of  nature,  that  is  to  both 
rationalize  and  moralize  religion.  Kant  sought  to  prove 
God,  freedom  and  immortality  by  the  moral  proof.  Wol- 
laston’s position  is  rather  that  any  kind  of  proof  must  be 
capable  of  intellectualization,  for  morality  itself  is  based 
on  an  intellectual  foundation  or  an  objective  basis,  not  an 
intuitional  basis  as  Kant  thought.  Moral  and  religious 
convictions  to  be  sure,  are  held  by  those  who  have  not  worked 
out  the  full  metaphysical  implications  of  those  convictions, 
which  implications  constitute  an  essential  part  of  those  con- 
victions.® 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  6,  48-9,  53  and  61.  Kant,  Kritik 
d.  Prakt.  Vernuft,  Werke  II,  133  ff.,  149  ff.  Kant,  Grundlegung  zur 
Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  3 Abschn.,  Werke. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGY  OF  WOLLASTON 


Section  III 

“of  reasoning,  and  the  ways  of  discovering  truth” 

This  section  of  Wollaston’s  book  is  really  epistemological 
in  nature,  as  the  heading  indicates,  and  it  is  not  especially 
significant  for  ethics.  But  it  is  interesting  and  significant 
that  Wollaston  dealt  with  this  question  of  knowledge  be- 
cause of  an  objection  of  an  epistemological  character  that 
had  been  offered  against  his  ethical  system.  He  says  that 
“an  objection  made  oblige  me  in  the  next  place  to  say  some- 
thing concerning  the  means  of  knowing,  what  is  true;  whether 
there  are  any,  that  are  sure,  and  which  one  may  safely  rely 
upon.  For  if  there  be  not,  all  that  I have  written  is  to  no 
purpose.”  In  addition  to  knowledge  of  particulars,  an  intel- 
ligent being  must  have  abstract  and  universal  knowledge; 
“this  must  be  true  if  there  be  any  such  thing  as  a rational 
being.”  That  this  is  the  pre-condition  of  rationality,  he 
thinks  to  be  an  all-sufficient  proof.  This  is  the  argument 
from  efficient  cause,  namely,  that  there  must  be  a rational 
world  ground  or  else  there  could  be  no  rational  creatures 
in  the  world,  but  there  are  rational  creatures  in  the  world 
so  there  must  be  a rational  world  ground.^  Wollaston  says 
that  “the  knowledge  of  a particular  idea  is  only  the  particu- 
lar knowledge  of  that  idea  or  thing;  there  it  ends.  But 
reason  is  something  universal,  a kind  of  general  instrument, 
applicable  to  particular  things  and  cases  as  they  occur.” 
We  have,  he  says,  ideas  of  a logical,  metaphysical  and 
mathematical  nature  which  are  not  limited  to  particular 
things,  but  ideas  which  “comprehend  whole  classes  and  kinds. 
And  it  is  by  the  help  of  these  that  we  reason.  ...  If  a 
proposition  be  true,  it  is  always  so  in  all  the  instances  and 

* Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  41. 

208 


The  Epistemology  of  Wollaston  209 

uses  to  which  it  is  applicable,  for  otherwise  it  must  be  both 
true  and  false.”  ^ 

Wollaston  next  proceeds  to  show  how  absolutely  essential 
correct  knowledge  is  to  a correct  understanding  of  what 
man’s  duty  is.  The  relation  of  ethics  and  epistemology  is 
necessarily  very  close  when  ethics  is  conceived  objectively, 
namely,  when  duty  is  determined  by  the  real  nature  and  re- 
lations of  things.  This  is  true  because  one  can  have  no 
idea  of  one’s  duty  without  a clear  knowledge  of  things  and 
relations.  This  relation  would  be  quite  otherwise  in  the 
systems  of  ethics  which  found  the  moral  criterion  not  on 
truth  but  on  intuition,  moral  sense  or  feeling,  because  in 
those  systems  the  general  problem  of  knowledge  is  irrelevant 
since  morality  is  based  on  a special  kind  of  knowledge.  But 
Wollaston  clearly  realizes  that  if  truth  is  to  be  taken  to  be 
the  criterion  of  morality  and  if  truth  is  to  be  conceived  as  the 
conformity  of  thoughts  to  the  real  nature  of  things  in  the 
objective  world,  then  is  a clear  understanding  of  the  entire 
process  of  knowing  important  for  ethics.  He  says  that  the 
faculty  of  reason  is  the  moral  faculty  also,  and  that  the 
knowledge  of  what  is  moral  is  dependent  upon  what  is  real. 
“That  power  which  any  intelligent  being  has  of  surveying 
his  own  ideas  and  of  comparing  them,  of  forming  to  him- 
self out  of  those  that  are  immediate  and  abstract  such  gen- 
eral and  fundamental  truths  as  he  can  be  sure  of,  and  of 
making  such  inferences  and  conclusions  as  are  agreeable  to 
them,  in  order  to  find  out  more  truth,  resolve  some  question 
or  determine  what  is  fit  to  be  done  upon  occasion,  is  what  I 
mean  by  the  faculty  of  reason.”  Most  people,  he  says,  both 
think  and  live  in  a hand-to-mouth  fashion,  because  “the  gen- 
erality of  people  are  so  little  under  the  dominion  of  reason,” 
guided  only  by  conventional  ideas  and  their  own  passions.® 

In  his  epistemology  Wollaston  seeks  to  effect  a reconcilia- 
tion of  empiricism  and  rationalism.  I have  taken  the  posi- 
tion throughout  this  paper  that  Wollaston  is  not  to  be  clas- 
sified as  an  intuitionist  in  morals  nor  as  an  intuitionalist  in 
knowledge.  The  proof  of  my  position  is  established  suffi- 

’ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  45-6. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  45-6. 


210 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


cientl}^  by  the  one  fact  that,  from  first  to  last,  Wollaston 
bases  morality  upon  the  nature  of  things.  No  one,  cer- 
tainly, would  take  the  position  that  one  could  have  intui- 
tional knowledge  of  the  objective  world,  so  if  morality  is  to 
an  extent  determined  by  the  nature  of  things  it  is  to  that 
extent  dependent  upon  empirical  knowledge  for  no  other 
kind  of  knowledge  can  be  had  of  the  world  of  things.  Ratio- 
cination is  also  necessary  in  most  cases  to  determine  one’s 
relations  and  one’s  duty  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances. 
As  I have  already  said,  Wollaston  was  perhaps  more  in- 
fluenced by  Locke’s  epistemology  than  by  any  other  influence, 
and  he  agreed  with  Locke  that  there  are  no  innate  ideas  of 
any  kind.  He  did  not,  however,  believe  the  mind  to  be  en- 
tirely passive  in  knowledge,  but  rather  took  the  position  that 
knowledge  is  an  organization  of  the  experiences  presented 
by  the  senses.  “There  is  such  a thing  as  right  reason. 
. . . To  prove  there  is  no  such  thing  as  right  reason  by  any 
good  argument,  is  indeed  impossible;  because  that  would  be 
to  show  there  is  such  a thing,  by  the  manner  of  proving  that 
there  is  not.”  Wollaston  says  that  we  have  immediate  and 
abstract  ideas  and  that  the  relations  of  these  are  “ade- 
quately known  by  the  mind,”  but  he  also  says  that  “these 
are  notified  to  us  by  the  help  of  our  senses.”  He  says,  fur- 
ther, that  “more  truth  particularly  of  the  kind,  which  is 
most  useful  to  us  in  our  conduct  here,  is  discoverable  by  this 
method.”  ^ I do  not  understand  him  to  say  that  there  are 
innate  ideas  of  morality  or  other  innate  ideas,  but  only  that 
there  is  a rational  factor  in  knowledge,  and  as  much  in  moral 
knowledge  as  in  any  other.  He  clearly  believes,  with  Locke, 
that  everything  in  the  understanding  came  in  through  the 
senses,  but  he  just  as  surely  believes  in  a rational  synthetic 
active  mind  as  a factor  in  knowledge.^  It  is  this  that  enables 
one  to  orientate  himself  in  any  life  situation  and  to  decide 
just  what  ought  to  be  done.  So  Wollaston  teaches  that 
there  are  both  sensory  and  rational  factors  in  knowledge 
and  so  in  morality.  It  may  be  asked,  if  this  be  true,  why 
has  Wollaston  so  frequently  been  classed  with  the  intu- 

* Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  pp.  48-9. 

“Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  bk.  I,  ch.  3. 


The  Epistemology  of  WoUaston  211 

itionists?  I think  that  a good  deal  of  this  misinterpretation 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  this  section  of  his  book  is  not  at  all 
well  known.  Many  of  those  who  characterize  his  system  as 
Intuitionism  show  no  evidence  of  having  read  this  section 
giving  his  theory  of  knowledge,  wliich  is  published  only  iri 
his  complete  work,  a very  rare  book.  Naturally  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge  is  treated  only  incidentally  in  the  other 
sections. 

Wollaston  then  makes  the  ethical  application  of  his  episte- 
mology: “To  act  according  to  right  reason,  and  to  act  ac- 
cording to  truth  are  in  effect  the  same.  ...  To  be  gov- 
erned by  reason  is  the  general  law  imposed  by  the  Author 
of  Nature  upon  them,  whose  uppennost  faculty  is  reason; 
as  the  dictates  of  it  in  particular  cases  are  the  particular 
laws,  to  which  they  are  subject.”  ® Here,  as  plainly  as  any- 
where, Wollaston  gives  his  idea  of  what  conscience  is.  It 
is  a man’s  judgment  as  to  just  what  he,  in  particular,  ought 
to  do,  under  the  particular  circumstances.  He  makes  it 
evident  that  this  is  his  view  as  he  goes  on  to  say:  “It  is 
plain,  that  reason  is  of  a commanding  nature;  it  enjoins 
this,  condemns  that,  only  allows  some  other  things,  and  will 
be  paramount  if  it  is  at  all.  Now  a being,  who  has  such  a 
determining  and  governing  power  so  placed  in  his  nature,  as 
to  be  essential  to  him,  is  a being  certainly  framed  to  be 
governed  by  that  power.  It  seems  to  me  as  much  designed 
by  nature  or  rather  the  Author  of  Nature,  that  rational 
animals  should  use  their  reason,  and  steer  by  it ; as  it  is  by 
the  shipwright,  that  the  pilot  should  direct  the  vessel  by  the 
use  of  the  rudder  he  has  fitted  to  it.  The  rudder  would  not 
be  there,  if  it  were  not  to  be  used ; nor  would  reason  be  im- 
planted in  any  nature  only  to  be  not  cultivated  and  neg- 
lected. And  it  is  certain,  it  cannot  be  used,  but  it  must 
command;  such  is  its  nature.  It  is  not  in  one’s  power  de- 
liberately to  resolve  not  to  be  governed  by  reason.”  For, 
he  argues,  it  is  contradictory  to  reason  that  one  will  not 
be  governed  by  reason  and  equally  so  for  a rational  being 
not  to  reason  why  he  acts.  The  fact  that  one  is  to  steer 
by  the  reason  by  no  means  implies  that  experience  is  unnec- 

* Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  50. 


212 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


essary ^ in  fact,  no  figure  could  better  represent  the  function 
and  necessity  of  the  two  factors  in  knowledge  and  in  morals 
than  that  of  the  pilot. Wollaston  thinks  that  one  can 
steer  clear  of  all  dangers  by  the  right  use  of  reason,  so  he 
says  that,  “If  a rational  being,  as  such,  is  under  obligation 
to  obey  reason,  and  this  obedience,  or  practice  of  reason, 
coincides  with  the  observation  of  truth,”  it  follows  that 
Natural  Religion  is  true.® 

It  is  not  time,  as  some  critics  of  Wollaston  accuse,  that 
he  identifies  intellectual  error  and  immorality,  for  he  insists 
that  immorality  as  truly  as  morality  implies  the  truth  of 
the  relations,  and  it  could  not  be  immorality  otherwise.®  It 
is  true  that  he  emphasizes  proper  education  and  thinks  that 
a good  deal  of  the  evils  of  the  world  could  be  remedied  by 
education.  “The  generality  of  people,”  he  says,  “are  not 
sufficiently  prepared  by  a proper  education,  to  find  truth 
by  reasoning.  And  of  them  who  have  liberal  education,  some 
are  soon  immersed  and  lost  in  pleasures,  or  at  least  in  fash- 
ionable methods  of  living,  rolling  from  one. visit  or  company 
to  another,  and  flying  from  nothing  so  much  as  from  them- 
selves and  the  quiet  retreat  proper  for  meditation;  others 
become  involved  in  business  and  the  intricate  affairs  of 
life.” 

Dugald  Stewart  says  that  Wollaston  tried  to  reconcile 
Locke’s  theory  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  with  the  immuta- 
bility of  moral  distinctions  by  taking  the  position  that  vir- 
tue consists  in  conduct  conformable  to  truth.  He  says  that 
Wollaston  insisted  that  right  and  wrong  cannot  be  just 
simple  ideas,  but  that  morality  consists  of  actions  conform- 
able with  relations  perceived  by  the  reason.^^  If  Stewart  is 
right,  and  I think  that  he  is,  Wollaston  agreed  with  Locke 
that  there  are  no  innate  ideas  either  of  morality  or  any 
other  kind.  Right  and  wrong  are  not  original  notions,  but 
are  products  of  experience  and  ratiocination.  There  are 

’Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Delin.,  p.  51. 

* Ibid.,  p.  52. 

* Ibid.,  p.  8. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  61. 

“D.  Stewart,  Works,  vol.  VI,  p.  290. 


The  Epistemology  of  WoUaston  213 

two  factors  in  knowledge,  thinks  Wollaston,  an  empirical 
and  a rational,  and  he  thinks  of  them  as  having  just  about 
the  same  relation  to  each  other  as  Kant  afterwards  gave 
them.  He  would  not  deny  that  all  knowledge  comes  from 
experience,  but  he  does  insist  upon  the  importance  of  the 
rational  factor.  In  Wollaston’s  thought  it  is  not  just  empty 
formal  reason  that  constitutes  the  criterion  of  morality, 
and  here  he  differs  essentially  from  Kant  who  made  morality 
to  rest  on  an  intuition  due  to  the  impingement  of  an  infal- 
lible conscience.  Kant  made  the  moral  law  autonomous, 
resting  neither  upon  experience,  nor  upon  deductions  of  the 
speculative  reason;  but  upon  the  revelation  of  immediate 
consciousness.^^ 

Wollaston  would  not,  however,  go  quite  as  far  as  Locke 
does  in  the  empirical  direction.  Locke’s  position  is  that  our 
rules  of  morality,  so  far  from  being  innate  ideas  are  just 
the  practical  regulations  that  experience  has  demonstrated 
to  be  best.  Wollaston  would  not  say  with  Locke  that  the 
truth  and  reasonableness  of  the  Golden  Rule  need  to  be 
demonstrated  but  would  say  that  intelligence  would  assent 
to  it  as  an  unquestionable  truth.  I think  that  Wundt  is 
right  in  saying  that  Wollaston’s  ethics  follows  logically 
from  the  epistemology  of  Locke.  “As  truth  consists  in 
the  agreement  of  our  ideas  with  the  nature  of  things,  so  the 
good  consists  in  the  agreement  of  our  acts  with  things.” 
To  act  according  to  the  nature  of  things  is  to  act  morally 
and  in  obedience  to  God.  So  in  order  to  act  morally,  ac- 
cording to  Wundt’s  interpretation  of  Wollaston,  one  must 
first  discover  the  nature  of  things  and  his  relation  thereto, 
then  what  one’s  duty  i^  begins  to  become  evident,^®  When 
it  is  said  that  Wollaston  makes  reason  the  moral  faculty, 
it  must,  then,  be  remembered  that  it  is  the  ordinary  reason 
that  is  meant  and  that  the  reason  determines  what  is  right 

“ Kant,  Grundlegung  zur  Meta,  der  Sitten,  Werke,  III,  44. 

“Locke,  Human  Understanding,  pp.  26-8. 

“ “Wie  das  wahre  in  der  Uebereinstimmung  unserer  Vorstellungen  mit 
der  Natur  der  Dinge  bestehe,  so  das  Gute  in  der  Ueberinstimmung 
unserer  Handlungen  mit  den  Dingen.” 

“Wundt,  Ethil^  p.  323. 


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The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 

and  wrong  as  it  determines  true  and  false,  namely,  by  ascer- 
taining the  facts  and  passing  judgment  upon  the  situation.^® 

Noack  says  that  Wollaston  agreed  with  Locke  ej)istemo- 
logically  with  regard  to  the  matter  of  innate  ideas.  He  says 
that  Wollaston  also  “denies  with  Locke  all  innate  practical 
principles  (alle  angeboren  praktischen  Grundsatze),  and 
finds  the  great  principle  of  natural  religion  in  that  every 
intelligent,  active  and  free  being  should  act  so  that  he  does 
not  contradict  any  truth  with  his  action  or  that  he  may 
treat  everything  as  such  as  it  is.”  Williams  goes  so  far 
as  to  say  that  this  view  of  ethics  is  a more  logical  conse- 
quence of  Locke’s  epistemology  than  is  Locke’s  own  ethics. 
This  he  says  is  true  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  these  moralists 
are  generally  supposed  to  hold  the  very  different  theory  of 
Intuitionism.^®  Practically  this  same  position  is  taken  in 
the  anonymous  article  in  Francke’s  Dictionary  of  Philosophy 
and  Science.  It  is  stated  “thaj;  Wollaston  must  be  ranked 
among  those  philosophers  who  base  morality  on  reason  and 
not  feeling  ...  or  on  interest.”  This  distinguishes  Wol- 
laston’s position  both  from  that  of  Hedonism  and  that  of 
Intuitionism,  with  which  systems  he  has  often  been  errone- 
ously connected.  The  article  is  very  careful  to  state  that 
his  position  is  rationalistic  but  not  intuitionalistic.  It  says 
that  “the  majority  of  the  Rationalistic  School  consider  the 
idea  of  good  as  a supreme  principle,  absolutely  simple  and 
irreducible,  divine  type  placed  by  God  in  our  intelligence.”' 
The  article  goes  on  to  say  that  Wollaston  takes  quite  a dif- 
ferent position.  He  tried  to  state  the  criterion  of  morality 
in  intellectual  terms:  “To  act  confonnably  with^  truth  is 
to  act  well  (Agir  conformemant  a la  verite,  c’est  bien 
Agir) .” 

Maurice  says  that  Wollaston  wrote  his  book  before 
Locke’s  Essay  had  gained  any  great  authority,  but  that 
“he  participated  in  many  of  the  feelings  that  gave  birth  to 
it.”  He  regarded  “truth  as  the  foundation”  of  man’s  na- 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  51. 

” Noack,  Phil.  Gesch.  Lexion,  p.  931. 

“ Williams,  Art.  Ethics,  Brit. 

“ Francke,  Diet.  Des  Sciences  Philosophiques,  p.  1728. 

Ibid.,  p.  1729. 


The  Epistemology  of  Wollaston  215 

ture,  Maurice  says,  and  also  took  the  position  that  “to  be 
true  is  to  be  happy.”  Maurice  says  that  Locke  had  been 
compelled  by  his  epistemology  to  say  that  things  are  good 
or  bad  “only  in  reference  to  pleasure  or  pain.”  Maurice 
says  that:  “If  we  must  begin  from  the  senses,  if  all  knowl- 
edge of  what  man  thinks  and- is  must  be  derived  from  im- 
pressions on  the  senses,  or  from  reflections  on  these  impres- 
sions, the  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain  must  be  regarded 
as  the  ultimate  ground  of  good  and  evil.”  It  is  possible 
to  be  empirical  in  method  and  arrive  at  an  ethical  philosophy 
other  than  Hedonism,  thinks  Maurice,  only  by  giving  due 
consideration  to  what  is  implied  by  “reflections  on  these  im- 
pressions” as  a factor  in  knowledge,  but  this  is  precisely  what 
is  meant  by  rationalism.  Of  course  you  cannot  discover  the 
true  nature  of  things  without  actual  sense  data,  but  this 
data  will  be  meaningless  without  organization.  An  objective 
system  of  ethics  must  start  with  the  nature  of  things  and 
this  can  be  discovered  only  empirically,  but  moral  as  well  as 
intellectual  orientation  necessitates  a synthesis  of  experi- 
ence. 

Smale,  in  his  critical  treatment  of  the  abstract  rational- 
ism of  Cudworth,  shows  the  way  that  Wollaston  relates  the 
two  factors  in  knowledge.  He  says  that  there  can  be  no 
knowledge  that  is  purely  sense  knowledge  because  the  senses 
give  only  the  individual,  the  material  and  the  accidental, 
while  knowledge  is  occupied  with  the  universal,  the  abstract 
and  the  essential.  Sense,  as  such,  “is  a mere  consciousness 
of  the  impression,  without  the  slightest  reference  to  truth 
or  falsehood ; but  it  is  with  truth  and  falsehood  that  knowl- 
edge has  to  do.  Sense  but  gives  to  the  mind  the  cue  fpr 
action  and  hints  to  the  understanding.”  Sense,  Smale 
says,  can  only  give  a never-ending  flux,  each  part  of  which 
is  individual  and  unconnected  with  any  other.  Knowledge 
is  dependent  upon  sense,  but  it  is  equally  dependent  upon 
the  rational  factor.  Cudworth  is  right,  thinks  Smale,  in 
holding  that  “the  reason  is  the  divine  governor  of  man’s 

““  Maurice,  Moral  and  Metaphysical  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  454. 

“Ibid.,  p.  446. 

“Smale,  Sense  and  Reason  in  Cudworth,  With  Especial  Reference  to 
the  Ethical  Implications,  pp.  10-11. 


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The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


life,  the  very  voice  of  God,”  if  he  means  by  the  reason  “the 
organized  activity  of  the  intelligible  ideas.”  In  this  sense, 
Smale  says,  the  reason  can  be  regarded  as  the  basis  of 
morality ; for  “as  the  relations  of  space  and  number  have 
objective  reality  cognizable  by  the  reason;  so  also  have 
the  distinctions  of  good  and  evil.”  In  this  sense  Wol- 
laston regards  the  reason  as  the  moral  faculty.  Cudworth 
had  a very  different  conception  of  the  reason’s  way  of  gov- 
erning life.  He  thought  that  the  guidance  of  the  reason 
is  due  to  certain  innate  ideas  of  good  and  evil  which  the 
mind  has  prior  to  all  experience. 

Robert  Blakey  thinks  that  Wollaston  held  a view  like 
Cudworth’s.  He  takes  a rather  interesting  position  in  his 
interpretation  of  Wollaston,  saying  that  “his  ethical  specu- 
lations rested  upon  a system  of  metaphysical  knowledge  that 
might  be  classified  as  the  epistemology  of  common  sense” 
based  on  a “metaphysical  dualism.^®  I would  be  disposed 
to  agree  that  this  is,  so  far,  a fair  characterization  of  his 
philosophy.  He  does  not  stop  here,  nor  does  he  interpret 
Wollaston’s  theory  of  moral  knowledge  at  all  realistically  as 
he  has  led  one  to  expect.  Instead  be  says  that  Wollaston 
taught  that  the  mind  is  “a  real  spiritual  entity”  and  that 
“it  has  innate  powers  of  reflection,  and  notions  of  right  and 
wrong,  good  and  evil,  irrespective  of  the  influence  of  the 
senses,  or  the  conventional  rules  of  society.”  While  he  says 
that  “Wollaston’s  ethics  is  grounded  on  a simple  metaphysi- 
cal principle  that  truth  in  everything  is  to  be  in  conformity 
with  the  constituted  order  of  nature  . . . and  that  every- 
thing in  the  world  is  regulated  by  infinite  wisdom,”  he  thinks 
that  Wollaston’s  ethics  is  that  of  Intuitionism.  He  inter- 
prets Wollaston  this  way  and  then  goes  right  on  and  says 
that  he  taught  that  “every  act  of  a rational  being,  must  be 
the  act  of  one  capable  of  distinguishing  and  choosing  by 
the  powers  of  its  own  will.” 

Erdmann  says  that  Wollaston’s  system  of  ethics  rests 
upon  an  empirical  epistemology.  He  characterizes  his 

^ Smale,  Sense  and  Reason  in  Cudworth,  etc.,  pp.  11-14. 

““  Blakey,  His.  of  Phil.,  vol.  Ill,  1 and  3. 

“"Ibid.,  7-8. 


The  Epistemology  of  Wollaston  217 

standard  of  morality  as  objective,  saying  that  his  criterion 
is  based  neither  upon  an  innate  idea  of  virtue  nor  upon  an 
inner  impulse  of  feeling  of  oughtness,  but  upon  the  real  ob- 
jective nature  of  things.  Now  this  objective  nature  of  things 
can  be  known  only  by  experience,  consequently  objective 
ethics  must  start  with  experience.  I do  not  understand 
Erdmann  to  deny  that  Wollaston  believed  in  a general  pre- 
established  harmony  or  general  rationality  throughout  the 
universe,  but  only  to  insist  that  the  individual  mind  is  de- 
pendent upon  experience  for  its  knowledge  of  the  world 
beyond  itself,  and  that  things  cannot  be  treated  as  they  are 
unless  we  know  what  they  are.  It  is,  we  may  say,  an  a 
priori  principle,  with  Wollaston,  that  things  should  be 
treated  as  they  are;  but  what  they  are  is  something  that 
must  be  ascertained  by  experience.  “If,”  says  Erdmann, 
“the  essential  of  this  doctrine  is  that  the  nature  of  things 
determines  action  and  that  the  same  is  conditioned  by  the 
knowledge  of  the  things,  the  theoretical  question  how  we 
know  the  things  and  their  relations  is  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance for  ethics  from  this  point  of  view.”  For  this  rea- 
son, he  says,  Wollaston  raises  the  epistemological  ques- 
tion. “Now  when  he  does  not  answer  the  question  to  the 
effect  that  knowledge  comes  from  experience,  but  rather 
that  it  is  based  on  certain  abstract  ideas  whose  relations 
are  directly  certain  to  us  and  give  the  contents  to  the  uni- 
versally true  propositions  whose  application  particular 
true  propositions  are;  this  seems  to  speak  against  the  view 
that  Wollaston  is  an  empiricist.”  Nevertheless,  says  Erd- 
mann, that  is  his  epistemology.^'^  Erdmann  thinks  that 
Wollaston  failed  to  think  himself  through,  so  that  there  is 
no  complete  agreem^ent  between  his  attitude  toward  the  theo- 
retical question  of  knowledge  and  his  attitude  toward  moral 
knowledge.  “In  the  moral  realm  he  has  not  arrived  at  a 
pure  empiricism,”  but  he  rather  “oscillates,”  thinks  Erd- 
mann; “Sometimes  he  insists  on  the  certainty  of  reason,  on 
ratiocination  (der  Sicherheit  der  Vernunft-Erkenntniss), 
and  seems  to  greatly  prefer  it  to  sense  perception  or  empiri- 
cal knowledge;  because  the  sense  organs  are  defective  he 
Erdmann,  Geschichte  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  119. 


218 


The  Ethics  of  WiLliam  WoUaston 


regards  knowledge  that  is  dependent  upon  sense  data  as 
unreliable;  then  again  he  admits  that  ratiocination  has  as 
its  beginning  sense  perception  (dass  die  Vernunft-Erkennt- 
niss  zu  ihrem  Anfange  allerdinges  die  simliche  Erkenntniss 
habe)  ; but  finally  he  speaks  again  entirely  in  the  sense  of 
empiricism  when  he  asserts  emphatically,  that  the  mind  has 
not  so  definite  a conception  of  itself  as  of  objects.”  Erd- 
mann says  that  Wollaston  stands  on  the  threshold  which 
leads  to  a more  advanced  view  of  etliics  than  that  of  either 
Intuitionism  or  Hedonism  “which,  with  an  empirical  basis 
is  inevitable  (welche  bei  empirischer  Ginindlage  nicht 
ausbleiben  kann),  namely,  Eudfemonism.”  Erdmann  very 
properly  mentions  the  two  sides  of  WoUaston’s  epistemology, 
but  instead  of  saying  that  he  oscillates  from  empiricism  to 
rationalism,  I think  that  it  would  be  more  correct  to  say,^ 
that  he  endeavors  to  synthesize  the  two  and  to  show  that 
they  are  both  essential  to  knowledge.  In  his  other  work 
Erdmann  says  that  Wollaston  makes  the  essence  of  knowl- 
edge lie  in  reason,  and  at  the  same  time  believes  that  all 
knowledge  comes  through  the  senses.^®  I see  no  inconsistency 
in  such  a position,  for  it  is  just  the  belief  that  there  is  both 
a rational  and  an  empirical  factor  in  knowledge.®® 

“Erdmann,  Gesch.  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  pp.  119-120. 

Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Dell.,  pp.  45-6. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  FREEDOM 


Section  IV 

“OE  THE  OBLIGATIONS  OF  IMPERFECT  BEINGS  WITH  RESPECT  TO 
THEIR  POWER  OF  ACTING” 

In  this  section  Wollaston  meets  some  objections  as  to 
man’s  freedom:  “The  question  was  this,  If  a man  can  find 
out  truth,  may  he  not  want  the  power  of  acting  agreeably 
to  it?”  He  argues  at  length  and  in  a familiar  way  that  with- 
out freedom  there  can  be  no  moral  obligation;  “no  being  is 
capable  of  any  obligation  to  do  that,  which  it  has  not  power 
or  opportunity  to  do.”  Without  freedom  a person,  says 
Wollaston,  is  in  respect  to  anything  “a  being  utterly  unac- 
tive, no  agent  at  all,  and  therefore  as  to  that  act  nothing 
at  all.”  ^ Wollaston’s  position  in  this  section  is  practically 
the  same  as  in  his  introduction  to  the  section  on  the  true  and 
good,  namely,  that  freedom  is  the  precondition  of  morality. 
“The  imputations  of  moral  good  and  evil  to  beings  capable 
of  understanding  and  acting  must  be  in  proportion  to  their 
endeavor;  or,  their  obligations  reach,  as  far  as  their  en- 
deavors may.”  He,  in  effect,  says,  that,  we  cannot  say  ought 
except  where  we  can  say  can.  “They  who  are  capable  of 
discerning  truth”  and  of  “acting  conformably  to  it  are 
morally  obliged  to  do  it,  as  far  as  they  are  able;  or,  it  is 
the  duty  of  such  a being  sincerely  to  endeavor  to  practice 
reason ; not  to  contradict  any  truth,  by  word  or  deed ; and 
in  short,  to  treat  everything  as  being  what  it  is.”  ^ 

Wollaston  treats  the  question  rather  more  in  a practical 
than  in  a theoretical  way.  He  exhorts  rational  beings  to 
live  in  conformity  to  reason:  “This  is  the  sum  of  their  re- 

^ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  62  and  7. 

®Ibid.,  p.  63. 


219 


220 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


ligion,  from  which  no  exemption  or  excuse  lies.”  This  does 
not  mean,  of  course,  that  Wollaston  identified  religion  and 
ordinary  morality,  for  a life  in  conformity  to  truth  implies 
a life  in  conformity  to  all  truth,  divine  as  well  as  human. 
The  question  of  freedom  is  one  wliich  each  person  can  answer 
for  himself,  Wollaston  thinks,  by  trying  to  do  what  he 
thinks  he  ought  to  do.  “I  am  persuaded,  if  men  would  be 
serious,  and  put  forth  themselves,  they  would  find  by  experi- 
ence, that  their  wills  are  not  so  universally  and  peremp- 
torily determined  by  what  occurs,  nor  predestination  and  fate 
so  rigid  but  that  much  is  left  to  their  own  conduct.  Up 
and  try.”  ® Wollaston  says  that  “at  least  a man  can  for- 
bear to  do  that  which  contradicts  truth,  even  though  he 
may  not  be  able  always  to  avoid  contradictions  of  truths 
because  of  omissions.”  No  man,  he  says,  is  morally  obliged 
to  do  the  impossible,  and  “to  oblige  a man  to  do  what  he  is 
not  free  to  do  is  like  commanding  a man  to  do  something 
with  his  third  hand.”  ^ 

Perhaps  the  main  reason  why  Wollaston  said  so  little 
on  the  subject  of  freedom  was  the  fact  that  Clarke  had 
treated  the  subject  so  extensively  and  from  the  same  point 
of  view.  While  Clarke  emphasized  the  moral  argument,  to 
which  Wollaston  confined  himself  almost  exclusively,  he  also 
offered  other  arguments  of  a more  theoretical  nature.  He 
says  that  it  is  the  very  nature  of  man  to  be  free.  The  soul 
is  “a  permanent,  indivisible,  immaterial  substance,”  which 
has  certain  powers,  namely,  thinking,  feeling  and  willing. 
Will  is  the  power  of  the  soul  to  act,  and  volition  is  the  actual 
exercise  of  this  power.®  “Man  either  has  within  himself  a 
principle  of  action,  a self-moving  faculty,  or  he  has  not.” 
If  he  has  such  a principle  he  is  free,  if  otherwise,  he  is  not 
free  but  necessitated  by  causes  without  himself.  A free 
being  is  “one  that  is  endued  with  a power  of  acting,  as  well 
as  of  being  acted  upon.”  ® The  soul  of  man  is  such  a free 
being  and  so  every  man  “has  entirely  within  himself  a free 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  63-4. 

* Ibid.,  p.  62. 

“Clarke,  Letters  to  Dodel,  176  and  197. 

“Clarke,  Remarks,  p.  15. 


The  Problem  of  Freedom 


221 


principle  or  power  of  determining  his  own  action.”  ^ “ ’Tis 
the  man  that  freelj  determines  himself  to  act.”  ® The  soul 
has  both  passive  and  active  powers.  In  perception,  feeling 
and  judgment  the  mind  is  passive;  in  volition  the  mind  is 
active.  The  mind  cannot  avoid  giving  its  assent  to  reas^- 
able  demonstrations.  The  passive  states  of  the  soul  are 
necessary,  says  Clarke,  for  they  belong  to  the  great  system 
of  natural  causes  and  effects  which  follow  necessarily  from 
the  nature  of  things  and  the  laws  of  the  universe.®  It  was 
objected,  if  the  soul  passive  with  its  reasons,  motives  and 
judgments  be  but  a part  of  the  necessary  order  of  things, 
does  not  the  soul  active  belong  to  the  same  chain  of  causes 
and  effects.?  Clarke  says  not,  because  no  matter  what  the 
reasons,  feelings  and  motivej,  the  soul  has  the  power  of  act- 
ing from  within  itself.  “Nothing  that  is  passive  can  pos- 
sibly be  the  cause  of  anything  that  is  active.  Understand- 
ing, or  judgment,  or  assent,  or  approbation,  can  no  more 
possibly  be  the  efficient  cause  of  action  than  rest  can  be 
the  cause  of  motion.”  The  reason  or  motive,  says  Clarke,  is 
not  the  cause  but  only  the  occasion  of  action.^®  No  matter 
how  strong  the  motive  this  power  still  remains.  A man  can 
act  from  a strong  or  from  a weak  motive,  or  from  no  motive 
at  all,  or  he  may  act  even  contrary  to  the  very  strongest 
of  motives. There  can  be  no  moral  agency  without  free- 
dom, so  he  agrees  with  Wollaston  that  freedom  is  the  pre- 
condition of  morality.  His  statement  is  almost  verbally 
the  same  as  Wollaston’s ; whatever  acts  necessarily,  does 
not  indeed  act  at  all,  but  is  only  acted  upon.”  If  there 
be  no  freedom  there  is  no  such  thing  as  morality  in  human 
lives  but  only  an  irresponsible  succession  of  natural  phe- 
nomena destitute  of  all  moral  quality  whatsoever.  Wollas- 
ton says,  in  this  connection,  that  “that  which  has  not  the 
opportunity  or  liberty  of  choosing  for  itself,  and  acting 
accordingly,  from  an  internal  principle,  acts,  if  it  acts  at 

’Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  p.  121. 

* Clarke,  Remarks,  p.  11. 

° Leibniz  and  Clarke  Correspondence,  p.  289.  Letters,  p.  405. 

“Clarke,  Remarks,  pp.  9-11. 

“ Leibniz  and  Clarke,  pp.  121  and  413. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  413-4. 


^22 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston 


all,  under  a necessity  incumbent  ab  extra.  But  that,  which 
acts  thus,  is  in  reality  only  an  instrument  in  the  hand  of 
something  which  imposes  the  necessity;  and  cannot  prop- 
erly be  said  to  act,  but  to  be  acted  on.  ...  A being  under 
the  above-mentioned  inabilities  is,  as  to  the  morality  of  its 
acts,  in  the  state  of  inert  and  passive  matter,  and  can  be 
but  a machine  to  which  no  language  or  philosophy  ever  as- 
cribed more.” 

Erdmann  is  one  of  the  few  critics  of  Wollaston  who  give 
evidence  of  having  carefully  considered  this  section.  After 
saying  that  Wollaston  “oscillates”  in  his  epistemology  from 
empiricism  to  rationalism,  he  proceeds  to  say  that  “In  his 
view  of  the  practical  this  oscillation  does  not  show  itself, 
action  being  always  determined  by  the  nature  of  things  (im- 
mer  ist  dass  Handeln  durch  die  Beschaffenheit  der  Dinge 
bestimmit).”  He  says  that  Wollaston  next  grapples  with 
the  question  as  to  whether  a man  is  free  to  act  according 
to  the  nature  of  things  after  he  has  attained  an /understand- 
ing of  them,  j Erdmann  says  that  Wollaston  “recognizes 
that  without  this  ability  man  can  be  under  no  moral  obli- 
gation,” but  he  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  Wollaston 
gave  only  empirical  argument.  Erdmann  is  of  the  opinion 
that  this  practical  belief  in  freedom  is  no  proof  of  its  truth. 
“The  inclinations  determine  man  and  by  letting  himself  be 
determined  by  them  he  acts  well,”  this  is  what  Erdmann  be- 
lieves to  be  the  conclusion  to  which  Wollaston’s  idea  of  treat- 
ing everything  as  what  it  is  really  comes.  He  says  that  “such 
autonomy  as  is  due  a person  when  it  has  to  realize  an  ideal 
set  up  by  himself  . . . Wollaston  has  not  granted  him.” 
Erdmann  thinks  that  “the  good  act  has  not  been  fully  de- 
fined” by  Wollaston;  that  “much  is  still  left  to  the  spon- 
taneity of  the  subject.  The  decision,  namely,  to  act  or  not 
to  act  according  to  the  nature  of  things, — only  that  deci- 
sion remains  to  him,  the  question  of  what  to  do  is  decided 
by  nature.”  Erdmann  seems  to  think  that  by  bringing  in 
the  wish  for  happiness  and  by  identifying  truth  and  happi- 
ness Wollaston  really  rules  out  freedom  as  a factor  in  the 
moral  life,  because  one’s  inclination  really  determines  one 
“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  7. 


The  Problem  of  Freedom 


223 


toward  a true  and  a happy  life.  The  only  freedom  remain- 
ing to  man  is  the  freedom  to  act  or  not  to  act  according  to 
the  nature  of  things.  There  is  no  freedom  as  to  the  con- 
tent of  morality,  for  that  is  decided  by  nature.^^ 

Burnet  tries  to  convict  Wollaston  of  determinism  for  a 
reason  very  similar  to  that  of  Erdmann’s.  He  says  that 
Wollaston  took  the  position  that  the  desire  of  public  happi- 
ness is  a reasonable  ethical  end  because  it  is  best  that  all 
should  be  happy.  That  it  is  best  that  all  should  be  happy 
is  necessarily  perceivable  by  all  rational  natures.  But  if 
men  are  so  constituted  by  nature,  asks  Burnet,  would  that 
not  mean  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  morality.^®  Burnet’s 
criticism  fails  to  consider  the  great  difference  between 
things  being  necessarily  perceivable,  a merely  intellectual 
matter,  and  morality,  which  is  a practical  matter.  Wollaston 
does  not  say  that  one  must  act  conformably  to  one’s  intel- 
lectual judgments. 

Irons  endeavors  to  show  Wollaston  to  be  a determinist 
in  connection  with  his  exposition  of  the  passage:  “Design- 
edly to  treat  things  as  being  what  they  are  not  is  the  greatest 
possible  absurdity.  It  is  to  put  bitter  for  sweet,  darkness 
for  light,  crooked  for  straight,  etc.  It  is  to  subvert  all 
science,  to  renounce  all  sense  of  truth,  and  flatly  to  deny 
the  existence.  For  nothing  can  be  true,  nothing  does  exist, 
if  things  are  not  what  they  are.”  Irons  says  that : “In 
these  circumstances  it  is  somewhat  comforting  to  learn  that 
it  is  not  in  one’s  power  deliberately  to  resolve  ^not  to  be 
governed  by  reason,  for  if  a person  could  do  this  he  must 
either  have  some  reason  for  making  that  resolution  or  none. 
If  he  has  none  it  is  a resolution  that  stands  upon  no  founda- 
tion; and  if  he  has  some  reason  for  it  he  is  governed  by 
reason.  This  demonstrates  that  reason  must  govern.” 
Irons  draws  a conclusion  that  Wollaston  guards  against, 
namely,  that  the  will  is  as  eqpally  determined  as  the  intel- 
lect. We  give  our  assent  to  demonstrated  truth,  says  Wol- 

“ Erdmann,  Geschichte  der  neuen  Phil.,  vol.  II,  pp.  130-33. 

“Gilbert  Burnet,  Art.  in  London  Journal,  p.  214. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  15. 

“ Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Review,  vol.  12,  p.  138. 


224 


The  Ethics  of  WUliam  WoUasfon 


laston,  because  as  rational  beings  we  cannot  possibly  do 
otherwise.  There  is  no  choice  in  matters  of  this  kind,  for 
an  intellectual  being  cannot  possibly  believe  anytliing  which 
he  perceives  to  be  self-contradictory.^®  Wollaston  does  not 
argue  from  this  that  moral  actions  are  equally  determined, 
but  insists  that  man  is  free  to  act  or  not  to  act  conform- 
ably with  truth  and  the  nature  of  things.  Irons,  though, 
argues  that:  “If  right  action  and  correct  thinking  stand  on 
the  same  basis,  it  is  clear  that  a wrong  action  is  an  utter 
impossibility.”  Yes,  of  course,  but  Wollaston  is  very  care- 
ful to  state  that  they  do  not  stand  on  the  same  basis.  He 
says  that  morality  is  as  true  as  an  intellectually  true  propo- 
sition, and  that  immorality  is  as  false  as  an  intellectually 
false  proposition ; but  he  does  not  place  them  on  the  same 
foundation  because  the  one  kind  of  relation  belongs  to  the 
realm  of  determinism,  the  other  to  the  realm  of  freedom.^® 
Clarke  has  a very  clear  statement  of  this  difference : “Assent 
to  a plain  speculative  truth  is  not  in  a man’s  power  to  with- 
hold; but  to  act  according  to  the  plain  right  and  reason 
of  things,  this  he  may,  by  the  natural  liberty  of  his  will 
forbear.”  But  Irons,  after  considering  this  passage,  still 
insists  that  freedom  cannot  explain  why  the  impossible  is 
actual.  His  argument  is  as  follows : to  do  wrong  is  the 
same  as  to  believe  the  self-contradictory,  which  cannot  be 
done.  Consequently  to  do  wrong  is  impossible,  and  not 
even  the  freedom  of  the  will  can  explain  it.  Wollaston, 
in  truth,  says  that  to  do  wrong  is  to  act  in  a self-contradic- 
tory way;  that  immorality  is  as  absurd  and  inconsistent  as 
the  denial  of  self-evident  truth.  Irons  proceeds  to  show  that 
morality  is  impossible  from  this  point  of  view,  because  “if 
reason  is  the  motive  power  which  lies  behind  right  conduct, 
the  individual  who  obeys  the  moral  law  acts  under  the  com- 
pulsion of  his  rational  nature.  There  is  then  no  difference 
between  moral  obligation  and  rational  necessity.  An  action 
is  not  moral,  however,  if  it  is  performed  under  compulsion 
of  any  kind.  Consequently,  if  the  rationalistic  view  of  con- 

“ Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  9. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  7 and  62. 

* Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  pp.  64-5. 


The  Problem  of  Freedom 


225 


duct  be  adopted,  right  action  can  have  no  moral  value  or 
significance,”  Wollaston,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  in- 
sists that  compulsion  belongs  only  to  existential  judgments, 
to  the  reaction  of  the  intellect  to  matters  of  fact,  not  to 
moral  actions.  Intellectual  beings  must  assent  to  the  truth’ 
of  the  proposition  A is  A,  but  a moral  being  may  act  as  if. 
A were  not  A.^^ 

Wollaston’s  rationalistic  theory  of  morals,  Leslie  Ste- 
phen thinks  to  be  but  an  application  to  ethical  specu- 
lation of  the  Cartesian  metaphysics.  According  to  this 
metaphysics,  says  Stephen,  the  nature  of  everything  is  as 
God  has  constituted  it,  consequently  there  can  be  nothing 
really  independent  or  external  to  God.  Wollaston’s  ethics, 
it  is  contended,  really  leads  to  the  .spiritual  determinism  of 
Spinoza  and  Calvin.  God  is  the  first  and  the  sustaining 
cause  of  all  things.  Since  “He  moves  the  stars  and  directs 
the  course  of  a bubble,”  all  natures  and  relations  are  de- 
termined ; the  moral  as  the  physical  laws  belong  to  the  nature 
of  things  as  He  has  constituted  them,^®  It  might  be  an- 
swered that  if  law  means  the  same  thing  when  we  speak  of 
moral  as  when  we  speak  of  natural  laws,  there  can  be  no 
such  thing  as  morality  because,  on  that  assumption,  we 
would  be  forced  to  admit  that  whatever  is  is  right,  and 
that  morality  is  mere  conformity  to  nature.  Wollaston  does 
not  identify  the  natural  and  the  moral,  but  differentiates  the 
one  from  the  other  on  the  ground  that  intellectual  relations 
are  determined,  while  moral  relations  are  free.^^  It  is  true 
that  Wollaston  says  that  morality  is  like  truth  in  one  re- 
spect, namely,  that  coherency  is  the  norm  for  both.  He 
says  that  both  immorality  and  self-contradictory  intellec- 
tual propositions  are  absurd,  but  there  is  this  difference 
between  them,  the  one  is  possible,  the  other  impossible.^^ 
While  assent  is  necessitated,  it  is  also  true  that  the  doc- 
trine of  necessity  assails  the  truthworthiness  of  knowledge. 
This  is  true,  because  in  a world  where  all  is  necessitated  one 

® Irons,  Rationalism  in  Modern  Ethics,  Phil.  Review.,  vol.  12,  p.  142. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  8. 

“ Leslie  Stephen,  Eng.  Thought  in  the  18th  Cen.,  vol.  2,  pp.  4-5. 

” Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  8,  42  and  63. 

“ Ibid.,  Sec.  I,  Prop.  II  and  III. 


226 


The  Ethics  of  WUliam  Wollaston 


event  is  just  as  conformable  to  the  nature  of  things  as  an- 
other. Only  in  a system  which  includes  freedom  is  there  any 
tenable  ground  for  the  distinction  between  truth  and  error. 
This  is  true  because  knowledge  presupposes  a unitary  psy- 
chical agent  capable  of  acting  and  not  only  of  being  acted 
upon,  for  whatever  may  come  from  without  there  is  knowl- 
edge only  as  the  mind  reacts  upon  this  sense  data.  The  ac- 
tivity of  the  mind  is  involved  in  the  relating  of  the  sense 
impressions.  There  can  be  no  knowledge  without  this  relat- 
ing activity  and  only  a free  unitary  psychical  agent  could 
be  conscious  of  identity  in  the  midst  of  change.^® 

In  his  section  relating  to  the  Deity,  Wollaston  under- 
takes the  reconciliation  of  human  freedom  and  divine  provi- 
dence. “It  is  not  impossible,”  he  says,  “that  men,  whose 
natures  and  actions  ar.e  foreknown,  may  be  introduced  into 
the  world  in  such  times,  places  and  other  circumstances,  as 
their  acts  and  behavior  may  not  only  coincide  with  the  gen- 
eral plan  of  things,  but  also  answers  many  private  cases 
too.”  He  thinks  that  there  may  well  be  in  the  Divine  mind 
something  like  a projection  of  the  future  history  of  man- 
kind and  also  a Divine  guidance  of  men  and  at  the  same 
time  men  be  left  to  live  their  lives  in  freedom. He  insists 
that  whatever  Divine  plans  there  may  be  for  the  world  and 
for  humanity,  and  he  has  a teleological  conception  of  things, 
must  be  ultimately  reconcilable  with  human  freedom. 

A significant  thing  in  Wollaston’s  ethics  is  that  he  clearly 
realizes  that  morality  gets  its  meaning  from  the  relation  of 
each  thing  to  every  other  in  the  universe.  Morality,  for 
him,  has  its  warrant  and  justification  in  the  ultimate  mean- 
ing of  reality  and  every  moral  act  has  a significance  for 
the  whole  of  reality.  If  this  be  his  metaphysics  of  morals 
then  we  can  expect  it  to  become  involved  in  all  the  diflBculties 
connected  with  every  idealistic  view  of  the  world,  particu- 
larly the  difficulties  connected  with  the  relation  of  the  one 
and  the  many.  In  a theistic  view  of  the  world,  like  that  of 
Wollaston,  morality  must  be  identified  with  the  realization 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  45.6  and  7.  Clarke,  Nat.  Reli., 
121,  and  Remarks,  p.  15. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  104-5. 


The  Problem  of  Freedom 


227 


of  the  supreme  spiritual  principle.  The  universe  cannot  be 
thought  of  as  planless  and  purposeless  but  if  we  say  that 
there  is  an  all-comprehending  divine  plan,  a cosmic  pur- 
pose running  through  everything,  what  is  left  of  the  idea 
of  freedom  and  individuality?  The  individual’s  moral  life 
as  a whole  is  apparently  but  a part  of  the  supreme  purpose 
of  the  universe,  and  each  moral  act  but  a part  of  the  divine 
plan.  To  be  sure  each  moral  act,  on  this  assumption,  has 
a supreme  worth;  but  the  question  Wollaston  is  concerned 
with  is  this : is  there  any  morality  attaching  to  acts  when 
the  moral  life  is  regarded  as  but  a part  of  the  consum- 
mation of  a divine  plan.  Ethical  idealism  must  identify  the 
moral  life  with  the  realization  of  the  supreme  spiritual  prin- 
ciple; but  this  does  not  mean,  Wollaston  seems  to  think, 
that  we  are  to  treat  the^contribution  of  the  moral  individual 
towards  the  fulfillment  of  the  supreme  purpose  as  merely  an 
expression,  through  him,  of  that  principle.  Wollaston  thinks 
that  there  is  a supreme  principle  and  a general  plan  of 
things  but  that  men  are  “left  to  live  their  lives  in  freedom.” 
I think  that  Schiller’s  words: 

“Nehmt  die  Gotter  auf  in  euren  Willen” 

well  expresses  Wollaston’s  position.  Wollaston  and  Clarke 
both  reacted  rather  strongly  from  the  spiritual  determinism 
of  Calvin  and  Leibniz  and  yet  they  clearly  saw  that  there 
must  be  a spiritual  principle  in  the  universe. 

In  every  moral  act  there  is  a divine  and  a human  aspect. 
The  first  relates  it  to  the  supreme  purpose  of  the  universe, 
while  the  second  gives  it  its  individual  character.  Wollaston 
seeks  to  find  the  truth  in  both,  but  does  not  quite  effect  a 
reconciliation  except  by  faith.  If  the  absolute  identifica- 
tion of  the  finite  wills  with  the  infinite  is  denied,  how  can 
we  believe  that  the  supreme  purpose  will  be  realized,  since 
its  realization  is  dependent  upon  the  success  or  failure  of 
finite  wills?  We  can  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  if  freedom 
is  true,  defeat  the  divine  purpose,  for  it  is  contingent  upon 
our  co-operation.  There  have  been  two  ways  of  solving  this 
difficulty  of  the  finite  and  the  divine  will.  Some  seem  to 
think  that  the  finite  moral  life  is  but  a medium  through  which 


228 


The  Ethics  of  William  Wollaston. 


the  divine  purpose  realizes  itself.  So  conceived,  the  indi- 
vidual is  just  an  instrument,  a mere  manifestation  of  the 
absolute,  differing  from  the  manifestations  in  nature  only 
in  self-onsciousness.  Freedom,  in  this  sense,  consists  in 
doing  what  the  divine  requires  of  us  and  in  acquiescence  in 
the  divine  plan.  The  supreme  principle  cannot  fail  to  real- 
ize its  purpose  in  the  world  no  matter  what  part  the  finite 
being  plays  or  falls  to  play.  The  other  extreme  view  is 
that  of  the  freedom  of  indifference.  Wollaston  seems  to 
have  believed  that  there  is  a general  plan  for  the  world  and 
that  our  duty  consists  in  conforming  our  lives  to  this  plan. 
He  did  not,  I think,  believe  that  creatures  are  necessary 
beings,  but  only  that  the  way  to  self-realization  is  through 
free  conformity  to  the  divine  plans. 

The  objective  method  of  ethics  makes  some  very  clear 
implications  as  to  the  relations  of  the  divine  and  the  human 
will,  for  if  our  criterion  be  that  everything  is  to  be  treated 
according  to  its  nature,  then  it  follows  necessarily  that 
morality  consists  in  living  conformably  to  God’s  plans. 
Wollaston  says  that  “the  owning  of  things,  in  all  our  con- 
duct, to  be  as  they  are,  is  direct  obedience  ...  to  Him,  who 
is  the  Author  of  Nature:”  Clarke  says  that  the  will  of 
God  always  determines  itself  to  act  according  to  the  eternal 
reason  of  things,  and  that  all  rational  creatures  are  obliged, 
if  they  would  be  rational  and  moral,  to  govern  themselves  in 
all  their  actions  by  the  same  eternal  rules  of  reason  that 
govern  God.  That  this  is  not  determinism  but  moral  free- 
dom is  very  evident  from  this  quotation:  “The  same  reason 
of  things,  with  regard  to  which  the  will  of  God  always  and 
necessarily  does  determine  itself  to  act  in  constant  con- 
formity to  the  eternal  rules  of  justice,  equity,  goodness  and 
truth ; ought  also  constantly  to  determine  the  wills  of  all 
subordinate  rational  things,  to  govern  all  their  actions  by 
the  same  rules.  It  is  very  unreasonable  and  blameworthy 
in  practice,  that  any  intelligent  creature  endued  with  reason 
and  will,  capable  of  distinguishing  good  from  evil  and  of 

**  Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  7 and  164-5.  Baillie,  in  Hastings 
Ency.  of  Reli.  and  Ethics,  vol.  V,  p.  410. 

“Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  14. 


The  Problem  of  Freedom 


229 


choosing  the  one  and  refusing  the  other,  should  wilfully  and 
perversely  choose  to  act  contrary  to  reason  and  nature,’^ 
The  moral  words  “ought,”  “should”  and  “choose”  all  occur 
in  this  brief  passage.  And  these  words  are  found  just  as 
frequently  in  Wollaston’s  work.  “By  religion,”  he  says, 
“I  mean  nothing  else  but  an  obligation  to  do  what  ought  not 
to  be  omitted,  and  to  forbear  what  ought  not  to  be  done.” 
This  means,  according  to  Wollaston,  “That  every  intelli- 
gent, active  and  free  being  should  so  behave  himself,  as  by 
no  act  to  contradict  truth;  or,  that  he  should  treat  every- 
thing as  being  what  it  is.” 

* Clarke,  Nat.  Reli.,  pp.  186-7. 

“"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  24. 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EVIL  AND  IMMORTALITY 


Section  V 


“truths  relating  to  the  deity” 

This  is  a long,  interesting  section  but  only  a small  part 
of  it  is  of  any  particular  interest  to  us.  His  discussion  of 
the  problems  of  evil  and  immortality  is  all  that  bears  on 
our  question.  He  takes  up  the  problem  of  evil  by  saying 
that  the  conception  of  the  Deity  as  unitary  precludes  the 
existence  of  an  independent  principle  of  evil.  As  to  moral 
good  and  evil,  “they  seem,”  he  says,  “to  depend  upon  our- 
selves. If  we  do  but  endeavor,  the  most  we  can,  to  do  what 
we  ought,  we  shall  not  be  guilty  of  not  doing  it ; and  there- 
fore it  is  not  our  fault,  and  not  to  be  charged  upon  any 
other  being,  if  guilt  and  evil  be  introduced  by  our  neglect, 
or  abuse  of  our  liberty.”  ^ His  solution  of  the  problem  of 
moral  evil  is  rather  more  practical  than  theoretical.  As  to 
physical  evil  he  suggests  as  an  explanation  our  finitude  or 
narrow  point  of  view.  “Some  things  seem  to  be  evil,  which 
would  not  appear  to  be  such,  if  we  could  see  through  the 
whole  contexture  of  things.”  And  if  there  is  a future  state, 
that  which  seems  to  be  evil  now  may  be  rectified  or  rather 
shown  to  be  good  from  the  point  of  view  of  eternity.  To 
ask  why  God  penuits  evil,  he  says,  is  the  same  as  asking 
why  God  created  a material  world  inhabited  by  imperfect 
beings.^  “If  the  virtuous  man  has  undergone  more  in  this 
life,  than  it  would  be  reasonable  he  should  suffer,  if  there 
was  no  other;  yet  those  sufferings  may  not  be  unreasonable, 
if  there  is  another.  For  they  may  be  made  up  to  him  by 
such  enjoyments,  as  it  would  be  reasonable  for  him  to 

'Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  73. 

“ Ibid.,  pp.  73-6. 


230 


231 


The  Problems  of  Evil  and  Immortality 

prefer,  even  with  those  present  mortifications,  before  the 
pleasures  of  this  life  with  the  loss  of  them.  Sometimes  the 
only  way  to  the  felicities  of  a better  state  may  lie  through 
dark  and  difficult  passes,  discipline  to  some  men  being  neces- 
sary, to  bring  them  to  reflect,  and  to  force  them  into  such 
methods  as  may  produce  in  them  proper  improvements ; 
such,  as  otheiTvise  and  of  themselves  they  would  never  have 
fallen  into.  On  the  other  side,  if  vicious  and  wicked  men 
do  prosper  and  make  a figure, — yet  it  is  possible  their  suf- 
ferings hereafter  may  be  such,  as  that  the  excess  of  them 
above  their  past  enjoyments  may  be  equal  to  the  just  pay- 
ment of  their  villainies  and  wickedness.”  ® This  Wollaston 
thinks  argues  for  the  necessity  of  the  future  state,  “if  good 
and  bad  men  are  not  respectively  treated  according  to  rea- 
son in  this  life,  they  may  be  yet  so  treated,  if  this  and  an- 
other to  follow  be  taken  together  into  account.^ 

The  assumption  back  of  all  the  thinking  of  Wollaston 
is  that  the  universe  in  which  we  live  is  inlierently  rational 
and  coherent.  He  thinks  that  this  is  the  necessary  implica- 
tion of  all  thinking.  An  objective  system  of  ethics  is  of 
course  built  upon  this  assumption.  “The  foundation  of  re- 
ligion lies  in  that  difference  between  the  acts  of  men,  which 
distinguishes  them  into  good,  evil,  indifferent.”  ® These  dis- 
tinctions lie  in  the  nature  of  things  and  so  morality  con- 
sists in  the  “owning  of  things,  in  all  our  conduct,  to  be  as 
they  are.”  ® Wollaston  believes  in  immortality  on  the  ground 
that  “there  must  be  a future  life  where  proper  amends  may 
be  made,”  where  the  wrongs  of  this  world  may  be  made  right. 
This  belief  in  immortality,  thinking  could  demand  only  if 
the  world  is  thought  to  be  ultimately  consistent  and  ra- 
tional. If  this  life  be  all,  Wollaston  says,  “the  general  and 
usual  state  of  mankind  is  scarce  consistent  with  the  idea 
of  a reasonable  cause.”  He  thinks  that  one  could  not' 
believe  in  a Supreme  Being,  at  least  in  one  who  is  rational, 
without  believing  in  the  hereafter,  because  it  would  be  inher- 

® Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  p.  113. 

■*  Ibid.,  p.  114. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  7. 

“ Ibid.,  p.  14. 

’ Ibid.,  p.  205. 


232  The  Ethics  of  William  Wollasto<n 

ently  irrational  for  the  good  to  suffer  as  they  frequently 
do  in  this  life  if  there  were  no  after  life  of  blessedness.  But 
how  can  we  be  sure  that  God  will  reward  virtue  in  the  next 
world  more  liberally  than  in  this?  In  trying  to  answer  this 
question,  he  says,  he  “begins  to  be  very  sensible  how  much 
he  wants  a guide.”  He  is  not  able  to  fall  back  on  revela- 
tion for  “a  guide”  but  still  he  feels  sure  that  all  is  well.  His 
ground  for  this  faith  is  that  there  must  be  “a  reasonable 
cause”  to  explain  it  all.® 

"Wollaston,  Reli.  of  Nat.  Deli.,  pp.  113-4  and  011. 


INDEX 


Albee,  quoted,  175. 

Aliotta,  quoted,  110. 

Analogy,  method  of,  in  Ethics, 
35-51,  78-84,  56,  98,  106,  109, 
126,  138,  144,  148,  152,  200,  224. 

Aristotle,  quoted,  110. 

Baillie,  referred  to,  228. 

Balguy,  quoted,  100. 

Bentham,  quoted,  173;  referred  to, 

184. 

Blakey,  quoted,  33,  83,  145,  153, 
204,  216. 

Bott,  quoted,  62,  73,  96,  180. 

Bradley,  referred  to,  176. 

Brown,  quoted,  118,  144,  174. 

Butler,  Bishop,  quoted,  167;  re- 
ferred to,  184,  191. 

Calvin,  referred  to,  25,  225,  227. 

Carneri,  quoted,  169. 

Catherein,  quoted,  94. 

Clarke,  John,  41,  50,  72,  95,  116, 
119,  137,  157,  182. 

Clarke,  Samuel,  influence  on  Wol- 
laston, 25-31,  72,  105,  219; 
quoted,  55,  79,  200,  220,  228; 
referr^  to,  84,  87,  105,  108,  133, 
139,  159,  176,  186,  206. 

“Conformity  to  Nature,”  as  moral 
formula,  14,  25,  90,  135,  184,  198. 

Conscience,  See  Intuitionism ; Wol- 
laston’s notion  of,  57,  59,  132, 
145,  211. 

Consequences,  place  of  in  motiva- 
tion, 29,  49,  129,  151,  169,  172, 
177,  179,  183,  195,  197,  200. 

Consistency,  as  the  moral  criterion, 
33-115,  122,  138,  141,  147,  156, 
164,  180,  189,  191,  193,  196,  205, 
220. 

Conybeare,  referred  to,  4,  108. 

Cudworth,  influence  on  Wollaston, 
19,  191,  215. 


Cumberland,  influence  on  Wollas- 
ton, 22. 

Deism,  relation  of  Wollaston  to, 
13,  31. 

Descartes,  referred  to,  19,  142,  205, 
225. 

Dewey,  quoted,  16. 

Drechsler,  referred  to,  4. 

Empiricism,  16,  21,  24,  93,  139,  151, 
209,  216,  222. 

Enlightenment,  relation  of  Wol- 
laston to,  13. 

Epicureanism,  167,  172. 

Epistemology,  208-218,  16,  19,  69, 
133,  139,  192,  206. 

Erdmann,  quoted,  24,  26,  32,  59, 
87,  90,  108,  187,  190,  216,  222. 

Eudaemonism  22,  29,  129,  188,  218. 

Evil,  problem  of,  230-32,  31,  33,  46. 

Existential  judgments.  See  Truth; 
relation  of  to  Valuational  judg- 
ments, 35-59,  71,  78,  85,  89,  105, 
113,  120,  140,  161,  225. 

Experience,  20,  34,  59,  69,  125,  133, 
138,  140,  192,  208,  211,  216. 

Falckenberg,  quoted,  27,  88,  131, 
185. 

Feeling,  as  a moral  criterion,  14, 
24,  128,  135,  137,  152,  159,  179; 
place  of  in  motivation,  57,  73, 
151,  154,  156,  169,  179,  188,  194, 
197. 

Fite,  quoted,  196. 

“Fitness  of  Things,”  as  moral  cri- 
terion, 26,  29,  45,  57,  71,  80,  106, 
110,  135,  138,  149,  169. 

Freedom,  necessity  of,  for  morals, 
32-5,  219-229,  17,  26,  29,  39,  45, 
47,  53,  55,  61,  80,  83,  86,  88,  97, 
102,  107,  110,  113,  118,  124,  126, 
142,  151,  154,  158,  205,  214. 


233 


234 


Index 


Garve,  quoted,  4,  39,  87,  108,  130, 
143. 

Gass,  quoted,  93,  170. 

Gay,  quoted,  149. 

God,  His  laws  natural  and  the  cri- 
terion of  morals,  32-76,  14,  21, 
23,  28,  31,  132,  142,  149,  164,  186, 
206,  211,  216,  228,  231. 

Goodness,  nature  of,  35-92,  23,  98, 
104,  108,  118,  124,  142;  relation 
to  truth,  33-115,  118,  136,  146, 
164,  172,  177,  187,  200,  209. 

Gross,  quoted,  38. 

Grote,  quoted,  84. 

Grotius,  influence  on  Wollaston. 
18. 


Hall,  quoted,  98,  185. 

Happiness,  significance  of,  for 
morals,  162-199,  17,  23,  28,  58, 
62,  128,  138,  144,  145,  151;  rela- 
tion of,  to  truth,  184-197. 

Hedonism,  162-197,  16,  18,  22,  27, 
62,  85,  128,  132, 138, 144,  150,  215. 

Hobbes,  influence  on  Wollaston,  18, 
25,  79. 

Humanity.  See  Personality. 

Hume,  quoted,  124,  130,  139,  151; 
referred  to,  134,  178. 

Hursts,  quoted,  163,  172. 

Hutcheson,  quoted,  117,  154. 

Idealism,  metaphysical,  relation  of 
Wollaston’s  ethics  to,  204-7,  16, 
66,  83,  85,  91,  102,  108,  117,  123, 
132,  136,  140,  145,  161,  165,  173, 
185,  226. 

Identity,  logical  law  of,  as  the 
moral  law,  17,  21,  24,  29,  31,  45, 
56,  71,  79,  82,  85,  89,  95,  99,  103, 
107,  110,  119,  126,  131,  169,  177, 
225. 

Immortality,  230-2,  31,  170,  185, 
207. 

Innate  ideas,  of  morality,  21,  23, 
90,  94,  135,  145,  187,  210,  216. 

Intellectual  and  moral,  differentia 
of,  37,  42,  46,  49,  63,  71. 

Intellectualism,  14,  19,  24,  35,  70, 
84,  126,  134,  138,  162,  168,  173, 
178,  194. 

Intelligence,  necessity  of,  for 
moral  responsibility,  33,  37,  39, 


47,  61,  83,  154,  158,  205,  214, 
216  229. 

Intention,  45,  47,  49,  96,  119,  129, 
157. 

Intuitionalism,  15,  19,  70,  133,  210, 
216. 

Intuitionism,  15,  19,  24,  29,  34,  66, 
69,  81,  86,  90,  92,  110,  125,  130, 
132,  137,  144,  155,  168,  192,  210, 
216,  218. 

Irons,  quoted,  112,  123,  158,  223. 

Janet,  quoted,  102,  116,  141. 

Jodi,  quoted,  134. 

Jouffroy,  quoted,  101,  120,  127. 

Karnes,  quoted,  134. 

Kant,  referred  to,  4,  15,  34,  66, 
114,  142,  190,  196,  199,  207. 

La  Rossignol,  quoted,  105,  173. 

Leibniz,  referred  to,  221,  227. 

Locke,  influence  on  Wollaston,  16, 
21,  210;  quoted,  24,  90,  212. 

Logic,  relation  of,  to  Ethics,  95- 
ll4,  21,  30,  51,  56,  81,  85,  125, 
131. 

Lowman,  quoted,  27. 

Mackintosh,  quoted,  81,  118. 

Martineau,  quoted,  110,  116,  139. 

Maurice,  quoted,  214. 

Metaphysics,  Wollaston’s  view  of, 
204-07,  226-32;  relation  to 

Ethics,  17,  83,  91,  102,  108,  117, 
123,  136,  139,  140,  161,  165,  185, 
204  209. 

Moral  Sense,  69,  117,  125,  135,  145, 
152,  155,  158. 

Morell,  referred  to,  205. 

Nature  of  Things,  as  the  moral 
criterion,  33-115,  14,  17,  22,  29, 
127,  131,  135,  140,  146,  159,  167, 
170,  177,  180,  186,  195,  202,  206, 
209,  217. 

Newton,  influence  on  Wollaston, 
19;  referred  to,  4,  90,  108. 

Noack,  quoted,  170,  214. 

Norden,  quoted,  134. 

Objective  method  in  Ethics,  85-94, 
21,  26,  33,  47,  71,  129,  131,  135, 
162,  168,  187,  193,  215,  231. 


Index 


Objectivity,  of  the  good,  34-115 
20,  24,  27,  125,  129,  139,  147,  159, 
163,  169,  172,  178,  188,  206,  209, 
216. 

Ought,  and  is,  130-146,  26,  36,  51, 
56,  63,  85,  108,  120,  127,  152,  160, 
224. 

Overton,  quoted,  203. 

Perry,  referred  to,  204. 

Personality,  significance  of,  for 
morals,  45,  47,  64,  73,  75,  77,  82, 
87,  97,  115,  119,  121,  129,  139, 
142,  148,  152,  163,  167,  174,  177, 
180,  190,  195,  197. 

Plato,  moral  system  of,  71,  84, 
191. 

Price,  referred  to,  81,  99,  146. 

Rashdall,  quoted,  159. 

Rationalism,  184-197,  16,  19,  22, 
30,  70,  87,  93,  112,  117,  133,  140, 
158,  162,  169,  186,  192,  206,  209, 
222. 

Reason,  as  moral  faculty,  184-97, 
T5,  154,  209,  219;  competence  of, 
in  the  realm  of  Ethics,  33-115, 
13,  20,  25,  30,  122,  131,  139,  148, 
152,  166,  211,  223;  impotence  of, 
151,  154,  158. 

Religion,  Natural,  32-76,  129-142, 
20,  29,  80,  87,  90,  102,  108,  117, 
161,  171,  180,  189,  206,  212,  219, 
228. 

Revelational  Theology,  ethics  of, 
13,  17,  24,  29,  132,  149. 

Right  and  wrong,  differentia  of, 
32,  37,  56,  68,  71,  127. 

Rogers,  referred  to,  19,  138. 

Schmidt,  quoted,  92. 

Selby-Bigge,  quoted,  13,  31,  79,  115, 
138,  177,  200,  204. 


235 

Sensational  School  of  Morals,  14, 
24,  135. 

Seth,  referred  to,  86,  193. 

Shaftesbury,  referred  to,  191. 

Sidgwick,  quoted,  79,  176,  178,  184. 

Simmel,  referred  to,  114,  159. 

Smale,  quoted,  215. 

Spinoza,  referred  to,  225. 

Stephen,  L.,  quoted,  3,  14,  19,  55, 
108,  110,  132,  155,  177,  225. 

Stewart,  quoted,  90,  212. 

Truth,  nature  of,  208-19,  33-35, 
26,  43,  52,  53,  71,  80,  85,  82,  98, 
119,  142,  168;  criterion  of  mor- 
als, 33-115,  130-46,  28,  124,  178, 
181,  202,  209;  relation  to  happi- 
ness, 184-197,  28,  65,  149,  162, 
164,  171,  177,  180,  202,  215. 

Truthfulness,  necessity  of,  51,  75, 
183,  190;  necessary  exceptions, 
75,  168,  190. 

Ueberweg,  quoted,  36. 

Utilitarianism,  176-83,  28,  198. 

Value,  judgments  of,  26,  36,  53, 
58,  85,  108,  120,  127,  139,  160. 

Von  Gizycki,  quoted,  134. 

Von  Hartmann,  quoted,  87,  91, 
116,  130. 

Vorlander,  quoted,  28,  87,  98,  190. 

Warburton,  referred  to,  182. 

Warlaw,  referred  to,  31,  118. 

Welfare,  22,  29,  65,  129,  176,  180, 
186,  191,  198,  201. 

Will,  significance  of,  for  morality. 
See  Freedom. 

Williams,  quoted,  81,  214. 

Windelband,  quoted,  83,  108,  169. 

Wright,  quoted,  194. 

Wundt,  quoted,  25,  90,  99,  126,  212. 


A993 


192.9 


W863ZT 


607750 


